AHPC SOCIAL TALLAHASSEE LLC v. PATTERSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

AHPC SOCIAL TALLAHASSEE,

LLC,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 4:25-cv-383-MW/MJF

NADIA PATTERSON,

Defendant.

/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This civil action originated in the County Court of Leon County

Court, Florida Civil Division, Case No. 2025 CC 003933. On September

11, 2025, Defendant Nadia Patterson proceeding pro se, filed a notice of

removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Doc. 1. Because the District

Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over this case, the

District Court should remand this civil action to the State court from

which Defendant attempts to remove it.

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BACKGROUND

On September 5, 2025, Plaintiff AHPC Social Tallahassee, LLC

commenced an eviction proceeding against Defendant by filing a civil

complaint in the County Court of Leon County, Florida. Doc. 1-1.

Additionally, Plaintiff sought to recover $5,861.00 from Defendant for

breach of the rental agreement. Id. On September 11, 2025, Defendant

filed a notice of removal and stated that removal is proper because

“Defendant asserts federal defenses and counterclaims.” Doc. 1 at 1.

DISCUSSION

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and they possess

only the power authorized by the Constitution and Congress. See Exxon

Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005); Kokkonen

v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “It is to be

presumed that a cause lies outside” a federal court’s “limited jurisdiction

. . . .” Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377. In cases removed from a state court, the

“burden is on the party who sought removal to demonstrate that federal

jurisdiction exists.” Friedman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 410 F.3d 1350,

1353 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted); Kirkland v. Midland

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Mortg. Co., 243 F.3d 1277, 1281 n.5 (11th Cir. 2001); Pacheco de Perez v.

AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1373 (11th Cir. 1998); Diaz v. Sheppard, 85

F.3d 1502, 1505 (11th Cir. 1996). Courts construe removal jurisdiction

narrowly and “doubts regarding whether removal jurisdiction is proper

should be resolved against federal jurisdiction.” Acuna v. Brown & Root

Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2000); see Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v.

Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108–09 (1941).

The general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, provides in relevant

part:

any civil action brought in a State court of which the district

courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be

removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district

court of the United States for the district and division

embracing the place where such action is pending.

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (emphasis added). In other words, “any civil case filed

in state court may be removed by the defendant to federal court if the

case could have been brought originally in federal court.” Tapscoot v. MS

Dealer Serv. Corp. 77 F.3d 1353, 1356 (11th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other

grounds by Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000).

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Here, Defendant asserts that this court has subject-matter

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 only by virtue of the federal questions

presented by her defenses and counterclaims.1 Doc. 1 at 1.

Section 1331 provides: “The district courts shall have original

jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or

treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Under this provision,

“jurisdiction may be based on a civil action alleging a violation of the

Constitution, or asserting a federal cause of action established by a

congressionally created expressed or implied private remedy for

violations of a federal statute.” Jairath v. Dyer, 154 F.3d 1280, 1282 (11th

Cir. 1998). “The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is

governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that

federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on

the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v.

1 Defendant does not assert that the District Court enjoys subject-matter

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Even if she had so alleged, it is

evident from the record that the requirements of diversity-of-citizenship

would not be met. Plaintiff seeks only $5,861 in damages, which is far

below the jurisdictional threshold. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (requiring the

jurisdictional amount to exceed $75,000).

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Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (emphasis added); Gully v. First Nat’l

Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 113 (1936).

Here, Plaintiff’s claims rely exclusively on Florida law. Doc. 1-1.

Plaintiff initiated eviction proceedings and also seeks damages for breach

of a rental agreement. Id. Defendant does not dispute that these claims

are governed by Florida law and not by federal law. Instead, Defendant

attempts to rely on her counterclaims and defenses to manufacture

federal-question jurisdiction. Defendant cannot do so. Federal-question

jurisdiction cannot be based merely on a defense or counterclaim that a

defendant seeks to assert. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393 (“a case may not

be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense”); Holmes

Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002)

(“It follows that a counterclaim . . . cannot serve as the basis for ‘arising

under’ jurisdiction.”); Stern v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 326 F.3d 1367,

1370 (11th Cir. 2003) (“A federal defense to a state law claim generally is

insufficient to satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.”).

Accordingly, the District Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and

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must remand this civil action to the Florida court from which Defendant

attempted to remove it.

CONCLUSION

Because the District Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over

this civil action, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the

District Court:

1. REMAND this civil action to the Florida court from which

Defendant attempts to remove it.

2. DIRECT the clerk of the court close this case file.

At Pensacola, Florida, this 12th day of September, 2025.

/s/ Michael J. Frank

Michael J. Frank

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

The District Court referred this case to a magistrate

judge to address preliminary matters and to make

recommendations regarding dispositive matters. See

N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B),

(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Objections to these proposed

findings and recommendations must be filed within

fourteen (14) days of the date of the report and

recommendation. Any different deadline that may

appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s

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internal use only and does not control. An objecting

party must serve a copy of the objections on all other

parties. A party who fails to object to the magistrate

judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a

report and recommendation waives the right to

challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on

unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions. See 11th

Cir. R. 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.

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