The opinion
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
3 Rosaura PABLO MIGUEL, Case No.: 25-cv-2644-AGS-MSB
4 Petitioner, ORDER REQUIRING RESPONSE
5 v.
6 Christopher LAROSE, et al.,
7 Respondent.
8
9 Petitioner Rosaura Pablo Miguel seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
10 § 2241 challenging her immigration detention. At this stage, she need only make out a
11 claim that is sufficiently cognizable to warrant a response. See Rules Governing Section
12 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 4 (authorizing summary dismissal “if
13 it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not
14 entitled to relief”); id., Rule 1(b) (permitting use of those Rules to any “habeas corpus
15 petition”). In this context, the relevant federal rules permit “summary dismissal of claims
16 that are clearly not cognizable.” Neiss v. Bludworth, 114 F.4th 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2024)
17 (cleaned up). But “as long as a petition has any potential merit, it is not so frivolous or
18 incredible as to justify summary dismissal[.]” Id.
19 Petitioner claims to have been in immigration custody since “August 10, 2025.”
20 (ECF 1, at 2.) She alleges that she has been “subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8
21 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A),” and thus denied bond during the pendency of removal
22 proceedings. (ECF 1, at 2) This is due to a “new DHS policy issued on July 8, 2025,
23 instructing all Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) employees to consider anyone
24 inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)—i.e., present without admission—to be an
25 ‘applicant for admission’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore subject to
26 mandatory detention during the removal hearing process.” (ECF 1, at 3 (footnote omitted).)
27 Despite originally succeeding at a bond hearing, the immigration judge allegedly changed
28 course thereafter and determined that he “lacked jurisdiction to redetermine Respondent’s
| custody” “in light of’ the Board of Immigration Appeals’ opinion in “Matter of Yajure
2 || Hurtado.” (Id. at 4.) She charges that Yajure Hurtado and the “new legal interpretation of
3 INA is plainly contrary to the statutory framework and contrary to decades of agency
4 ||practice applying § 1226(a) to people like Petitioner who are present within the
5 || United States.” Ud. at 5.)
6 This challenge has sufficient potential merit to warrant a response. The Court notes
7 || functionally identical ones across the country have been found to have a “likelihood of
8 ||success on the merits” or have resulted in the writ being issued. See, e.g., Mosqueda v.
9 || Noem, No. 5:25-CV-02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL 2591530, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025)
10 (‘T]he Court concludes that petitioners are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims
11 || because section 1226(a), not section 1225(b)(2), likely governs their detention.”); Vazquez
12 ||v. Feeley, No. 2:25-CV-01542-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 2676082, at *11 (D. Nev. Sept. 17,
13 |}2025) (same); see also Rodriguez v. Bostock, No. 3:25-CV-05240-TMC, 2025 WL
14 2782499, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025) (“Every district court to address this question
15 concluded that the government’s position belies the statutory text of the INA, canons
16 statutory interpretation, legislative history, and longstanding agency practice.”); Luna
17 || Quispe v. Crawford, No. 1:25-CV-1471-AJT-LRV, 2025 WL 2783799, at *6 (E.D. Va.
18 ||Sept. 29, 2025) (‘“Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a)’s discretionary
19 || framework, not § 1225(b)’s mandatory detention procedures, as at least thirty federal
20 || district courts around the country, including two in this Circuit, have concluded when faced
21 || with habeas petitions from comparably situated petitioners.”’).
22 By October 28, 2025, respondent must answer the petition. Petitioner’s reply must
23 filed by November 18, 2025.
24 || Dated: October 7, 2025
Hon. rew G. Schopler
United States District Judge
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