holding that a declaratory judgment action against a Commonwealth agency is “squarely within the scope of the Commonwealth Court's original jurisdiction”
How later courts described this case
- holding that a declaratory judgment action against a Commonwealth agency is “squarely within the scope of the Commonwealth Court's original jurisdiction”
- observing that the Commonwealth Court has original jurisdiction over mandamus actions against administrative agencies
- stating, under prior law, that “[n]o right of appeal is provided under the Administrative Agency Law from the mere promulgation of a regulation”
- observing that “[i]t is well-settled that if an 13 2 Pa.C.S. §§ 101, 501-508 & 701-704. 10 agency action is not an ‘adjudication,’ then it is not subject to judicial review by way of appeal”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Joseph B. O’Neill, Jr., :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
Pennsylvania Fish and Boat :
Commission, : No. 550 M.D. 2024
Respondent : Submitted: September 9, 2025
BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge
OPINION
BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: October 10, 2025
Petitioner, Joseph B. O’Neill, Jr. (O’Neill), pro se, filed a petition for
review and, subsequently, an amended petition for review (Amended Petition for
Review), in this Court’s original and appellate jurisdiction. Respondent,
Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Commission (Commission), has filed preliminary
objections (POs) to the extent O’Neill’s claims in the Amended Petition for Review
lie in our original jurisdiction. The Commission has filed an “Application for Relief
Seeking to Quash Amended Petition for Review: Appeal of final Order of
Government Agency: Request for Declaratory Judg[]ment and Action in
Mandamus” (Application to Quash) to the extent O’Neill’s claims in the Amended
Petition for Review lie in our appellate jurisdiction.1 After thorough review, we
sustain the POs in part and overrule them in part, grant the Application to Quash,
and dismiss the Amended Petition for Review with prejudice.
1
O’Neill filed an application for relief asking this Court to strike the Commission’s brief
as untimely. We denied the application to Strike, by order dated May 22, 2025.
I. Background
The gravamen of O’Neill’s Amended Petition for Review is his demand
that the Commission enact a regulation through which increased salaries will be paid
to Water Conservation Officers and Assistant Regional Supervisors. O’Neill filed
the Amended Petition for Review in this Court’s dual jurisdiction (1) seeking to
appeal the Commission’s rejection of O’Neill’s “Proposed revised new 58 Pa. Code
§ 51.14 to be promulgated under 30 Pa.C.S. § 304” (Second O’Neill Letter Petition);
(2) seeking, in mandamus, to have this Court compel the Commission to take certain
actions related to the Second O’Neill Letter Petition; and (3) alleging violations of
Section 709 of the Pennsylvania Sunshine Act (Sunshine Act),2 65 Pa.C.S.
§ 709(c.1), and certain rights under the Pennsylvania Constitution. O’Neill’s
appellate and original jurisdiction claims all relate to the Commission’s treatment of
the Second O’Neill Letter Petition.
On June 24, 2024, O’Neill submitted a letter to the Commission titled
“Petition for Regulation pursuant to 58 Pa. Code § 58.6” (First O’Neill Letter
Petition) seeking the implementation of a regulation requiring that increased salaries
be paid to Water Conservation Officers and Assistant Regional Supervisors.
Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 2a-6a.3 On July 8, 2024, Commission staff replied,
also by letter (First Commission Response), stating that the First O’Neill Letter
Petition conflicted with applicable Commonwealth law, was not acceptable under
2
65 Pa.C.S. §§ 701-716.
3
In citing the Reproduced Record, we conform to the numbering format prescribed by Rule
2173 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa.R.A.P. 2173, with which O’Neill did
not fully comply.
2
58 Pa. Code § 51.6(b)(2),4 and was being returned to O’Neill. See Id. at 7a. The
First Commission Response further indicated that what O’Neill was requesting
4
Section 51.6 of the Commission’s regulations provides, in pertinent part:
§ 51.6. Petitions or requests for regulations.
(a) Form. Petitions or requests for regulations addressed to the
Commission shall be submitted in the format set forth in 1 Pa. Code
§ 35.18 (relating to petitions for issuance . . . of regulations).
(b) Initial staff review.
(1) The staff will review every petition for regulations to
ensure that:
(i) It is complete as required by 1 Pa. Code § 35.18.
(ii) The petition requests an action within the
authority or jurisdiction of the Commission.
....
(2) If the staff determines the petition is not acceptable for
one of the reasons set forth in paragraph (1), it will return the
petition to the petitioner together with a statement of the
reason why it is not acceptable.
(c) Oral presentation. A petitioner will be given the opportunity to
make a 5-minute oral presentation on a petition that the staff
determines is appropriate for further consideration. The oral
presentation will be scheduled for the next meeting of the
Commission occurring more than 30 days after completion of the
initial staff review.
(d) Commission determination. After the oral presentation, the
Commission will determine whether or not to accept the petition
for further review. The Commission may refuse to accept the
petition when one or more of the following conditions exist:
....
(3) The action is not appropriate for rulemaking by the
Commission.
58 Pa. Code § 51.6 (emphasis added).
3
would not typically qualify as a regulation. Id. The First Commission Response
also posited that the Commission already had authority generally under 30 Pa.C.S.
§ 3045 to take the requested actions in accordance with the Policemen and Firemen
Collective Bargaining Act, commonly known as Act 111.6 Id. The First
Commission Response stated that the Commission was in negotiations with the
Fraternal Order of Police, Conservation Police Officers’ Lodge No. 114 (Lodge
114),7 and shared O’Neill’s concerns about compensation. Id.
O’Neill then filed the Second O’Neill Letter Petition on July 30, 2025.
R.R. at 13a-15a. The Second O’Neill Letter Petition addressed the salaries of
Waterway Conservation Officers and Assistant Regional Supervisors in more detail
and suggested a salary for both of those positions that the Commission should deem
“a fair and decent Step 1 starting annual wage[.]” Id. at 14a. By letter of September
18, 2024 (Second Commission Response), Commission staff indicated that the
Second O’Neill Letter Petition was not acceptable and was being returned to O’Neill.
Id. at 16a-17a. Specifically, the Second Commission Response explained that,
although the Commission is responsible for hiring Waterways Conservation Officers
and fixing their salaries, it does so based on the classification and compensation
plans established by the Executive Board pursuant to 30 Pa.C.S. § 304(a).8 Id.
5
30 Pa.C.S. § 304 relates to the appointment and setting of compensation for waterways
patrolmen and employees.
6
Act of June 24, 1968, P.L. 237, No. 111, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 217.1-217.12.
7
Lodge 114 filed an Application to Intervene in the action pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule
of Appellate Procedure 1531, Pa.R.A.P. 1531. This Court denied intervention by Order dated July
21, 2025.
8
Section 304(a), governing appointments and compensation, provides:
4
On September 30, 2024, O’Neill filed a “Petition for Review and
Appeal of Actions of Staff” (Board Appeal) with the Commission’s Board of
Commissioners (Board) seeking to appeal the Second Commission Response,
specifically the Commission staff’s statement that the Second O’Neill Letter Petition
was “not acceptable.” R.R. at 22a-32a. O’Neill asked to have the Second O’Neill
Letter Petition placed on the next meeting of the full Board for consideration. Id. at
31a. After receiving the Board Appeal, the Commission reached out to O’Neill
through its attorney in an October 4, 2024 letter (Appeal Response) indicating that,
“to save resources and unnecessary costs related to an appeal,” O’Neill would be
permitted to give a five-minute oral presentation regarding the Second O’Neill Letter
Petition during the Board’s October 21, 2024 meeting. Id. at 56a. The Appeal
Response further indicated that the Second O’Neill Letter Petition would be placed
on the Board’s agenda “for a vote by the Board of whether or not to accept the
[Second O’Neill Letter Petition] for further review as outlined in [58 Pa. Code
§ ]51.6(d).” Id. The Appeal Response referred to an earlier discussion between
O’Neill and the Commission’s attorney and reminded O’Neill to “file the signed
statement stating that [his] complaint ha[d] been satisfied and requesting dismissal
in accordance with 1 Pa. Code § 35.41.”9 Id. O’Neill responded with a letter headed
The executive director, with the approval of the [C]ommission,
shall, in accordance with law and the classification and
compensation plans of the Commonwealth as established by the
Executive Board, appoint and fix the compensation of such number
of waterways patrolmen and other employees as the commission
deems necessary to enforce and carry out the provisions of this title
and perform the functions and work of the [C]ommission.
30 Pa.C.S. § 304(a).
9
Section 35.41, governing satisfaction of complaints, provides: “If the respondent satisfies
a formal complaint either before or after answering, a statement to that effect signed by the
5
“Re: Satisfaction of Complaint / Appeal of Determinations of Staff” (Board Appeal
Dismissal Request) in which O’Neill indicated that, in light of the Commission’s
stated willingness to proceed regarding the Second O’Neill Letter Petition “in
accordance with 58 Pa. Code § 51.6 and 1 Pa. Code § 35.18,” O’Neill was requesting
dismissal of his Board Appeal without prejudice. R.R. at 57a. In essence, the
Commission was agreeing to treat the Second O’Neill Letter Petition as though staff
had forwarded it to the Commission for an oral presentation, following which the
Board would determine whether or not to accept the Second O’Neill Letter Petition
for further review. See 58 Pa. Code § 51.6(b)-(d).
At the Commission meeting on October 21, 2024, the Board members
voted in favor of granting the Board Appeal Dismissal Request and allowed O’Neill
to give his presentation concerning the Second O’Neill Letter Petition. Certified
Record (C.R.) at 191-98 (Notes of Transcript, 10/21/24 Board Meeting). At the
conclusion of the presentation, the Board went into an executive session to discuss
the matter further. Id. at 199-200. When the Board reconvened the public meeting,
the Board president asked whether there was a motion to accept the Second O’Neill
Letter Petition for further review. When no motion was heard, the president
indicated that the motion failed and made the following statement (Board
Statement), a portion of which is the subject of the instant Amended Petition for
Review:
[T]he Board . . . support[s] our Waterway Conservation
Officers and their right to collectively bargain. We
support fair and equitable compensation for all employees,
including Waterway Conservation Officers. And we have,
opposing parties shall be filed, setting forth when and how the complaint has been satisfied and
requesting dismissal.” 1 Pa. Code § 35.41.
6
and we will continue to express that position to the Office
of Administration.
That being said, the [C]ommission has the authority to
create rules and regulations for fishing to aid in the better
protection, preservation and management of fish and
boating and the management and operation of boats. The
[C]ommission does not have the authority to create rules
and regulations regarding [C]ommonwealth employee
compensation.
Id. at 200-01 (emphasis added).
By Notice issued December 3, 2024, this Court recognized the dual
nature of O’Neill’s Petition for Review.
The appellate aspect of the Amended Petition for Review seeks to
appeal the last portion of the Board Statement as a final order. Amended Petition for
Review (1/9/2025) ¶¶ 40-41. In our original jurisdiction, O’Neill seeks declaratory
and mandamus relief and alleges violations of the Sunshine Act and certain
individual rights under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
In Counts 1 through 5, O’Neill alleges that by allowing him to make a
five-minute presentation on the Second O’Neill Letter Petition, the Commission was
stipulating that the Second O’Neill Letter Petition was appropriate and met all
applicable regulatory criteria. O’Neill also avers that the Commission erred in
determining that the Second O’Neill Letter Petition conflicted with Commonwealth
laws and that the Commission failed to perform a legally required duty when the
Board did not vote on the Second O’Neill Letter Petition.
In Count 6, O’Neill alleges that by failing to include copies of the Board
Appeal Dismissal Request and the Second O’Neill Letter Petition in the meeting
7
agenda packet and then holding impromptu executive sessions on both, the
Commission violated Section 709(c.1) of the Sunshine Act, 65 Pa.C.S. § 709(c.1).10
In Counts 7 and 8, O’Neill alleges that the Commission has deprived
O’Neill of certain individual rights under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Specifically, O’Neill alleges a deprivation of the right to petition under article I,
10
Section 709(c.1), governing notice of agency business to be considered at a public
meeting, provides:
(1) In addition to any public notice required under this section, an
agency shall provide the following notification of agency business
to be considered at a meeting as follows:
(i) If the agency has a publicly accessible Internet website,
the agency shall post the agenda, which includes a listing of
each matter of agency business that will be or may be the
subject of deliberation or official action at the meeting, on
the website no later than 24 hours in advance of the time of
the convening of the meeting.
(ii) The agency shall post the agenda, which includes a
listing of each matter of agency business that will be or may
be the subject of deliberation or official action at the
meeting, at the location of the meeting and at the principal
office of the agency.
(iii) The agency shall make available to individuals in
attendance at the meeting copies of the agenda, which
include a listing of each matter of agency business that will
be or may be the subject of deliberation or official action at
the meeting.
(2) This subsection shall not apply to a conference or a working
session under section 707 (relating to exceptions to open meetings)
or an executive session under section 708 (relating to executive
sessions).
65 Pa.C.S. § 709(c.1).
8
section 2011 and the right to “clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment[]” afforded to him by
article I, section 27.12
II. Issues
The Commission’s POs assert (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
(2) lack of standing, (3) failure to state a cognizable claim in mandamus, (4) failure
to state a cognizable claim for declaratory judgment, and (5) failure to state a
cognizable claim for a violation of the Sunshine Act.
The Commission’s Application to Quash asserts that O’Neill cannot
seek review of the Commission’s failure to entertain the Second O’Neill Letter
Petition, because there was no adjudication or final order by the Commission from
which to seek review. The Commission also argues that O’Neill is not aggrieved by
the Commission’s failure to act on the Second O’Neill Letter Petition – an argument
similar to the PO asserting lack of standing.
11
Article I, section 20 provides: “The citizens have a right in a peaceable manner to
assemble together for their common good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of
government for redress of grievances or other proper purposes, by petition, address or
remonstrance.” Pa. Const. art. I, § 20.
12
Article I, section 27 provides:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the
environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the
common property of all the people, including generations yet to
come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.
Pa. Const. art. I, § 27.
9
O’Neill, in addition to opposing the Commission’s POs and the
Application to Quash, requests, in his Application to Strike, that this Court strike the
Commission’s brief as untimely filed.
III. Discussion
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
1. Appellate Jurisdiction
We first address the Commission’s challenge to our subject matter
jurisdiction. Counts 1 through 5 of the Amended Petition for Review seek appellate
review of the Commission’s disposition of the Second O’Neill Letter Petition. We
agree with the Commission, however, that its mere failure to move forward to
consider the Second O’Neill Letter Petition was not an adjudication and did not
result in the issuance of a final appealable order.
Section 763(a)(1) of the Judicial Code provides that this Court has
jurisdiction over, inter alia, direct appeals from final orders of Commonwealth
agencies. 42 Pa.C.S. § 763(a)(1). Similarly, to be appealable, an agency’s activity
must constitute an “adjudication,” which is defined by Section 101 of the
Administrative Agency Law,13 2 Pa.C.S. § 101, as a “final order, decree, decision,
determination or ruling by an agency affecting personal or property rights,
privileges, immunities, duties, liabilities or obligations of any or all of the parties to
the proceeding in which the adjudication is made.” See Doheny v. Dep’t of Transp.,
Bureau of Driver Licensing, 171 A.3d 930, 935 n.12 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017), aff’d
without op., 187 A.3d 246 (Pa. 2018) (observing that “[i]t is well-settled that if an
13
2 Pa.C.S. §§ 101, 501-508 & 701-704.
10
agency action is not an ‘adjudication,’ then it is not subject to judicial review by way
of appeal”) (additional quotation marks and citation omitted).
As quoted more fully above, the Commission’s applicable regulation
provides that where, as here, the Commission receives a petition asserting a request
for a regulation, the request is initially reviewed by staff to determine whether, inter
alia, the petition is complete and requests an action within the Commission’s
authority or jurisdiction. 58 Pa. Code § 51.6(b)(1). If not, staff will return the
request after the initial staff review with a statement of why it is not being accepted
for further consideration. 58 Pa. Code § 51.6(b)(2); see also supra at 3 n.3 (quoting
Section 51.6 in pertinent part). The Commission followed that procedure here.
Nothing in the Commission’s governing statute or regulations confers a right to a
hearing or an adjudication relating to a request for a regulation.
Nevertheless, after O’Neill’s submission of the Board Appeal, the
Commission elected to expedite the resolution of the matter by allowing O’Neill to
provide a five-minute oral presentation on the Second O’Neill Letter Petition. The
Commission’s regulation provides for such a presentation where the staff determines
a petition is appropriate for further consideration. 58 Pa. Code § 51.6(c). Here, the
Commission agreed to allow O’Neill to offer an oral presentation despite the staff’s
initial review and rejection of the Second O’Neill Letter Petition, and O’Neill agreed
to withdraw the Board Appeal. In effect, the Commission agreed to treat the Second
O’Neill Letter Petition as though staff had forwarded it for an oral presentation.
Contrary to O’Neill’s position, the Commission was not thereby agreeing to accept
the Second O’Neill Letter Petition for further consideration. The Commission
agreed only to allow an oral presentation under Section 51.6(c) of its regulations.
11
Once an oral presentation has been made, the regulation contemplates
a determination by the Commission whether it will accept the petition for further
review. 58 Pa. Code § 51.6(d). The Commission may refuse to accept the petition
where, inter alia, the requested action is not appropriate for rulemaking by the
Commission. Id. The Commission properly followed that procedure in this case.
When O’Neill’s request for a regulation was presented, the Board discussed it in
executive session, but upon reconvening the public meeting, failed to receive a
motion to accept the Second O’Neill Letter Petition for further consideration.
This Court has held that the actions of the Commission in adopting and
promulgating a regulation is not an appealable adjudication or determination and,
accordingly, is not a proper subject of this Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Laurel
Lake Ass’n, Inc. v. Pa. Fish & Boat Comm’n, 710 A.2d 129, 133 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998);
see also Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Ins. Dep’t, 327 A.2d 411, 414 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1974)
(stating, under prior law, that “[n]o right of appeal is provided under the
Administrative Agency Law from the mere promulgation of a regulation”). The
logical corollary to this holding is that the Commission’s failure to adopt a regulation
likewise cannot constitute an appealable adjudication.
In addition, as set forth above, to be a final order and thereby subject to
appeal, an agency’s adjudication must “affect[] personal or property rights,
privileges, immunities, duties, liabilities or obligations of any or all of the parties to
the proceeding in which the adjudication is made.” 2 Pa.C.S. § 101 (emphasis
added). Here, however, the Second O’Neill Letter Petition sought promulgation of
a Commission regulation to increase the minimum starting salaries of certain
Commission employees. O’Neill, who was the only party before the Commission,
is not among those employees, none of whom were parties to the Second O’Neill
12
Letter Petition. Therefore, the outcome O’Neill sought would not have affected the
rights of anyone who was a party. For that additional reason, the Commission’s
refusal to accept the Second O’Neill Letter Petition for further consideration was not
an agency adjudication subject to appellate review by this Court.
Accordingly, there is nothing before this Court that can be subjected to
appellate review. We conclude that we lack appellate subject matter jurisdiction
regarding the Commission’s failure to accept the Second O’Neill Letter Petition for
further consideration after O’Neill’s oral presentation. This Court lacks appellate
subject matter jurisdiction over Counts 1 through 5 of the Amended Petition for
Review, all of which relate to the Commission’s failure to accept the Second O’Neill
Letter Petition. O’Neill’s Application to Quash is granted, and his requests for
appellate review in Counts 1 through 5 are quashed.
2. Original Jurisdiction
The Commission posits that this Court also lacks original subject matter
jurisdiction because O’Neill is seeking review of the Commission’s failure to accept
the Second O’Neill Letter Petition for further consideration after his oral
presentation at a Board meeting. We conclude that we have original jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the Amended Petition for Review.
Section 761(a)(1) of the Judicial Code14 provides that “[t]he
Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions or
proceedings[ a]gainst the Commonwealth government, including any officer
thereof, acting in his official capacity. . . .” 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1). Here, O’Neill
seeks declaratory and/or mandamus relief regarding the Commission’s alleged duty
14
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-9913.
13
to consider the Amended Petition for Review and to act on it in a public meeting.
Both kinds of claims are within this Court’s original jurisdiction. See
Commonwealth v. Donahue, 98 A.3d 1223, 1233 (Pa. 2020) (holding that a
declaratory judgment action against a Commonwealth agency is “squarely within
the scope of the Commonwealth Court's original jurisdiction”); Saunders v. Dep’t of
Corr., 749 A.2d 553, 555 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (observing that the Commonwealth
Court has original jurisdiction over mandamus actions against administrative
agencies). Accordingly, we overrule the Commission’s POs challenging this Court’s
original jurisdiction over O’Neill’s claims.
