Everett

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

TORRIAUN R. EVERETT,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 1:25-CV-376 DRL-SJF

INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTION, LLOYD ARNOLD,

CHARLES BOWEN, RHONDA

THOMAS-HARDY, SMITH,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Torriaun R. Everett, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a complaint. ECF 1. “A

document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotations and citations omitted).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court still must review the merits of a prisoner complaint

and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant.

Mr. Everett’s complaint centers on events that occurred at the Chain O’Lakes Re-

Entry Center during a heat wave at the end of June 2025. He complains that the facility

did not have an adequate heat exhaustion procedure in place, such as providing for cool

showers or medical screenings of vulnerable inmates. He further complains that facility

staff confiscated the cooling towel he was using to alleviate the effects of the heat. The

grievances attached to the complaint explain that the towel was confiscated because it

was not purchased through commissary. He was told, “Cooling towels are a ‘commissary

only’ item that may only be purchased form commissary. Any exception to this must first

be approved by the facility before you have item sent in on your own.” ECF 1 at 12.

Mr. Everett responds that commissary was sold out of cooling towels at the time.

Mr. Everett alleges he has anxiety, depression, and a respiratory condition, all of

which are exacerbated by the heat. He alleges he could not regulate the excessive heat,

and this impaired his ability to complete routine grooming and impacted his ability to

sleep. The heat also caused a loss of appetite, which led him to miss multiple meals and

recreational activities.

Mr. Everett first raises a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),

42 U.S.C §§ 12131–12134. He alleges that Chain O’Lakes’ failure to have an adequate heat

exhaustion policy in place disadvantaged inmates with disabilities more than inmate

without disabilities. His claim seems to be that the facility did not provide him with a

reasonable accommodation for his disability in the form of a cooling towel, and this

prevented him from taking full advantage of meals and other recreational activities.

Title II of the ADA provides that qualified individuals with disabilities may not

“be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or

activities of a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Prisons and correctional facilities are

public entities within the purview of Title II. See Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206,

210 (1998). “Disability” in this context means: “(1) a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (2) a record

of such an impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment.” Steffen v.

Donahoe, 680 F.3d 738, 743 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal alteration omitted).

Mr. Evertt does not state a claim under the ADA because he has not plausibly

alleged that he is a person with a disability as the ADA defines it. He says he has anxiety,

depression, and unspecified respiratory problems. But there are no allegations that these

conditions substantially limit a major life activity. The regulations explain that:

Major life activities include, but are not limited to:

(i) Caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating,

sleeping, walking, standing, sitting, reaching, lifting, bending, speaking,

breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating,

interacting with others, and working; and

(ii) The operation of a major bodily function, including functions of the

immune system, special sense organs and skin; normal cell growth; and

digestive, genitourinary, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory,

circulatory, cardiovascular, endocrine, hemic, lymphatic, musculoskeletal,

and reproductive functions. . . .

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1). Mr. Everett does not say what his respiratory problems are or

whether they are severe enough to constitute a disability as defined by the ADA.

Depression and anxiety can be covered disabilities under the ADA if those conditions

substantially limit the plaintiff’s ability to perform a major life activity. See Schneiker v.

Fortis Ins. Co., 200 F.3d 1055, 1061 (7th Cir. 2000). But “[a] plaintiff alleging discrimination

on the basis of an actual disability under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) must allege a specific

disability.” Tate v. SCR Med. Transp., 809 F.3d 343, 345 (7th Cir. 2015). Mr. Everett’s

complaint is too vague about the details of his alleged disability to allow a claim to

proceed under the ADA.

The court next considers whether Mr. Everett states a claim for cruel and unusual

punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment prohibits conditions

of confinement that deny inmates “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.”

Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 773 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). In evaluating an

Eighth Amendment claim, courts conduct both an objective and a subjective inquiry.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The objective prong asks whether the alleged

deprivation is “sufficiently serious” that the action or inaction of a prison official leads to

“the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. (citations omitted).

Although “the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons,” Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981), inmates are entitled to adequate food, clothing, shelter, bedding,

hygiene materials, and sanitation, Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2009);

Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2006).

On the subjective prong, the prisoner must show the defendant acted with

deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. As the

Seventh Circuit has explained:

[C]onduct is deliberately indifferent when the official has acted in an

intentional or criminally reckless manner, i.e., the defendant must have

known that the plaintiff was at serious risk of being harmed and decided

not to do anything to prevent that harm from occurring even though he

could have easily done so.

Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (cleaned up); see also Reed v. McBride,

178 F.3d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 1999) (when inmate complained about severe deprivations but

was ignored, he established a “prototypical case of deliberate indifference.”).

