Carson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

BRIAN WASHINGTON

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 25-1618

CARSON, ET AL. SECTION “R”(1)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Brian Washington, a pretrial detainee at St. Tammany Parish Jail, filed this pro

se and in forma pauperis civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Washington sued defendants

“Carson,” Lt. Moore, “Richmond,” Captain Galloway, “Lungford,” J. Harrington, Andrea Albert,

Stephen Eckholdt, and Galloway Law Firm. In the complaint, Washington complains of retaliation

since her1 incarceration in March 2025, defamation, and that the jail has no law library.

Federal law requires that this matter be screened. For example, with respect to actions, such

as this one, which are filed in forma pauperis, federal law mandates:

Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the

court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that ... the action …

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

In addition, because Washington is incarcerated, screening is also required by 28 U.S.C. §

1915A. That statute mandates that federal courts “review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any

event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks

1 Washington identifies as a transgender woman. This Court will refer to Washington using feminine pronouns.

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.”2 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). Regarding such lawsuits, the statute similarly provides:

On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or

any portion of the complaint, if the complaint –

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted; or

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

A claim is frivolous “if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.” Reeves v. Collins, 27 F.3d

174, 176 (5th Cir. 1994). When making that determination, the Court has “not only the authority

to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to

pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual

contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Macias v. Raul

A. (Unknown), Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994).

A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when the plaintiff does

not “plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Factual allegations

must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the

allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” In re Katrina Canal Breaches

Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (footnote, citation, and quotation marks omitted).

The United States Supreme Court has held:

A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability

requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a

2 “As used in this section, the term ‘prisoner’ means any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused

of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions

of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c).

defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility

of entitlement to relief.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Washington filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In pertinent part, that statute

provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to

be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, “[t]o state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the

violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that

the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins,

487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

I. Discussion

A. Retaliation

Washington admits that she has commenced other lawsuits in state or federal court dealing

with the same facts involved in this action or relating to her imprisonment.3

It is proper to dismiss an action on the basis that it is malicious and frivolous if it duplicates

claims raised by the same plaintiff in previous or pending litigation. See Roberson v. Breen, 444

F. App’x 841, 842 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Pittman v. Moore, 980 F.2d 994, 994-95 (5th Cir. 1993)).

3 Rec. Doc. 3 at 1 ¶ 1(A). Since March 2025, and including the instant action, Washington has filed a total 12 federal

civil rights actions. Washington v. St. Tammany Parish Jail, et al., No. 25-649 “T”(2); Washington v. St. Tammany

Parish Jail, et al., No. 25-882 “T”(2); Washington v. Galloway, et al., No. 25-883 “T”(2); Washington v. Harrington,

et al., No. 25-1144 “T”(2); Washington v. Mendo, No. 25-1285 “T”(2); Washington v. Commissary Store, et al., No.

25-1286 “T”(2); Washington v. Galloway, et al., No. 25-1287 “B”(5) (dismissed without prejudice as malicious);

Washington v. Kairdorf, et al., No. 25-1436 “T”(2); Washington v. Mendo, et al., No. 25-1617 “I”(4); Washington v.

St. Tammany Parish Jail, et al., No. 25-1834 “B”(4); and Washington v. St. Tammany Parish Jail, et al., No. 25-1835

“D”(1). In a majority of these cases, Washington asserts claims that she was sexually assaulted and is being subjected

to retaliation.

“When declaring that a successive in forma pauperis suit is ‘malicious’ the court should insure that

the plaintiff obtains one bite at the litigation apple – but not more.” Pittman, 980 F.2d at 995.

In this case, Washington asserts retaliation claims against defendants Captain Galloway,

Andrea Albert, Stephen Eckholdt, Galloway Law Firm, Harrington, Richmond, and Lungford. The

retaliation claims are repetitive to claims asserted in prior cases against them. The lead case,

Washington v. St. Tammany Parish Jail, et al., No. 25-649 “T”(2), is currently pending, along with

consolidated member cases, Nos. 25-882 “T”(2); 25-883 “T”(2), 25-1144 “T”(2), 25-1285 “T”(2),

25-1286 “T”(2), 25-1436 “T”(2), and 25-1617 “T”(2).4 Although Washington now adds

defendants Carson and Moore, who were not named as defendants in the prior actions, duplicative

claims are subject to dismissal as malicious even if brought against defendants not named in the

previous litigation. Lewis v. Sec’y of Pub. Safety & Corr., 508 F. App’x 341, 344 & n. 2 (5th Cir.

2013) (“A case is duplicative if it involves ‘the same series of events’ and allegations of ‘many of

the same facts as an earlier suit.’”); Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1988)

(affirming dismissal of successive complaint suing different defendants but repeating the same

factual allegations asserted in earlier case).5

Therefore, Washington’s claims of retaliation in this lawsuit are subject to dismissal as

malicious without prejudice to her pursuing the claims in her prior pending consolidated lawsuit.

B. Access to the Courts

Washington implies that she is being denied her constitutionally protected right of access

4 That litigation is being screened by United States Magistrate Judge Donna Phillips Currault, who recently held a

Spears hearing in the matter. See Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985). “[T]he Spears procedure affords

the plaintiff an opportunity to verbalize his complaints, in a manner of communication more comfortable to many

prisoners.” Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005-06 (5th Cir. 1998).

5 An amended petition in Washington’s pending litigation is optional, as the Fifth Circuit observed in Lewis. Lewis,

508 F.2d at 1021 n. 2 (“That the instant complaint names three different defendants does not change the result

[because] Lewis may seek to amend his complaint in the first lawsuit, under Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, to name the three new defendants.”).

to courts because there is no traditional law library at St. Tammany Parish jail. She also claims

that she has been “refused pauper forms” by the mail room.6

Inmates clearly have a constitutional right of access to the courts, and that right extends to

pretrial detainees. See United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 743 (7th Cir. 1988); Wetzel

v. Strain, No. 09-7048, 2010 WL 744993, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 26, 2010); Kirkpatrick v. Daugherty,

No. 6:05cv461, 2006 WL 2401108, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2006). However, that right does not

encompass “an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance” in prison. See Lewis

v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). Further, “[w]hile the precise contours of a prisoner’s right of

access to the courts remain somewhat obscure, the Supreme Court has not extended this right to

encompass more than the ability of an inmate to prepare and transmit a necessary legal document

to a court.” Vaccaro v. United States, 125 F.3d 852, 1997 WL 574977, at *1 (5th Cir. 1997)

(quotation omitted).

Significantly, an access to the courts claim is cognizable only if the alleged deprivation

resulted in actual prejudice to the plaintiff in her litigation. See, e.g., Chriceol v. Phillips, 169 F.3d

313, 317 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[A]n inmate alleging denial of access to the courts must demonstrate an

actual injury stemming from defendants’ unconstitutional conduct.”); Ruiz v. United States, 160

F.3d 273, 275 (5th Cir. 1998); McDonald v. Steward, 132 F.3d 225, 230-31 (5th Cir. 1998)

(“[B]efore a prisoner may prevail on a claim that his constitutional right of access to the courts

was violated, he must demonstrate that his position as a litigant was prejudiced by his denial of

access to the courts.” (quotation marks omitted)); Walker v. Navarro County Jail, 4 F.3d 410, 413

(5th Cir. 1993). The plaintiff must “demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings ... hindered [her]

efforts to pursue a legal claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. In Lewis, the Supreme Court made clear

6 Rec. Doc. 3 at 4.

that an inmate must establish actual injury to state a claim for denial of her right of access to the

courts. In examining the particular claims of the inmates in the Lewis case, the Court stated that

the First Amendment right of prisoners to access to the courts is the right to “have a reasonably

adequate opportunity to file nonfrivolous legal claims challenging their convictions or conditions

of confinement.” Id. at 356.

It is unclear whether Washington is claiming that she is being denied access to the state

criminal court. Regardless, Washington testified at a Spears hearing related to her previous civil

rights litigation that she is represented by counsel in her state criminal proceedings. As such, to

the extent that she claims a denial of access to the state criminal court, her claim is foreclosed. See

Dickinson v. TX, Fort Bend County, 325 F. App’x 389, 390 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Because Dickinson

had court-appointed counsel to represent him, he did not have a constitutional right of access to a

law library to prepare his criminal defense.”); Ashcraft v. Cameron County, No. 97-41219, 1998

WL 611201, at *3 (5th Cir. Aug. 17, 1998) (“A criminal defendant cannot complain that he was

denied access to the courts while represented by counsel.”); Ford v. Foti, No. 94-30614, 1995 WL

241811, at *3 (5th Cir. Apr. 14, 1995) (“A criminal defendant who is represented by counsel has

meaningful access to the courts vis-a-vis the criminal action pending against him.”); Childs v.

Scott, No. 94-60723, 1995 WL 153057 (5th Cir. Mar. 22, 1995) (“If a criminal defendant is

represented by counsel, he has constitutionally sufficient access to the courts.”); Webb v. Havins,

No. 93-1452, 1994 WL 286151, at *3 (5th Cir. June 13, 1994); Crockett v. Carpenter, No. 93-

1480, 1994 WL 144645, at *3 (5th Cir. Apr. 5, 1994). Further, Washington fails to allege that she

was deprived of an opportunity to present any relevant and non-frivolous issues to the state

criminal court through her counsel; therefore, she fails to allege a “relevant actual injury” caused

by the denial of access to the law library.

Second, it is clear that Washington’s ability to exercise her right of access to the courts for

purposes of civil litigation has not been unduly impeded. Indeed, as previously explained, she has

been prolific in filing twelve federal civil rights lawsuits since March 2025. Two of those lawsuits

were filed just one month after the instant lawsuit.7 It is clear that no actual legal prejudice to

Washington’s position as a litigant of the type required by Lewis was caused by any action or

omission of the defendants relating to the lack of a traditional law library. “[C]ausation is an

element of a [S]ection 1983 claim; [defendants’] actions must have actually caused the deprivation

... of which [plaintiff] complains.” Hart v. O’Brien, 127 F.3d 424, 446 (5th Cir. 1997), abrogated

in part on other grounds as recognized in Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999); accord

Brown v. Bryan County, OK, 219 F.3d 450, 457 (5th Cir. 2000). Washington has not shown how

the alleged lack of a traditional law library caused her any actual injury to her position as a litigant

in these matters. Ike v. Sweet, No. 2:11-cv-2188, 2014 WL 5312527, at *1-2 (W.D. La. Oct. 16,

2014) (dismissing claim of denial of access to the courts for failure to demonstrate any injury

resulting from defendants’ alleged actions, including failing to provide access to law library and

legal forms, where prisoner had filed at least 18 lawsuits).

While Washington specifically claims that defendants have failed to provide her with

copies of the form pauper application, she has not demonstrated any resulting prejudice. Court

records demonstrate that in this case, and the six cases previously filed wherein Washington

initially failed to file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, the Clerk’s Office provided

Washington with the forms, she subsequently submitted the completed pauper applications, and

was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.8 Accordingly, she suffered no prejudice as a result

7 Washington v. St. Tammany Parish Jail et al., No. 25-1835 “B”(4) and Washington v. St. Tammany Parish Jail, et

al., No. 25-1835 “D”(1).

8 Those cases are as follows: Washington v. St. Tammany Parish Jail, et al., No. 25-882 “T”(2) at Rec. Docs. 2, 4, 5;

Washington v. Harrington, et al., No. 25-1144 “T”(2) at Rec. Docs. 2, 5, 7; Washington v. Mendo, No. 25-1285 “T”(2)

of the defendants’ failure to provide her with pauper application forms, and so her access-to-courts

claims should be dismissed. See Ford v. Foti, No. 94-30614, 1995 WL 241811, at *3 (5th Cir. Apr.

14, 1995) (although inmate was denied forms by jail officials, he was not prejudiced, and therefore

not denied access to the courts, because he could pursue relief in a timely manner after obtaining

the forms directly from the court); see also Petty v. Kelly, No. 02-41231, 2003 WL 21756716, at

*1 (5th Cir. June 24, 2003) (finding no access-to-courts violation where inmate “was able to file

the complaint that he sought to file”); Ike, 2014 WL 5312527, at *1-2.

For the foregoing reasons, Washington’s claims concerning inadequate access to the court

are legally frivolous and fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1983, and

the claims should be dismissed.

C. State Law Claims

Collins also asserts a claim for defamation. It is unclear if she intended to assert any other

state law claims. Regardless, the Court should decline to consider any state law claims against

defendants because Washington lacks a valid federal claim. Batiste v. Island Records, Inc., 179

F.3d 217, 227 (5th Cir. 1999). The Court therefore recommends that jurisdiction be declined over

any supplemental state law claims against these defendants and that those claims be dismissed

without prejudice.

at Rec. Docs. 2, 4, 7; Washington v. Commissary Store, et al., No. 25-1286 “T”(2) at Rec. Docs. 2, 4, 6; Washington

v. Galloway, et al., No. 25-1287 “B” at Rec. Docs. 2, 4, 5; Washington v. Kairdorf, et al., No. 25-1436 “M”(2) at Rec.

Docs. 2, 4, 5; Washington v. Mendo, et al., No. 25-1617 “I”(4) at Rec. Docs. 2, 4, 6. The Court recognizes that

Washington also failed to submit pauper applications in her two most recent cases. However, the Clerk’s Office mailed

her pauper application forms to complete with a return date of September 29, 2025. Washington v. St. Tammany

Parish Jail, et al., No. 25-1834 “B”(4) at Rec. Doc. 2; Washington v. St. Tammany Parish Jail et al., 25-1835 “D”(1)

at Rec. Doc. 2.

RECOMMENDATION

It is therefore RECOMMENDED that Washington’s federal civil rights claims against

defendants for retaliation be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to their prosecution in Civil

Action No. 25-649 “T”(2).?

It is FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Washington’s federal civil rights claims against

defendants for denial of access to courts be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

It is FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Collins’s state law claims be DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and

recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within fourteen (14) days after

being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on

appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district

court, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will result from

a failure to object. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d

1415, 1430 (Sth Cir. 1996) (en banc).

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 15th day of September, 2025.

{loan

JANIS\VAN MEERVELD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

° In the event that the District Judge determines that the retaliation claims should not be dismissed as malicious, the

undersigned alternatively recommends that this action be transferred to Section T and Magistrate Division 2 pursuant

to Local Rule 3.1.1 for handling and possible consolidation with Civil Action 25-649 “T”(2).