Dcpp v. Z.B., in the Matter of the Guardianship of M.S.B.

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0991-24

NEW JERSEY DIVISION

OF CHILD PROTECTION

AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

Z.B.,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

N.J.P., JR.,

Defendant.

__________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE

GUARDIANSHIP OF

M.S.B. and N.A.B., minors.

__________________________

Submitted September 23, 2025 – Decided October 14, 2025

Before Judges Sumners and Chase.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,

Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County, Docket

No. FG-15-0012-24.

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for

appellant (Catherine W. Wilkes, Assistant Deputy

Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for

respondent (Donna Arons, Assistant Attorney General,

of counsel; Michelle J. McBrian, Deputy Attorney

General, on the brief).

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, Law Guardian,

attorney for minors (Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy

Public Defender, of counsel; Noel C. Devlin, Assistant

Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Z.B. (Zindy)1 appeals from the trial court's November 14, 2024

order terminating her parental rights to her daughters, M.S.B. and N.A.B.

(Nellie), who were nearly four and three years old, respectively. 2 We affirm.

The parties presented their cases over four non-consecutive trial days

before the Family Part judge. The Division of Child Protection and Permanency

(DCPP) presented testimony from Alan J. Lee, Psy.D., a psychological expert;

1

We use initials and pseudonyms to preserve the parties' confidentiality. See

R. 1:38-3(d)(12).

2

The girls' father N.J.P., Jr. (Neal) surrendered his parental rights at the

beginning of trial.

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two DCPP employees, Takesha Yankannah, a permanency worker, and Melissa

Gambardella, an adoption worker, and M.J. (Melissa), paternal relative resource

parent. Defendant did not testify but presented testimony by Andrew Brown,

III, Ph.D., a psychological and neuropsychological expert. The Law Guardian

supported DCPP's termination of parental rights plan followed by Melissa's

adoption and has continued to do so on appeal.

Our review of a trial judge's termination of parental rights is limited. N.J.

Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. C.J.R., 452 N.J. Super. 454, 468 (App. Div.

2017). We do not reverse the "[judge's] termination decision 'when there is

substantial credible evidence in the record to support the court's findings.'" Ibid.

(quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)).

We defer to the judge's fact-findings and credibility determinations. N.J. Div.

of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 552-53 (2014). Deference is

accorded to the judge's findings of fact due to "'the Family Part['s] . . . special

expertise . . . in domestic relations.'" Id. at 553 (alteration in original) (quoting

Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412-13 (1998)). The judge has "the opportunity

to make first-hand credibility judgments about the witnesses who appear on the

stand; [the judge] has a 'feel of the case' that can never be realized by a review

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of the cold record." E.P., 196 N.J. at 104 (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam.

Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 293 (2007)).

"Only when the trial [judge's] conclusions are so 'clearly mistaken' or

'wide of the mark' should an appellate court intervene and make its own findings

to ensure . . . there is not a denial of justice." Ibid. (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth

& Fam. Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007)). No deference is given to the

judge's interpretation of the law, which is reviewed de novo. D.W. v. R.W., 212

N.J. 232, 245-46 (2012).

To decide whether to terminate parental rights, a trial judge considers the

four-prong best interests test:

(1) The child's safety, health or development has been

or will continue to be endangered by the parental

relationship;

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the

harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to

provide a safe and stable home for the child and the

delay of permanent placement will add to the harm;

(3) The [DCPP] has made reasonable efforts to provide

services to help the parent correct the circumstances

which led to the child's placement outside the home and

the court has considered alternatives to termination of

parental rights; and

(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more

harm than good.

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[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).]

DCPP must prove the four prongs by "clear and convincing" evidence. N.J. Div.

of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 611-12 (1986). The prongs "are

not discrete and separate; they . . . overlap . . . to . . . comprehensive[ly] . . .

identif[y] a child's best interests." In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337,

348 (1999). These considerations are fact-sensitive and require particularized

evidence addressing the specific circumstances. Ibid.

Zindy argues on appeal that DCPP failed to satisfy the four prongs of the

best interest test. We do not detail DCPP's involvement with Zindy and her

family set forth in the judge's order. We incorporate by reference the factual

findings in the judge's written decision because they are supported by clear and

convincing evidence in the record and carefully track the statutory requirements

of the best interest test. We address each prong of the test as follows.

First Prong

Zindy contends DCPP failed to prove that she endangered her children's

health, safety, and development and declined to meaningfully engage with the

services offered by DCPP to warrant reunification with her daughters . We are

unpersuaded.

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The record supports the judge's finding by clear and convincing evidence

that Zindy subjected her daughters to harm by exposing them to domestic

violence, substance abuse, and her mental health issues. DCPP received at least

five referrals between 2020 and 2022 regarding Zindy's struggles with mental

health issues, substance abuse, and domestic violence incidents—all of which

exposed her children to the risk of harm under prong one. During this period,

Zindy moved her children from her mother's home, where she alleged she was

verbally and physically assaulted, to various domestic shelters while

maintaining contact with Neal, with whom she initiated and faced domestic

violence from. Zindy received treatment in a psychiatric hospital, expressed

suicidal ideation, and was briefly incarcerated. On one occasion, Zindy was

arrested after engaging in a "rolling domestic [dispute]" while heavily

intoxicated, physically assaulting Neal while driving, and subjecting infant

Nellie to injury by pouring a "[five]-gallon bottle of motor oil" in the back of

the car where Nellie was seated.

Zindy correctly notes that she improved her situation by securing

permanent housing (for five months at trial), becoming sober, and beginning

certain programming. However, the judge relied upon Dr. Lee's testimony that

her mere engagement with services is not sufficient to address her "chronic

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entrenched issues[,]" because it takes significant time to improve one's behavior.

The doctor further noted Zindy's continued problematic behavior and risks that

could adversely affect her parenting.

In sum, the evidence showed that Zindy harmed her daughters because she

was unable to properly parent them due to domestic violence, substance abuse,

and mental health issues. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.G., 344

N.J. Super. 418, 436 (App. Div. 2001) (finding that the first prong was satisfied

where a mother was incapable of parenting and managing stress due to her

significant mental health diagnoses); N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.M.,

211 N.J. 420, 449 (2012) (noting that "a mother's relationship with her child's

potentially dangerous father" is relevant when assessing the threat of harm under

prong one).

Second Prong

Zindy asserts the judge erred in finding that she was unwilling or unable

to eliminate the harm posed to her children and improperly relied upon her

daughters' placement with Melissa as a basis to terminate her parental rights.

We find no error.

Initially, we note the first and second prongs "are related to one another,

and evidence that supports one informs and may support the other" under the

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best interests of the child test. In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 379

(1999). The record supports the judge's finding by clear and convincing

evidence that Zindy was unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm posed to her

children. She initially did not visit her children because of her failure to resolve

an outstanding warrant. She failed to timely complete DCPP's recommended

evaluations and services. Additionally, although Zindy was sober and compliant

with substance abuse treatment at the time of trial, the judge found credible Dr.

Lee's testimony that she was unlikely to become an effective parent in the

foreseeable future due to other risk factors.

Third Prong

Zindy asserts the judge erred in finding that she did not successfully

complete any services before the trial. We find no error.

The record supports the judge's finding by clear and convincing evidence

that DCPP made reasonable efforts to connect Zindy with counseling, substance

abuse treatment, and housing assistance. The agency scheduled her for three

psychological evaluations, which she failed to attend, as well as anger

management classes. DCPP referred her to substance abuse treatment programs,

but she was discharged from the programs due to noncompliance. The judge

stressed that Zindy failed to complete any services by the commencement of

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trial; not that she failed to make any progress in terms of sobriety or housing.

Zindy's "limited progress," however, according to the judge, was insufficient to

correct the harm caused by her prior prevalent behavior. Furthermore, even

recognizing some merit to Zindy's argument does not invalidate the judge's

finding that DCPP provided proper services which she mostly failed to

complete.

Additionally, the judge correctly found that DCPP explored alternative

placements before seeking parental termination. He pointed to DCPP's two

implemented safety protection plans to address domestic violence between

Zindy and Neal. DCPP explored Kinship Legal Guardianship (KLG) with

Melissa on several occasions, explaining the differences between KLG and

adoption. However, Melissa was only committed to adoption because of Zindy's

history of "inappropriate and threatening behavior towards her."

Fourth Prong

Zindy argues the judge erroneously found that termination of her parental

rights would not cause more harm than good because the judge did not consider

her strong emotional bond with her children, and how parental termination

would adversely affect them. She stresses the judge should have given greater

weight to Dr. Brown's testimony because he conducted bonding evaluations of

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her daughters, in contrast with Dr. Lee who did not conduct bonding evaluations

or consider DCPP records (visitation sheets) documenting her strong bond with

her daughters. We find no error.

The record supports the judge's finding by clear and convincing evidence

that terminating Zindy's parental rights would not do more harm than good. For

support, the judge cited Melissa's "loving, stable and reliable caretak[ing]" of

the children for the past two years; Zindy's minimal progress in successfully

completing services to allow for reunification; and that Dr. Brown recommended

that Zindy continue supervised visitation. Although Dr. Lee's assessment was

based solely on his interview with Zindy and review of her records and he did

not conduct a bonding evaluation of Zindy or Melissa, this was not fatal to the

judge's fourth prong finding.

In this matter, a bonding evaluation was not required. A bonding

evaluation is only necessary to assess prong four. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam.

Servs. v. A.R., 405 N.J. Super. 418, 436-37 (App. Div. 2009). However, one is

not required where termination "[is] not predicated upon bonding, but rather

reflect[s] [the child's] need for permanency and [the parent's] inability to care

for [the child] in the foreseeable future." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v.

B.G.S., 291 N.J. Super. 582, 593 (App. Div. 1996). The judge appropriately

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recognized Zindy's reunification prospects are dire due to her history of

substance abuse, poor mental health, and insufficient engagement in services.

The children are in a stable, thriving, and loving placement with Melissa, who

seeks to adopt them. Based on these circumstances, the trial judge correctly

determined that termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.

A bonding evaluation would not have disproved this fact.

For these reasons, there is no basis to second-guess the Family judge's

findings that termination of parental rights was in the children's best interests.

Any arguments raised by Zindy not addressed is because they lack sufficient

merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

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