“Materiality is for the 9 court, state of mind is for the jury.”
How later courts described this case
- “Materiality is for the 9 court, state of mind is for the jury.”
- collecting cases on height and 13 weight discrepancies affecting probable cause
- “Neither Baca nor the County was faced with a pattern of similar 23 constitutional violations by untrained employees.”
- “Where, as here, the County employees 14 are not making life-threatening decisions, and because micromanaging of municipal 15 policies should be avoided, the single incident exception is inapplicable.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE
7
CRISTIAN NAVARRETE, CASE NO. 2:22-cv-01431
8
Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART
9 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
10
CITY OF KENT, a municipal
11 corporation, and JAMES SHERWOOD,
and his marital community,
12
Defendants.
13
14
1. INTRODUCTION
15
Plaintiff Cristian Navarrete sues the City of Kent and Officer James
16
Sherwood of the Kent Police Department under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging judicial
17
deception and fabrication of evidence. Navarrete also pursues a Monell claim
18
against the City and state-law claims against Officer Sherwood. Defendants have
19
moved for summary judgment on each of these claims. Dkt. No. 83. Having
20
considered the Parties’ briefing, the record, and the relevant law, the Court finds
21
that issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on Navarrete’s claims
22
23
1 against Officer Sherwood, but that Navarrete has failed to establish a triable issue
2 about municipal liability against the City of Kent.
3 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART Defendants’ motion. Dkt. No. 83.
4
2. BACKGROUND
5
On July 14, 2020, two teenagers shot another teenager north of the Kent
6
Transit Center, causing serious injuries. The Kent Police Department responded,
7
and Defendant Officer James Sherwood led the investigation into the shooting.
8
Detective John Crane participated in the investigation. The central dispute in this
9
case is whether Officer Sherwood deliberately omitted and misrepresented material
10
facts in warrant applications that led to Navarrete’s arrest and prosecution for a
11
crime he did not commit.
12
2.1 Kent police officers investigated a shooting involving two suspects of
13
different heights.
14 Through witness interviews, the officers learned that the victim, his
15 girlfriend, and two of their friends had ridden the bus to the Kent Transit Center
16 just before the shooting. While on the bus, they met and spoke with the suspects,
17 two Hispanic male teenagers identifying as Sureños. Dkt. No. 109-1 at 86–88. When
18 the bus arrived at the transit center, the victim and his girlfriend separated from
19 their friends. Id. at 88. The suspects apparently followed them and later approached
20 them from behind, asked for directions, then shot the victim. Id. at 86, 96–98.
21 The officers obtained surveillance footage from two sources that would
22 become central to the identification dispute: a local business showing the two
23
1 suspects walking through an alley before the shooting, and footage from Metro
2 Transit showing the eyewitnesses and suspects together on the bus. Id. at 87, 142–
3 43. Because the suspects appeared young, Detective Crane sent still images to
4 Renton High School’s resource officer, who was “90% sure” that the taller suspect
5 was Luis Cano but did not recognize the shorter suspect. Id. at 89, 196.
6 The officers later obtained a search warrant for Cano’s family home, and
7 SWAT served the warrant on September 8, 2020, leading to Cano’s arrest. Id. at 90.
8 There is no dispute that Cano stands 5’10” tall and was one of the
9 perpetrators. Dkt. No. 115-1 at 18.
10
2.2 Surveillance footage and witnesses established height differences
between suspects.
11
The surveillance footage and witness statements established that one suspect
12
was noticeably taller than the other, creating a height differential central to the
13
Court’s probable cause analysis below.
14
Detective Crane noted in his case report that “[o]ne suspect, listed here as
15
Suspect 1, is taller,” while “[t]he other suspect, listed here out [sic] as Suspect 2, is
16
shorter.” Dkt. No. 109-1 at 106. A subsequent interview with one of the victim’s
17
friends confirmed that one of the suspects “was taller and one was shorter[.]” Id. at
18
140.
19
These are the still images from the surveillance footage:
20
21
22
23
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13
15 Navarrete maintains that the surveillance footage shows that one of the
individuals is taller and has lighter skin than the other. Officer Sherwood testified
17 || that the footage does not show an appreciable difference in skin tone. Dkt. No. 84 at
19 During a follow-up interview, an eyewitness stated that “[o]ne [suspect] was
20 short and one was tall.” Dkt. No. 109-1 at 157-58. She estimated that the shorter
21 suspect was about her height or slightly taller, so about 54”, id., while describing
99 the taller suspect as between 510 and 6’. Dkt. No. 84 at 4, 15. Officer Sherwood
23 ||confirmed that this eyewitness believed the shorter suspect was “approximately”
1 “half a foot” shorter than the taller suspect. Dkt. No. 109-1 at 22. The same witness
2 also noted a difference in skin tone, stating that the shorter suspect had darker skin
3 than the taller suspect. Dkt. No. 109-1 at 164.
4
2.3 V.C.—a minor—provided the only identification of Navarrete
through two separate interviews.
5
The identification of Navarrete as the shorter suspect rests entirely on
6
statements by V.C., Cano’s fourteen-year-old sister. The Parties present different
7
characterizations of the circumstances and reliability of her identification.
8
9 2.3.1 Officers interviewed V.C. during the SWAT search of her
family home.
10
While the SWAT team searched Cano’s family home at 5:30 a.m., Officer
11
Sherwood interviewed Cano’s parents and V.C. separately, showing them
12
surveillance images for identification purposes. Dkt. No. 109-1 at 90, 217–23. Cano’s
13
mother and V.C. identified Cano as the taller suspect; but Cano’s parents didn’t
14
recognize the shorter suspect at all. Id. at 90; Dkt. No. 109-1 at 90, 211.
15
When Officer Sherwood asked V.C. about the shorter suspect, she repeatedly
16
stated, “I can’t be sure it’s him,” indicating that Officer Sherwood had been
17
discussing a specific person with her before beginning the recorded interview. Id. at
18
218. When Officer Sherwood directed her attention to “the shorter person” in the
19
photos, V.C. said, “I don’t recognize him.” Id. She eventually referenced the bus
20
photo and said, “[w]ell, this looks like Christian, that, the person I’m talking about,
21
22
23
1 but . . . I can’t say cause it’s like blurry.”1 Id. at 223. V.C. also stated that she did
2 not believe the surveillance footage from the bus showed the same person as the
3 surveillance footage from the alley. Id. at 222. Finally, V.C. told the officers that
4 “Christian” lived in the same mobile home park as her family and that her brother,
5 Cano, hung out with him infrequently. Id. at 219, 222.
6
2.3.2 Officers conducted a second interview with V.C. alone at
Goodwill.
7
On September 29, 2020, Officer Sherwood and Detective Crane interviewed
8
V.C. again. See Dkt. No. 109-1 at 52–53. When they went to her family home, a
9
neighbor told them that she was at Goodwill. Dkt. No. 84 at 11. Officer Sherwood
10
then called V.C. directly on her personal cell phone, told her that he knew she was
11
at Goodwill, and asked if he could interview her again. Dkt. No. 109-1 at 53–55. The
12
officers did not ask V.C. whether she wanted her parents present, nor did they
13
inform her parents of the interview. Dkt. No. 115-1 at 16 (filed under seal); see Dkt.
14
No. 84 at 11–12. Officer Sherwood and Detective Crane met V.C. at Goodwill and
15
interviewed her in the parking lot, alone. Id.
16
The officers questioned V.C. with the same surveillance photos again, and
17
V.C. again expressed confusion about whether the surveillance footage from the
18
alley showed the same person as the surveillance footage from the bus. Dkt. No. 84-
19
7 at 13. As Officer Sherwood explains, “I showed V.C. the same photos again and
20
21
1 Plaintiff’s name is correctly spelled “Cristian Navarrete.” Throughout Officer
22 Sherwood’s affidavit, police reports, and other investigative documents, his first
name was frequently misspelled as “Christian.” This order uses the correct spelling
23 except when directly quoting source materials that contain the misspelling.
1 she asked if the male walking next to her brother was the same guy sitting down in
2 the bus. I told her they were.” Id. In addition to these photos, the officers showed
3 her Navarrete’s school photo. Dkt. No. 109-1 at 52–56; see also Dkt. No. 84-5; 109-1
4 at 188.
5 After this, Officer Sherwood recorded approximately two minutes of the
6 interview:
7 DET. SHERWOOD: Okay. [V.C.], I showed you pictures again
because I just wanted to clarify a few things. In those pictures I
8 showed you, there was two people, one in a blue shirt, which you
said was your brother, correct?
9
MISS C: Yeah. Yes.
10
DET. SHERWOOD: And then there was another male that was on
11 the bus with your brother and also walking with him. That person
you -- you said that you did -- that he looks like who?
12
MISS C: Cristian.
13
DET. SHERWOOD: Okay. And is he the fourth one in from the
14 entrance, on the east side? Okay. Now, Cristian. You said that you
recognize him as Cristian. How certain are you?
15
MISS C: Well, I’m for sure for sure that’s him.
16
DET. SHERWOOD: Okay. Are you -- like say zero percent to a
17 hundred percent?
18 MISS C: A hundred.
19 DET. SHERWOOD: A hundred percent that that’s Cristian?
20 MISS C: Yes.
21 DET. SHERWOOD: Okay. All right. Do you know if he is associated
with any gangs?
22
MISS C: No. I’m not – no.
23
1 DET. SHERWOOD: Okay. But your brother Luis hangs out with
him?
2
MISS C: Yes.
3
DET. SHERWOOD: Okay. All right. And is there anything else that
4 you could think of about those photos that sticks out to you that you
know that that is Cristian?
5
MISS C: No.
6
DET. SHERWOOD: All right. Just seeing his face?
7
MISS C: Yeah.
8
DET. SHERWOOD: Okay. All right. Is there anything else that
9 you’d like to add to this statement at this time?
10 MISS C: No.
11 Dkt. No. 84-5 at 1–4.
12
2.4 Cano identified a different person as his accomplice.
13
Later, Officer Sherwood interrogated Cano, but Cano did not identify
14
Navarrete. Instead, he identified the shorter suspect as “Wiked” and denied
15
knowing his real name. Dkt. No. 84 at 10–11. After Cano’s arrest, Detective Crane
16
asked the student resource officer at Renton High School if he knew anybody
17
associated with Cano named “Christian.” Dkt. No. 109-1 at 48–49, 135. The
18
resource officer responded that if it was “related to Luis Cano, it’s Christian
19
Navarrete,” and provided Navarrete’s school photo. Id. at 135. Notably, this was the
20
same school resource officer who had previously identified Cano—and not the
21
shorter suspect—from the surveillance footage.
22
23
1 Officer Sherwood then “ran” Navarrete’s full name and obtained additional
2 information about Navarrete’s physical characteristics that became material to the
3 probable cause analysis. When he accessed Navarrete’s learner’s permit, he found
4 his height listed as 5’9”—making him only one inch shorter than Cano (5’10”) rather
5 than the “half a foot” differential observed by witnesses. Id. at 49–50.
6
2.5 Officer Sherwood submitted warrant applications containing
selective information and omissions.
7
Officer Sherwood submitted a probable cause affidavit in support of his
8
application for a search warrant of Navarrete’s home (“Affidavit”) and later filed a
9
certification for determination of probable cause supporting Navarrete’s
10
prosecution.
11
Using the surveillance images, the Affidavit refers to one suspect as “taller”
12
and the other as “shorter.” Id. at 3–4. Officer Sherwood states that the shorter male
13
was “identified” as Navarrete, and the taller male was identified as Cano. Id. He
14
writes that one witness believed the “shorter” suspect was 5’5” to 5’6,” and the taller
15
suspect as 5’10” to 6’. He recounts the witness’s statement that the taller suspect
16
“was light skinned compared to the other guy.” Id. at 7.
17
The Affidavit relies on V.C.’s identification to support the assertion that the
18
shorter suspect was “later identified” as Navarrete. See id. at 4. Officer Sherwood
19
summarizes his first interview with V.C. by stating that “[V.C.] told me the other
20
guy in the dark clothing looked like Christian and advised he lives in the same
21
mobile home park as them, the 4th trailer from the entrance. [V.C.] told me that
22
Luis and Christian do hang out but not all the time.” Id. at 11.
23
1 Officer Sherwood describes his second interview with V.C. as follows:
2 I showed V.C. the same photos again and she asked if the male
walking next to her brother was the same guy sitting down in the
3 bus. I told her they were. V.C. pointed to the male sitting down in the
bus wearing the black clothing without his mask on and told me that
4 was definitely Cristian. Detective Crane had obtained a school photo
of Cristian from School Resource Officer Kerkhoff. I showed that
5 photo to V.C. who told me “yeah that is Cristian.”
6 Id.
7 Officer Sherwood also states that he “ran Christian’s name” and found his
8 full name and address. Dkt. No. 84-6 at 11.
9 Officer Sherwood’s affidavit omits information about Navarrete’s height and
10 skin tone, despite Officer Sherwood having access to Navarrete’s learner’s permit
11 information. The Affidavit does not mention that V.C. is a minor or describe the
12 circumstances of either interview. It does not include V.C.’s expressions of
13 uncertainty during the first interview, her statement that the images were “blurry,”
14 or her doubt about whether different surveillance footage showed the same person.
15 The Affidavit does not mention that V.C.’s parents failed to recognize the shorter
16 suspect or that the first interview occurred during a SWAT search of V.C.’s family
17 home.
18
2.6 The search of Navarrete’s home yielded no physical evidence.
19
Officer Sherwood and other KPD officers executed the search warrant on
20
Navarrete’s family home on October 7, 2020, and arrested him. Dkt. No. 84-9 at 8.
21
Detectives searched the home but found no gun or identifying clothing. Officer
22
Sherwood’s testimony confirms that officers “did not obtain any items of evidentiary
23
1 value for the case during th[e] exhaustive search [of Navarrete’s home].” Dkt. No.
2 109-1 at 62.
3 Later that day, Officer Sherwood filed a certification for determination of
4 probable cause, stating there was probable cause to believe that Navarrete
5 committed first degree assault and unlawful possession of a firearm. Dkt. No. 84 at
6 10. The certification largely mirrors the prior affidavit, with a few additions
7 including Officer Sherwood’s statement that during the search, “Christian
8 [Navarrete] told [the officers] that the gun was never inside his residence.” Dkt. No.
9 84-9 at 8. Officer Sherwood states that “Christian wouldn’t say what happened to
10 the gun but only stated it was never inside his residence” and “did elude [sic] that
11 possibly someone else has it but wouldn’t say who.” Id. Navarrete denies making
12 any statements that would have “elude[d]” to the gun used in the crime. Officer
13 Sherwood did not record these statements.
14
2.7 Officer Sherwood handled evidence and disclosed information about
an alternate suspect.
15
After arresting Navarrete, Officer Sherwood took photos of him standing in
16
the interrogation room, in front of a wall plaque. He had taken photos of Cano in
17
the same position after his arrest. While Officer Sherwood saved the photos of Cano
18
by uploading them to “Evidence.com,” he deleted the photos of Navarrete without
19
uploading them. Dkt. No. 84 at 17. Navarrete claims that the destroyed photos were
20
exonerating, as they would have shown that he was at least as tall as Cano.
21
Dkt. Nos. 13 at 22; 109-1 at 231. Navarrete maintains that Officer Sherwood
22
purposefully destroyed the photos, Dkt. No. 13 at 15, while Officer Sherwood asserts
23
1 that the photos were never disclosed as a result of “either [his] oversight or a
2 technical error,” and he states, “he had no intention of deliberately withholding the
3 photographs.” Dkt. No. 84 at 17.
4 In January 2021, Navarrete’s attorney sent KPD materials implicating
5 another suspect as the shooter. Officer Sherwood interviewed the new suspect on
6 January 26, 2021. Dkt. No. 115-1 at 64 (filed under seal). It is now undisputed that
7 this suspect is “Wiked,” the person Cano had identified during his interrogation.
8 Officer Sherwood took several photographs of this suspect during the interview, but
9 did not include height comparison photos. Id. at 41–46 (photographs filed under
10 seal). Officer Sherwood did not submit his supplemental police report detailing this
11 interaction until May 3, 2021. Dkt. No. 109 at 12 (citing 115-1 at 64 (filed under
12 seal)).
13 About a month later, the prosecutor emailed her staff stating, “[w]e have the
14 wrong guy (just for Navarrete). We are dismissing tomorrow.” Dkt. No. 115-1 at 47
15 (filed under seal). Navarrete spent 141 days in custody during the height of the
16 COVID-19 pandemic, including Thanksgiving, Christmas, New Year’s, and his
17 birthday. Dkt. No. 112 ¶ 5.
18
3. DISCUSSION
19
3.1 Legal standards.
20 Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there is no
21 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
22 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is “genuine” if “a reasonable jury
23 could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” and a fact is “material” if it “might
1 affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
2 Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When considering a summary judgment motion, the
3 court must view all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and
4 draw all reasonable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. Hawai’i Disability
5 Rts. Ctr. v. Kishimoto, 122 F.4th 353, 363 (9th Cir. 2024).
6 Navarrete brings constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
7 “provides a cause of action for the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
8 immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” Long v.
9 Cty. of L.A., 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). The
10 cause of action has two essential elements: “(1) that a right secured by the
11 Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged
12 violation was committed by a person acting under the color of State law.” Id. (citing
13 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, (1988)). Here, the Parties do not dispute the second
14 element—that Defendants were acting under color of State law. As analyzed below,
15 Navarrete asserts that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free
16 of unreasonable search and seizure and his Fourteenth Amendment right to Due
17 Process.
18
3.2 Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on Navarrete’s
Fourth Amendment judicial deception claim.
19
Navarrete asserts a cause of action under Section 1983 for violations of his
20
Fourth Amendment rights, claiming Officer Sherwood obtained his arrest warrant
21
through judicial deception. “Just as the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless
22
searches [and seizures] generally, so too does it prohibit a search [or seizure]
23
1 conducted pursuant to an ill-begotten or otherwise invalid warrant.” Bravo v. City of
2 Santa Maria, 665 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2011). “‘Judicial deception’ consists of
3 either ‘deliberate omission or affirmative misrepresentation.’” Scanlon v. Cnty. of
4 Los Angeles, 92 F.4th 781, 799 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting David v. Kaulukukui, 38
5 F.4th 792, 801 n.3 (9th Cir. 2022)). Indeed, “[w]hether the alleged judicial deception
6 was brought about by material false statements or material omissions is of no
7 consequence.” Liston v. Cty. of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 973 (9th Cir. 1997). An
8 affiant violates an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights by “intentionally or
9 recklessly omit[ting] facts required to prevent technically true statements in the
10 affidavit from being misleading.” Id. (quoting United States v. Stanert, 762 F.2d
11 775, as amended, 769 F.2d 1410 (1985)). In other words, officers cannot manipulate
12 probable cause by “reporting less than the total story[.]” Id. (quoting United States
13 v. Stanert, 762 F.2d 775, 781, as amended, 769 F.2d 1410 (1985)).
