Anderson

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ROCK ISLAND DIVISION

MILTON ANDERSON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 4:25-cv-04154-JEH

GREG DONATHAN, et al.,

Defendants.

Merit Review Order

Plaintiff Milton Anderson, proceeding pro se and civilly detained in the

Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility (“Rushville”) pursuant to the Illinois

Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1, pursues an action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged constitutional violations. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff seeks

leave to proceed in forma pauperis and to waive the reduced filing fee. (Docs. 3, 6).

The “privilege to proceed without posting security for costs and fees is reserved

to the many truly impoverished litigants who, within the District Court’s sound

discretion, would remain without legal remedy if such privilege were not afforded

to them.” Brewster v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 461 F.2d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 1972). A

court must dismiss cases proceeding in forma pauperis “at any time” if the action is

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim, even if part of the filing fee has been

paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)(2). Accordingly, this Court will grant leave to proceed in

forma pauperis only if the Complaint states a federal claim.

This case is before the Court for a merit review of Plaintiff’s Complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s Complaint and

dismiss any legally insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. § 1915A. A

claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the Complaint, the Court

accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in the Plaintiff’s

favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory

statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a

claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418,

422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

I

Plaintiff files suit against Program Director Greg Donathan, Program

Administrator Sharon Coleman-Weems, Assistant Program Director Erin Posey,

Cheryle Hinthorne, Security Director Ham, Internal Investigator Waterkotte, and

Security Therapy Aides Logan, Ryan Kerr, and Wear.

On September 6, 2023, Plaintiff was forced into a suicide watch cell and

stripped of his clothing, even though he was not suicidal. Plaintiff does not specify

who allegedly placed him in a suicide watch cell or took his clothing. When

Plaintiff was naked, Defendants Logan and Kerr allegedly made lewd comments

regarding Plaintiff’s body. Plaintiff wrote to Defendant Coleman-Weems, but she

did not respond or take action.

On January 3, 2024, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Wear searched his cell for a

MP3 player. Plaintiff states his MP3 player was in his t-shirt near his stomach area.

During a pat down, Plaintiff alleges he was restrained or held by another

unidentified Security Therapy Aide. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Wear “rubbed his

hand(s) from behind on my genitals focusing only on my penis and testic[les]

before he probed my anus by separating my buttocks, he was making unusual

sounds.” (Doc. 1 at p. 10). Plaintiff alleges he cried for help but was ignored.

Plaintiff alleges he now suffers from severe panic attacks and sleep deprivation.

Plaintiff alleges Defendants Donathan, Coleman-Weems, Posey, Hinthorne,

and Ham were aware of the verbal and sexual abuse Plaintiff experienced by

through the Attempt to Resolve and grievance process. Plaintiff alleges

Defendants failed to take action or investigate the abuse.

II

Plaintiff alleges Defendants Logan and Kerr made lewd sexual remarks

about his body on September 6, 2023. “Verbal harassment generally does not rise

to the level of a constitutional violation, though some harassment may be serious

enough to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.” Boston v. Brown, No. 25-CV-

1525-DWD, 2025 WL 2377992, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2025) (citing Beal v. Foster, 803

F.3d 356, 358 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding that verbal sexual harassment, accompanied

by suggestive gestures, that created a risk both from the harasser and fellow

inmates, was sufficient to proceed beyond initial review)). “[M]ost verbal

harassment by jail or prison guards does not rise to the level of cruel and unusual

punishment.” Beal, 803 F.3d at 358; see also Smith v. Myers, No.

118CV02255TWPDLP, 2018 WL 3631285, at *1 (S.D. Ind. July 30, 2018)

(“[A]lthough indefensible and unprofessional, isolated verbal abuse, harassment,

and unprofessional conduct do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation for

which relief may be granted in a civil rights case.”) (citing DeWalt v. Carter, 224

F.3d 607, 612 n. 3 (7th Cir. 2000)). Defendants’ sexually suggestive or humiliating

comments do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Defendants Logan

and Kerr are dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and § 1915A.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Wear sexually assaulted him during a body

search on January 3, 2024. As a civil detainee, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is governed

by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Miranda v. Cnty. of Lake,

900 F.3d 335 (7 Cir. 2018). “Civilly committed detainees are entitled to ‘protection

against cruel and inhumane treatment’ under the Due Process Clause that is ‘at

least as extensive as that afforded to prisoners by the Eighth Amendment.’” Hughes

v. Farris, 809 F.3d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 893

(7th Cir. 2008)).

Generally, “only those [bodily] searches that are maliciously motivated,

unrelated to institutional security, and hence totally without penological

justification are considered unconstitutional.” Whitman v. Nesic, 368 F.3d 931, 934

(7th Cir. 2004). This is because inmate searches are critical to the security of an

institution, and prison officials are permitted to touch, pat down, and search a

prisoner to determine whether the prisoner is hiding anything dangerous on his

person. Id. However, “[a]n unwanted touching of a person's private parts,

intended to humiliate the victim or gratify the plaintiff's sexual desires, can violate

a prisoner's constitutional rights.” Washington v. Hively, 695 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir.

2012). Accordingly, to prove a due process claim, the plaintiff must show that a

search was “conducted in a harassing manner intended to humiliate and inflict

psychological pain.” Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 939 (7th Cir. 2003). Based on

his allegations, the Court finds Plaintiff has alleged a Fourteenth Amendment

substantive due process claim against Defendant Wear based on allegedly groping

Plaintiff’s genitals and probing his anus without penological justification during a

pat down search on January 3, 2024.

Plaintiff alleges Defendants Donathan, Coleman-Weems, Posey, Hinthorne,

and Ham were aware of the verbal and sexual abuse by reading about the abuse

through the Attempt to Resolve and grievance procedures. Section 1983 does not

allow actions against individuals based on their supervisory role of others.

Individual liability under § 1983 can only be based upon a finding that the

defendant caused the deprivation alleged. Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir.

1996) (“Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and

predicated upon fault; thus, liability does not attach unless the individual

defendant caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.”). Simply

receiving correspondence from a prisoner does not make a prison official liable for

the alleged constitutional violation. Norington v. Daniels, No. 11- 282, 2011 WL

5101943, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 25, 2011); see also Diaz v. McBride, No. 93-176, 1994

WL 750707, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 30, 1994) (plaintiff cannot establish personal

involvement and subject a prison official to liability under § 1983, merely by

sending the official various letters or grievances). Defendants Donathan, Coleman-

Weems, Posey, Hinthorne, and Ham are dismissed without prejudice for failure to

state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and § 1915A.

Finally, Plaintiff named Waterkotte as a Defendant, but Plaintiff did not

include any specific allegations about Waterkotte in his Complaint. Therefore,

Waterkotte is dismissed without prejudice.

III

Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 3)

and a Motion to Waive Fees (Doc. 6).

For indigent plaintiffs who are institutionalized, but not prisoners, as

defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), the Court employs a reduced filing fee procedure

that assesses an initial, partial filing fee equal to 50% of the plaintiff’s average

monthly income for six months preceding the filing of the complaint, except when

trust fund ledgers show an average monthly balance of $1.00. The Court permits

a plaintiff an opportunity to request a waiver of any fee assessed.

When Plaintiff sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis and submitted his

trust fund ledger in September 2025, his average monthly income for the six

months prior was $25.01. (Doc. 5). Accordingly, the Court assessed an initial filing

fee of $12.51 and directed Plaintiff to pay the fee within 14 days or to file a motion

to waive fee demonstrating good cause for a waiver. (d/e 9/10/2025). Plaintiff

now asks the Court to waive the reduced fee because he does not have sufficient

funds in his trust account to pay the fee. (Doc. 6).

In his Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis, Plaintiff states he has

no money in a checking or savings account, assets, or income. (Doc. 3). Plaintiff’s

trust fund ledger indicates that he has $11.23 in his account and therefore lacks the

funds to pay reduced filing fee of $12.51. (Doc. 5). The Court finds good cause to

waive the filing fee. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma

pauperis and Motion to Waive Fee are GRANTED. The reduced filing fee is waived.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) According to the Court's Merit Review of Plaintiff's Complaint under

28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this case shall proceed on a Fourteenth Amendment substantive

due process claim against Defendant Wear based on allegedly groping Plaintiff's

genitals and probing his anus without penological justification during a pat down

on January 3, 2024. Additional claims shall not be included in the case above,

except in the Court's discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

2) Defendants Greg Donathan, Sharon Coleman, Erin Posey, Cheryle

Hinthorne, Ham, Waterkotte, Logan, and Ryan Kerr are DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Clerk is directed to TERMINATE them as

parties.

3) Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis [3] and

Motion to Waive Fee [6] are GRANTED. The reduced filing fee is waived.

4) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff

to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendant before filing any motions to give

Defendant notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed

before Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as

premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time unless

otherwise directed by the Court.

5) The Court will attempt service on Defendant by mailing a waiver of

service. If Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within

30 days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect

formal service through the U.S. Marshals Service on Defendant and will require

Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 4(d)(2).

6) Defendant shall file an answer within 60 days of the date the Clerk

sends the waiver of service. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer

should include all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and

subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. In

general, an answer sets forth Defendant’s positions. The Court does not rule on

the merits of those positions unless and until Defendant files a motion. Therefore,

no response to the answer is necessary or will be considered. If Defendant has not

filed an answer or appeared through counsel within 90 days of the entry of this

Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After Defendant

has been served, the Court will enter a scheduling order setting discovery and

dispositive motion deadlines.

7) If Defendant no longer works at the address Plaintiff provided, the

entity for whom Defendant worked while at that address shall submit to the Clerk

Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, Defendant’s forwarding

address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service.

Documentation of Defendant’s forwarding address shall be retained only by the

Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

8) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendant’s

counsel has filed an appearance, Defendant’s counsel will automatically receive

electronic notice of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk.

Plaintiff does not need to mail to Defendant’s counsel copies of motions and other

documents that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk. However, this does not apply to

discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses are not filed

with the Clerk. Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and responses directly

to Defendant’s counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent to the Clerk will be

returned unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of a motion to compel.

Discovery does not begin until Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance and

the Court has entered a scheduling order, which will explain the discovery process

in more detail.

9) Defendant’s counsel is hereby granted leave to depose Plaintiff at

Plaintiff’s place of confinement. Defendant’s counsel shall arrange the time for the

deposition.

10) Plaintiff shall immediately inform the Court, in writing, of any change

in his mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to notify the Court

of a change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this

lawsuit, with prejudice.

11) Plaintiff shall be provided a copy of all pertinent medical records

upon request.

12) Within 10 days of receiving from Defendant’s counsel an

authorization to release medical records, Plaintiff is directed to sign and return the

authorization to Defendant’s counsel. The Clerk is directed to enter the standard

qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act.

13) The Clerk is directed to set an internal court deadline 60 days from

the entry of this Order for the Court to check on the status of service and enter

scheduling deadlines.

It is so ordered.

Entered: October 14, 2025

s/Jonathan E. Hawley

U.S. District Judge