B. Standing
This Court has explained the requirements for standing as follows:
Under traditional standing, a party must be aggrieved by
the matter he challenges. W[illiam] Penn Parking Garage,
Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, . . . 346 A.2d 269 ([Pa.] 1975)
(plurality). To establish aggrievement, a party must show
an interest that is substantial, direct and immediate. Id. A
substantial interest means the party suffers a discernible
adverse effect to an interest other than the interest of all
citizens in compliance with the law. Id. A direct interest
means the party shows the matter complained of caused
harm to his interest. Id. Lastly, relating to the causal
connection, the party must show the interest is immediate
and not a remote consequence of the matter complained
of. Id.
Scarnati v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 220 A.3d 723, 728 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019), aff’d, 240
A.3d 536 (Pa. 2020), abrogated in part on other grounds by In re Nomination
Petition of deYoung, 903 A.2d 1164, 1168 n.5 (Pa. 2006).
14
O’Neill is not an employee of the Commission, but a volunteer.15 He
asserts no interest as to which the Commission’s failure to enact the requested
regulation would create “a discernible adverse effect . . . other than the interest of all
citizens . . . .” Scarnati, 220 A.3d at 728. Moreover, he fails to aver facts indicating
an immediate causal connection, rather than a remote relationship, between allegedly
inadequate salaries and the Commission’s allegedly insufficient personnel for
effective enforcement of its regulations. We conclude, therefore, that O’Neill has
failed to plead facts to establish that he has standing to pursue his claims against the
Commission.
C. Demurrer – Salary Regulations
Section 322 of the Commission’s governing statute, the Fish and Boat
Code,16 provides generally that “[t]he [C]ommission may promulgate rules and
regulations concerning: (1) Fishing to aid in the better protection, preservation and
management of fish [and] (2) Boating and the management and operation of boats.”
30 Pa.C.S. § 322. More specifically, Section 2102 authorizes the Commission to
enact various regulations for the protection, preservation, and management of fish
and fish habitat, including, inter alia, fishing seasons, fish sizes, transport and sale
of fish, creel sizes, and traps, seines, and other devices for catching fish. 30 Pa.C.S.
§ 2102.
15
Section 327(d)(1) & (4) of the Fish and Boat Code provides that volunteers are not
employees of the Commonwealth and “shall not be assigned to any full-time or wage position that
is covered by any labor agreement, presently filled, vacant or authorized in the [C]ommission.”
30 Pa.C.S. § 327(d)(1) & (4).
16
30 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-7314.
15
Section 302(a) of the Fish and Boat Code authorizes the Commission,
with the approval of the Governor, to set the compensation of the Commission’s
Executive Director. 30 Pa.C.S. § 302(a). Section 304(a) authorizes the
Commission’s Executive Director, with the approval of the Commission, to set
employee compensation “in accordance with law and the classification and
compensation plans of the Commonwealth . . . .” 30 Pa.C.S. § 304(a).
However, nothing in any of these statutory provisions authorizes the
Commission to set the minimum starting salary of its employees by regulation. To
the contrary, the Commission’s employee salaries are governed by a collective
bargaining agreement, the current version of which is effective through June 30,
2028.17 Thus, we agree with the Commission that it lacks authority to consider the
Second O’Neill Letter Petition.
D. Demurrer – Sunshine Act
O’Neill contends that the Commission violated Section 709(c)(1) of the
Sunshine Act by failing to include copies of the Board Appeal Dismissal Request
and the Second O’Neill Letter Petition in the meeting agenda packet and then
holding impromptu executive sessions on both. We agree with the Commission that
this count of the Amended Petition for Review fails to set forth a claim on which
relief can be granted.
As quoted at length above, Section 709(c)(1) sets forth the public notice
requirements for agency meetings. See 65 Pa.C.S. § 709(c)(1). Nothing in that
section relates to copies of written materials other than providing meeting attendees
17
The Commission’s current collective bargaining agreement can be accessed online at
https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp-pagov/en/hrmoa/documents/employee-relations/cba-
md/documents/cba-fop-fish-boat-2024-2028.pdf (last visited October 9, 2025).
16
with copies of the meeting agenda. Moreover, O’Neill fails to acknowledge that
Section 709(c)(2) expressly excepts executive sessions from the notice requirements
of Section 709(c)(1). See 65 Pa.C.S. § 709(c)(2). O’Neill does not assert that the
executive session was not held regarding permissible subject matter or that any
decision was improperly made during the executive session. See generally 65
Pa.C.S. § 708 (governing executive sessions). Accordingly, O’Neill has failed to
plead any violation of the Sunshine Act.
E. Demurrer – Constitutional Claims
Article I, section 20 confers a right upon citizens to petition government
for proper purposes. Pa. Const. art. I, § 20. However, nothing in article I, section
20 confers a right to an adjudication where a citizen petitions a government agency
asking that agency to exercise its legislative power in a specific manner. Here,
O’Neill wants the Commission to give further consideration to his request for a
Commission regulation that would increase the minimum starting salary for certain
Commission employees. However, O’Neill does not cite any pertinent authority
conferring on him a right to formal consideration, much less a final adjudication,
under article I, section 20.
Article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, commonly
known as the Environmental Rights Amendment (ERA), declares the right of
Pennsylvanians to clean air and water and to the preservation of the natural, scenic,
historic, and aesthetic resources. Pa. Const. art. I, § 27. This provision makes the
Commonwealth the trustee tasked with the protection and preservation of these
resources. Id. This Court has explained, however:
Because it is the Commonwealth, not individual agencies
or departments, that is the trustee of public natural
17
resources under the ERA, and the Commonwealth is
bound to perform a host of duties beyond implementation
of the ERA, the ERA must be understood in the context of
the structure of government and principles of separation of
powers. In most instances, the balance between
environmental and other societal concerns is primarily
struck by the General Assembly, as the elected
representatives of the people, through legislative action.
See Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Casey, . . . 600 A.2d
260, 265 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1991), aff’d, . . . 619 A.2d 1063
([Pa.] 1993) (holding that the Governor can only execute
laws and the balance required by the ERA was achieved
through legislative enactments). While executive branch
agencies and departments are, from time to time, put in the
position of striking the balance themselves, they do so
only after the General Assembly makes “basic policy
choices” and imposes upon the agencies or departments
“the duty to carry out the declared legislative policy in
accordance with the general provisions of the statute.”
MCT Transp., Inc., v. Phila. Parking Auth., 60 A.3d 899,
904 (Pa. Cmwlth.), aff’d sub nom. MCT Transp., Inc. v.
Phila. Parking Auth., . . . 81 A.3d 813, and aff’d sub nom.
MCT Transp., Inc. v. Phila. Parking Auth., . . . 83 A.3d 85
([Pa.] 2013) (quotation omitted).
Funk v. Wolf, 144 A.3d 228, 235 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016), aff’d, 158 A.3d 642 (Pa. 2017).
Stated otherwise, the ERA does not speak in absolute terms, either regarding the
duty imposed on the Commonwealth as trustee or regarding an individual citizen’s
right to relief. Id. The General Assembly must balance the interests to be protected
under the ERA with all the other interests of Pennsylvania’s citizens. Id.
Here, O’Neill fails to point to any constitutional, statutory, or regulatory
provision that would empower him to compel the Commission to undertake the
enactment of a regulation raising employee salaries with the indirect goal of
complying with the ERA. Accordingly, we sustain the Commission’s demurrer to
O’Neill’s constitutional claims.
18
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing discussion, we sustain the Commission’s PO
asserting lack of subject matter jurisdiction for claims asserted in this Court’s
appellate jurisdiction as to Counts 1 through 5. We overrule the Commission’s PO
asserting lack of original jurisdiction. We sustain the Commission’s POs in the form
of demurrers. We grant the Commission’s application for relief seeking quashal of
O’Neill’s claims asserted in this Court’s appellate jurisdiction. We dismiss
O’Neill’s Amended Petition for Review with prejudice.
__________________________________
CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
19
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Joseph B. O’Neill, Jr., :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
Pennsylvania Fish and Boat :
Commission, : No. 550 M.D. 2024
Respondent :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 10th day of October, 2025, the preliminary objection
(PO) of Respondent, Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Commission (Commission)
asserting lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the Amended Petition for Review
by Petitioner, Joseph B. O’Neill, Jr. (O’Neill) regarding claims asserted in this
Court’s appellate jurisdiction are SUSTAINED as to Counts 1 through 5. The
Commission’s PO asserting lack of original jurisdiction is OVERRULED. The
Commission’s POs in the form of demurrers to O’Neill’s statutory and constitutional
claims are SUSTAINED.
The Commission’s application for relief seeking quashal of O’Neill’s
claims asserted in this Court’s appellate jurisdiction is GRANTED.
O’Neill’s Amended Petition for Review is DISMISSED with prejudice.
__________________________________
CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge