Sanders v. City of San Antonio, Texas

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

SAN ANTONIO DIVISION

MICHAEL SANDERS, §

§

Plaintiff, § 5:23-CV-00447-FB-RBF

§

vs. §

§

CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS, §

JOSUE VALLEJO-MARTINEZ, §

§

Defendants. §

§

§

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

To the Honorable United States District Judge Fred Biery:

This Report and Recommendation concerns Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

See Dkt. No. 31. All pretrial matters in this action have been referred for resolution, pursuant to

Rules CV-72 and 1 of Appendix C to the Local Rules for the United States District Court for the

Western District of Texas. See Dkt. No. 10. Authority to enter this recommendation stems from

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. No. 30,

should be DENIED.

Factual and Procedural Background

This 42 U.S.C. §1983 action involves allegations of excessive force in connection with

the tasing of plaintiff Michael Sanders by off-duty San Antonio Police Department (SAPD)

Officer Vallejo-Martinez. On May 2, 2021, Sanders was enjoying his apartment complex’s pool,

along with a group of friends and family members. See Dkt. No. 1 (Compl.) ¶12-14. Defendant

SAPD Officer Vallejo-Martinez, working in an off-duty capacity, was patrolling the complex as

a courtesy officer. When he came across Sanders and company, Officer Vallejo-Martinez

requested that the group vacate the pool area because it was near the pool’s closing time. Id. ¶14-

16. Vallejo-Martinez then, according to Sanders, “approach[ed] the main pool gate and shine[d]

his flashlight towards the group while yelling for them to pack their things and leave or they

would be arrested for Public Intoxication.” Id. ¶15.

As Officer Vallejo-Martinez then opened and passed through the gate to the pool area,

the live complaint explains, Sanders approached the officer wanting to ask, “why he was

threatening arrest.” Id. ¶18. Sanders’ complaint explains that he continued to ask questions of

Officer Vallejo-Martinez but received no response. Id. ¶¶18-21. But according to Vallejo-

Martinez’s version of events, Sanders was yelling loudly, while the officer could smell an odor

of alcohol coming from him. Dkt. No. 31 (Resp.) Exb. 1. Officer Vallejo-Martinez states that

Sanders was slurring his words and behaving angrily, while trying to provoke a fight with the

officer. Id. When Officer Vallejo-Martinez moved to restrain Sanders, the officer alleges,

Sanders moved his arms away multiple times and was resisting the arrest. Id. Sanders, in

contrast, states that at no point “did [he] resist or fight Officer Vallejo-Martinez in any way.” See

Dkt. No. 30 (Mot.) ¶7. All agree that Vallejo-Martinez then deployed his taser, striking Sanders’

chest. Compl. ¶25.

Sanders initiated this action on April 12, 2023, suing the City of San Antonio and Officer

Vallejo-Martinez and alleging excessive force by Vallejo-Martinez and a municipal-liability

claim against the City. See Compl. Plaintiff Sanders filed the present Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment, seeking a finding that Officer Vallejo-Martinez is not entitled to qualified

immunity as a matter of law. See Mot.

Legal Standard

The Court grants summary judgment if the movant shows there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

56. To establish that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, the movant must either

submit evidence that negates the existence of some material element of the non-moving party’s

claim or defense, or, if the crucial issue is one for which the nonmoving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial, merely point out that the evidence in the record is insufficient to support

an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim or defense. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d

1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (citing, inter alia, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323 (1986)).

For a court to conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact, the court must be

satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could have found for the nonmovant, or, in other words,

that the evidence favoring the nonmovant is insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a

verdict for the nonmovant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In

making this determination, a court should review all the evidence in the record, giving credence

to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as the “evidence supporting the moving party

that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that evidence comes from

disinterested witnesses.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000).

A court “may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence” in ruling on a motion

for summary judgment, id. at 150, and it must review all facts in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. First Colony Life Ins. Co. v. Sanford, 555 F.3d 177, 181 (5th Cir. 2009).

Analysis

The thrust of Plaintiff Sanders’ Motion for Summary Judgment is that Officer Vallejo-

Martinez is not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law because Vallejo-Martinez acted

without discretionary authority during the episode when he tased Sanders. Qualified immunity

protects government officials acting within their authority from individual liability “when their

actions could reasonably have been believed to be legal.” Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 412

(5th Cir. 2011) (en banc). For a police officer or other government employee to establish

qualified immunity, they must show, first, that their conduct was within the scope of their

discretionary authority. Sweetin v. City of Tex. City, Tex., 48 F.4th 387, 391-92 (5th Cir. 2022)

(“To even get into the qualified-immunity framework, the government official must satisfy his

burden of establishing that the challenged conduct was within the scope of his discretionary

authority.”) (internal quotations omitted). To determine whether an act was within the scope of

the official’s discretionary authority, the Court looks to state law. Id. Looking to that law and

other authorities confirms Sanders’ arguments are without merit and he is not entitled to

summary judgment, as discussed further below.

A. Officer Vallejo-Martinez Had Authority to Arrest Sanders.

Under Texas law and as a general matter, “a peace officer is a peace officer only while in

his jurisdiction and when the officer leaves that jurisdiction, he cannot perform the functions of

his office.” Martinez v. State, 261 S.W.3d 773, 775 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. ref’d). But

that does not end the inquiry. There are statutory exceptions to this jurisdictional limit that are

directly on-point here.

Texas Criminal Code of Procedure Article 14.03 provides that “[a] peace officer who is

outside his jurisdiction may arrest, without a warrant, a person who commits an offense within

the officer’s presence or view, if the offense is a felony, a violation of Chapter 42 [concerning

disorderly conduct and related offenses] or 49 [concerning intoxication and alcoholic beverage

offenses], Penal Code, or a breach of the peace.” Nunez-Marquez v. State, 501 S.W.3d 226, 233

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 14.03(d)).

Additionally, “a licensed city police officer outside city limits ‘may arrest without warrant a

person who commits an offense within the officer’s presence or view,’ other than a violation of

the Rules of the Road.” Id. (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 14.03(g)).

Here, it is undisputed that at the time of the arrest and tasing, Officer Vallejo-Martinez

was a licensed peace officer. Resp. at 7 (noting that Vallejo-Martinez is licensed under Chapter

1701 of the Texas Occupations Code as a peace officer of a municipality). Under Article 14.03,

Vallejo-Martinez was therefore authorized to make an arrest while outside of his jurisdiction

without warrant for any offense committed within his presence or view, except for some traffic

offenses. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 14.03(g). Moreover, on a motion for summary judgment

brought by the plaintiff, it is the defendant’s version of the disputed facts that the Court must

credit. See, e.g., Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990) (noting that on

summary judgment controverted evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-

movant). With the disputed facts concerning Sanders’ actions viewed in a light favorable to

Officer Vallejo-Martinez, it is plain that, at a bare minimum, there is a fact dispute concerning

the officer’s authority, as well as the objective reasonableness of his actions. Summary judgment

for Sanders is therefore not warranted.

The Court’s conclusion is not altered by Sanders’ argument that Article 14.03 doesn’t

apply because Officer Vallejo-Martinez was enforcing house rules. See Mot. at 12. It is only in

Sanders’ version of events that Officer Vallejo-Martinez was enforcing house rules. According

to the officer’s version of events, however, Sanders was publicly drunk and disorderly, and he

further resisted arrest. This version of events is properly before the Court in the declaration

provided by Officer Vallejo-Martinez. See Resp. Exb. 1 at 2 (Vallejo-Martinez Decl.). This is

therefore a disputed fact matter. Indeed, Vallejo-Martinez arrested Sanders for public

intoxication, an offense under chapter 42 of the Penal Code. See id.

Next, Sanders unavailingly argues that Officer Vallejo-Martinez’s jurisdiction was

limited by city ordinance. Sanders cites Chapter 25 of the San Antonio Code of Ordinances,

stating that this ordinance “limits the duty of San Antonio Police Department officers to ‘within

city limits.’” Mot. at 11 (citing San Antonio, Tex., Code of Ordinances ch. 25, art. V, § 5-a). He

argues that this ordinance, by describing the duties of officers while within city limits, in fact

limits the extraterritorial arrest authority granted in Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 14.03. The Court

believes Sanders intended to cite Article I of Chapter 25, and not Article V, which describes the

policies for restricted entry access systems. In Article I, the Ordinance states:

It shall be the duty of the police of the city at all times of the day and night, within

the city limits, and the officers and members of the police force of the city are

hereby empowered to specially preserve the public peace, prevent crime, detect

and arrest offenders, suppress riots, mobs and insurrections, disperse unlawful and

dangerous assemblages, and assemblages which obstruct the free passage of the

public streets, sidewalks and plazas; to protect the rights of person and property,

guard the public health; to preserve order at all the public meetings, assemblages,

theaters and all places of public amusement or resort; to prevent confusion and

regulate the movement of vehicles in the streets, highways and public places of

the city; to remove all nuisances in the streets, plazas or highways of the city not

otherwise provided for; to arrest all mendicants and beggars and all dangerous and

suspicious characters, and all loafers and pimps; to assist, advise and protect

strangers and travelers in the public plazas, streets and highways of the city, and

to repress and restrain all unlawful and disorderly conduct or practices therein;

and to enforce and prevent the violation of this Code and all laws of the state and

ordinances of the city.

