Trevillion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

(1) JEFF TREVILLION, as Special

Administrator for the Estate of Louis

Perales, deceased,

Plaintiff, Case No.: 4:22-cv-00473-JAR-MTS

v.

(2) SCOTT OWEN, in his individual

and official capacity as Sheriff

Washington County, Okla.; and

(3) JAMES WATHEN, III,

(4) JOSHUA DURHAM,

(5) ANDREW GALANIS,

(6) DAVID KERR,

(7) ETHAN DONOVAN,

(8) JORDAN INMAN,

(9) MICHAEL HOPPER,

(10) MICHAEL KITCHENS,

(11) RANDY MORGAN,

(12) SETH O’NEAL,

(13) AARON WITT,

(14) BRANDI UNDERWOOD,

(15) COLTON TATTERSHALL,

(16) JOSEPH RAMERIZ, and

(17) REED BLACKARD,

all in their individual capacities,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Jane A. Restani, Judge*:

Jeff Trevillion, as Special Administrator for the Estate of Louis Perales,

deceased (“the Estate”), filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) for cruel

and unusual punishment in violation of Louis Perales’ (“Perales”) Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights. Compl. at 1, 11–15, ECF No. 2 (Oct. 25, 2022)

(“Compl.”). The Estate brings this claim against the arresting officer and the jail staff

in their individual capacities, and Sheriff Scott Owen (“Owen”) in his official capacity.

Id. at 1. Pending before the court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Sheriff

Owen. Def. Scott Owen’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 88 (July 31, 2025) (“Def.’s

Mot.”). For the reasons set forth below, the court denies Owen’s motion.

I. Factual Background

The court presumes familiarity with the facts of the case. On November 3,

2020, Officer James Wathen (“Wathen”) responded to a report of a naked adult male

“having a mental episode” in a motel. James Wathen Initial Narrative Report at 1,

ECF No. 88-2 (July 31, 2025) (“Incident Narrative Report”). When he arrived on the

scene, he found Perales naked and covered in urine in a bathroom that was covered

in human feces. Id. Perales was waving his arms and talking incoherently. Id.

Perales had an outstanding warrant. Dep. of Officer James Wathen at 24:22–24

(“Wathen Dep.”), ECF No. 97-1 (Aug. 27, 2025). Wathen called EMS to the scene to

check Perales’ health before taking him into custody for the outstanding warrant.

* Jane A. Restani, Judge for the United States Court of International Trade, sitting

by designation.

Incident Narrative Report at 1. EMS did not find any immediate medical issues, id.,

but EMS was still willing to transport Perales to the hospital. See Wathen Dep. at

66:20–67:1. Perales refused, and Wathen transported him to the Washington County

Jail (“the jail”). Incident Narrative Report at 1.

At the jail, Perales was unable to sign his bond sheet because of his flailing

arms. Id. The jail placed Perales in a holding cell where he could sober up to the

point where he could complete the booking process. See Dep. of Josh Durham at 21:3–

7, ECF No. 88-6 (July 31, 2025) (“Durham Dep.”). While in the holding cell, Perales

continued to defecate on himself, with jail staff cleaning him and offering him food

and water. See CCTV Video at 1:24:26, 2:27:15, 9:42:17, 15:58:47, 19:40:39, ECF No.

97-8 (Aug. 27, 2025) (filed under seal and by conventional means) (“CCTV Video”).

On the morning of November 4, 2020, jail staff found Perales unresponsive in his cell.

Id. at 20:33:07. Perales was pronounced dead at the hospital, with the cause of death

listed as atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease exacerbated by methamphetamine.

Compl. at 10.

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is warranted when “there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and [] the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citation modified). The party

moving for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility . . . [of] identifying

those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323 (citation modified). The

court will not scour the record for evidence that a party fails to bring to the court’s

attention. Cf. Orr v. City of Albuquerque, 417 F.3d 1144, 1151 (10th Cir. 2005). The

court, however, will not close its eyes to authentic video evidence that tells a clear

story of the events in question. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378–80 (2007).

III. Discussion

A. What constitutes the jail’s policy or practice cannot be resolved on

summary judgment

Owen argues that the policy of the jail was to give every inmate adequate

medical care. Def.’s Mot. at 18–19. He asserts that the jail’s policy was to assess

whether each new inmate needs medical attention and that jail employees are

instructed to get immediate medical care for severely intoxicated inmates. Id. at 19.

Owen, however, admits that “[t]he jail had an informal custom of placing intoxicated

inmates in holding cells until they sobered up.” Id. at 20. The Estate responds that

the jail’s policy in reality was to place intoxicated inmates in holding cells to “sober

up” without “a medical assessment to determine risk . . . [, a] time limit[,] . . . [or a]

requirement to take vital signs to evaluate the trajectory of their condition, even

where the need to obtain vital signs was required by written policy.” Resp. in Opp.

to Mot. for Summ. J. at 18, ECF No. 97 (Aug. 27, 2025) (“Pl.’s Resp.”).

While municipalities may be held liable for constitutional violations under

Section 1983, they cannot be sued “for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or

agents.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).

Instead, the plaintiff must show that their injury was caused by the “execution of a

government’s policy or custom.” Id. Municipal liability “may be based on a formal

regulation or policy statement, or it may be based on an informal custom so long as

this custom amounts to a widespread practice that . . . is so permanent and well

settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” Brammer-Hoelter v.

Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 602 F.3d 1175, 1189 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing City of St.

Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)) (citation modified).

The written policy from the jail directs staff to give inmates “individualized

orders for observation and care” if “the inmate is determined to be acutely

intoxicated.” Washington County Sheriff’s Office Intoxication and Withdrawal Policy

at B.3, ECF No. 88-21 (July 31, 2025) (“Intoxication Policy”). Any intoxicated inmates

will be transferred to the hospital “[i]f the inmate’s condition deteriorates during the

detoxification process,” id. at B.7, or if they have “altered consciousness or stupor,

unstable vital signs, irregular or extreme paranoid behavior.” Id. at B.1(a). This is

in addition to the jail’s intake policy, which directs officers to “determine if the inmate

is in need of immediate medical attention.” Washington County Intake of Inmates

Policy at A.2, ECF No. 88-20 (July 31, 2025) (“Intake Policy”). The jail, however, had

an informal policy of placing acutely intoxicated inmates into holding cells to “sober

up.” Def.’s Mot. at 20; Witt Dep. at 20:20–23:02, ECF No. 97-5 (July 31, 2025).

The arresting officer suspected that Perales was suffering from acute

methamphetamine intoxication and communicated that to jail staff. James Wathen

Suppl. Narrative Report at 1, ECF No. 88-5 (July 31, 2025). The arresting officer also

knew that methamphetamine intoxication can cause serious health issues and was

aware that Perales had medication for high blood pressure. Wathen Dep. at 51:3–14,

ECF No. 88-1 (July 31, 2025); James Wathen Suppl. Narrative Report at 1. Perales

arrived at the jail flailing his arms so much that he could not sign his bond sheet.

Incident Narrative Report. The jail staff knew he was so intoxicated that he was a

“fall risk” and placed him in a padded holding cell so that he would not injure himself.

Durham Dep. at 18:7–19:4. Jail staff confirmed that inmates like Perales were often

put in holding cells on the assumption that they would become sober after sleeping.

Id. at 33:4–24. Once in the cell, Perales continued to flail, fall over, defecate on

himself, and scream almost continuously for 20 hours. See CCTV Video. It does not

appear that jail staff or the nurse ever took Perales’ vital signs until he was found

unresponsive. See id.

Based on the facts in the record, the court denies summary judgment on the

issue of the adequacy of the jail’s policy or practice. The jail’s written policy shows a

comprehensive system to provide intoxicated inmates individualized medical care

and a willingness to send them to the hospital if needed. Owen, however, admits that

the jail also had an informal custom of sending intoxicated inmates to holding cells

to “sober[] up” and has not presented any evidence to suggest that this custom

includes taking the inmates from the holding cells to a hospital if their conditions

deteriorate. Def.’s Mot. at 20. At the very least, this custom is in tension with the

written policy, which requires that inmates with “altered consciousness or stupor” be

“sent to the hospital for treatment.” Intoxication Policy at B.1. Because Owen fails

to explain how the jail reconciles this custom with the written policy, summary

judgment is inappropriate at this juncture.

Further, the behavior of the jail staff in this case does not align with the

written policy. Perales was clearly suffering from “altered consciousness,” “stupor,”

and “paranoid behavior” given his methamphetamine intoxication and his condition

inside the holding cell. See Intoxication Policy at B.1; see generally CCTV Video. He

was not sent to the hospital, and jail staff confirmed that it is normal practice not to

send severely intoxicated inmates to the hospital. Durham Dep. at 33:4–24. Perales’

condition also arguably deteriorated over time, given that he essentially did not sleep

for 20 hours, continued to defecate on himself even after 10 hours of “sobering up,”

and continuously flailed his arms and yelled. See generally CCTV Video. Despite

this, jail staff did not check his vital signs or appear to give him individualized care.

See generally id. These actions contradict the written policy. As a result, summary

judgment is inappropriate because, based on the undisputed facts of the conditions of

Perales’ death, it is not clear that the jail’s policy or practice sufficiently afforded

Perales the level of medical care required by the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments.

B. Summary judgment is denied on the issue of the existence of

deliberate indifference

Owen argues that the jail staff could not have shown deliberate indifference to

Perales’ medical needs because they were not aware of any substantial risk of harm.

Def.’s Mot. at 12–18. Owen contends that this is because Perales appeared “ok,” was

behaving normally for an intoxicated inmate, and had not presented any obvious

signs of medical distress. Id. at 14–18. The Estate responds that the jail staff were

deliberately indifferent to Perales’ medical needs in violation of his constitutional

rights because of past incidents of intoxicated inmates in the jail dying in their cells

and because of Perales’ underlying conditions, of which the jail staff were aware. Pl.’s

Resp. at 19–21; Wathen Dep. at 17:14–23.

Jail staff violate an inmate’s Eighth Amendment right to freedom from cruel

or unusual punishment when they show “deliberate indifference” to his serious

medical needs. Paugh v. Uintah Cnty., 47 F.4th 1139, 1153 (10th Cir. 2022) (citation

omitted). Deliberate indifference falls “somewhere between the poles of negligence

at one end and purpose or knowledge at the other.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

836 (1994). The standard has both an objective and subjective component. Est. of

Beauford v. Mesa Cnty., Colorado, 35 F.4th 1248, 1262 (10th Cir. 2022). “To satisfy

the objective component, the alleged deprivation must be sufficiently serious to

constitute a deprivation of constitutional dimension.” Paugh, 47 F.4th at 1155 (citing

Self v. Crum, 439 F.3d 1227, 1230 (10th Cir. 2006) (citation modified)). Death will

always be a sufficiently serious deprivation to meet this objective prong. Id. at 1155–

56. To satisfy the subjective component, the official must have known of and

disregarded an excessive risk to the inmate’s health or safety. Strain v. Regalado,

977 F.3d 984, 990 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 751 (10th Cir.

2005)). This knowledge requirement is met when an official “decline[s] to confirm

inferences of risk that he strongly suspect[s] to exist.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 n.8.

Whether the requisite knowledge existed is a fact-intensive inquiry that may be

answered by inference from circumstantial evidence. Paugh, 47 F.4th at 1156

(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).

Owen admits that Perales’ death is a sufficiently serious medical condition to

satisfy the objective prong of this analysis. Def.’s Mot. at 13. Perales may have

answered the EMS’ questions coherently early on, leading the arresting officer to

believe that Perales was “clear” to be taken to jail. See Wathen Dep. 88:12–25. Jail

staff knew Perales was intoxicated and suffered from high blood pressure. See id. at

20:8–21. Perales arrived at the jail flailing his arms so much that he could not sign

his bond sheet. Incident Narrative Report at 1. Once in the holding cell, Perales’

condition essentially did not change for 20 hours, during which time he did not sleep

for more than a few minutes at a time. See CCTV Video. Jail staff visually checked

on him while he was flailing and screaming on the floor but rarely entered the cell

and never sent him to the hospital. Id. at 25:01, 53:12, 9:35:01, 14:05:27, 20:21:45.

When he defecated on himself the first time, jail staff did not come to clean it up and

check on him for a full hour, despite having a constant camera feed to his cell. Id. at

1:24:26, 2:27:15. When he defecated on himself the second time, he had blood coming

out of his rectum, and jail staff called for the nurse. Id. at 2:19:06, 2:25:05. The nurse

then checked his rectum area but did nothing more to check his vital signs. Id. at

2:25:05. He continued to flail and scream for multiple more hours until he defecated

on himself again. Id. at 9:42:17. The jail staff took forty minutes to check on him and

clean him up, and this time they did not call the nurse. Id. at 10:27:51. When jail

staff offered Perales food, he smashed the tray of food and did not eat.1 Id. at 16:40:32.

After over 15 hours, jail staff had to force-feed Perales water, as he had not drunk

anything since coming to the jail. Id. at 19:40:39. Jail staff finally called for more

serious medical attention once they found Perales unresponsive and without a pulse,

after 20 hours in the holding cell. Id. at 20:33:07; Breton Nursing Note, ECF No. 88-

15 (July 31, 2025).

The court also denies summary judgment on the issue of deliberate

indifference. At the very least, jail staff knew that Perales had multiple underlying

conditions and was suffering from acute methamphetamine intoxication yet did not

get Perales even minimal medical care. Beyond that, the jail staff watched Perales’

condition fail to improve for nearly a full day. Any observation of the video feed would

have shown that Perales was not sleeping, eating, or drinking water while he

screamed and vigorously moved over the course of the 20 hours. Even after ten hours

of “sobering up,” Perales continued to defecate on himself. These issues indicate that

the jail staff may have known Perales was suffering from serious medical issues and

failed to seriously respond to any of these signs. Their “sight checks” consisted mostly

of seeing Perales flailing around on the floor and doing nothing in response. Even

when the jail staff did call the nurse due to blood in Perales’ stool, she did not take

his vital signs.

1 Nurse Sonia Breton testified that Perales ate his food, but the CCTV video shows

that the “empty tray” she saw was a result of Perales destroying his tray and refusing

to eat his food. See Excerpt from Dep. of Sonia Breton at 84:7–10, ECF No. 88-14

(July 31, 2025); CCTV Video at 16:43:10, 17:14:49.

Owen has failed to present sufficient evidence that this behavior met a

reasonable level of care for Perales’ serious medical needs. Not only does the video

evidence contradict Owen’s version of events, but he fails to present any evidence,

such as an expert report to controvert plaintiff’s expert, that shows the jail responded

appropriately to Perales’ medical needs. The court therefore concludes that there is

enough evidence to preclude summary judgment on this issue.

C. Summary judgment is denied on the claim of failure to supervise

Owen argues that because all jail staff had the authority to call for extra

medical assistance or send an inmate to hospital, no failure to supervise the staff

caused Perales’ death. Def.’s Mot. at 23. The Estate responds that the core issue in

its failure to supervise claim is whether the jail left “intoxicated arrestees with

serious acute medical conditions inside holding cells without regular monitoring or

supervision.” Pl.’s Resp. at 24–25 (emphasis removed).

As the court explained in its opinion denying the motion to dismiss, a failure

to supervise claim requires an “affirmative link” between the supervisor and the

constitutional violation. Est. of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 435 (10th Cir. 2014)

(quoting Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep’t, 717 F.3d 760, 767 (10th

Cir. 2013)). When the affirmative link is not a result of direct participation by an

official, “the elements for supervisory and municipal liability are the same.”2 Burke

v. Regalado, 935 F.3d 960, 999 (10th Cir. 2019).

2 The Tenth Circuit in Burke explained that when the supervisor is a municipal

policymaker and the supervisor did not personally participate in the underlying

constitutional violations, both supervisory and municipal liability require the same

The parties do not present any new facts on this claim beyond what they

presented in their discussion of the municipality’s policy or practice. Neither party

discussed any facts relating to Sheriff Owen’s supervision of jail staff, jail staff

hierarchy, or anything similar in their briefs to the court.

The court denies summary judgment on the failure to supervise claim. At the

summary judgment stage, the movant bears the burden of showing that there is no

genuine issue of material fact, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Owen has not presented any evidence that

jail staff were properly supervised. From the facts discussed, lack of proper

supervision may be inferred by the jury.

D. Summary judgment is denied on the claim of failure to train

Owen argues that jail staff were trained in various methods of getting inmates

medical attention, and that the county was not on notice of the need for further

procedures. Def.’s Mot. at 21–23. Owen contends that this means that the Estate

cannot show the required “deliberate indifference” for a failure to train claim. Id.

The Estate responds that jail staff were not trained on how to identify health

problems, take vital signs, or when to remove intoxicated inmates from holding cells.

Pl.’s Resp. at 22–23.

“A municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous

where a claim turns on a failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61

elements: (1) policy or custom, (2) “a causal relationship between the policy or custom

and the underlying violation,” and (3) “deliberate indifference.” Burke v. Regalado,

935 F.3d 960, 998–99 (10th Cir. 2019).

(2011). To satisfy Section 1983, a municipality’s failure to train must be relevant to

the cause of the injury and must amount to “deliberate indifference to the rights of

persons with whom the untrained employees come into contact.” Id. (quoting City of

Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (citation modified)). Municipal deliberate

indifference liability ordinarily requires a pattern of similar constitutional violations

by untrained employees. Id. at 62 (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty, Okla.

v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)).

Jail staff was not given specific training on how to handle inmates exhibiting

involuntary movements due to severe intoxication. Dep. of Officer Randy Morgan at

12:5–24, ECF No. 97-18 (Aug. 27, 2025) (“Morgan Dep.”). Nor did jail staff receive

substantial training on how to handle intoxicated inmates in general. Id. at 17:1–

18:2; see Dep. of Officer Ethan Donovan at 15:19–17:15, ECF No. 97-17 (Aug. 27,

2025) (“Donovan Dep.”). The Estate asserts that the jail previously had six inmates

subject to the “sober up” policy who were not initially medically screened and later

suffered an “adverse medical event,” resulting in the need to be taken to the hospital

by ambulance.3 Pl.’s Resp. at 7. According to Owen, new policies to deal with inmate

intoxication were only implemented after Perales’ death. Def.’s Mot. at 22.

The court denies summary judgment on this issue. Deposition testimony from

both jail staff and Sheriff Owen do not conclusively show that jail staff received any

formal training on how to handle intoxicated inmates or the side effects of severe

3 Owen acknowledges one prior incident of an intoxicated person who allegedly died

due to an untreated head injury. Def.’s Mot. at 13.

intoxication. See, e.g., Morgan Dep. at 12:5–24; Donovan Dep. at 15:19–17:15; Dep.

of Sheriff Scott Owen at 68:25–69:24, ECF No. 97-16 (Aug. 27, 2025). The record

evidence leaves open the issue of whether the jail was on notice that failing to train

its employees on these issues could result in a lack of sufficient care for a prisoner’s

serious medical needs. By Owen’s admission, though, the jail did not increase medical

training for staff until after Perales died. Def.’s Mot. at 22. This lack of training even

after serious incidents precludes summary judgment on this issue at this stage.

IV. Conclusion

Defendant Sherriff Owen’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 88, is

DENIED.

/s/ Jane A. Restani

Jane A. Restani, Judge

Date: October 10, 2025

New York, New York