In looking specifically at temperatures affecting inmates, “[t]o determine whether

extreme heat or cold amount to a serious constitutional deprivation, courts look to

various factors, including the severity of the cold or heat, its duration, whether the

prisoner has alternative means to protect himself, and whether the prisoner must endure

other uncomfortable or harsh conditions.” White v. Monahan, No. 07 C 437, 2013 WL

587511, 9 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 14, 2013) (quotation marks omitted); see also Rogers v. Scott, 695 F.

Appx. 155, 158 (7th Cir. 2017). Here, the complaint lacks details that allows the court to

infer that the conditions meet the objective prong of an Eighth Amendment violation.

Mr. Everett does not say how long the heat wave lasted, whether he was exposed to other

harsh conditions, what alternatives he had to keep cool, whether he had freedom of

movement or was confined to a cell all day, and whether he was forced to do other

activities in the heat. Mr. Everett complains only that he was not allowed to keep his

cooling towel. This one act, divorced from the full context of the situation, does not state

an Eighth Amendment violation.

Next, Mr. Everett sues Warden Charles Bowen and Deputy Warden Rhonda

Thomas for improperly handling grievances. He has no constitutional right to access the

grievance process, so the alleged mishandling of the grievance process does not state a

claim. See Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 770 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that there is not

a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to an inmate grievance

procedure).

Mr. Everett also complains that Deputy Warden Hardy violated his rights by using

threating and intimidating tactics towards him. Specifically, he points to an interaction

they had when he asked her about the grievance he filed about his cooling towel. She told

him that because the lieutenant said no, he was not going to get it while “clapping her

hands in an aggressive and threatening manner in the Plaintiff’s face and elevated tone.”

ECF 1 at 4-5. The Constitution is not a civility code that requires prison staff to use

“genteel language and good manners.” Lisle v. Welborn, 933 F.3d 705, 719 (7th Cir. 2019).

Thus, “most verbal harassment by jail or prison guards does not rise to the level of cruel

and unusual punishment.” Beal v. Foster, 803 F.3d 356, 358 (7th Cir. 2015). This interaction

does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.

Finally, Mr. Everett alleges that Deputy Warden Hardy did not hire him for an

opening on the administration sanitation team in retaliation for the grievances he filed.

He alleges he is qualified for the job and was exceeding the performance requirements of

his current job. The inmate she hired instead, he alleges, was not as qualified as he was

and did not even apply for the role.

To assert a First Amendment retaliation claim, an inmate must allege: “(1) he

engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that

would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment

activity was at least a motivating factor in the Defendants’ decision to take the retaliatory

action.” Douglas v. Reeves, 964 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2020) (quotations and citation

omitted). The second prong applies an objective standard, inquiring whether the alleged

deprivation would likely deter “a person of ordinary firmness” from continuing to

engage in protected activity. Surita v. Hyde, 665 F.3d 860, 878 (7th Cir. 2011).

“Furthermore, the harsh realities of a prison environment affect [the court’s]

consideration of what actions are sufficiently adverse. Prisoners may be required to

tolerate more than public employees, who may be required to tolerate more than average

citizens, before an action taken against them is considered adverse.” Holleman v. Zatecky,

951 F.3d 873, 880–81 (7th Cir. 2020) (quotations omitted).

Here, Mr. Everett has not plausibly alleged that being passed over for the

Administration Sanitation position constituted an adverse act in the prison context. A

prisoner must provide “more than subjective discontent with his assigned job” for job

assignments to be considered an adverse act. Douglas v. Reeves, 964 F.3d 643, 648 (7th Cir.

2020). Instead, he must “show a more concrete difference between the positions, whether

in pay, working conditions, or side benefits.” Id. Mr. Everett does not say what his current

job is or explain how the administration sanitation position was different or better than

his current job.

This complaint does not state a claim for which relief can be granted. If Mr. Everett

believes he can state a claim based on (and consistent with) the events described in this

complaint, he may file an amended complaint because “[t]he usual standard in civil cases

is to allow defective pleadings to be corrected, especially in early stages, at least where

amendment would not be futile.” Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726, 738 (7th Cir.

2018). To file an amended complaint, he needs to write this cause number on a Pro Se 14

(INND Rev. 2/20) Prisoner Complaint form, which is available from his law library. He

needs to write the word “Amended” on the first page above the title “Prisoner

Complaint” and send it to the court after he properly completes the form. He needs to

explain when, where, why, and how each defendant violated his rights. He needs to

include every fact necessary to explain his case and describe his injuries or damages.

For these reasons, the court:

(1) GRANTS Torriaun R. Everett until November 12, 2025 to file an amended

complaint; and

(2) CAUTIONS Torriaun R. Everett if he does not respond by the deadline, this

case will be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A without further notice because the current

complaint does not state a claim for which relief can be granted.

SO ORDERED.

October 14, 2025 s/ Damon R. Leichty

Judge, United States District Court