San Antonio, Tex., Code of Ordinances ch. 25, art. I, § 25-1.

By any plain reading of this ordinance, it describes officers’ duties within city limits but

does not state that those duties cannot extend beyond city limits, or that officers couldn’t have

any duties outside of city limits if directed by state law. To interpret this ordinance as Sanders

advocates would require elevating it above state law, which makes little sense.

B. Officer Vallejo-Martinez Had Discretion When He Executed the Arrest.

There is no merit to Sanders’ argument that Officer Vallejo-Martinez was not performing

a discretionary act when he arrested Sanders. Indeed, it is well established under Texas law that

whether and how to execute an arrest are discretionary acts. 1

Articles 14.03(d) and (g) rely, first and foremost, on an officer using discretion to

determine whether there is an offense being committed. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 14.03(d)

& (g). The statutes then both permit an officer to arrest a subject. Id. These are clearly

discretionary acts, as is the use of force necessary to perform an arrest. See Tex. Penal Code §

9.51 (providing that authority to arrest carries with it authority to use reasonable force); Dent v.

City of Dallas, 729 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (noting that an

officer’s decision regarding “if, how, and when to arrest a person” is discretionary). There is,

therefore, simply no merit to Sanders’ argument that Officer Vallejo-Martinez acted without

discretionary authority when arresting Sanders. See Mot. at 13.

Moreover, the case cited in support of this unavailing argument, Sweetin v. City of Texas

City, Texas, involved a city “permit officer,” who handled ambulance permits, pursuing an

1 See Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 654 (Tex. 1994) (“Under Texas law, a police

officer’s decision to arrest a suspect, including by force, is a discretionary act within the scope of

his or her authority as peace officer.”) (collecting cases); Quinn v. Roach, 326 Fed. Appx. 280,

289 (5th Cir. 2009) (“A number of Texas appellate courts have held that a police officer’s . . .

decision[s] concerning if and when to make an arrest[] are discretionary functions.”) (collecting

cases); see also Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 748, 760-61 (2005) (finding

that police officers always have discretion to arrest or not arrest, even when a police department

has an official policy requiring arrest).

ambulance lacking a permit and detaining the two ambulance drivers until a fire marshal with

citation authority arrived. 48 F.4th 387, 390-91 (5th Cir. 2022). The Court found that as a permit

officer, the employee had no authority to perform any stops of any kind. Id. at 392. In obvious

contrast, Officer Vallejo-Martinez is a licensed peace officer with discretionary authority to

determine probable cause for arrest, and to perform an arrest. Reliance on Sweetin in this context

is misplaced. See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 760-61 (recognizing that a Colorado

statute could not divest police officers’ discretion to arrest or not, and noting, “It is, the [United

States Supreme] Court proclaimed, simply ‘common sense that all police officers must use some

discretion in deciding when and where to enforce city ordinances.’” (emphasis in original and

quoting Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 62 n.32 (1999)).

Conclusion and Recommendation

For the reasons discussed above, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment, Dkt. No. 30, be DENIED.

Instructions for Service and Notice of Right to Object/Appeal

The United States District Clerk shall serve a copy of this report and recommendation on

all parties by either (1) electronic transmittal to all parties represented by attorneys registered as

a “filing user” with the clerk of court, or (2) by mailing a copy by certified mail, return receipt

requested, to those not registered. Written objections to this report and recommendation must be

filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of same, unless this time period is

modified by the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Objections,

responses, and replies must comply with the same page limits as other filings, unless otherwise

excused by the district court’s standing orders. See Rule CV-7. The objecting party shall file the

objections with the clerk of the court, and serve the objections on all other parties. A party filing

objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions, or recommendations to which

objections are being made and the basis for such objections; the district court need not consider

frivolous, conclusory, or general objections. A party’s failure to file written objections to the

proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report shall bar the party

from a de novo determination by the district court. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-52 (1985);

Acuna v. Brown & Root, Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 340 (Sth Cir. 2000). Additionally, failure to timely

file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in

this report and recommendation shall bar the aggrieved party, except upon grounds of plain error,

from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions

accepted by the district court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (Sth

Cir. 1996) (en banc).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

SIGNED this 29th day of August, 2025.

RICHARD B. FARRER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE