Lewis

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

OCALA DIVISION

JAMES F. LEWIS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 5:25-cv-209-JSS-PRL

BRIAN CAMPBELL and ROBERT S.

CHAUSSE,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

ORDER

Defendants, Brian Campbell and Robert Chausse, move to dismiss the

complaint. (Dkt. 10.) Plaintiff, James Lewis, opposes the motion. (Dkt. 18.) Upon

consideration, for the reasons outlined below, the motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a self-described citizen journalist, activist, and YouTuber. (Dkt.

1 ¶ 6.) According to the complaint, he was filming storefronts while window shopping

when the manager of a local business asked him to stop. (Id. ¶¶ 5–7.) When Plaintiff

refused, she called the police. (Id. ¶ 8.) Defendants are two of the police officers who

were dispatched to the scene. (Id. ¶ 9.)

The entirety of events is captured in Plaintiff’s hour-long video, the recording of

the bank manager’s call to law enforcement, and the officers’ body camera footage.1

(See Dkts. 19, 20, 23.) Initially, Plaintiff’s video shows him strolling through a

shopping complex, pausing on several occasions to film storefront displays featuring

items such as lingerie and luxury women’s clothing. (Dkt. 20, Ex. E at 00:23:00–

00:28:40.) Twenty-five minutes into the video, Plaintiff arrives at a bank. (Id. at

00:24:59.)

As he had done before, Plaintiff approached the bank’s windows to film inside.

(Id. at 00:24:59–00:35:41.) Eventually, Plaintiff came upon a window with a view of

a banker’s computer monitor. (Id. at 00:26:27.) For several minutes, Plaintiff filmed

over the banker’s shoulder. (Id. at 0:26:27–0:28:40.) Eventually, Plaintiff was

discovered, and the bank’s manager came out to confront him. (Id. at 00:28:00–

00:29:00.) During their brief encounter, the bank’s manager asked Plaintiff not to film

through the windows, to protect client information. (Id. at 00:28:40–00:29:00.)

Plaintiff refused. (Id.) Then, the bank’s manager warned Plaintiff that she would call

1 When considering a motion to dismiss, the court “may properly consider a document

not . . . attached to a complaint under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine if the document is (1)

central to the plaintiff’s claims[] and (2) undisputed, meaning that its authenticity is not challenged.”

Johnson v. City of Atlanta, 107 F.4th 1292, 1300 (11th Cir. 2024). In the complaint, Plaintiff refers to

video footage of the relevant events captured on his cell phone and the responding officers’ body

cameras, as well as the 911 call to which the officers were responding. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 5, 8–9, 11, 21.)

Although Plaintiff did not provide copies of these materials in conjunction with his complaint, he did

so in responding to the motion to dismiss. (See Dkt. 20.) Defendants have similarly provided copies

to the court. (Dkt. 23.) All parties have asked the court to consider these materials in deciding the

motion. (See Dkt. 10 at 6–9; see also Dkt. 18 at 6.) The contents of the call and the videos are central

to Plaintiffs’ causes of action, and their authenticity is uncontested. (See Dkt. 19 at 4–5; see also Dkt.

20.) As a result, the court considers the bank manager’s call to law enforcement and the footage

captured by each of the parties as incorporated by reference in the amended complaint. See Johnson,

107 F.4th at 1300.

the police if he continued to film into the bank. (Id. at 00:29:04.) Plaintiff continued

to film. (Id. at 00:29:00–00:35:30, 00:38:32–00:39:00.)

The bank’s manager called the police. During the call, she told the dispatcher

that an unknown man was intentionally filming into her bankers’ offices, where

computer monitors displayed customer information. (Dkt 20, Ex. A at 00:00:08–

00:02:30.) She also told the dispatcher that she had confronted Plaintiff and asked him

to stop filming, but he had refused. (Id. at 00:00:08–00:00:20, 00:01:10–00:02:17.)

According to the bank’s manager, Plaintiff was still walking around the exterior of the

bank and filming through windows, which had led the staff to lock the doors and close

the blinds. (Id. at 00:02:50–00:04:15.)

Several officers arrived shortly thereafter and engaged Plaintiff in a consensual

encounter. (Dkt. 18 at 14.) Plaintiff was aggressive from the start, often yelling at

officers and hurling explicatives, while demanding to know whether the officers were

responding to a call for assistance from the bank or another location in the shopping

plaza. (Dkt. 20, Ex. E at 00:51:10–01:01:00.) Plaintiff also refused to answer questions

or even identify himself. (Id. at 00:53:25–00:53:35, 01:03:25–01:06:48.)

While several officers engaged Plaintiff, Defendant Chausse departed to meet

the staff at the bank. (Dkt. 20, Ex. B at 00:08:35–00:11:00). During their meeting, the

bank’s staff asked that Plaintiff be cited for trespassing. (Id.) Meanwhile, Plaintiff was

detained so officers could determine whether he had committed a crime. (Dkt. 20, Ex.

E at 01:00:59–01:02:43.) Shortly thereafter, the bank’s security officer stepped outside

to tell Plaintiff that he had been trespassed from the bank. (Id. at 01:03:00–01:03:20.)

Plaintiff started to leave but was informed by Defendant Campbell that he was still

detained because the officers needed to investigate and document the trespass. (Id. at

01:03:20–01:06:48.)

Overall, Plaintiff was detained for just under six minutes. (Id. at 01:01:05–

01:06:48.) He now sues Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 22, 26, 29),

alleging that they violated his rights secured by the United States Constitution and

Florida law, (id. ¶¶ 22–31). In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his

Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when

they briefly detained him. (See Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 15–18, 21–25.) In Count II, Plaintiff

seemingly claims that his brief detention constituted a false imprisonment, in violation

of the United States Constitution and Florida law. (Id. ¶¶ 18–21, 26–28.) In Count

III, Plaintiff asserts that his detention violated the First Amendment because the

impetus for the stop was not Defendants’ reasonable suspicion that Plaintiff had

engaged in criminal activity, but retaliation for a lawsuit that he had filed against two

other police officers. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 21, 29–31.)

APPLICABLE STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a complaint

for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

When ruling on such a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all well-pleaded factual

allegations as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Lotierzo v. A Woman’s

World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir. 2002). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6)

challenge, a plaintiff cannot put forth solely “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Instead, the “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quotation omitted). “A complaint is plausible

on its face when it contains sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1296

(11th Cir. 2018) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). To meet this standard, the facts alleged

in the complaint must show more than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556

(2007)).

The allegations of a pro se complaint are subject “to less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165,

1168 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). Courts

therefore “give liberal construction” to pro se filings. Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d

826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007). Nonetheless, the court may not serve as de facto counsel

for a pro se party or rewrite a deficient complaint to sustain a lawsuit. See Campbell,

760 F.3d at 1168–69.

ANALYSIS

Defendants move to dismiss each count. (See Dkt. 10.) Primarily, Defendants

contend that the complaint must be dismissed because they are entitled to qualified

immunity.2 (Id. at 2, 11–20.)

“Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established . . . constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Carruth v. Bentley, 942 F.3d

1047, 1053 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotations omitted). “The purpose of this immunity is to

allow government officials to carry out their discretionary duties without fear of

personal liability or harassing litigation, protecting from suit all but the plainly

incompetent or one who is knowingly violating the federal law.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284

F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation and quotation omitted), overruled in part on

other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009); accord Carruth, 942 F.3d at

1054. “To invoke the defense of qualified immunity, a government official must have

been acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful

acts occurred.” Spencer v. Benison, 5 F.4th 1222, 1230 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation

2 In their motion to dismiss, Defendants also argue that the complaint is a shotgun pleading. (Id. at

2, 9–11.) They further contend that Count II fails to state a claim because violations of state criminal

law cannot support a cause of action under section 1983, and that Count III fails to plead sufficient

facts to state a claim. (Dkt. 10 at 20–25.) The court notes that state law violations cannot support

Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims. See Martes v. Chief Exec. Officer of S. Broward Hosp. Dist., 683 F.3d 1323,

1325 (11th Cir. 2012); Skinner v. City of Miami, 62 F.3d 344, 347 (11th Cir. 1995) (“To succeed, a

section 1983 plaintiff must show a violation of a right secured by federal law.”). Accordingly, the

court limits its consideration to whether Plaintiff has a cause of action under section 1983 for the

purported constitutional violation. In any event, because the court agrees that qualified immunity

applies, it does not address Defendants’ remaining arguments.

omitted). “After a government official establishes that he was acting within the scope

of his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the official’s

conduct (1) violated federal law (2) that was clearly established at the relevant time.”

Id.

Here, the parties agree that Defendants were exercising discretionary authority

as police officers when they detained Plaintiff to conduct an investigatory stop. (Dkt.

10 at 11, 23 n.6; Dkt. 18 at 4, 20.) See Jackson v. City of Atlanta, 97 F.4th 1343, 1356

(11th Cir. 2024) (“There is no dispute that in making an investigatory stop[,] an officer

is exercising a discretionary function.”). Each cause of action stems from Defendants’

conduct in relation to the investigatory stop. (See Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 22–31.) As a result, the

burden shifts to Plaintiff “to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate.” Carruth,

942 F.3d at 1054 (quotation omitted).

Qualified immunity is inappropriate if Plaintiff can show that “(1) the facts

alleged in his complaint constitute a violation of his constitutional rights[] and (2) the

constitutional rights were clearly established when . . . [D]efendant[s] committed the

act complained of.” Morris v. Town of Lexington, 748 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2014)

(quotation omitted). Plaintiff must make these showings on “a claim-by-claim and

defendant-by-defendant basis.” Miller v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 129 F.4th 1329,

1333 (11th Cir. 2025). If Plaintiff fails to make either showing, Defendants are entitled

to qualified immunity for that cause of action. Jacoby v. Baldwin County, 835 F.3d 1338,

1344 (11th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). The court may therefore begin its analysis

with either prong. See Morris, 748 F.3d at 1322; see also Maddox v. Stephens, 727 F.3d

1109, 1121 (11th Cir. 2013) (noting that courts have “flexibility to determine that the

right allegedly violated was not clearly established without deciding whether a

constitutional violation occurred at all”).

A. Counts I and II

A section 1983 plaintiff “must show that he or she was deprived of a federal

right by a person acting under color of state law.” Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d

1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001). In Count I, Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated

his rights secured by the Fourth Amendment when they detained him “without

reasonable suspicion of a crime being afoot.” (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 15–24.) In Count II, he

contends that the same conduct resulted in his false imprisonment, in violation of the

Fourth Amendment. (Id. ¶¶ 26–27.)

“The Fourth Amendment guarantees individuals the right to be free from

unreasonable searches and seizures of their persons.” United States v. Solomon, No.

2:15-CR-142-FTM-38CM, 2016 WL 561420, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2016) (citing

U.S. Const. amend. IV). “Law enforcement officers violate this right if they commit

certain acts without [a] proper basis. A Terry stop is one such act.” Id. (citation

omitted). However, “[t]he law is clearly established that an officer’s brief,

investigatory stop of a suspect does not violate the Fourth Amendment when the

officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Jackson,

97 F.4th at 1355-1356 (quotation omitted); accord Metz v. Bridges, No. 23-11275, 2024

WL 5088586, at *3 (11th Cir. Dec. 12, 2024) (“A brief, investigatory Terry stop does

not violate the Fourth Amendment when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that

the person has committed or is about to commit a crime.” (citing United States v. Jordan,

635 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 2011))). Defendants maintain that they are entitled to

qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims because a reasonable

officer could believe that Plaintiff either had committed, or was about to commit,

several criminal acts, thus providing arguable reasonable suspicion to detain Plaintiff.

(Dkt. 10 at 16–17.)

Reasonable suspicion is a “low bar.” United States v. Black, No. 8:24-CR-113-

KKM-AAS, 2025 WL 2418485, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2025); accord United States

v. Jean-Charles, No. 15-60309-CR, 2016 WL 828830, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2016)

(“The reasonable suspicion required to conduct an investigatory stop is not a high

hurdle.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). To meet this low bar, an officer needs

only “a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” Jackson v. Sauls,

206 F.3d 1156, 1165 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted).

When an officer asserts qualified immunity in the context of an investigatory

stop, that low bar drops even further, as the issue “is not whether reasonable suspicion

existed in fact, but whether the officer had arguable reasonable suspicion to support

an investigatory stop.” Id. at 1166 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Webb v.

English, No. 3:19-CV-975-MMH-JBT, 2021 WL 4340426, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 23,

2021) (explaining that qualified immunity will insulate officers from liability if they

had “an arguably reasonable suspicion that [a person has] violated Florida law, as

opposed to an actual violation”).

Whether an officer has arguable reasonable suspicion to support an

investigatory stop is viewed objectively “‘from the standpoint of a reasonable official

at the scene’ . . . based on the totality of the circumstances.” Young v. Brady, 793 F.

App’x 905, 909 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Hicks v. Moore, 422 F.3d 1246, 1252 (11th

Cir. 2005)). Thus, an officer’s “motive in making the [investigatory] stop does not

invalidate what is otherwise objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth

Amendment.” Jenkins v. Gaither, 543 F. App’x 894, 897 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting

United States v. Harris, 526 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2008)).

In this case, a hypothetical, reasonable officer would have had arguable

reasonable suspicion to believe that Plaintiff had engaged in criminal activity. See

Young, 793 F. App’x at 909. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Torres-

Bonilla illustrates the presence of arguable reasonable suspicion in this case. See 556

F. App’x 875, 879–80 (11th Cir. 2014). In Torres-Bonilla, officers observed Torres-

Bonilla inserting several cards into a series of ATMs and withdrawing cash. Id. at 877.

The officers thought this conduct was suspicious, so they tried to speak with Torres-

Bonilla, but he ran away. Id. When the officers finally caught up to him, they sought

to determine who he was and what he had been doing, but Torres-Bonilla refused to

identify himself. Id. Consequently, officers arrested him for, among other things,

loitering and prowling in violation of section 856.021, Florida Statutes. Id. Having

arrested Torres-Bonilla, officers then searched him and his vehicle, uncovering further

evidence of criminal activity. Id. at 877–78. At trial, Torres-Bonilla moved to suppress

this evidence, contending officers neither had reasonable suspicion to detain nor

probable cause to arrest him. See id. at 878. The court denied the motion, and Torres-

Bonilla was ultimately convicted of several offenses. Id. On appeal, Torres-Bonilla

argued that the district judge erred in denying his motion to suppress. Id. The Eleventh

Circuit upheld the validity of the search, finding that officers had probable cause to

arrest Torres-Bonilla under section 856.021. Id. at 879. In reaching this decision, the

court concluded that officers had probable cause to believe Torres-Bonilla was engaged

in criminal activity when they observed him “loitering at several ATMs in a manner

not usual for law-abiding individuals.” Id. at 880 (quotation and citation omitted).

The court also determined that the circumstances warranted “a justifiable and

reasonable alarm or immediate concern” that the property of others was at risk based

on the man’s suspicious activities and his refusal to identify himself. Id. (quotation

omitted).

Like Torres-Bonilla, Plaintiff was observed acting suspiciously in a place where

financial transactions occur and personal identification information is exchanged.

(Dkt. 20, Ex. E at 00:24:59–00:39:00.) In her call to police, the bank manager reported

that an unknown man, matching Plaintiff’s description, was walking around the

building’s exterior, looking into offices, and intentionally filming computers that

displayed customer information. (See Dkt 20, Ex. A.) This sort of behavior is not

usual for law-abiding individuals. See Torres-Bonilla, 556 F. App’x at 880. Although

Defendants did not witness Plaintiff loitering or filming client information through the

bank’s windows, they had constructive knowledge of his suspicious behavior under

Florida’s fellow officer rule. See State v. Maynard, 783 So. 2d 226, 229 (Fla. 2001)

(imputing knowledge from a dispatcher to the officer who ultimately responded to the

call); see also Terrell v. Smith, 668 F.3d 1244, 1252 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[B]oth the United

States Supreme Court and the Florida Supreme Court have allowed the collective

knowledge of the investigating officers to be imputed to each participating officer.”);

Joseph v. Chronister, No. 8:16-CV-274-T-35CPT, 2020 WL 13657218, at *21 (M.D. Fla.

Feb. 21, 2020) (finding an officer was entitled to qualified immunity under the fellow

officer rule for causes of action emanating from an arrest made upon information

supplied by a fellow deputy). Based on the information relayed by the bank’s manager,

Defendants had arguable reasonable suspicion to believe that Plaintiff was loitering or

prowling “in a place, at a time[,] or in a manner not usual for [a] law-abiding

individual[]” in violation of section 856.021. See Fla. Stat. § 856.021(1). Defendants

also had arguable reasonable suspicion to believe that the circumstances “warrant[ed]

a justifiable and reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of . . . property

in the vicinity,” as required under that statute, because Plaintiff refused to identify

himself. See id.; see also Torres-Bonilla, 556 F. App’x at 880 (“Alarm is presumed under

the second element of § 856.021 if, when law enforcement appears, the

defendant . . . refuses to identify himself.”). Further, Defendants “were entitled to be

reasonably and justifiably concerned that the property of others was at risk,” having

received a report that Plaintiff was filming computer monitors that displayed personal

identification information—such as bank account and payment card numbers—

belonging to the bank’s clients in violation of Florida law. (Dkt 20, Ex. A at 00:00:08–

00:04:15.) This information also provided Defendants with arguable reasonable

suspicion to believe that Plaintiff may have violated section 817.5685, Florida Statutes,

which prohibits “intentionally or knowingly possess[ing], without authorization, the

personal identification information of another person.” See Fla. Stat. § 817.5685(1)–

(2) (defining “personal identification information” to include a person’s “social

security number, . . . bank account number, [and] credit or debit card number”). (See

Dkt 20, Ex. A.)

Under the totality of the circumstances, Defendants had arguable reasonable

suspicion to believe that Plaintiff had engaged in criminal activity. Any subjective

reason that they may have had for detaining him is immaterial. See Jenkins, 543 F.

App’x at 897. Further, because Defendants had arguable reasonable suspicion to

believe criminal activity was afoot, Plaintiff cannot show that Defendants violated his

Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Metz,

2024 WL 5088586, at *3 (citing Jordan, 635 F.3d at 1186). Defendants are therefore

entitled to qualified immunity on Counts I and II.

Even if Defendants did not have arguable reasonable suspicion to detain

Plaintiff consistent with the Fourth Amendment, they are still entitled to qualified

immunity because Plaintiff has not shown that his right not to be detained in this case

was sufficiently well-established that “every reasonable [officer] would have

understood” that Defendants’ conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. Gates, 884

F.3d at 1296 (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). “In other words,

‘existing precedent must have placed the . . . constitutional question beyond debate,’”

thereby giving Defendants fair warning that their conduct violated the law. Id.

(quoting Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664).

A right can be clearly established in one of three ways:

First, the plaintiff can point to a materially similar case decided at the

time of the relevant conduct by the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit,

or the relevant state supreme court. This first method looks at the relevant

[caselaw] at the time of the alleged violation that would have made it

obvious to the officer that his actions violated federal law. The prior

[caselaw] need not be directly on point, but an existing precedent must

have placed the . . . constitutional question beyond debate. Second, the

plaintiff can identify a broader, clearly established principle that should

govern the novel facts of the situation. Third, the plaintiff can show that

the conduct at issue so obviously violated the Constitution that prior

[caselaw] is unnecessary. For this third route, the plaintiff must establish

that the conduct lies so obviously at the core of what the alleged

constitutional amendment prohibits that the unlawfulness of the conduct

was readily apparent to the officer, notwithstanding the lack of fact-

specific [caselaw]. This third method, often referred to as the obvious

clarity scenario, is a narrow exception to the normal rule that only

[caselaw] and specific factual scenarios can clearly establish a violation.

Stalley v. Cumbie, 124 F.4th 1273, 1284 (11th Cir. 2024) (alterations adopted and

quotations omitted).

When a plaintiff attempts to show that the defendant violated a clearly

established right by pointing to a materially similar case, the court must consider

“whether the factual scenario that the official faced [in the present case] is fairly

distinguishable from the circumstances facing [the] government official in [the]

previous case.” Gaines v. Wardynski, 871 F.3d 1203, 1209 (11th Cir. 2017) (quotations

omitted). If caselaw “has not staked out a bright line, qualified immunity almost

always protects the defendant.” Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 907 (11th Cir. 2009)

(quotations omitted).

In opposing Defendant’s entitlement to qualified immunity, Plaintiff directs the

court to several decisions, each of which is inapposite. To begin, the decisions in

Gestewitz v. State of Florida, 34 So. 3d 832 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010), S.N.J. v. State of

Florida, 17 So. 3d 1258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009), and Rodriguez v. State of Florida, 29

So. 3d 310 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009), could not have placed the constitutionality of

Plaintiff’s detention beyond debate because they were not authored by the United

States Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or the Florida Supreme Court. See Stalley,

124 F.4th at 1284. (See also Dkt. 18 at 9, 12, 14, 15.)

Turning to the authoritative decisions in Plaintiff’s brief, the court finds that the

decisions in State of Florida v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 2004), and Papachristou v. City

of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), are too dissimilar to have placed the constitutional

question beyond debate, as neither decision considered the constitutionality of an

investigatory stop. See Gaines, 871 F.3d at 1209. (See also Dkt. 18 at 9, 11, 17.) In J.P.,

the Florida Supreme Court struck down a pair of ordinances imposing curfews on

minors because they were unconstitutionally overbroad, 907 So. 2d at 1112–13, while

the United States Supreme Court in Papachristou held that a traditional vagrancy

ordinance criminalizing activities such as “common night walk[ing],” “wandering or

strolling . . . without any lawful purpose or object,” “habitual loaf[ing],” and

“habitually living upon the earnings” of one’s wife or minor children was

unconstitutionally vague, 405 U.S. at 158 n.1, 162; Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev.,

Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 184 (2004) (“In Papachristou . . ., the Court held that a

traditional vagrancy law was void for vagueness. Its broad scope and imprecise terms

denied proper notice to potential offenders and permitted police officers to exercise

unfettered discretion in the enforcement of the law.”). Plaintiff is not challenging an

ordinance that criminalized his status as a vagrant or that prevented him from being

out after a certain hour. (See Dkt. 1.) See Watts v. State, 463 So. 2d 205, 206–07 (Fla.

1985) (reaffirming the constitutionality of section 856.021); State v. Ecker, 311 So. 2d

104, 107 (Fla. 1975) (distinguishing section 856.021 from the ordinance at issue in

Papachristou because section 856.021 does not broadly proscribe loitering or idling, but

only such conduct “that threatens public safety or a breach of the peace”). Thus, the

decisions in J.P. and Papachristou are too factually attenuated to have given Defendants

fair warning that their conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. See Gates, 884 F.3d

at 1296.

Plaintiff also relies upon Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) to support his

arguments against the application of qualified immunity. (See Dkt. 18 at 10-11.) In

Brown, the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a Terry

stop in which officers detained a man without suspecting him of any “specific

misconduct.” 443 U.S. at 49. Instead, the officers detained him solely “to ascertain

his identity.” Id. at 52. As the Court held, the stop “violated the Fourth Amendment

because the officers lacked any reasonable suspicion to believe [that the man] was engaged

or had engaged in criminal conduct.” Id. at 53 (emphasis added). That is not what

happened here. While Defendant Campbell may have asked Plaintiff to identify

himself during the investigatory stop, that was not the only reason for Plaintiff’s

detention. As discussed, Plaintiff was detained for just under six minutes following a

report that a man matching his description was walking around a bank while videoing

computer monitors that displayed other people’s personal information. (Dkt 20, Ex.

A.) As a result, Plaintiff has not cited a decision of the United States Supreme Court,

Eleventh Circuit, or Florida Supreme Court applying the Fourth Amendment right

against unreasonable searches and seizures to a sufficiently similar factual scenario

such that it would have put the unconstitutionality of Plaintiff’s detention beyond

debate. See Gaines, 871 F.3d at 1209–10.

Nor has Plaintiff identified a broad, yet clearly established, principle in the

Constitution or an authoritative decision that is “specific enough to establish clearly

the law applicable to” Defendants’ conduct and the circumstances of this case such

that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. See Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d

1340, 1350 (11th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff cites the Fourth Amendment as the source of his

right, but the Amendment’s language is too broad to place the constitutionality of

Plaintiff’s detention beyond debate. See City [and] County of San Francisco v. Sheehan,

575 U.S. 600, 613 (2015) (“Qualified immunity is no immunity at all if clearly

established law can simply be defined as the right to be free from unreasonable searches

and seizures.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559

(1979) (“The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of

precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need

for the particular search [or seizure] against the invasion of personal rights that [it]

entails.” (emphasis added)); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59 (1967) (“[W]hether a

search and seizure is unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment

depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. . .” (citations omitted)).

Because the Fourth Amendment’s broad prohibition against unreasonable searches

and seizures does not place the constitutionality of Plaintiff’s detention beyond debate,

it could not have provided Defendants with fair warning that their conduct violated

the law. See Gates, 884 F.3d at 1296. Thus, Plaintiff needed to identify an authoritative

decision that was sufficiently specific to provide Defendants with fair warning that

their conduct was unlawful. See Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1350.

Broad statements of principle in authoritative judicial decisions can show that

a constitutional right was clearly established when they “are not tied to [the]

particularized facts” of the case and can thus establish a clear, broad principle that can

be applied to “different sets of detailed facts.” Id. at 1351. Still, there is a presumption

that judge-made law does not create “wide principles of law.” Id. Thus, “if a broad

principle in [caselaw] is to establish clearly the law applicable to a specific set of facts

facing a governmental official, it must do so with obvious clarity to the point that every

objectively reasonable government official facing the circumstances would know that

the official’s conduct did violate federal law when the official acted.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). “[G]eneral, conclusory allegations or broad legal truisms”

will not do. Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir. 1993)

(quotations omitted).

Plaintiff quotes several broad passages from Brown, J.P., Papachristou, and

Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991), none of which clearly establish a principle that

would have given Defendants “fair warning . . . that the conduct at issue violated a

constitutional right.” Gaines, 871 F.3d at 1208. For instance, Plaintiff derives the

principle that “[a]ll Florida citizens have a right under the Florida Constitution to chat

on a public street, stroll aimlessly, and saunter down a sidewalk” from the Florida

Supreme Court’s decision in J.P. (See Dkt. 18 at 9 (quotation omitted).) He further

cites Papachristou for the premise that “[h]ailing a cab or a friend, chatting on a public

street, and simply strolling aimlessly are time-honored pastimes in our society and are

clearly protected under Florida as well as federal law.” (Id. at 11.) Finally, Plaintiff

points to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Bostick for the rule that police

must have reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain a citizen and the Court’s earlier

opinion in Brown for the rule that “detaining a person for the purpose of requiring him

to identify himself constitutes a seizure requiring a reasonable, articulable suspicion

that a crime had just been, was being, or was about to be committed.” (Id. at 10–11,

12 (quotations omitted).) These legal propositions are too broad to provide a

hypothetical, reasonable officer with fair warning that detaining Plaintiff would violate

the Fourth Amendment, as Plaintiff was not detained while chatting on a public street,

strolling aimlessly, or hailing a friend. See Post, 7 F.3d at 1557 (“To show the law is

clearly established, a plaintiff cannot rely on general, conclusory allegations or broad

legal truisms.” (quotations omitted)). Further, the decisions in Bostick and Brown

cannot provide the clear, broad principle that Plaintiff needs to overcome Defendants’

entitlement to qualified immunity, because their rules are tied to the particular facts of

those cases. Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1351. As discussed, Brown turned on the officers’

utter lack of reasonable suspicion. See 443 U.S. at 49. Bostick is similarly confined to

its particular facts because the state had previously conceded that the officers “lacked

the reasonable suspicion required to justify a seizure.” 501 U.S. at 433–34. Thus, the

sole issue on appeal was “whether a police encounter on a bus of the type described [in the

briefing] constitute[d] a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Id.

at 433 (emphasis added). Still, even if the decisions in Bostick and Brown were not so

confined, they do not state principles that would have given Defendants fair warning

that Plaintiff’s detention violated the Fourth Amendment, as Defendants had arguable

reasonable suspicion to detain Plaintiff. See Gates, 884 F.3d at 1296. At bottom, the

principles that Plaintiff extracts from Bostick, Brown, J.P., and Papachristou do not

establish clear legal principles that would have led every objectively reasonable officer

to conclude that Defendants’ conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.

Finally, Plaintiff has not shown that this case fits within the “narrow exception

to the normal rule that only [caselaw] and specific factual scenarios can clearly

establish a violation.” Stalley, 124 F.4th at 1284 (quotations omitted). This final

method for demonstrating that a right is clearly established is “reserved for extreme

circumstances presenting particularly egregious facts that would have put any

reasonable officer on notice that his actions offended the Constitution.” Demarcus v.

Univ. of S. Ala., 133 F.4th 1305, 1319 (11th Cir. 2025) (quotations omitted). Cases

falling within this category “are few and far between[] and . . . invariably deal with

conduct that is beyond any reasonable pale.” Id. Plaintiff does not allege such

conduct.

Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that Defendants violated his Fourth

Amendment rights or that his purported constitutional right not to be detained in this

case was sufficiently well-established that “every reasonable [officer] would have

understood” that Defendants’ conduct violated the Constitution. See Gates, 884 F.3d

at 1296. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Counts I and

II.

B. Count III

Count III is a section 1983 claim asserting that Defendants deprived Plaintiff of

his First Amendment rights when they detained him in retaliation for suing two other

police officers. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 29–30.) Thus, the viability of Plaintiff’s First Amendment

claim turns on the legality of his detention. See Gates, 884 F.3d at 1298 (“[W]hen an

officer has arguable probable cause to arrest, he is entitled to qualified immunity both

from Fourth Amendment claims for false arrest and from First Amendment claims

stemming from the arrest.”); Redd v. City of Enterprise, 140 F.3d 1378, 1383 (11th Cir.

1998) (“Because . . . the officers had arguable probable cause to arrest [the

plaintiff,] . . . the officers are also entitled to qualified immunity from the . . . First

Amendment claims.” (citation omitted)). Because Defendants had arguable

reasonable suspicion to detain Plaintiff and are entitled to qualified immunity on his

Fourth Amendment claims arising from the detention, they are also entitled to

qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiff's First Amendment claim. See Bannister v.

Conway, No. 1:12-CV-1487-TWT, 2013 WL 5770802, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 23, 2013)

(“A plaintiff may not sustain a First Amendment retaliation claim based on acts

protected by qualified immunity.”).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly:

1. Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. 10) is GRANTED.

2. The complaint (Dkt. 1) is DISMISSED with PREJUDICE.

3. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly, terminate any

pending motions, and close this case.

ORDERED in Ocala, Florida, on October 14, 2025.

JUVIE S. SNEED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

Unrepresented Party

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