14 “To survive summary judgment on a claim of judicial deception, a § 1983
15 plaintiff need not establish specific intent to deceive the [warrant] issuing court.”
16 Bravo, 665 F.3d at 1083 (citing Lombardi v. City of El Cajon, 117 F.3d 1117, 1124
17 (9th Cir. 1997)). “Rather, the plaintiff must (1) establish that the warrant affidavit
18 contained misrepresentations or omissions material to the finding of probable
19 cause, and (2) make a ‘substantial showing’ that the misrepresentations or
20 omissions were made intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth.” Id.
21 (citing Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1223–24 (9th Cir. 2009)); Liston,
22 120 F.3d at 973–74. “Clear proof of deliberation or recklessness is not required at
23 the summary judgment stage.” Scanlon, 92 F.4th at 800 (citation modified). “If a
1 plaintiff satisfies these requirements, the matter should go to trial.” Id. (citation
2 modified).
3 The Court addresses each element below.
4
3.2.1 Officer Sherwood’s warrant affidavit contained
misrepresentations and omissions material to probable
5
cause.
6
Whether the contested misrepresentations and omissions are material to
7
probable cause is a question of law for the court to decide. Bravo, 665 F.3d at 1084
8
(citing Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1024 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Materiality is for the
9
court, state of mind is for the jury.”)). The court determines the materiality of the
10
false statements or omissions by assessing “whether the [officer’s] affidavit, once
11
corrected and supplemented, establishes probable cause.” Bravo, 665 F.3d at 1084
12
(quoting Ewing, 588 F.3d at 1224)); Liston, 120 F.3d at 973 (quoting Stanert, 762
13
F.2d at 782) (The district court considers whether the corrected affidavit would have
14
provided “[the issuing] magistrate with a substantial basis for concluding that
15
probable cause [for a warrant] existed”).
16
“The Supreme Court has declined to articulate a ‘neat set of legal rules’ for
17
evaluating probable cause, and instead has instructed magistrate judges to
18
determine probable cause by considering the ‘totality-of-the-circumstances.’” Chism
19
v. Washington, 661 F.3d 380, 389 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation modified). Probable cause
20
for an arrest exists when “officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy
21
information sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that an
22
offense has been or is being committed by the person being arrested.” United States
23
1 v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007). If the district court concludes that
2 probable cause remains after amendment, “then no constitutional error has
3 occurred.” Bravo, 665 F.3d at 1084.
4 Here, the Court must determine whether, after correcting Officer Sherwood’s
5 statements about V.C.’s identification and including the omitted information about
6 Navarrete’s appearance and height, probable cause existed to arrest him as the
7 “shorter” suspect.
8 a. Officer Sherwood’s probable cause statement and certification of
probable cause omit material information about Navarrete’s physical
characteristics.
9
In the Ninth Circuit, discrepancies in physical characteristics—particularly
10
height and other identifying features—can significantly impact probable cause
11
determinations when the differences are substantial. See Garcia v. Cnty. of
12
Riverside, 817 F.3d 635, 640–42 (9th Cir. 2016) (collecting cases on height and
13
weight discrepancies affecting probable cause). For example, in Garcia, the Ninth
14
Circuit emphasized that a nine-inch height difference between the warrant subject
15
and the detained individual was a “red flag” that could not be ignored and
16
warranted additional identity checks. Id. at 642. Similarly, in Grant v. City of Long
17
Beach, 315 F.3d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit held that mere
18
resemblance to a general description is insufficient to establish probable cause
19
when descriptions are vague or conflicting—finding that a 5’7” Hispanic male could
20
not reasonably be mistaken for a 6’2” Caucasian male based on the descriptions
21
provided. See also United States v. Ricardo, 912 F.2d 337, 342 (9th Cir. 1990)
22
23
1 (officers did not have probable cause to arrest a suspect because he fit the
2 descriptions of a “thin man, not too tall” and “young Mexican male”).
3 Officer Sherwood’s investigation emphasized the suspects’ relative heights,
4 consistently referring to one suspect as the “taller” one and the other as the
5 “shorter” one throughout his affidavit. Dkt. No. 84-6 at 3–7. While skin tone was not
6 the organizing principle of the investigation like height was, it was another
7 distinguishing physical characteristic that witnesses noted and that Sherwood
8 included in his affidavit. Id. at 7. Yet Officer Sherwood’s affidavit omitted crucial
9 information about both characteristics and whether Navarrete fit the description of
10 the second suspect.
11 Before seeking the warrant, Officer Sherwood ran Navarrete’s name and
12 obtained his DMV records showing he stood 5’9”. Dkt. No. 109-1 at 49-50. He knew
13 Cano, the “taller” suspect, was 5’10’. Yet his affidavit included witness estimates
14 placing the shorter suspect at 5’5” to 5’6” while omitting Navarrete’s documented
15 height entirely. As Chism makes clear, officers cannot “pick and choose” facts to
16 manufacture probable cause where none exists. 661 F.3d at 386. Officer Sherwood’s
17 selective inclusion of witness estimates while concealing documentary evidence
18 about Navarrete’s height violates this principle.
19 Officer Sherwood’s affidavit noted that a witness described the taller suspect
20 as “light skinned compared to the other guy,” Dkt. No. 84-6 at 7, meaning that the
21 shorter suspect had darker skin. But Officer Sherwood’s affidavit omitted any
22 information about Navarrete’s actual skin tone, who like Cano, was lighter-skinned.
23 This omission is particularly significant given Officer Sherwood’s statement that he
1 “did not perceive a meaningful difference in the suspects’ complexions” on the
2 surveillance footage.2 Dkt. No. 84 ¶ 51. If Officer Sherwood could not discern a skin
3 tone difference in the footage, this suggests either: (1) the witness’s first-hand
4 observations were incorrect; or (2) the footage quality was insufficient to make such
5 determinations. Either interpretation should have prompted additional
6 investigation. By including the witness’s observation about skin tone differences
7 while omitting both his own inability to confirm those differences and Navarrete’s
8 actual complexion, Officer Sherwood selectively presented evidence to support
9 probable cause while withholding evidence that contradicted it. The surveillance
10 footage confirms the materiality of these omissions.
11 Even accepting Officer Sherwood’s testimony that he could not determine
12 exact measurements from this footage, he could see—as this Court can see—
13 substantial differences between the suspects in both height and appearance. These
14 visible differences, combined with witness observations and Officer Sherwood’s
15 knowledge of Navarrete’s actual characteristics, would have alerted any reasonable
16 magistrate that Navarrete could not be the shorter, darker-skinned suspect.
17 Defendants argue that “courts generally consider height differences of five
18 inches or less to be insufficient to undermine probable cause,” citing Willis v. City of
19
2 Notably, Detective Crane, who assisted in the investigation, testified that he could
20 see a difference in skin complexion between the suspects when viewing the
surveillance footage. When shown a still image from the surveillance footage during
21 his deposition, Detective Crane testified that “the subject on right appears to have a
slightly darker complexion than the subject on the left.” Dkt. No. 109-1 at 128–129.
22 This contradicts Officer Sherwood’s claim that he observed no appreciable difference
in skin tone and corroborates witness observations that the shorter suspect had
23 darker skin than the taller suspect.
1 Bakersfield, Case No. 1:21-cv-01077-CDB, 2024 WL 1624113, at *10 (E.D. Cal. April
2 15, 2024) and Hayes v. Kern Cnty., Case No. 1:19-cv-01722-CDB, 2023 WL 8806570,
3 at *7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2023). Dkt. No. 83 at 18. But these cases are inapposite—
4 both involved officers making good-faith arrests based on height estimates that
5 later proved inaccurate. They do not address the situation here, where evidence
6 showed that the suspect was actually shorter than the arrestee before the officers
7 even drafted a warrant application. Moreover, neither of these addressed the
8 cumulative effect of multiple physical characteristics excluding an arrestee from
9 being the perpetrator. In any event the cases are not binding on this Court, and
10 both are on appeal.
11 Including Navarrete’s actual physical characteristics in the affidavit would
12 have revealed: (1) he stood 5’9”, virtually identical to the “taller” suspect Cano at
13 5’10”, not the 5’4” to 5’6” “shorter suspect”; and (2) he had lighter skin like Cano, not
14 the darker complexion witnesses attributed to the shorter suspect. No reasonable
15 magistrate would find probable cause to arrest someone who matched neither the
16 height nor the skin tone of the described perpetrator. These omissions were not
17 merely material—they were outcome-determinative.
18 b. Officer Sherwood’s affidavit includes material mischaracterizations and
omissions related to V.C.’s identification of Navarrete.
19
The reliability of witness identifications is critical to probable cause,
20
particularly when an identification provides the sole link between a defendant and
21
a crime. Grant, 315 F.3d at 1087–88. Courts must consider whether identification
22
procedures were impermissibly suggestive and whether the witness exhibited
23
1 sufficient indicia of reliability. Id. Here, V.C.’s identification of Navarrete was the
2 only evidence connecting him to the shooting, yet Officer Sherwood’s affidavit
3 omitted critical information undermining its reliability.
4 Officer Sherwood’s affidavit states that V.C. was “100% positive” about her
5 identification while failing to disclose the highly suggestive circumstances that
6 produced it. Officer Sherwood never stated that V.C. was a child or that she was
7 alone during both interviews. He did not inform the issuing court that V.C.—at
8 fourteen years old—was present during the 5:30 a.m. SWAT search of her family
9 home, which immediately led to her brother Cano’s arrest. Officer Sherwood also
10 omitted the fact that the first interview took place at V.C.’s family home during that
11 SWAT search.
12 Similarly, Officer Sherwood omitted key information about his second
13 interview with V.C. First, Officer Sherwood failed to explain how he initiated the
14 second interview—by calling V.C.’s cell phone directly, telling her he knew she was
15 at Goodwill, and asking to meet her there in the parking lot to speak with her
16 again. He did not mention that V.C. was alone when she agreed to meet him and
17 Detective Crane at Goodwill for further questioning. During the recorded portion of
18 this second interview—lasting only two minutes—Officer Sherwood spoke 291
19 words while V.C. spoke only 29, a ten-to-one ratio demonstrating his domination of
20 the conversation. Dkt. No. 110 at 7.
21 The affidavit’s assertion that V.C. “told me the other guy in the dark clothing
22 looked like Christian” materially mischaracterizes her interviews. The recording
23
1 transcripts reveal that V.C. repeatedly expressed inability and unwillingness to
2 identify the shorter suspect:
3 • When asked about “the shorter person,” V.C. said, “I don’t recognize him.”
4 Dkt. No. 84-2 at 2.
5 • She later stated: “I’m not sure if it’s Christian.” Dkt. No. 109-1 at 218.
6 • Most tellingly, she explained: “I can’t say cause it’s like blurry.” Dkt. No.
7 109-1 at 223.
8 Officer Sherwood included the partial statement that the suspect “looked like
9 Christian” while omitting V.C.’s immediate qualifier that she “can’t say” because of
10 image quality. This selective quotation manipulated the inference the magistrate
11 would draw about the reliability of V.C.’s identification. See Liston, 120 F.3d at 973
12 (by “reporting less than the total story, an affiant can manipulate the inferences a
13 magistrate will draw”).
14 Most critically, the evidence indicates Officer Sherwood showed V.C.
15 Navarrete’s school photograph before obtaining her “100%” identification. Showing
16 a witness a single photograph of the police’s chosen suspect is “danger[ous]” because
17 it signals whom the police believe committed the crime. Simmons v. United States,
18 390 U.S. 377, 383 (1968); see Grant, 315 F.3d at 1087–88 (explaining that Supreme
19 Court has warned against emphasizing one person’s photograph during
20 identification procedures). Here, Officer Sherwood showed V.C. the same blurry
21 images she couldn’t identify three weeks earlier, but now supplemented them with
22 a clear school photograph of Navarrete—essentially directing this isolated fourteen-
23 year-old toward the identification he sought.
1 The affidavit also omitted that no adult who viewed the surveillance images
2 identified Navarrete, despite several having the capacity to do so. V.C.’s parents,
3 who knew Navarrete from their neighborhood, failed to recognize him as the shorter
4 suspect. Dkt. No. 109-1 at 90, 211. The School Resource Officer, who knew both
5 Navarrete and Cano as students, identified Cano with “90% certainty” but did not
6 recognize the “other guy” as Navarrete. Id. at 89, 196. This omission is material
7 because it shows that adults with greater familiarity and maturity could not make
8 the identification that Officer Sherwood claimed a fourteen-year-old made with
9 absolute certainty.
10 Upon correcting and supplementing Officer Sherwood’s affidavit, see Bravo,
11 665 F.3d at 1084, the Court finds that the only evidence linking Navarrete to the
12 crime was an identification obtained through suggestive procedures from a
13 fourteen-year-old who: (1) repeatedly stated she couldn’t identify the suspect from
14 the surveillance images; (2) only expressed certainty after being shown Navarrete’s
15 school photograph; (3) was interviewed alone without her parents; and (4) whose
16 identification was not corroborated by any adult who viewed the same evidence,
17 including her own parents who knew Navarrete.
18 These omissions and misleading statements are material, as the corrected
19 affidavit would not have provided “[the issuing] magistrate with a substantial basis
20 for concluding that probable cause existed” to issue an arrest warrant, Liston, 120
21 F.3d at 973 (quoting United States v. Stanert, 762 F.2d 775, 782, as amended, 769
22 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1985)). No reasonable magistrate would issue an arrest warrant
23 based solely on such an unreliable identification. Cf. Grant, 315 F.3d at 1087–88.
1 Having established materiality, the Court turns to the second prong of the
2 judicial deception analysis.
3
3.2.2 Navarrete has made a “substantial showing” that the
misrepresentations or omissions were made either
4
intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth.
5
The second judicial deception prong considers whether the material
6
misrepresentations or omissions were made “intentionally or with a reckless
7
disregard for the truth.” Bravo, 665 F.3d at 1083. While the plaintiff must make a
8
substantial showing on this prong to survive summary judgment, they need not
9
provide “clear proof” of recklessness or intent. Id. at 1087. As the Ninth Circuit has
10
repeatedly held, “the question of intent or recklessness is ‘a factual determination
11
for the trier of fact.’” Id. (quoting Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir. 1995)).
12
Here, a reasonable juror could find that Officer Sherwood either intentionally
13
or recklessly omitted key information from his affidavit. From the evidence, a jury
14
could find that the direct contradiction between V.C.’s recorded statement (“I don’t
15
recognize him”) and Officer Sherwood’s written characterization (she “told me the
16
other guy in the dark clothing looked like Christian”) constitutes intentional
17
misrepresentation rather than interpretive error. A jury could also infer from
18
Officer Sherwood’s pattern of omissions—excluding Navarrete’s documented height
19
while including witness estimates, omitting V.C.’s age and expressions of
20
uncertainty while emphasizing her eventual certainty—that he deliberately
21
selected facts to favor probable cause. And a jury could find that Officer Sherwood’s
22
conduct by proceeding with Navarrete’s arrest even after personally observing that
23
1 Navarrete matched Cano’s height and complexion, and by repeating the same
2 mischaracterizations, demonstrates either deliberate deception or reckless
3 disregard for accuracy.
4 Given the importance of the omitted information, a reasonable juror could
5 conclude that these omissions and misrepresentations were reckless or intentional.
6 See Liston, 120 F.3d at 975 (“Whether that decision [to omit information from
7 search warrant affidavit] was reckless or intentional is an issue of fact for the jury
8 to decide.”).
9
3.3 Due Process Claim Analysis.
10
In addition to his Fourth Amendment Claim, Navarrete alleges that Officer
11
Sherwood deliberately fabricated evidence against him, violating his Fourteenth
12
Amendment due process rights. “To prevail on a § 1983 claim of deliberate
13
fabrication, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant official deliberately
14
fabricated evidence and (2) the deliberate fabrication caused the plaintiff’s
15
deprivation of liberty.” Spencer v. Peters, 857 F.3d 789, 798 (9th Cir. 2017). Unlike a
16
Fourth Amendment claim, deliberate fabrication violates due process regardless of
17
whether probable cause existed. Id. at 801–02 (holding lack of probable cause to
18
prosecute defendant was not element of claim under § 1983 alleging deliberate
19
fabrication of evidence by police officer in violation of due process clause of
20
Fourteenth Amendment).
21
The plaintiff may prove deliberate fabrication through direct or
22
circumstantial evidence. Id. at 801. Direct evidence exists when “an interviewer . . .
23
1 deliberately mischaracterize[d] witness statements in her investigative report.” Id.
2 at 799. (quoting Costanich v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 627 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th
3 Cir. 2010)). When there is direct evidence of deliberate fabrication, the plaintiff
4 need not show that the investigating officer knew of his innocence. Id. at 793.
5 Circumstantial evidence exists when the evidence shows that an investigating
6 officer knew or should have known that the suspect was innocent but continued to
7 investigate them anyway. Id. at 799. From this, a reasonable juror could infer “that
8 the investigator has an unlawful motivation to frame an innocent person.” Id.
9 “Similarly, if an investigator knowingly uses coercive and abusive techniques that
10 likely will generate false information, then that circumstantial evidence suggests
11 that the investigator is deliberately fabricating evidence.” Id.
12 Here, Navarrete has presented both types of evidence. As discussed above,
13 direct evidence supports a reasonable inference that Officer Sherwood deliberately
14 mischaracterized V.C.’s statements during her first interview. See e.g., Dkt. No.
15 109-1 at 47–48 (Sherwood dep.); id. at 218–24 (V.C. interview transcript). It also
16 supports a finding that Officer Sherwood misled the issuing judge by omitting
17 information that undermined the only identification of Navarrete.
18 Moreover, Officer Sherwood’s certification for probable cause contains a
19 potentially fabricated statement that was conspicuously not recorded. In his
20 certification for determination of probable cause, Officer Sherwood testified that
21 Navarrete answered questions about the gun while the police searched his home,
22 suggesting that he knew about the gun and had once possessed it. Navarrete argues
23 that Officer Sherwood fabricated his statements. This disputed fact is especially
1 important considering the officers found none of the evidence they expected to find
2 during the search of Navarrete’s home.
3 Circumstantial evidence of deliberate fabrication exists here, as a reasonable
4 juror could find that Officer Sherwood continued to investigate Navarrete while
5 knowing he was innocent when he observed that Navarrete matched the physical
6 characteristics of the taller suspect, not the shorter, darker suspect he was alleged
7 to be. But Officer Sherwood proceeded with the arrest and prosecution nonetheless.
8 This persistence despite exculpatory evidence supports an inference of deliberate
9 fabrication. Spencer, 857 F.3d at 799.
10 The allegedly fabricated evidence caused Navarrete’s 141-day pretrial
11 detention. The prosecutor’s charging decision relied on Officer Sherwood’s affidavit
12 and certification, and charges were dismissed only after defense counsel identified
13 the actual perpetrator who used the moniker “Wiked”—the name Cano had given
14 from the beginning.
15 Whether Officer Sherwood deliberately fabricated evidence through
16 mischaracterizing witness statements, inventing incriminating admissions, or
17 continuing prosecution despite knowledge of innocence presents disputed issues of
18 material fact that preclude summary judgment.
19
3.4 Officer Sherwood is not entitled to qualified immunity.
20
Officer Sherwood argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity on
21
summary judgment, but the Court finds that he is not entitled to this protection.
22
23
1 “Police officers are not entitled to qualified immunity if (1) the facts ‘[t]aken
2 in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury’ show that ‘the [officers’]
3 conduct violated a constitutional right’ and (2) ‘the right was clearly established’ at
4 the time of the alleged violation.” Thompson v. Rahr, 885 F.3d 582, 586 (9th Cir.
5 2018) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). While “[t]hese inquiries
6 are questions of law,” genuine issues of material fact may prevent the court from
7 deciding them. Id. (citing Morales v. Fry, 837 F.3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 2017)). When
8 that happens, “the case must proceed to trial.” Id.
9 For Navarrete’s Fourth Amendment claim, it has long been clearly
10 established that searching and arresting individuals without probable cause
11 violates the Fourth Amendment. Chism v. Wash. State, 661 F.3d 380, 393 (9th Cir.
12 2011). And the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that “governmental employees are
13 not entitled to qualified immunity on judicial deception claims” that survive
14 summary judgment. Id.; see Hervey, 65 F.3d at 788. Because Navarrete’s judicial
15 deception claim survives summary judgment for the reasons discussed above,
16 Officer Sherwood cannot invoke qualified immunity. See Chism, 661 F.3d at 393.
17 Nor does qualified immunity entitle him to summary judgment on
18 Navarrete’s Due Process claim. It was clearly established at the time of Navarrete’s
19 arrest that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the deliberate fabrication of
20 evidence by a state official.” Spencer, 857 F.3d at 793 (quoting Devereaux v. Abbey,
21 263 F.3d 1070, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc)). It is also “clearly established that
22 police officers [are] bound to disclose material, exculpatory evidence.” Mellen v.
23 Winn, 900 F.3d 1085, 1103 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Carillo v. Cnty. of L.A., 798 F.3d
1 1210, 1219 (9th Cir. 2015)). As explained above, when taken in the light most
2 favorable to Navarrete, there are questions of material fact about whether Officer
3 Sherwood violated Navarrete’s clearly established Due Process rights.
4 Accordingly, summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is denied as
5 to both claims.
6
3.5 Because Navarrete has failed to establish a pattern of similar
constitutional violations, his Monell claim fails.
7
Navarrete seeks to hold the City of Kent liable under Section 1983 for
8
allegedly inadequate police training. While concerning evidence exists about
9
individual officers’ training deficiencies, the Supreme Court requires far more to
10
establish municipal liability than what Navarrete has presented.
11
Under the Monell doctrine, “[m]unicipalities are ‘persons’ under
12
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and thus may be liable for causing a constitutional deprivation.”
13
Long, 442 F.3d at 1185 (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690
14
(1978)). This theory of liability is only viable, however, when the execution of a
15
government policy or custom inflicts the plaintiff’s injury. Id. In other words, “[a]
16
municipality may not be sued under § 1983 solely because an injury was inflicted by
17
its employees or agents.” Id.
18
A municipality’s failure to train employees may serve as the basis for Section
19
1983 liability “only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to
20
the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” City of Canton v.
21
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). This deliberate indifference standard is
22
“stringent,” requiring proof that a municipal actor “‘disregarded a known or obvious
23
1 consequence of his action.’” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (quoting
2 Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997)). Most
3 critically for this case, the Supreme Court has held that “[a] pattern of similar
4 constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to
5 demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Id. at 62
6 (quoting Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 409). The Court’s reasoning is straightforward:
7 “Without notice that a course of training is deficient in a particular respect,
8 decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training program
9 that will cause violations of constitutional rights.” Id.
10 Navarrete’s attempt to rely on the Kammerzell matter as evidence of a
11 pattern, Dkt. No. 108 at 15–17, fails to create a genuine dispute of material fact.
12 That incident involved fundamentally different misconduct—workplace
13 discrimination and instructing subordinates to lie about internal Nazi imagery—not
14 judicial deception in criminal proceedings. As the Supreme Court emphasized in
15 Connick, prior violations must be “similar to the violation at issue” to provide the
16 requisite notice. 563 U.S. at 62–63. The Court explained that four prior Brady
17 reversals “could not have put Connick on notice that the office’s Brady training was
18 inadequate with respect to the sort of Brady violation at issue” because “[n]one of
19 those cases involved failure to disclose blood evidence, a crime lab report, or
20 physical evidence of any kind.” Id. The Kammerzell incident, involving workplace
21 misconduct rather than warrant-related deception, similarly could not have put
22 Kent on notice of the need for different training regarding judicial proceedings. No
23 reasonable jury could find the pattern requirement satisfied based on this evidence.
1 Navarrete cannot escape the pattern requirement by invoking the narrow
2 single-incident exception recognized in Canton. While Canton acknowledged that
3 “in a narrow range of circumstances” a pattern might not be necessary, see Connick,
4 563 U.S. at 63, the Supreme Court provided only one example: the obvious need for
5 training officers on constitutional limits for deadly force, id. The Connick Court
6 explained that this exception applies where “city policymakers know to a moral
7 certainty that their police officers will be required to arrest fleeing felons,” id. at
8 101 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting), and understand the “known frequency with which
9 police attempt to arrest fleeing felons and the predictability that an officer lacking
10 specific tools to handle that situation will violate citizens’ rights,” id. at 63–64. The
11 Ninth Circuit has interpreted this exception narrowly, limiting it to times when
12 employees are “making life-threatening decisions[.]” Benavidez v. Cnty. of San
13 Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1155 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Where, as here, the County employees
14 are not making life-threatening decisions, and because micromanaging of municipal
15 policies should be avoided, the single incident exception is inapplicable.”) (citation
16 modified). The isolated incident of one officer allegedly engaged in judicial deception
17 in a warrant application does not meet the single-incident exception.
18 Navarrete’s reliance on Long v. City of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir.
19 2006), to excuse his failure to demonstrate a pattern of violations is misplaced. (Dkt.
20 108 at 30). Connick was decided after Long, and post-Connick cases consistently
21 require pattern evidence. See, e.g., Flores v. Cnty. of L.A., 758 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th
22 Cir. 2014) (“Neither Baca nor the County was faced with a pattern of similar
23 constitutional violations by untrained employees.”).
1 Even viewing the evidence favorably to Navarrete, as the Court must, the
2 officers’ individual training deficiencies—Crane’s inability to define “probable
3 cause” after fifteen years, Dkt. No. 109-1 at 116–17, and Sherwood’s lack of recall
4 about constitutional training, Dkt. 109-1 at 4–7, 10—constitute negligence at most,
5 not deliberate indifference. Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 484–85
6 (9th Cir. 2007) (“evidence of the [city’s] failure to train a single officer is insufficient
7 to establish a municipality’s deliberate policy” for Monell liability). Kent maintained
8 written policies on these issues, Dkt. No. 70 ¶¶ 4–13, and without prior violations
9 providing notice of constitutional deficiencies, no reasonable jury could find
10 deliberate indifference. Similarly, Officer Sherwood’s promotion after Navarrete’s
11 tort claim, Dkt. 108 at 30, fails to establish ratification absent evidence that
12 policymakers knew of and approved the specific alleged misconduct. Christie v.
13 Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1239 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[T]o show ratification, a plaintiff must
14 prove that the “authorized policymakers approve a subordinate’s decision and the
15 basis for it.”) (quoting City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)).
16 Because Navarrete has failed to present evidence from which a reasonable
17 jury could find that Kent acted with deliberate indifference to a known or obvious
18 risk, no genuine dispute of material fact exists, and Defendants are entitled to
19 judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary
20 judgment on the Monell claim is GRANTED.
21
22
23
1 3.6 Issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on Navarrete’s
false arrest claim.
2
Along with his federal claims, Navarrete brings state-law claims for false
3
arrest and malicious prosecution arising from the same investigative conduct.
4
Under Washington law, “[t]he gist of an action for false arrest . . . is the
5
unlawful violation of a person’s right of personal liberty or the restraint of that
6
person without legal authority.” Bender v. City of Seattle, 664 P.2d 492, 499 (Wash.
7
1983) (en banc). “[T]he general rule is that an officer is not liable if he makes an
8
arrest under a warrant.” Id. But that is not the case “when the same officer provides
9
information to obtain the warrant and then also executes the warrant.” Id. In that
10
circumstance, the officer “is not merely directed to fulfill the order of the court; he is
11
in a position to control the flow of information to the magistrate upon which
12
probable cause determinations are made.” Id. Thus, Washington courts “see no
13
distinction between an officer who makes an invalid, warrantless arrest and one
14
who knowingly withholds facts in order to obtain a warrant.” Id. Nor do they allow
15
officers to “‘cleanse’ the transaction by supplying only those facts favorable to the
16
issuance of a warrant.” Id. at 500.
17
As established above, Officer Sherwood both supplied the information for the
18
warrant and executed it. Because genuine disputes of material fact exist regarding
19
whether Officer Sherwood knowingly withheld and misrepresented facts to obtain
20
the warrant he then executed, summary judgment on the false arrest claim is
21
DENIED.
22
23
1 3.7 Issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on Navarrete’s
malicious prosecution claim.
2
Navarrete’s other state-law claim alleges malicious prosecution based on the
3
same course of conduct underlying his federal and false arrest claims.
4
To maintain an action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must prove five
5
elements: “(1) the prosecution was instituted or continued by the defendant,
6
(2) there was want of probable cause for the institution or continuation of the
7
proceeding, (3) the proceeding was instituted or continued through malice, (4) the
8
proceeding was terminated on the merits in favor of the plaintiff or was abandoned,
9
and (5) plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the prosecution.” Youker v. Douglas
10
Cnty., 258 P.3d 60, 66–67 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Bender, 664 P.2d at 500).
11
Defendants argue that summary judgment is appropriate because probable cause
12
existed for Navarrete’s arrest and because Navarrete has failed to provide evidence
13
of malice.
14
Probable cause has not been established as a matter of law, making summary
15
judgment on the second element inappropriate. “Washington cases have long held
16
that probable cause is deemed established as a matter of law . . . if it clearly appears
17
that the defendant provided the prosecuting attorney with a full and fair disclosure,
18
in good faith, of all the material facts known to him or her, and the prosecutor
19
thereupon preferred a criminal charge and caused arrest.” Id. at 67. Because issues
20
of material fact exist on Navarrete’s judicial deception claim, probable cause is not
21
established as a matter of law.
22
23
1 Turning to the malice requirement, Washington law provides that “[ml]alice
9 may be inferred from lack of probable cause and from proof that the investigation or
3 prosecution was undertaken with improper motives or reckless disregard for the
4 plaintiffs rights.” Jd. at 68 (citing Turngren v. King Cnty., 705 P.2d 258, 266 (Wash.
5 1985)). Navarrete has submitted evidence from which the jury may infer that his
g investigation or prosecution were undertaken with improper motives or a reckless
7 disregard for his rights. This evidence includes but is not limited to evidence of
g_||judicial deception and deliberate fabrication, as well as the purported spoliation of
9 evidence after Navarrete’s arrest.
10 Because disputed facts exist regarding probable cause, malice, and whether
11 Officer Sherwood made a full and fair disclosure to prosecutors, summary judgment
12 on the malicious prosecution claim is DENIED.
13
4. CONCLUSION
14 . ; . . .
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to all
5 claims against Officer Sherwood and GRANTED as to the Monell claim against the
16 .
City of Kent. Dkt. No. 83.
The City of Kent is DISMISSED from this action. This case shall proceed to
trial on all remaining claims against Officer Sherwood.
19
20 .
Dated this 8th day of October, 2025.
21
22
amal N. Whitehead
23 United States District Judge