Woodruff

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JOHN WOODRUFF,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:23-cv-1155-CLM-NAD

LUIGI RAGAZZONNI, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The magistrate judge has entered a report, recommending that under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e) and 1915A, the court dismiss without prejudice all of Plaintiff

John Woodruff’s claims except his Fourth Amendment wrongful search and

seizure claims against Defendants Luigi Ragazzoni and David Pressley

(Counts I and III). (Doc. 18). The magistrate judge recommended that the court

refer these Fourth Amendment claims to him for further proceedings. (See id.,

p. 21). Woodruff objects to the Report and Recommendation. (See Doc. 20).

BACKGROUND

1. Statement of the alleged facts: On August 27, 2021, Woodruff learned

that Shelby County had issued a warrant for his arrest based on alleged

violations of his probation for failure to register a vehicle in compliance with

the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act. (Doc.

9, p. 2; Doc. 18, p. 4, n.1). That evening, Woodruff drove to his fitness club

where Pelham police officers directed him to exit his vehicle. (Doc. 9, p. 3). The

Pelham officers handcuffed Woodruff, but they informed him that they only

were holding him until Shelby County officers arrived. (Id.). Ragazzoni, a

Shelby County deputy, then arrived and took custody of Woodruff. (Id.).

Woodruff told Ragazzoni that his “vehicle was not to be towed as it was lawfully

parked upon private commercial property.” (Id., p. 4). But Ragazzoni “rifle[d]

through [Woodruff’s] truck” and then had it towed. (Id.).

Around three days later, Woodruff bonded out of the Shelby County Jail

and retrieved his impounded truck. (Id.). That same day, the Shelby County

prosecutor moved to revoke Woodruff’s probation on an underlying conviction

for violating ASORCNA. (Id., see also Doc. 18, p. 6 n.3).

A few weeks later, Woodruff went to Buc-ee’s in Leeds, Alabama (Doc. 9,

p. 4). After Woodruff left the store, he returned to his truck, which was then

surrounded by Leeds police officers who ordered Woodruff to get out of the

truck. (Id., p. 5). The officers told Woodruff that they were arresting him on

behalf of “Shelby County,” which had located Woodruff from an image of his

truck that was “captured by a plate-reading traffic camera in Moody.” (Id.).

Pressley, another Shelby County Sheriff’s Deputy, then arrived and placed

Woodruff in his patrol car. (Id.). And again, over Woodruff’s protestation,

Pressley searched Woodruff’s truck and then impounded it. (Id.).

2. Procedural history: In his amended complaint (doc. 9), Woodruff brings

claims for unlawful search and seizure of his truck under federal law (Counts

I and III); claims for unlawful search and seizure under state law (Counts II

and IV); a claim for “unlawful surveillance” under federal law (Count V); a

claim for “unlawful surveillance” under state law (Count VI); “willful

negligence” under state law (Count VII); a general claim for violation of his

civil rights under federal law (Coun VIII); and a claim for conspiracy under

federal law (Count IX). Woodruff does not challenge his underlying arrests or

prosecution. (Doc. 9, pp. 4, 6).

DISCUSSION

Woodruff does not raise any specific objections to the magistrate judge’s

recommendation that the court dismiss Counts II, IV, V, VI, VII, and IX. And

the court agrees with the magistrate judge’s recommendation that the court

dismiss these counts for failure to state a claim. Counts II, IV, VI, and VII are

all state-law claims. Under Alabama law, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs “are

entitled to immunity from individual-capacity claims for damages whenever

the acts that form the basis of their alleged liability were being performed

within the line and scope of their employment.” Ex parte Underwood, --- So. 3d

----, 2025 WL 1776225, at *4 (Ala. June 27, 2025) (cleaned up). Because

Defendants’ alleged conduct was within the scope of their employment as the

Shelby County Sheriff and deputies, they are immune from suit for state-law

individual-capacity damages claims. And as the magistrate judge noted, even

if the court were to liberally construe Count VII as a § 1983 claim against

Sheriff Samaniego, that claim would fail because Woodruff does not plausibly

allege a claim of supervisory liability. Plus, Woodruff’s unlawful surveillance

claims against Sheriff Samaniego (Counts V and VI) are based only on

speculation that Sheriff Samaniego may have used his former employment

with DHS to improperly surveil Woodruff. Thus, those counts do not plausibly

state a claim for relief. As for Count IX, the magistrate judge correctly noted

that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine bars Woodruff’s § 1983 conspiracy

claim. See Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 2010).

The court will thus accept the magistrate judge’s recommendation that the

court dismiss these counts and will discuss them no further.

A. Judicial Economy

Woodruff first asserts that because the magistrate judge recommends

that Counts I and III proceed past the screening stage, judicial economy

supports allowing all of his claims to proceed. (See Doc. 20, pp. 2–3). According

to Woodruff, discovery on his unlawful search and seizure claims will “produce

evidence which [will] revive other claims but [will] then require motions to

restore claims and motions for discovery in the restored claim, all of which

injects avoidable delays.” (Id., p. 3). As explained, most of the claims that the

magistrate judge recommends the court dismiss fail as a matter of law. And

Woodruff’s unlawful surveillance claims against Sheriff Samaniego are based

on pure speculation. The court thus declines to reject the Report and

Recommendation based on Woodruff’s belief that discovery might provide him

with facts that could revive his deficiently pleaded claims.

B. Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A

Woodruff next argues that the magistrate judge’s screening of his

complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act is “overbroad and abusive,”

asserting that the Report and Recommendation is “a 23-page dissection of

Woodruff’s stated causes of action” rather than “a very limited screening.” (Id.).

Woodruff misunderstands the screening provisions of the PLRA. Under

the PLRA, this court is required to screen any “civil action in which a prisoner

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee.” 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(a).1 “On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the

complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint . . . (1) is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2)

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2). “And a complaint may be subject to dismissal for

failure to state a claim—based on an affirmative defense—. . . when the

affirmative defense appears on the face of the complaint.” Wells v. Brown, 58

F.4th 1347, 1350 (11th Cir. 2023). So while Woodruff objects to the magistrate

judge’s identification of “defenses which Defendants would propound,” (doc. 20,

p. 4), that is the exact role the screening process requires. See, e.g., Bingham

v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that a district court

“may dismiss sua sponte a complaint if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted”).

Woodruff was also granted in forma pauperis status. (See Docs. 2, 3, 13).

So his claims are also subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See

Wells, 58 F.4th at 1355–56. Under § 1915(e)(2) this court is to sua sponte

dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if the court determines that the action

“(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

The magistrate judge’s screening of Woodruff’s complaint complies with

the requirements of both statutes. So the court OVERRULES Woodruff’s

objection that asserts that the magistrate judge’s screening of his complaint

was “overbroad and abusive.”

1 At the time Woodruff filed this action he was incarcerated. (See Doc. 1). But Woodruff has

since notified the court that he has been released from the custody of the Alabama

Department of Corrections. (See Doc. 6). For the purposes of the PLRA’s screening provisions,

the court looks to Woodruff’s status at the time he filed his initial complaint. See Danglar v.

Dep’t of Corr., 50 F.4th 54, 59 (11th Cir. 2022).

C. Judicial Notice of the Arrest Warrant

Woodruff also objects to the magistrate judge taking judicial notice of

several documents in his state court cases, including his arrest warrant. (See

Doc. 20, pp. 5–6). As discussed, Woodruff does not challenge the validity of his

arrest, and he notes in his objections that any causes of action based on his

prosecution, arrest, or imprisonment are not ripe. (See id., p. 5, n.1). But

Woodruff’s complaint references Shelby County issuing a warrant for his

arrest. (See Doc. 9, p. 2). Because Woodruff’s complaint references his arrest

warrant, it was appropriate for the magistrate judge to consider the contents

of the warrant when evaluating Woodruff’s claims. See Grider v. Cook, 522 F.

App’x 544, 546 n.2 (11th Cir. 2013).

Nor did the magistrate judge’s consideration of Woodruff’s arrest

warrant affect his recommendation that the court dismiss most of Woodruff’s

claims. Woodruff asserts that the magistrate judge could not use the arrest

warrant to conclude that defendants are shielded by the warrant and also enjoy

sheriff’s immunity for actions performed in the sheriff’s name. But Woodruff

cites no authority to support this assertion. To the extent that Woodruff is

objecting to the magistrate judge’s finding that state law immunity bars his

state-law claims, that objection is OVERRULED. As explained, sheriffs and

deputy sheriffs cannot be sued under state law for acts being performed during

the line and scope of their official duties. See Ex parte Underwood, 2025 WL

1776225, at *4. And sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are acting within the line and

scope of their duties when they take actions related to the execution of an

arrest warrant. Plus, even without considering the arrest warrant’s contents,

the allegations in Woodruff’s complaint establish that his claims against

Defendants are based on actions taken during the line and scope of their official

duties. So Defendants are immune from Woodruff’s state-law claims.

Finally, the court notes that the magistrate judge does not recommend

that the court dismiss any of Woodruff’s federal-law claims based on the

defense of qualified immunity. So to the extent that Woodruff asserts that the

magistrate judge improperly considered the arrest warrant to conclude that

Defendants were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority, the

court finds this argument misplaced.

D. Estoppel

Woodruff’s next objection is labeled as an estoppel argument and asserts

that his arrest warrant “was obtained by an outright lie,” so the magistrate

judge erred in relying on the warrant to find that Defendants are immune from

suit under Alabama law. (Doc. 20, pp. 6–7). But Woodruff’s complaint does not

challenge the validity of his arrests. (See Doc. 9, pp. 4, 6). And though Woodruff

argues that “Defendants are judicially estopped from asserting as a defense

that their impoundment of [his] vehicle was permitted incident to an arrest,”

(doc. 20, p. 6), the arrest warrant was based on the statement of Investigator

William Mullins, who is not a named defendant (see doc. 18-3). Woodruff cannot

both not challenge his arrests and claim Defendants’ reliance on the arrest

warrant was misplaced.

Besides, as the court has repeatedly noted, the allegations in Woodruff’s

complaint establish that Defendants’ actions were within the line and scope of

their duties as Shelby County Sheriff and Deputy Sheriffs. So the court needn’t

rely on the arrest warrant to determine that Woodruff cannot bring his state-

law claims against the Defendants. In filing his complaint, Woodruff chose to

challenge the search and seizure of his vehicle without challenging the validity

of his underlying arrests. So the facts of this case, taken as true and construed

in the light most favorable to Woodruff, show that Defendants’ actions relate

to presumptively valid arrests. The court thus OVERRULES this objection.

E. Perceived Errors of Case Law

Woodruff also objects to the case law discussed by the magistrate judge

when analyzing Woodruff’s unlawful search and seizure claims related to the

alleged wrongful impoundment of his truck. (Doc. 20, pp. 7–9). Woodruff first

says that the magistrate judge erred in discussing several Supreme Court

cases on the search and seizure of vehicles because Woodruff alleged in his

complaint that those cases were distinguishable. The four Supreme Court

cases Woodruff disavows all concern the search, seizure, or impoundment of a

vehicle incident to an arrest. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987);

South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413

U.S. 433 (1973); and Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967). And it is for the

court to decide the relevancy of these cases. So the court rejects this argument.

The court also rejects Woodruff’s other arguments that assert that the

magistrate judge improperly analyzed the relevant case law. Contrary to

Woodruff’s assertion, Cannon v. State, 601 So. 2d 1112 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992),

overruled Morton v. State, 452 So. 2d 1361 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984), “[t]o the

extent that Morton holds that a driver must be given an election on whether to

have his vehicle impounded or left where parked.” See Cannon, 601 So. 2d at

1115. And though Woodruff faults the magistrate judge for not discussing

J.T.C. v. State, 990 So. 2d 444 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008), and Arizona v. Gant, 556

U.S. 332 (2009), a judge’s failure to cite the entire realm of case law applicable

to a given fact pattern does not make the legal analysis of that claim any less

correct. Plus, the magistrate judge likely didn’t cite J.T.C. or Gant because

they are not inventory and impoundment cases. See J.T.C., 990 So. 2d at 445–

46 (considering whether officers had probable cause to conduct warrantless

search of juvenile’s vehicle incident to a traffic stop); Gant, 556 U.S. at 336–37

(noting that, after Gant was arrested on a traffic violation, handcuffed, and

placed in the back of a patrol car, officers searched his vehicle, found cocaine,

and charged Gant with possession).2

Regardless, the magistrate judge has recommended that the court allow

Woodruff’s Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims to proceed because

the Shelby County deputies were required to follow their own regulations when

they inventoried, then impounded Woodruff’s truck. (See Doc. 18, pp. 12–15).

So Woodruff’s objections related to his impoundment claims are

OVERRULED AS MOOT.

2 Woodruff explains that he didn’t cite Gant in his amended complaint “to entice Defendants

to conclude Woodruff” was ignorant “of Gant and to state a policy defense that was in conflict

with Gant.” (Doc. 20, p. 8, n.3). He then complains that because of the magistrate judge’s

report and recommendation “he has been forced to disarm this booby-trap and bemoans that

pro se litigants are categorically assumed unsophisticated.” (Id.). The court warns Woodruff

that had an attorney represented to the court that he was “booby-trapping” a complaint to

mislead opposing counsel, the court would consider sanctions. And Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 11 applies to pro se litigants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1) (In presenting a pleading

to the court, “an unrepresented party certifies to the best of the person’s knowledge

information and belief . . . that it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to

harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.”). So future

attempts to mislead the court or Defendants will likely result in sanctions.

F. Monell Liability

Woodruff next asserts that his “complaint (in another booby-trap) sets

forth factual allegations consistent with a cause of action under Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).” (Doc. 20, p. 9). According

to Woodruff, the idea behind his “booby-trap” was that “if Defendants notice

the indicia [of a Monell claim] they will be more likely to consider the value of

settlement (and if they fail to notice the indicia they will be harmed in future

suits).” (See id.). Woodruff then says that the magistrate judge misidentified

these allegations as allegations of Sheriff Samaniego being liable under a

theory of respondeat superior. (See id.).

The court again warns Woodruff that future attempts to “booby trap”

Defendants or the court will likely result in sanctions. And the magistrate

judge did not consider whether Woodruff had stated a claim under Monell

because Woodruff did not bring a Monell claim. A valid Monell claim requires

a plaintiff to plead (1) that his constitutional rights were violated, (2) that the

municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to

that constitutional right, and (3) that the custom or policy caused the violation.

See Teel v. Lozada, 99 F.4th 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2024). A plaintiff can satisfy

the second element in one of three ways: “(1) identifying an official policy; (2)

identifying an unofficial custom or widespread practice that is so permanent

and well-settled as to constitute a custom and usage with the force of law; or

(3) identifying a municipal official with final policymaking authority whose

decision violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Chabad Chayil, Inc. v.

Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cty., 48 F.4th 1222, 1229 (11th Cir. 2022).

The Monell-related allegations that Woodruff says he sprinkled

throughout his complaint may include his allegations that Sheriff Samaniego

“sustained an aggressive policy of illegal and/or unlawful

impoundments/searched in open disregard of constitutionality, and that as

chief policy maker for his agency [Samaniego] is also liable for the trespasses

of [Ragazzoni] and [Pressley] . . . to the extent they acted according to such

policy.” (Doc. 9, p. 6). But these allegations do nothing more than recite the

elements of a cause of action for supervisory liability. And Woodruff’s other

allegations against Sheriff Samaniego do not state a claim for Monell liability.

For example, Woodruff claims that Samaniego “used his influence and/or

holdover credentials of his prior employment in the U.S. Department of

Homeland Security to surveil Plaintiff in a manner otherwise unavailable or

lawful under his state authority.” (Id.). He then asserts that Samaniego

“created or perpetrated a conspiracy to violate Plaintiff’s civil rights . . . .” (Id.).

In other words, Woodruff’s well-pleaded factual allegations claim that he

was arrested based on a personal vendetta against him and not under a custom

or policy of Shelby County itself. Thus, the magistrate judge properly construed

Woodruff’s claims as including a respondeat superior claim against Sheriff

Samaniego but not a Monell claim against Shelby County. And though

Woodruff says he attempted to “booby-trap” his amended complaint to sneak

in a Monell claim, none of the 9 counts Woodruff brought in his amended

complaint actually pleads a claim under Monell. So the court OVERRULES

Woodruff’s Monell-related objections. See Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760

F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014) (While this court holds “the allegations of

a pro se complaint to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers[,]” the court cannot “serve as de facto counsel for a party, or . . .

rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.”).

G. Typographical Error

Woodruff finally objects to the magistrate judge construing Count VIII

as being brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, asserting that he made a

typographical error and intended to bring that count under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

instead. The magistrate judge considered all of Woodruff’s constitutional

claims under § 1983. And while § 1983 provides a cause of action for

constitutional violations committed under color of state law, Burton v. City of

Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1187–88 (11th Cir. 1999), § 1983 creates no rights

independent of the constitution, see, e.g., Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370,

1390 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting that the remedial scheme set out by Congress in

§ 1983 “precludes the implication of a direct constitutional action” for federal

constitutional violations and recognizing that a cause of action against an

individual for an alleged federal constitutional violation can only be brought

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Thus, it would be superfluous for Woodruff to bring

Count VIII as a general claim under § 1983, and the court OVERRULES

Woodruff’s objection to the magistrate judge’s recommendation that the court

dismiss his freestanding § 1983 claim.

CONCLUSION

Having reviewed and considered de novo all the materials in the court

file, including the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and

Woodruff's objections, the court OVERRULES Woodruffs objections,

ADOPTS the report, and ACCEPTS the recommendation. Consistent with

that recommendation, the court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE all of

Woodruffs claims EXCEPT his Fourth Amendment wrongful search and

seizure claims against Ragazzoni and Pressley (Counts I and III).

The court REFERS Woodruff’s Fourth Amendment wrongful search and

seizure claims (Counts I and III) to the magistrate judge for further

proceedings.

The court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to TERMINATE Sheriff John

Samaniego as a Defendant listed on the docket sheet.

Done and Ordered on October 16, 2025.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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