“The burden of establishing subject- matter jurisdiction is on the party asserting jurisdiction.”
How later courts described this case
- “The burden of establishing subject- matter jurisdiction is on the party asserting jurisdiction.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
DEMOND TRAVELLE BOONE,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 25-CV-00500-SEH-JFJ
AMAZON;
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE;
DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR
VEHICLES;
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA;
EPIC SYSTEMS RECORDS;
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION
CALIFORNIA;
GREYHOUND LINES;
FIRST SECURITY INVESTMENTS;
DEMOND TRAVELLE BOONE
RECORDS;
AFTERMATH;
PRIME CAR RENTAL/LEASE;
STAPLES;
CRYPTO CURRENCY;
EXCLUSIVE;
ROSS;
P.S.I. CALIFORNIA;
all as a corporation,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Demond Travelle Boone’s Complaint [ECF
No. 1] and Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [ECF No. 4]. Plaintiff is
proceeding pro se. Upon reviewing Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court finds that
Plaintiff fails to show that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Because
the Court must dismiss a case once it determines that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice, and
finds that the Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis is moot.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and there is a
presumption against the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Merida Delgado v.
Gonzalez, 428 F.3d 916, 919 (10th Cir. 2005); Penteco Corp. v. Union Gas
Sys., Inc., 929 F.2d 1519, 1521 (10th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff has the burden to
allege jurisdictional facts demonstrating the presence of federal subject
matter jurisdiction. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., Inc., 298
U.S. 178, 182 (1936) (“It is incumbent upon the plaintiff properly to allege the
jurisdictional facts, according to the nature of the case.”); Montoya v. Chao,
296 F.3d 952, 955 (10th Cir. 2002) (“The burden of establishing subject-
matter jurisdiction is on the party asserting jurisdiction.”). Regardless of
whether a litigant raises the issue of jurisdiction, the Court has an obligation
to consider whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(h)(3).
As the Supreme Court has stated, and as the Tenth Circuit has reiterated,
federal courts have “‘an independent obligation to determine whether subject-
matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party,’
and thus a court may sua sponte raise the question of whether there is
subject matter jurisdiction ‘at any state of the litigation.’” 1mage Software,
Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co., 459 F.3d 1044, 1048 (10th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)). Here, Plaintiff
proceeds pro se, and as is required by both Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit
precedent, the Court must liberally construe his pleadings when considering
the allegations contained in the Complaint. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972); Gaines v. Stenseng, 292 F.3d 1222, 1224 (10th Cir. 2002).
Although the Court must hold a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings to a less stringent
standard than those drafted by lawyers, it is not “the proper function of the
district court to assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant.” Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
Mr. Boone does not plead a valid basis for the Court’s jurisdiction. Mr.
Boone’s Complaint, which includes a list of vague allegations (fraud,
harbor/concealment of corporation titles also what they all produce, and
punitive), does not allege jurisdictional facts from which the Court can
discern whether federal subject-matter jurisdiction exists. See [ECF No. 1].
As best the Court can tell, Mr. Boone appears to allege that the defendants
concealed titles from him and committed fraud, but even that is not clear
from the face of the complaint. Id. Mr. Boone offers no statutory basis for
pursuing a private right of action in federal court against the defendants, as
required for federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Moreover, Mr. Boone alleges no facts from which the Court could find that
complete diversity of citizenship exists among the parties or what the amount
in controversy is, or that it exceeds $75,000, as required to establish diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Mr. Boone pleads that he is a citizen
of California, [ECF No. 1 at 1], but he makes no mention of the defendants’
citizenship. Nor does he state what relief he seeks or that it meets the
minimum required amount in controversy. Construing Mr. Boone’s complaint
as liberally as the law requires, the Court finds that he neither presents a
federal question nor alleges any basis for federal diversity jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding Mr. Boone’s status as a pro se litigant, the Court cannot
permit his case to proceed in the absence of federal subject-matter
jurisdiction.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Mr. Boone’s Complaint, [ECF No.
1], is dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. A
judgment will be entered separately.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Boone’s Motion for Leave to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis, [ECF No. 4], is DENIED as MOOT.
Nothing in this order impacts the General Order of this Court imposing
filing restrictions on Mr. Boone. See In re: Demond Travelle Boone Filing
Restrictions, No. 25-go-00001-JFH, [ECF No. 12] (N.D. Okla. 2025).
DATED this 10th day of October, 2025.
Sara E. Hill
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE