PARAHAM

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CHRISTOPHER PARAHAM : CIVIL ACTION

:

v. :

:

LCT OPCO LLC : NO. 24-3148

MEMORANDUM

Bartle, J. October 15, 2025

In July of 2024, plaintiff Christopher Paraham filed

against defendant, La Colombe Holdings, Inc., a collective

action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et

seq.) (“FLSA”), and a putative class action under the

Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act (43 P.S. § 333.101 et seq.), and

the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law (43 P.S.

§ 260.1 et seq.). On November 6, 2024, plaintiff amended his

complaint by substituting LCT OpCo LLC as the defendant.

Defendant LCT OpCo LLC operates as La Colombe. It

manufactures and sells coffee and related products. It owns and

operates coffee shops in California, Illinois, Massachusetts,

New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington, D.C.1 Plaintiff

asserts that defendant violated federal and state laws by

failing to pay hourly workers for all hours worked, including

1. Former defendant La Colombe Holdings Inc.’s assets and

liabilities were transferred to defendant LCT OpCo LLC pursuant

to a written agreement. Pursuant to that agreement, LCT OpCo

LLC has operated as La Colombe and employed hourly-paid

unpaid pre-shift activities and post-shift work, and by

miscalculating the regular rate of pay for overtime.

Before the court is the joint motion of plaintiff and

defendant for final approval of the settlement of collective

action and class action (Doc. # 36). The settlement fund

provides a maximum pay out $450,000. Out of this fund,

plaintiff seeks to compensate class members, and pay attorneys’

fees, litigation and administrative expenses. He also requests

a service fee.

I

After the parties engaged in extensive investigation

and analysis of payroll and timekeeping records and exchanged

preliminary discovery, the parties participated in a successful

mediation with Dina R. Jansenson, Esq. As a result, the parties

executed a settlement agreement on June 4, 2025 and moved for

preliminary approval of the settlement that same day.

On June 9, 2025, this court granted preliminary

approval. The court ordered that defendant provide the

settlement administrator within thirty days with the contact and

payroll information for all employees who met the class action

or collective action requirements. The settlement administrator

was also required to disseminate notice of the collective and

class action settlement to those persons within fourteen days of

receiving the contact information.

The settlement provides for compensation to two

groups. The FLSA collective consists of “all persons employed

by Defendant or its predecessor, La Colombe TorrefactionInc., as

hourly-paid production workers in Pennsylvania or Michigan at

any time between July 18, 2021, and October 13, 2024.” The Rule

23 class encompasses hourly production workers in Pennsylvania

during the same period. Accordingly, Pennsylvania workers are

included in both the FLSA collective and the Rule 23 class.

Workers in Michigan are only eligible for the FLSA collective.

There are 850 FLSA collective members,2 of whom 260 individuals

are also members of the Rule 23 class.

Under the settlement agreement, members of the FLSA

collective must submit a valid and timely claim form to receive

a payment. The form will serve as their opt-in consent.

Members of the Rule 23 state law class who have not opted out

will receive automatic payments. Payments to class and

collective members are allocated based on factors including the

number of workweeks, pay rate, additional compensation received,

and location, and are intended to reflect each member’s

potential recovery under the claims asserted.

2. The joint motion for final approval (Doc. # 36) states that

there are only 850 FLSA collective members. However, the

accompanying affidavit of the settlement administrator lists 851

members. Because the most recent affidavit lists 850 members

and thus matches the motion, the court concluded that there are

850 members.

The settlement agreement, as noted, provides for a

maximum payment from defendants of $450,000, which includes

distributions to collective and class members as well as

attorneys’ fees ($150,000), litigation costs ($6,000),

settlement administration expenses ($19,000), and the named

plaintiff’s service award ($10,000). The settlement covers the

period from July 18, 2021 through October 13, 2024. After

subtracting those costs, the amount to be available to

collective and class members is $265,000. This figure

represents roughly 72% of collective and class members’

estimated unpaid wages. The net settlement amount allocates

67.22% to the FLSA collective and 32.78% to the Rule 23 class.

Unclaimed FLSA collective funds will revert to the defendant.

Unredeemed class funds will be distributed to Philabundance, a

nonprofit organization selected by the parties as the cy pres

beneficiary.

After the court’s June 9, 2025 order, eligible

Pennsylvania employees were notified of their state law claims

and FLSA claims. They were also informed of their respective

rights to opt out of the state law class action and to opt in to

the FLSA collective action. There was a separate notice for

those who are a part of the FLSA collective settlement only,

namely the Michigan employees. They were informed of their

rights to opt into the collective action.

Settlement administrator Madely Nava, a case manager

of Apex Class Action, LLC, estimates that its notice program

reached approximately 97.9% of collective and class members. As

of September 15, 2025, it has received 244 claim forms from the

FLSA Collective Members (a claim rate of 28.7%). Apex Class

Action has not received any requests for exclusion or any

objections. The deadline for exclusion requests and objections

was August 29, 2025. Of those 244 claimants, eighty-three are

also members of the Rule 23 class. Nava estimates defendant

stands to pay a total of $152,563.62 from the settlement fund to

participating collective and class members. Specifically, the

244 participating collective members stand to receive $65,703.64

and the 260 participating class members stand to receive

$86,859.98. Per-person payments average $179.49.

Because the settlement agreement includes both a class

action settlement and a FLSA collective settlement, the court

will address each under its appropriate legal standards.

II

To approve a proposed FLSA collective settlement, the

court must determine whether it is a “fair and reasonable

resolution of a bona fide dispute over FLSA provisions rather

than a mere waiver of statutory rights brought about by an

employer’s overreaching.” Cuttic v. Crozer–Chester Med. Ctr.,

868 F. Supp. 2d 464, 466 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (quoting Lynn’s Food

Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1354 (11th Cir.

1982) (internal quotation marks omitted)). If the court

determines that the settlement resolves a “bona fide” dispute,

the court must engage in a two-part fairness inquiry: first,

whether the settlement is fair and reasonable to the employees,

and second, “whether the agreement furthers or impermissibly

frustrates the implementation of the FLSA in the workplace.”

Mabry v. Hildebrandt, No. 14-5525, 2015 WL 5025810, at *2 (E.D.

Pa. Aug. 24, 2015).

A “bona fide” dispute exists when there is evidence

that the defendant has an intent to reject plaintiffs’ claim

when it is presented, and that such claim falls within the ambit

of the FLSA. Altnor v. Preferred Freezer Servs., Inc., 197 F.

Supp. 3d 746, 763 (E.D. Pa. 2016). There can be no doubt that

such a dispute exists here.

Final certification of a collective action under the

FLSA requires that the plaintiffs be “similarly situated.”

Matthews v. Philadelphia Corp. for Aging, No. 22-4632, 2025 WL

992198, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 2025) (quoting Zavala v. Wal-

Mart Stores Inc., 691 F.3d 527, 536-37 (3d Cir. 2012)). The non-

exhaustive relevant factors the court considers include whether

plaintiffs share the same job title, performed similar duties,

and advance similar legal claims. Id. “[C]ertification under

the FLSA is less stringent than certification of a Rule 23

class.” Id. (citing Hall v. Accolade, Inc., No. 17-3423, 2020

WL 1477688, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2020)).

The plaintiff and collective members were all hourly-

paid production workers employed in defendant’s Pennsylvania or

Michigan production facilities. They all had similarly hourly

pay structures and circumstances of employment. They all

advance claims that defendant miscalculated the regular rate of

overtime pay and thus seek the same form of relief of unpaid

wages, liquidated damages and statutory penalties. The court

finds that plaintiff and the other 850 collective members are

similarly situated.

The court must also determine whether the proposed

settlement is “fair and reasonable” to the employees. In FLSA

collective actions, district courts in this Circuit typically

apply the nine-factor test outlined in Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d

153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975), to assess the fairness and

reasonableness of any proposed settlement. See, e.g., Altnor,

197 F. Supp. 3d at 764; Howard v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 197 F.

Supp. 3d 773, 777 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 2016). Because the same Girsh

factors are used to determine whether a Rule 23 class settlement

is reasonable, see, e.g., Kraus v. PA Fit II, LLC, 155 F. Supp.

3d 516, 524 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 2016), the court will address the

Girsh factors hereafter for both the FLSA collective and Rule 23

class together.

Even if the settlement is otherwise fair and

reasonable, the court must also decide whether the settlement

would impermissibly frustrate the implementation of the FLSA in

the workplace. Courts must take into account whether the

proposed settlement contains overly broad waiver or release

provisions, a confidentiality agreement, or any attempt by the

parties to keep the agreement private. Mejia v. KVK-Tech, Inc.,

No. 19-4841, 2020 WL 5292074, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2020).

The agreement, which was publicly filed, does not contain a

confidentiality agreement.

Finally, the court must review any waiver or release

provision of the settlement agreement. A waiver provision is

overbroad when it is prospective or requires that plaintiffs

release unrelated claims. See, e.g., Kraus v. PA Fit II, LLC,

155 F. Supp. 3d 516, 532-33 (E.D. Pa. 2016). While the

settlement agreement does contain a waiver provision, collective

members here will simply waive any wage and hour and related

claims that would have arisen based on the facts of the lawsuit

up through the date of final approval. The release provision

here is narrowly drawn and is fair.

III

The court now turns to the review of the Rule 23 class

action settlement of claims under the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage

Act (43 P.S. § 333.101 et seq.), and the Pennsylvania Wage

Payment and Collection Law (43 P.S. § 260.1 et seq.).

Plaintiff, as noted previously, seeks final approval of the

class composed of “all persons employed by Defendant or its

predecessor, La Colombe Torrefaction Inc., as hourly-paid

production workers in Pennsylvania at any time from July 18,

2021 through October 13, 2024.” Settlement Agreement ¶ FF. A

court may not grant final approval of a settlement unless the

class meets all prerequisites of Rule 23. See In re General

Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55

F.3d 768, 797 (3d Cir. 1995).

First, any class must satisfy the following

requirements of Rule 23(a): numerosity, commonality, typicality,

and adequacy of representation. Numerosity is typically

satisfied when a class exceeds forty members. See in re

Processed Egg Prod. Antitrust Litig., 284 F.R.D. 249, 260 (E.D.

Pa. 2012). As there are 260 class members, this class meets the

numerosity requirements.

There are common questions of law and fact that must

be answered regarding the class. Significantly, to establish

liability a factfinder must determine whether defendant failed

to pay for the class’s pre-shift “walking time” and

miscalculated the regular rate of overtime pay.

The inquiries of typicality and adequacy “tend to

merge” because they both consider potential conflicts and

whether the claim of the named plaintiff is so interrelated to

the claim of the class such that the class can be fairly and

adequately protected. Beck v. Maximus, Inc., 457 F.3d 291, 296

(3d Cir. 2006). The claims of the named plaintiff are typical

of the class. Like the class members, he worked for defendant

as an hourly-paid production worker and was subject to the same

pay and timekeeping policies. Finally, he and class counsel

adequately represent the class. There is no apparent conflict

between the named plaintiff and the absent class members. See,

e.g., In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 191 F.R.D. 472, 482

(W.D. Pa. 1999). Class counsel also negotiated this settlement

agreement with years of experience with class actions under

federal and state wage laws. In sum, the court finds that the

class satisfies the prerequisites set forth in Rule 23(a).

Next, the court must decide whether the class may be

certified under Rule 23(b)(3) for money damages. It allows for

certification when “the court finds that the questions of law or

fact common to class members predominate over any questions

affecting only individual members and that a class action is

superior to other available methods of fairly and efficiently

adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). In

making this finding, the court considers:

(A) the class members’ interests in

individually controlling the prosecution

or defense of separate actions;

(B) the extent and nature of any litigation

concerning the controversy already begun

by or against class members;

(C) the desirability or undesirability of

concentrating the litigation of the

claims in the particular forum; and

(D) the likely difficulties in managing a

class action.

Id. This rule requires that potential class members be notified

of the pending litigation and provided an opportunity to opt-out

from the class. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338,

362 (2011).

Predominance “asks whether common issues of law or

fact in the case predominate over non-common, individualized

issues of law or fact.” Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, 794

F.3d 353, 370 (3d Cir. 2015). The presence of individual

questions does not bar a finding of predominance, but such

individualized issues cannot “overwhelm” common ones. Id. at

371. Questions as to whether defendant properly calculated the

regular rate of pay for overtime and whether pre-shift “walking

time” is compensable under the applicable statute can be

answered in the aggregate. Individualized questions of injury

do not predominate over these common liability questions. Thus,

the requirement of predominance is satisfied.

Certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) is appropriate

if a “class action is superior to other available methods for

the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.”

Litigating these cases individually would not be feasible. Each

class member has suffered relatively small damages, and the cost

of litigating the individual claim would not be worth it.

Proceeding as a class action permits class members with smaller

claims to vindicate their rights.

The settlement also has a proper notice procedure.

Rule 23(c)(2)(B) requires that the Court “direct to class

members the best notice that is practicable under the

circumstances, including individual notice to all members who

can be identified through reasonable effort.” Hall v. Accolade,

Inc., No. 17-3423, 2020 WL 1477688, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25,

2020). Rule 23(e) requires all members of the class be notified

of the terms of any proposed settlement. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).

The notice to members includes a description of the lawsuit, a

summary of the terms of the settlement, and a synopsis of each

member’s legal rights and options. The court finds this notice

procedure has been followed.

IV

Finally, the court must determine for both the FLSA

collective action and the Rule 23(b) class whether the

settlement is fair. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2); Altnor, 197 F.

Supp. 3d at 763.

Our Court of Appeals has identified nine factors to

guide the lower courts in approving proposed class and

collective action settlements. See Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d

153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975); see also Altnor, 197 F. Supp. 3d at

764. Those factors are:

(1) The complexity, expense, and likely

duration of the litigation; (2) the reaction

of the class to the settlement; (3) the

stage of the proceedings and the amount of

discovery completed; (4) the risks of

establishing liability; (5) the risks of

establishing damages; (6) the risks of

maintaining the class action through the

trial; (7) the ability of the defendants to

withstand a greater judgment; (8) the range

of reasonableness of the settlement fund in

light of the best possible recovery; and (9)

the range of reasonableness of the

settlement fund to a possible recovery in

light of all the attendant risks of

litigation.

In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 534-35 (3d

Cir. 2004) (citing Girsh, 521 F.2d at 156-57). The court should

presume that a settlement was fair if it makes a preliminary

finding that (1) the settlement was developed as a result of

arms’ length negotiations; (2) there was sufficient discovery in

the litigation; (3) proponents of the settlement are experienced

in similar litigation; and (4) only a small fraction of the

class objected. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 232

n.18 (3d Cir. 2001).

The law favors settlement in complex cases where

substantial judicial resources can be conserved by avoiding

formal litigation. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck

Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784 (3d Cir. 1995).

A settlement in this FLSA collective action and Rule 23 class

action would conserves such resources, avoids further expenses

of litigation, and resolves a dispute that could otherwise

linger for years. See id.

The parties engaged in a full-day mediation session

with Dina R. Jansenson, Esq., a mediator with experience in

wage-and-hour disputes. The involvement of a neutral mediator

demonstrates that these negotiations were conducted at arm’s

length. See Utah Ret. Sys. v. Healthcare Servs. Grp., No. 19-

1227, 2022 WL 118104, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2022). Lead

counsel has extensive experience in the field. The parties

entered the mediation after comprehensive written submissions

that outlined the parties’ respective positions, damages

estimates, and legal arguments. No one has objected to or

disputed the settlement. Accordingly, the court presumes that

the settlement is reasonable.

Regardless of this presumption, the court will

nevertheless evaluate the settlement in light of the factors

enunciated by our Court of Appeals in Girsh as applied to both a

FLSA collective and a class action.

The first Girsh factor is the complexity, expense, and

likely duration of the litigation. If the court does not

approve the settlement, the court would need to resolve what the

parties agree would be contested FLSA collective and Rule 23

class certification motions. The parties would likely need to

litigate the scope of what constitutes “representative” evidence

for presentation at trial. Additionally, the parties have

stated the trial would “certainly last several days.” Joint

Motion for Final Approval at 4, Paraham v. La Colombe Holdings,

Inc., Civ. A. No. 24-3148 (E.D. Pa. June 4, 2025) (Doc. # 36).

This factor weighs in favor of settlement.

The second Girsh factor is the “reaction of the class

to the settlement.” A collective FLSA settlement requires that

absent employees or former employees opt into the settlement.

The objections process of Rule 23 is not applicable. There have

been no objections to the Rule 23(b)(3) class. Generally,

“silence constitutes tacit consent to the agreement.” Schwartz

v. Avis Rent a Car Sys., 2016 WL 3457160, at *7 (D.N.J. June 21,

2016) (quoting In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank

Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 812 (3d Cir. 1995)). Neither

has there been any exclusion requests or disputes. Accordingly,

the lack of any objection supports approval of the settlement.

The third Girsh factor which the court must evaluate

is the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery

completed. The court must “determine whether counsel had an

adequate appreciation of the merits of the case before

negotiating.” Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 537 (quoting Cendant, 264

F.3d at 235). Counsel for plaintiff and for defendant engaged

in extensive investigation and analysis of payroll and

timekeeping records before negotiating. Negotiations began

following preliminary exchanges of information. While

negotiation began early in the process, this factor, under the

circumstances, does not weigh against approval of the

settlement.

The fourth, fifth, and sixth Girsh factors require the

court to weigh the potential risks that plaintiff would confront

in establishing liability, establishing damages, and maintaining

their litigation through trial. Defendant at all times has

denied liability and would also oppose certification of claims

on a class and collective basis. Accordingly, the named

plaintiff would face additional hurdles in obtaining FLSA

collective and class certifications. If the collective or the

class is not certified, each member runs the risk of needing to

litigate his or her claims as individual actions and thus

multiply the litigation’s time and expense. Even assuming

plaintiff achieved a certification, it is always possible it

will be decertified. See Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 537. Similarly,

to prove damages, the named plaintiff would have to prove the

number of hours each opt-in FLSA collective member and Rule 23

class member worked each week during his or her employment.

These factors weigh in favor of settlement.

The seventh Girsh factor directs the court to consider

“whether the defendants could withstand a judgment for an amount

significantly greater” than the settlement reached. Cendant,

264 F.3d at 240. The risk of non-payment is neutral in the

settlement analysis.

The final two Girsh factors are the range of

reasonableness of the settlement in light of both the best

possible recovery and the attendant risks of litigation. These

factors require the court to consider whether the settlement

“represents a good value for a weak case or a poor value for a

strong case.” The total settlement fund, inclusive of member

pay-outs, attorneys’ fees and other costs ($450,000), represents

approximately 122% of the estimated total damages that could

have been recovered if plaintiff and the class and collective

members fully prevailed at trial. The settlement amount

available to pay to collective and class members represents

approximately 72% of their estimated unpaid wages. However, the

settlement administrator estimates defendant stands to pay only

$152,563.62 from the net settlement fund to them. This amounts

to only 41% of their estimated wages. Nevertheless, wage-and-

hour settlements in this district have previously been approved

where class or collective members receive similar percentages of

claim wages. See Lunemann v. Kooma III LLC, No. 23-3704, 2024

WL 3744359, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2024) (collecting cases).

And, as stated previously, proceeding to trial, or otherwise

continuing to litigate this case, poses significant risks.

These two factors counsel toward approval of the settlement.

Accordingly, the court finds that both the class

components and the collective action components of the

settlement are fair, reasonable, and adequate.

V

Lead plaintiff also seeks the appointment of Brown,

LLC as class counsel. The court previously appointed this firm

on an interim basis pursuant to Rule 23(g)(3) when the

settlement was preliminarily approved.

Rule 23(g)(1) requires a formal appointment of class

counsel. The rule describes four factors that must be

considered when doing so:

(i) the work counsel has done in identifying

or investigating potential claims in the

action; (ii) counsel's experience in

handling class actions, other complex

litigation, and the types of claims asserted

in the action; (iii) counsel's experience in

handling class actions, other complex

litigation, and the types of claims asserted

in the action; [and] (iv) the resources that

counsel will commit to representing the

class[.]

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g). The court may also consider

any other matter pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly and

adequately represent the interests of the class. Id. The court

previously found class counsel’s representation to be adequate.

Class counsel negotiated this settlement agreement with years of

experience with class actions under federal and state wage laws.

Additionally, class counsel has expended more than 203 hours

investigating plaintiff’s claims, reviewing and analyzing

defendant’s payroll and timekeeping data, preparing damages

analyses, and participating in a full-day mediation before an

experienced wage-and-hour mediator.

The court confirms the appointment of Brown, LLC as

Class Counsel.

VI

Plaintiff also seeks approval of fees for lead counsel

in the amount of $150,000, that is 33.33% of the settlement

fund.

After a class is certified under Rule 23, the court

“may award reasonable attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that

are authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 23(h). Both the Supreme Court and our Court of Appeals

favor calculation of attorney’s fees as a percentage of class

recovery. See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478-79

(1980); In re AT&T Corp., 455 F.3d 160, 164 (3d Cir. 2006).

The FLSA states that the court “shall, in addition to

any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a

reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs

of the action.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). In wage and hour cases

such as this, district courts in our circuit use the percentage-

of-recovery method and award a fixed portion of the settlement

fund to counsel. See, e.g., Mejia, 2020 WL 5292074, at *4.

Lead plaintiff seeks approval of fees for lead counsel

that was calculated via the percentage-of-recovery method.

Accordingly, this fee will be approved if deemed reasonable.

In determining the reasonableness of a proposed award

for counsel in collective action and class action settlements

such as this, our Court of Appeals has stated that a district

court should consider the following seven so-called Gunter

factors:

(1) the size of the fund created and the

number of beneficiaries, (2) the presence or

absence of substantial objections by members

of the class to the settlement terms and/or

fees requested by counsel, (3) the skill and

efficiency of the attorneys involved, (4)

the complexity and duration of the

litigation, (5) the risk of nonpayment, (6)

the amount of time devoted to the case by

plaintiffs’ counsel, and (7) the awards in

similar cases.

Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 195 n.1 (3d Cir.

2000) (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Pracs.

Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 336-40 (3d Cir. 1997)).

First, the court will take into account the size of

the fund created and the number of beneficiaries. Lead

plaintiff achieved a cash settlement of $450,000, which will

benefit 260 class members and another 161 collective class

members. The total settlement fund represents approximately

122% of the estimated total damages and yielding net payments

equal to about 72% of alleged unpaid wages. Class counsel has

achieved a recovery per member similar to other recently

approved settlements in wage and hour collective and class

actions. See Lunemann v. Kooma III LLC, No. 23-3704, 2024 WL

3744359, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2024); see also Wood v. Saroj &

Manju Invs. Philadelphia LLC, No. 19-2820, 2021 WL 1945809, at

*11 (E.D. Pa. May 14, 2021). This factor supports the approval

of the fee.

There have been no objections to the settlement. Nor

have there been any requests for exclusion. Thus, the reaction

of the members, the second Gunter factor, weighs in favor of

approval of the attorneys’ fee requested.

The third Gunter factor is the skill and efficiency of

the attorneys involved. As discussed previously, Brown, LLC has

successfully litigated numerous class and collective actions

under FLSA and state wage laws nationwide. This factor weighs

in favor of approval of the fee request.

The fourth Gunter factor is the complexity and

duration of the litigation. Negotiations began following

preliminary exchanges of information. The parties reached a

settlement before any dispositive motions were filed to

challenge the case's basis. Additionally, the case does not

appear to have been unusually or especially complicated, either

factually or legally, when compared to other class and

collective actions. See Altnor v. Preferred Freezer Servs.,

Inc., 197 F. Supp. 3d 746, 765 (E.D. Pa. 2016). This factor

weighs against the fee request.

The court, pursuant to the fifth Gunter factor,

considers the risk of nonpayment. Lead counsel represented the

class on a contingency fee basis. The risk created by

representing a party on a contingent fee basis “militates in

favor of approval.” In re Cigna-Am. Specialty Health Admin. Fee

Litig., No. 16-3967, 2019 WL 4082946, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29,

2019) (citing In re Schering-Plough Corp. Enhance ERISA Litig.,

No. 08-1432, 2012 WL 1964451, at *7 (D.N.J. May 31, 2012)). The

significant risk of nonpayment counsels toward the granting of

the fee award.

The sixth Gunter factor concerns the amount of time

lead counsel devoted to this action. Brown, LLC has worked

203.4 hours on this litigation. These efforts do not reach the

level of efforts typically seen in cases where a high percentage

of recovery has been approved. Altnor v. Preferred Freezer

Servs., Inc., 197 F. Supp. 3d 746, 766 (E.D. Pa. 2016)

(collecting cases). However, lead counsel did assume the risk

of nonpayment under the contingency agreement. This factor is

at best neutral towards the award of the attorneys’ fees.

Finally, under the seventh Gunter factor, the court

will compare this proposed award to awards in similar cases. In

this Circuit, the percentage of the recovery awards in FLSA

common fund cases ranges from roughly 20–45%. Mabry v.

Hildebrandt, No. 14-5525, 2015 WL 5025810, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug.

24, 2015) (collecting cases); see also Altnor v. Preferred

Freezer Servs., Inc., 197 F. Supp. 3d 746, 766 (E.D. Pa. 2016).

An award of approximately one-third of the settlement fund is

therefore typical for lead counsel in similar settlements in

this district. An attorneys’ fee of 33% of the settlement here

is fair and reasonable.3

The award of attorneys’ fees requested will be

approved.

3 If the court does not reach a conclusion upon consideration

of the Gunter factors, it may conduct a lodestar cross-check.

Cendant, 264 F.3d at 284-85. The court out of an abundance of

caution has done so. See Cendant. The lodestar is the number

of hours class counsel worked multiplied by the reasonably

hourly billing rate for the services rendered. In re AT&T

Corp., 455 F.3d at 164.

Class counsel expended a total of 203.04 hours litigating

this matter, which the court finds reasonable. The court also

finds its hourly rates, which range from $850 to $415 based on

years of legal experience, to be reasonable in this market.

Administrative assistants had an hourly rate of $240, which the

court also finds reasonable. Multiplying the individual’s

hourly rate by their hours worked, class counsel’s total

lodestar is $78.913.50. The lodestar cross-check does not

undermine the requested fee award.

VII

Plaintiff also seeks an award to lead counsel and the

claims administrator to reimburse them for litigation expenses.

Rule 23 permits parties to seek nontaxable costs after

certification of a class upon the agreement of parties. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). In the settlement agreement, the parties

agreed that “Class Counsel may recover up to $6,000

in costs, in addition to attorneys’ fees.” Settlement Agreement

at § III.D.

Requesting litigation expenses is standard practice.

See McDonough v. Toys R Us, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 3d 626, 658 (E.D.

Pa. 2015). As stated in Lachance v. Harrington, “there is no

doubt that an attorney who has created a common fund for the

benefit of the class is entitled to reimbursement of his

reasonable litigation expenses from that fund.” 965 F. Supp.

630, 651 (E.D. Pa. 1997).

Counsel incurred a total of $5,291.60 in expenses.

The bulk of those expenses reflect the net cost of mediation

($4,412.50). Lead counsel submitted an affidavit demonstrating

support for the costs requested. Such expenses were reasonable

and their payment will be approved.

Plaintiff also requests approval of $19,000 in

settlement administration costs. The costs included preparing,

printing, and mailing the Court-approved notices, conducting

address verification and skip tracing, re-mailing notices where

necessary, and processing claim forms. Lead counsel submitted

an affidavit demonstrating support for the administration

expenses requested. The court takes note that of the more than

800 class members, only 18 were undeliverable after skip

tracing. Accordingly, such expenses were reasonable and their

payment will be approved.

VIII

Finally, plaintiff seeks an award of $10,000 for the

named plaintiff, Christopher Paraham. Service awards are common

in collective and class actions, especially in cases where a

common fund has been created to benefit all members. See In re

Flonase Antitrust Litig., 291 F.R.D. 93, 106 (E.D. Pa. 2013);

Altnor, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 769.

As stated in an affidavit by counsel, plaintiff

meaningfully advanced the litigation by supplying counsel with

information and documents that facilitated their investigation

and the drafting of the complaint, assisting in identifying and

explaining relevant timekeeping and pay practices, and helping

counsel evaluate defendant’s payroll data for purposes of the

damages analysis.

This award is on the high end of service awards

approved in this district made to named plaintiffs in similar

actions. See, e.g., Hall v. Accolade, Inc., No. 17-3423, 2020

WL 1477688, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2020). However, no class

or collective member has objected. In FLSA collective and class

actions where no one has objected, higher service awards have

been granted by this district. See, e.g., In re Janney

Montgomery Scott LLC Fin. Consultant Litig., No. 06-3202, 2009

WL 2137224, at *12 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 2009); Hall v. Accolade,

Inc., No. 17-3423, 2020 WL 1477688, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25,

2020). The court will approve the payment of $10,000 to

Christopher Paraham.

IX

For the foregoing reasons, the court will certify the

FLSA collective and the state law class and finds the terms of

the settlement to be fair and reasonable. The court will

approve the settlement in its entirety and will enter an order

to this effect.