TAYLOR v. TOWN OF SPENCER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

MARK ANTHONY AUGUSTUS )

TAYLOR, JR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:25CV581

)

TOWN OF SPENCER, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case comes before the undersigned Magistrate Judge for

review of “[P]laintiff’s implicit requests [for the Clerk] to issue

summonses to the North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts

and Rowan County” (Docket Entry 13 at 3 (internal citations

omitted) (citing Docket Entry 10-1)). (See id. (“referr[ing said

requests] to the Magistrate Judge”).) Because Plaintiff did not

submit properly completed summons forms for Defendants North

Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts (“NCAOC”) and Rowan

County, the Court should order the Clerk not to issue the requested

summonses. Furthermore, because Plaintiff’s claims against

Defendants NCAOC and Rowan County suffer from obvious, fatal, legal

defects, the Court should dismiss those claims as frivolous.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff commenced this action by filing in state court a pro

se “Petition for Constitutional Violation, Equitable Relief, and

Demand for Jury Trial” (Docket Entry 2 at 1),' against the Town of

Spencer and four of its police officers (see id.), asserting, inter

alia, claims “under 42 U.S.C. §$§ 1983 and 1985(3), to remedy

constitutional violations” (id. at 7-8), including (A) Plaintiff’s

“unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment” (id. at 9),

(B) “warrantless seizure of [his] commercial vehicle . . . without

judicial order, lawful complaint, or probable cause” (id. at 10),

in contravention of “the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause”

(id.), (C) “perversion of the criminal justice system, violating []

the Fourteenth Amendment” (id.) and “constitut[ing] a civil

conspiracy to deprive [him] of his rights under [Section] 1985(3)”

(id.), and (D) “retaliation for [his] exercise of rights, violating

the First and Fourteenth Amendments” (id. at 11; see also id. at l

(declaring that four named officers “are liable in both individual

and official capacities”), 11 (“[T]he Town of Spencer is liable

under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978),

for its failure to supervise, investigate, or remedy the unlawful

conduct of its officers, and for policies or customs that

affirmatively contributed to [his] injuries[.]”)).

After Defendants removed this action to this Court (see Docket

Entry 1) and moved to dismiss (see Docket Entry 6), Plaintiff filed

the First Amended Complaint, dropping the four officers as

* Quotations from Plaintiff’s filings omit all-caps and bold

font.

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Defendants and adding Defendants Rowan County and NCAOC (see Docket

Entry 10 at 3-4 (listing only Plaintiff, Town of Spencer, Rowan

County, and NCAOC in section labeled “Parties” (italics omitted));

see also id. at 1 (same as to caption), 2 (“formally join[ing]

additional Defendants Rowan County . . . and [NCAOC]”); but see,

e.g., id. at 4-5 (discussing said four officers in “Factual

Background” section and describing each as “sued in his official

capacity” (italics omitted)). The First Amended Complaint does not

purport to hold Defendants NCAOC and Rowan County liable for

Plaintiff’s first four claims for relief. (See id. at 12-17

(omitting Defendants NCAOC and Rowan County from lists of those

“La]lgainst” whom Plaintiff asserted said claims) .)

The “Fifth Claim for Relief” (id. at 17), entitled

“Institutional Liability for Unconstitutional Detention and

Systemic Due Process Violations” (id. (italics omitted)), however,

does state that it lies “[a]gainst[ Defendant] Rowan County” (id.

at 18; see also id. at 18-19 (“[Defendant] Rowan County .. .

failed to ensure lawful processing of arrests, filings, and habeas

corpus petitions, resulting in prolonged and unlawful detention of

Plaintiff... . This prolonged detention without due process

violates the Fourth and Fifth Amendments ... .”)}). Additionally,

Plaintiff asserted the “Sixth Claim for Relief” (id. at 19), for

“Denial of Access to Court and [] Systemic Judicial Obstruction”

(id. (italics omitted)), “[a]lgainst[ Defendant NCAOC]” (id.; see

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also id. at 20-21 (“[Defendant] NCAOC failed to modernize or

implement necessary safeguards to ensure timely assignment, review,

or disposition of habeas petitions and constitutional filings

submitted by detainees. . . . As a result, Plaintiff was . . .

denied access to court, legal review, or meaningful remedy for over

two months. . . . [Defendant] NCAOC’s archaic and ineffective

administrative regime functionally suspended habeas corpus rights

in violation of both federal constitutional mandates and the

public’s right to lawful remedy.”)). Plaintiff lodged his (final)

“Seventh Claim for Relief” (id. at 21), for “Constitutional Torts,

Fiduciary Breach, and Emotional Distress” (id. (italics omitted)),

“[a]gainst [Defendants] Town of Spencer, Rowan County, [and NCAOC]”

(id.; see also id. at 22 (alleging that “Defendants collectively

subjected Plaintiff to a sustained course of unconstitutional

conduct, including: [w]arrantless seizure of property and person;

[d]eprivation of court access and suppression of habeas relief;

[a]rbitrary confinement without hearing, counsel, or judicial

review; [m]alicious prosecution initiated without probable cause;

[and d]enial of business rights and destruction of commercial

viability” (internal bullet points omitted))).

Plaintiff attached to the First Amended Complaint two

incomplete summons forms. (See Docket Entry 10-1 at 1-2.) More

specifically, the first summons form denotes “NCAOC” in the

caption’s line for “Defendant(s)” (id. at 1), but – in the blank

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following the line “To: (Defendant’s name and address)” (id.) -

that summons form lists no name (see id.; see also id. (listing

address of “114 W. Edenton St.[,] Raleigh, NC, 27602-0629” in that

blank with words “Attorney General Office” written off to the

side)). In addition, Plaintiff failed to complete that summons

form’s blank intended for him to notify the recipient about where

and to whom the recipient “must serve on [ P]Jlaintiff an answer to

the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure” (id.). (See id. (providing no

information after prompt for identification of “[P]Jlaintiff or

[his] attorney, whose name and address are:”).) The second summons

form similarly references “Rowan County” in the caption’s line for

“Defendant(s)” (id. at 2), while again mentioning no name in the

blank for the recipient (see id.; see also id. (giving address of

“130 W. Innes Street[,] Salisbury, NC 28144” in that blank with

words “Rowan County County Manager” written off to the side)).

And, as with the first summons form, the second summons form

contains no “name and address” (id.) to whom and at which “[t]he

answer or [responsive] motion must be served” (id.). (See id.)

The Court (per Chief/Senior United States District Judge

Catherine C. Eagles) thereafter entered an Order (Docket Entry 13),

in which she noted that “[P]Jlaintiff ha[d] not responded to the

motion to dismiss” (id. at 1), but “ha[d] filed [the First A]mended

[C]omplaint as allowed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

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15(a) (1) (B)” (id. (citing Docket Entry 10)). That Order explains

that (A) “[t]he evidence submitted by the [officer] defendants

named in the original complaint . . . shows that they ha[d] never

been served with process” (id.) and (B) “nothing on the docket

reflect[ed] that [ P]laintiff ever requested that summonses be

issued to those defendants . . . [or that he filed] proof of

service” (id.). After observing, inter alia, that “[t]he [officer]

defendants are no longer listed as defendants in the caption of the

[First A]mended [C]omplaint” (id. at 2 (citing Docket Entry 10 at

1)) and that “neither” (id.) of the “summons[ forms attached] to

[the First A]mended [C]omplaint .. . is directed to any [officer]

defendant” (id. (citing Docket Entry 10-1)), Chief/Senior Judge

Fagles concluded that “dismissal without prejudice as to the

[officer] defendants [wa]s appropriate” (id. at 3). “As to

[D]efendant Town of Spencer, the motion to dismiss [wa]s otherwise

denied as moot, without prejudice to renewed motions to dismiss if

warranted.” (Id. (all-caps and bold font omitted); see also id.

(“[P]laintiff has filed [the First A]mended [C]lomplaint as of

right. Therefore, the motion to dismiss the original complaint for

failure to state a claim will be denied as moot... .” (internal

citation omitted)).) Lastly, “[{P]laintiff’s implicit requests

[for] issulance of] summonses to [Defendants NCAOC] and Rowan

County [we]lre referred to the [undersigned] Magistrate Judge.”

(Id. (internal citations omitted) .)

-~6-

DISCUSSION

To obtain service of process on a defendant, “[a] summons must

be served with a copy of the complaint.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1).

“The plaintiff is responsible for having the summons and complaint

served within the time allowed by [Federal] Rule [of Civil

Procedure] 4(m) . . . .” Id. Accordingly, “[o]n or after filing

[a] complaint, the plaintiff may present a summons to the clerk for

signature and seal. If the summons is properly completed, the

clerk must sign, seal, and issue it to the plaintiff for service on

the defendant.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(b) (emphasis added). Among

other things, to qualify as “properly completed,” id., “[a] summons

must . . . be directed to the defendant[ and ] state the name and

address of the plaintiff’s attorney or – if unrepresented – of the

plaintiff,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a)(1). Here, as documented in the

Introduction, Plaintiff submitted summons forms along with the

First Amended Complaint, “but he only partially completed them,”

Stewart v. Bishop, No. 0:24CV3606, 2024 WL 5290907, at *5 (D.S.C.

Aug. 29, 2024) (unpublished), recommendation adopted, 2024 WL

5054919 (D.S.C. Dec. 9, 2024) (unpublished).

“[Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 4(b) . . . states that

the Clerk is not required to sign, seal or issue a summons unless

it is ‘properly completed.’” Martinez v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr.

Co., No. 5:11CV580, 2012 WL 140496, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2012)

(unpublished) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(b)). In this case, “the

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[C]lerk cannot sign, seal, and issue the [proposed] summonses

because Plaintiff has not included [1] Defendants’ names ... or

[2] his name and address.” Stewart, 2024 WL 5290907, at *5. Nor,

as concerns the first of those two defects, i.e., Plaintiff’s

failure to comply with the requirement that “[a] proper summons

[must] contain[] the correct name of the defendant [so that it can

be] directed to the defendant,” Newton v. BBVA, No. 4:21CV574, 2022

WL 18141394, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2022) (unpublished),

recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 114216 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2023)

(unpublished), could the Court deem the summons forms submitted by

Plaintiff “properly completed,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(b), simply

because their captions include the names of Defendants NCAOC and

Rowan County (see Docket Entry 10-1 at 1-2). To the contrary,

service on such entities, i.e., “state-created governmental

organization[s],” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(4) (2),° requires “delivering a

copy of the summons and of the complaint to [the governmental

organization’s] chief executive officer; or [] serving a copy of

each in the manner prescribed by that state’s law for serving a

summons or like process on such a defendant,” id. (emphasis added).

* North Carolina law has “established a State office to be

known as the Administrative Office of the Courts,” N.C. Gen. Stat.

S 7A-340, as well as “100 counties,” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-10,

including “Rowan,” id.; see also Davidson Cnty. v. City of High

Point, 321 N.C. 252, 257, 362 S.E.2d 553, 557 (1987) (“Counties

. . exist solely as political subdivisions of the State and are

creatures of statute.”).

-~g-

Under North Carolina law, all authorized means for service

“~Tu]pon an agency of the State,” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule

4(5) (4) (a), like Defendant NCAOC, mandate the direction of the

summons (whether for personal delivery or via approved mail/common

carrier method) “to the process agent appointed by the agency,” id.

(emphasis added). See, e.g., Gaddy v. University of N.C. Health

Care Sys., No. 23CV938, 2024 WL 4950173, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 3,

2024) (unpublished) (Schroeder, J.) (“North Carolina law instructs

that an agency of the state must be served by directing the summons

and complaint to its process agent.”); see also N.C. Gen. Stat.

§ 1A-1, Rule 4(j) (4) (6) (“Every agency of the State shall appoint

a process agent by filing with the Attorney General the name and

address of an agent upon whom process may be served.”).° As to

service “[u]pon a county,” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4(34) (5) (b),

North Carolina law limits the direction of all permitted forms of

service to the “county manager or to the chairman, clerk or any

member of [its] board of commissioners,” id. See, e.g., Fuller v.

Dixon, No. 7:21CV40, 2022 WL 3328877, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 11,

2022) (unpublished) (observing that, for counties, “North Carolina

permits service of process on the county manager or to the

chairman, clerk or any member of the board of commissioners for

> Defendant NCAOC has appointed a process agent and has filed

the required notice with the North Carolina Attorney General. See

https://ncedoj.gov/legal-services/legal-resources/process-agent-

directory (last visited Oct. 7, 2025).

□□□

such county” (internal quotation marks omitted)), aff’d, No. 22-

2231, 2024 WL 2874281 (4th Cir. June 7, 2024) (unpublished).

Plainly stated, service on an entity (such as Defendants NCAOC

and Rowan County) must go to an agent of such entity “and[,] when

the defendant is being served through its agent, the summons should

state the agent’s name and address.” Newton, 2022 WL 18141394, at

*4 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

RPR & Assocs., Inc. v. State, 139 N.C. App. 525, 531, 534 S.E.2d

247, 252 (2000) (explaining that summons for state agency should

list name of state agency followed by name and address of

“Registered Agent” prefaced with notation of “c/o”), aff’d, 353

N.C. 362, 543 S.E.2d 480 (2001). The summons forms tendered by

Plaintiff do not comply with that requirement because (as the

Introduction documents) they do not direct service to (A) Defendant

NCAOC along with the name and address of its “chief executive

officer,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2), or “the process agent appointed

by [Defendant NCAOC],” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(4)(a), or

(B) Defendant Rowan County along with the name and address of its

“chief executive officer,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2), “its county

manager[,] or [] the chairman, clerk or any member of [its] board

of commissioners,” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(5)(b). See

Styles v. McDonalds Rest., No. 4:17CV791, 2019 WL 2266636, at *4

(E.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2019) (unpublished) (“[I]t is [the p]laintiff’s

responsibility to find and to provide [the d]efendant’s agent for

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service and correct address for preparing summons, so that . . .

summons may issue; it is not the clerk’s office[’s] responsibility

to research and supply this information.”), recommendation adopted,

2019 WL 1219117 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2019) (unpublished); see also

Kenyatta v. Chalmers-Judd Land Enters., LLC, No. 1:25CV323, 2025 WL

2378989, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 15, 2025) (unpublished) (Eagles,

C./S.J.) (ruling attempted service “not valid” where the plaintiff

failed to show “that service was [directed to] one of the

designated persons” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j)(2)).

Ordinarily, given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court might

grant him another chance to submit properly completed summons forms

for Defendants NCAOC and Rowan County, in order to obtain summonses

for and to make service on them, but “the Court [should] find[]

that granting Plaintiff[] additional time for service[-related

activities] would be futile because the[ First Amended] Complaint

is [as to Defendants NCAOC and Rowan County] fatally defective in

that it sets forth frivolous claims [against them] which cannot be

remedied by amendment.” Gonzalez v. Ocwen Home Loan Servicing, 74

F. Supp. 3d 504, 521 (D. Conn. 2015) (internal quotation marks

omitted), aff’d sub nom., Gonzalez v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co.,

632 F. App’x 32 (2d Cir. 2016); see also Faison v. Vickers, No.

2:23CV1437, 2025 WL 346520, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 30, 2025)

(unpublished) (directing “[c]lerk of [c]ourt not to issue a signed,

sealed summons to [the plaintiff] until the [c]ourt finds that [he]

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has... stated a claim on which relief may be granted”); Stern v.

Epps, No. 2:08CV33, 2008 WL 4793720, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 29,

2008) (unpublished) (denying “request . . . for summons,” where

“[the pllaintiff ha[d] failed to allege facts that would entitle

him to relief against such parties”). To that end, apart from any

statutory provision requiring federal courts to dismiss frivolous

claims sua sponte in certain contexts, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915 (2) (B) (1), “there is little doubt they would have power to

do so even in the absence of [such a] statutory provision,” Mallard

v. United States Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 308

(1989); see also, e.g., Ross v. Baron, 493 F. App’x 405, 406 (4th

Cir. 2012) (“[F]rivolous complaints are subject to dismissal

pursuant to the inherent authority of the court... .”); Brown v.

Maynard, Civ. No. 11-619, 2011 WL 883917, at *1 (D. Md. Mar. 11,

2011) (unpublished) (“[I]t is well established that a court has

broad inherent power sua sponte to dismiss an action, or part of an

action, which is frivolous... .” (italics omitted)).

“In addition, because [the C]lourt lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over an obviously frivolous complaint, dismissal prior

to service of process is permitted.” Ross, 493 F. App’x at 406

(citing Ricketts v. Midwest Nat’1] Bank, 874 F.2d 1177, 1181-83 (7th

Cir. 1989), and Franklin v. Oregon, State Welfare Div., 662 F.2d

1337, 1342-43 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord Yi v. Social Sec. Admin.,

554 F. App’x 247, 248 (4th Cir. 2014); see also, e.g., Constantine

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v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 480 (4th

Cir. 2005) (“A federal court has an independent obligation to

assess its subject-matter jurisdiction, and it will raise a lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction on its own motion.” (internal quotation

marks omitted)). Indeed, “[o]ver the years [the Supreme] Court has

repeatedly held that the federal courts are without power to

entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are so

attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit,

wholly insubstantial, obviously frivolous, plainly unsubstantial,

or no longer open to discussion.” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528,

536-37 (1974) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Put another way, “where a claim is obviously without merit, Hagans

precludes a federal district court from exercising its

jurisdiction.” Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir.

1999); see also Davis v. Pak, 856 F.2d 648, 651 (4th Cir. 1988)

(“Hagans stands for the proposition that federal courts are without

jurisdiction to hear frivolous constitutional claims.”).

Starting with Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Rowan

County, the Court should reject those claims because they rest on

a frivolously false foundation, i.e., that “Defendant Rowan County

. . . oversee[s] the Rowan County Sheriff’s Office, Rowan County

Jail, and Rowan County Clerk of Superior Court.” (Docket Entry 10

at 5; see also id. at 19 (errantly alleging that “[Defendant] Rowan

County is responsible for overseeing the Rowan County Detention

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Center, Clerk of Court operations, and Sheriff’s Office all of

which contributed to the unlawful detention of Plaintiff” and that

“[t]hese offices and departments operated under [Defendant Rowan]

County’s direct authority and policy control”).) Even a cursory

review of applicable law reveals the patent falsity of Plaintiff’s

premise; for example, precedent dating back more than a quarter

century recognizes that, under North Carolina law, “[s]heriffs run

the county jails in North Carolina.” Knight v. Vernon, 214 F.3d

544, 545 (4th Cir. 2000); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 162-22 (“The

sheriff shall have the care and custody of the jail in his [or her]

county; and shall be, or appoint, the keeper thereof.”). Further,

Defendant Rowan County does not hire the sheriff who runs the jail

in Rowan County; “[c]ounty residents hire the sheriff (through

election) . . . .” Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, 341 (4th Cir.

1996). Moreover, under North Carolina law, “the sheriff has

freedom ‘to hire, discharge and supervise the employees in his [or

her] office.’” Id. (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-103(1)). In

fact, the governing statute grants the sheriff “the exclusive right

to hire, discharge, and supervise the employees in his [or her]

office.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-103(1) (emphasis added).

Consistent with the foregoing, controlling authority, members

of this Court and other federal courts in North Carolina repeatedly

have held that, where (as here) claims brought against a county

depend on “allegations that implicate [the actions of a c]ounty

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[s]heriff’s [o]ffice,” Lewis v. Hoke Cnty., No. 1:17CV964, 2024 WL

4988917, at *8 (M.D.N.C. June 12, 2024) (unpublished) (Webster,

M.J.), recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4850413 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 21,

2024) (Osteen, J.), “[the c]ounty is not the proper party to bring

suit against,” id. (collecting cases), and “[the cJounty is

entitled to dismissal as a matter of law,” id.; accord, e.g., Jones

v. Forsyth Cnty., No. 1:25CV78, 2025 WL 1184167, at *2 (M.D.N.C.

Mar. 5, 2025) (unpublished), recommendation adopted, 2025 WL

1180277 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 23, 2025) (unpublished) (Schroeder, J.);

Evans v. Guilford Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 1:13CV499, 2014 WL 4641150,

at *2 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 16, 2014) (unpublished) (Peake, M.J.),

recommendation adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C. Sept. 16, 2015) (Tilley,

S.J.), appeal dismissed, 616 F. App’x 84 (4th Cir. 2015); Wiley v.

Buncombe Cnty., 846 F. Supp. 2d 480, 486-87 (W.D.N.C.), affi’d, 474

F. App’x 285 (4th Cir. 2012); Gorham v. County of Onslow, No.

4:07CV114, 2008 WL 11381868, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 19, 2008)

(unpublished); Blair v. County of Davidson, No. 1:05CV11, 2006 WL

1367420, at *7 (M.D.N.C. May 10, 2006) (unpublished) (Beaty, J.).

“To the extent that Plaintiff argues that [Rowan] County is

responsible for the actions of [the Rowan County] Clerk[’s Office],

this claim must also fail.” Wiley, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 487. In the

well-chosen words of that decision:

Pursuant to Article IV, § 9 of the North Carolina

Constitution, the Clerk of Superior Court is also an

elected office. Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-102,

the Clerk appoints the assistants, deputies and other

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employees in the clerk’s office to serve at his [or her]

pleasure. [Rowan] County has no authority to make policy

for the Clerk of Court and/or his [or her] assistants.

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against [Rowan]

County for [the Rowan County Clerk’s Office’s] actions.

Id.; see also, e.g., Morris-Wilkins v. Joyner, No. 5:24CV462, 2025

WL 2399241, at *12 (E.D.N.C. July 7, 2025) (unpublished)

(recommending dismissal of claims against county for acts of

clerk’s office as such “clerks are state officials under [] North

Carolina law, not county officials”), recommendation adopted, 2025

WL 2798504 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2025) (unpublished); Mack v. Fox,

No. 1:07CV760, 2008 WL 4832995, at *6 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 4, 2008)

(unpublished) (Dixon, M.J.) (recommending dismissal of claims

against county where “[c]omplaint allege[d] constitutional

violations as a result of the policy . . . and the actions of

[state] judicial officials,” because any such “violations did not

arise out of an official policy or custom of [the c]ounty”),

recommendation adopted, 2008 WL 7674789 (Dec. 10, 2008)

(unpublished) (Tilley, J.).

In sum, Plaintiff cannot proceed against Defendant Rowan

County on his Fifth and Seventh Claims for Relief because, as a

consequence of the above-discussed, well-established law, he cannot

show that Defendant Rowan County bears responsibility for (A) any

alleged “failure to ensure ministerial compliance with habeas

corpus filing protocols, detention review procedures, and

jurisdictional hearings [which] created a foreseeable and direct

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constitutional injury” (Docket Entry 10 at 19), or (B) any alleged

“fail[ure] to train, supervise, or discipline agents whose conduct

predictably led to [any constitutional harm and/or] . . . to

remediate the harm” (id. at 22), respectively.

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant NCAOC (i.e., the Sixth

and Seventh Claims for Relief) fare no better. North Carolina law

“established [the NCAOC as] a State office,” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-

340, and “in the absence of consent a suit in which [a] State or

one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is

proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment,” Pennhurst State Sch, & Hosp.

v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). Plaintiff’s claims against

Defendant NCAOC do not allege facts showing that North Carolina

waived its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for such claims.

(See Docket Entry 10 at 19-23.) “Under the Eleventh Amendment,

therefore, the [C]ourt has no jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiff’s

[Section] 1983 and 1985 claims against the State of North Carolina

[or any of] its agencies.” D’Alessandro v. North Carolina, No.

5:14CV16, 2014 WL 2535222, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 27, 2014)

(unpublished) (recommending dismissal of “claims against the State

of North Carolina . . . and the North Carolina Administrative

Office of the Courts”), recommendation adopted, 2014 WL 2547696

(E.D.N.C. June 5, 2014) (unpublished); accord Olavarria v. North

Carolina Admin. Off. of the Cts., No. 5:15CV577, 2015 WL 10477546,

at *2 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 3, 2015) (unpublished), recommendation

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adopted, 2016 WL 1060238 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 14, 2016) (unpublished);

see also Sullivan v. Cannady, No. 7:12CV69, 2012 WL 4829616, at *5

(E.D.N.C. Oct. 10, 2012) (unpublished) (dismissing “claims against

the State of North Carolina by and through . . . [NC]AOC Director”

as barred by Eleventh Amendment) .*

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff did not properly complete summons forms’ for

Defendants NCAOC and Rowan County. Even more importantly, obvious,

fatal, legal deficiencies make his claims against them frivolous.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Court (A) direct the

Clerk not to issue the requested summonses (Docket Entry 10-1), and

(B) dismiss any claim(s) against Defendants NCAOC and Rowan County

in the First Amended Complaint (Docket Entry 10).

/s/_L. Patrick Auld

L. Patrick Auld

United States Magistrate Judge

October 10, 2025

“The First Amended Complaint notes that the “Ex [P]arte Young

[doctrine] permits suits against state officials in their official

capacity for injunctive relief to halt ongoing constitutional

violations” (id. at 20), but Plaintiff’s detention ended long ago

(upon dismissal of the charges against him) (see id. at 11). Asa

result, “Plaintiff’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief

appear to be moot because [he] is no longer in [] custody.” Torres

v. North Carolina Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. 1:24CV112, 2024 WL

4683300, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 5, 2024) (unpublished); accord

Sullivan, 2012 WL 4829616, at *5 n.5.

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