Anderson v. United States Department of Veteran's Affairs

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

DAVID ANDERSON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 6:25-cv-196-JSS-DCI

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT

OF VETERAN’S AFFAIRS,

PATRICIA BURKETT, FLORIDA

AGENCY HEALTH CARE

ADMINISTRATION & AFFILIATES,

and BAYVIEW REHAB SAMANTHA

WILSON CARE CENTER,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

ORDER

Defendants Patricia Burkett and the Florida Agency Health Care

Administration1 move to dismiss the amended complaint (Dkt. 4) and, in the

alternative, move for a more definite statement. (Dkts. 13, 15.) Plaintiff, David

Anderson, proceeding pro se,2 opposes the motions. (Dkts. 47, 48.) Upon

1 The Florida Agency for Health Care Administration notes that Plaintiff incorrectly names the

“Florida Agency for Health Care Administration & Affiliates,” which “is neither a person nor [an]

entity subject to the personal jurisdiction of this [c]ourt.” (Dkt. 15 at 2.) Accordingly, this order refers

to this Defendant as the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration throughout the complaint,

except when quoting Plaintiff. If Plaintiff repleads, he shall correct this error in the second amended

complaint.

2 The court recommends that all pro se litigants read the court’s Guide for Proceeding Without a

Lawyer, available as a PDF file from https://www.flmd.uscourts.gov/litigants-without-lawyers, and

that they avail themselves of the other resources found through this website.

consideration, for the reasons outlined below, the court grants in part and denies in

part Defendants’ motions.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings this case against the United States Department of Veterans’

Affairs, Patricia Burkett, the “Florida Agency Health Care Administration &

[A]ffiliates,” and “BayView Rehab Samantha Wilson Care Center, et al.” (Id. at 2.)

Plaintiff asserts six claims: 1) “Discrimination & Reprisal in Veterans Affairs

Administration of Benefits, Health Insurance, and Military Burial Benefits,” 2)

“Wrongful Death, Negligence, Elder Abuse, and Concealment of Death & Body,” 3)

“Nursing Home Care Negligence, Elder Abuse, Exploitation,” 4) “Abuse of Power,

Self-Dealing, Exploitation, Tortious Interference in Relationships, Contracts,

Inheritance Rights,” 5) “Reprisal or Retaliation of Whistleblowing Representative,”

and 6) “Tortious Interference with Relations or Contracts and Emotional Distress.”

(Id.) Plaintiff also appears to assert additional claims as subparts to his first claim,

including claims for a) “Discrimination & Reprisal in VA Benefits of Military Burial

Requests,” b) “Discrimination in VA Benefits & Health Insurance,” c) “Health Care

Disability Exemption Discrimination & Retaliatory Actions,” and d) “Exploitation of

Vulnerable Persons Status Applies in Present Case.” (Id. at 8–10.) Subsection a) is

further divided into claims for i) “Title 38 U.S.C. Chapter 1, Parts 15 & 18; Chapter

23 (VA Form 21P-530EZ)” and ii) “Request for Moving Graves.” (Id. at 8–9.)

Plaintiff’s claims seem to stem from events leading up to and following the death

of Plaintiff’s father.3 (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendants sold his

father’s house, car, and other property and held his father against his will in a nursing

home. (Id. at 11–14.) There, Plaintiff’s father was allegedly subjected to elder abuse

and died, possibly as a result of this abuse. (Id.) Defendants then allegedly concealed

records relating to Plaintiff’s father, causing Plaintiff to not learn about his father’s

death until years later. (Id. at 8–9, 11.) It appears that Plaintiff then requested various

records and a military burial and honors for his father, which have all been delayed or

denied. (Id. at 8–9.)

APPLICABLE STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to “contain . . . a

short and plain statement of [a] claim showing that the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(b) requires the plaintiff to

“state [his] claims . . . in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a

single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). To “promote clarity,” Rule 10(b)

also requires the plaintiff to state “each claim founded on a separate transaction or

occurrence . . . in a separate count.” Id. “Complaints that violate either Rule 8(a)(2)

or Rule 10(b), or both, are often disparagingly referred to as ‘shotgun pleadings.’”

3 The underlying facts and bases for the claims are unclear, especially because the complaint does not

include a fact section. (See id.) The confusion is compounded, given that the facts are not listed in

chronological order. (See id. at 8 (discussing events that happened between 2021 and 2025); id. at 9

(discussing events from 2015 and 2023); id. at 10 (discussing events that occurred in 2018, 2019, and

2020).)

Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). Shotgun

pleadings “fail . . . to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them

and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id. at 1323. A court should dismiss a

complaint as a shotgun pleading “where ‘it is virtually impossible to know which

allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief.’” Id. at 1325

(emphasis omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d

364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996)).

Although courts “give liberal construction” to documents filed by pro se

plaintiffs, Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007), pro se plaintiffs are

still “required . . . to conform to procedural rules,” Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304

(11th Cir. 2002). See Cummings v. Dep’t of Corr., 757 F.3d 1228, 1234 n.10 (11th Cir.

2014) (“The right of self-representation does not exempt a party from compliance with

relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” (quoting Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592,

593 (5th Cir. 1981))). Further, the leniency with which courts treat pro se plaintiffs

does not permit courts to “serve as de facto counsel” or “rewrite an otherwise deficient

pleading.” GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998).

ANALYSIS

Defendants move to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim.

(Dkts. 13, 15.) The Florida Agency for Health Care Administration specifically notes

that the amended complaint “alleges six counts in a ‘shotgun’ pleading, all co-mingled

together and unintelligible” and “does not specify which [c]ounts apply to which

Defendants.” (Dkt. 15 at 3.) While Burkett does not explicitly assert that the amended

complaint constitutes a shotgun pleading, she does argue that the counts are

“comingled and unintelligible” and notes that the amended complaint “does not

identify which counts apply to which [D]efendants.” (Dkt. 13 at 1.)

Because the court agrees that the complaint is a shotgun pleading, it grants the

motions on that basis and denies them without prejudice on the other asserted bases.

See Murray v. Taylor, No. 6:24-CV-6-CEM-LHP, 2024 WL 4956968, at *4 (M.D. Fla.

July 31, 2024), report and recommendation adopted by No. 6:24-CV-6-CEM-LHP, 2024

WL 4647947, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2024) (collecting cases); Laing v. Cordi, No.

2:11-CV-566-FTM-29, 2012 WL 2999700, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 23, 2012) (“T]he

[c]ourt cannot resolve the substantive issues [in the motions to dismiss] because the

[operative] [c]omplaint is a shotgun pleading.”); Tunstall v. William E. Donaldson Corr.

Facility, No. 2:24-CV-01504-RDP, 2025 WL 51945, at *7 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 8, 2025)

(explaining that the court could not determine the applicability of qualified immunity

because of the shotgun nature of the pleading); Smith v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc.,

No. 8:20-CV-2936-CEH-CPT, 2021 WL 4148326, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 2021)

(dismissing a complaint as a shotgun pleading and finding a statute of limitations

defense “not appropriate based on the current state of the pleadings”).

Plaintiff’s complaint is a shotgun pleading. The Eleventh Circuit has identified

four categories of shotgun pleadings. See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321–23. The amended

complaint implicates at least two categories. (See Dkt. 4.) The amended complaint

does “not separat[e] into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief.”

Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323; see, e.g., id. at 1323 n.13 (collecting cases). (See Dkt. 4 at 8–

16 (listing six counts with an additional six identified sub-counts).) For instance, in

count six Plaintiff brings a claim for “Tortious Interference with Relations or Contracts

and Emotional Distress.” (Id. at 15.) However, these are multiple causes of action,

each with their own elements. To state a claim for tortious interference with business

relations under Florida law, a plaintiff must allege “(1) the existence of a business

relationship . . ., (2) knowledge of the relationship on the part of the defendant[,] (3)

an intentional and unjustified interference with the relationship by the defendant[,]

and (4) damage to the plaintiff as a result of the breach of the relationship.” Ethan

Allen, Inc. v. Georgetown Manor, Inc., 647 So. 2d 812, 814 (Fla. 1994) (quoting Tamiami

Trail Tours, Inc. v. Cotton, 463 So. 2d 1126, 1127 (Fla. 1985)). Emotional distress can

either refer to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), or

negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED). Under Florida law, to state a claim

for IIED, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the defendant acted recklessly or

intentionally, (2) the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, (3) the

defendant’s conduct caused the plaintiff’s emotional distress, and (4) the plaintiff’s

emotional distress was severe. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 467 So.2d 277,

278–79 (Fla. 1985). In contrast, a claim of NIED requires that a plaintiff establish (1)

deliberate or reckless infliction of mental suffering, (2) by outrageous conduct, (3)

which conduct must have caused the suffering, and (4) the suffering was severe. See

Hart v. United States, 894 F.2d 1539, 1548 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Metropolitan Life Ins.

Co. v. McCarson, 467 So.2d 277, 278 (Fla. 1985)). Thus, to the extent that these causes

of action are distinct, they must be pleaded separately. Accordingly, in the second

amended complaint Plaintiff “must ensure that each distinct cause of action . . . is pled

in its own separate count.” Litke v. P.B. Express, Inc., No. 3:23-CV-1266-MMH-PDB,

2024 WL 3634947, at *3 (M.D. Fla. June 14, 2024).

The amended complaint also asserts “multiple claims against multiple

defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts

or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.” Weiland, 792

F.3d at 1323. The amended complaint routinely refers to the actions of “Defendants”

without delineating the roles or alleged wrongs attributable to each of the four named

Defendants. (See Dkt. 4 at 12 (“Defendants held Plaintiff against his will . . . .”); id. at

13 “Defendants sold Plaintiff[’]s [p]ersonal [r]esidence . . . .”); id. at 15 (“Defendants

held [them]selves out to Plaintiffs[] as a VA accredited attorney or agent . . . .”).) See

Pyatt v. Gimenez, No. 1:20-CV-20827, 2020 WL 4003495, at *5 (S.D. Fla. July 15,

2020) (dismissing complaint that “assert[ed] multiple claims against multiple

defendants without specifying which of the defendants is responsible for which acts or

omissions”); Hewlett Packard Enter. Co. v. Digicom Tech., LLC, No. 6:18-cv-1847-Orl-

40GJK, 2018 WL 7412892, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2018) (dismissing a complaint as

a shotgun pleading where “each [c]ount assert[ed] claims against two named and

twenty unnamed Doe Defendants without delineating each Defendant’s liability-

creating conduct”).

Plaintiff responds that the amended complaint “demonstrates [that] the four

Defendants are ‘jointly and severally’ liable.” (Dkt. 47 at 16.) Even if Plaintiff wishes

to allege that each party is ultimately responsible for the actions of another, Plaintiff

must still “explain who is responsible for precisely which alleged actions.” Dubose v.

Wish Farms Inc., No. 8:24-CV-01810-KKM-TGW, 2024 WL 4987427, at *1 (M.D. Fla.

Sept. 26, 2024). Further, Plaintiff “do[es] not allege any facts supporting such ‘joint

and several liability.’” King v. UA Loc. 91, No. 2:19-CV-01115-KOB, 2021 WL

2453995, at *9 (N.D. Ala. June 16, 2021). Conclusory assertions of joint and several

liability do not bring clarity to Plaintiff’s allegations. See Turner v. US Bank, No. 1:18-

CV-3272-LMM-LTW, 2019 WL 2344148 at *4 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 11, 2019) (stating that

“characteristics of a ‘quintessential’ shotgun pleading” include vague allegations of

“joint and several liability” and the failure to “specifically allege the conduct of each

[d]efendant” (citing Strategic Income Fund, LLC v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp., 305 F.3d

1293, 1295–96 (11th Cir. 2002))).

If Plaintiff repleads, he shall refrain from referring to Defendants collectively

and shall instead identify the specific actions he alleges are attributable to each

Defendant. He shall also clarify the Defendant or Defendants for each count. See

Embree v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 779 F. App’x 658, 664 (11th Cir. 2019) (affirming

a dismissal on shotgun pleading grounds when counts “failed to specify the exact

conduct each defendant engaged in as to each count”); Zimmerman v. Buttigieg, 521 F.

Supp. 3d 1197, 1207 (M.D. Fla. 2021) (“[L]ump[ing] all allegations against each

defendant together . . . is an unacceptable form of establishing a claim for relief.”).

Accordingly, the court dismisses the complaint without prejudice as a shotgun

pleading. See Mikov v. Village of Palm Springs, No. 23-13311, 2024 WL 3178043, at *3

(11th Cir. June 26, 2024) (affirming a dismissal without prejudice on shotgun pleading

grounds when the complaint “made it overly burden[]some to identify which facts

support[ed] each claim”). If Plaintiff repleads, he shall heed this order to avoid a future

shotgun pleading. See Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir.

2018). The court cautions Plaintiff that an amended complaint supersedes a previous

complaint. See TVPX ARS, Inc. v. Genworth Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 959 F.3d 1318, 1327

(11th Cir. 2020). If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, he shall “list each cause of

action into a separately numbered count, with one legal theory per count, and a

specifically named defendant or defendants per count.” Omni Healthcare Inc. v. N.

Brevard Cnty. Hosp. Dist., No. 6:22-cv-696-JSS-DCI, 2024 WL 4235850, at *6 (M.D.

Fla. Sept. 19, 2024) (quotation omitted). Plaintiff “shall not lump[] together multiple

theories in one count; instead, he shall narrow down and separate out his theories of

liability such that each asserted theory gets its own count in the amended pleading.”

Pringle v. Seminole Cnty. Pub. Schs., No. 6:24-cv-835-JSS-DCI, 2025 WL 20019, at *7

(M.D. Fla. Jan. 2, 2025) (quotation omitted); see Ortiz v. Carnival Corp., No. 20-24838-

Civ-Scola, 2020 WL 6945958, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2020) (“Each distinct

theory . . . is a separate cause of action that must be asserted independently and with

corresponding supporting factual assertions.” (collecting cases)).

Additionally, Plaintiff must include in each count the elements for that count’s

claim and the factual allegations supporting those elements because “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” standing alone, “will not do.” Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Each count must include only the elements

and facts applicable to it. See Ely v. Mobile Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. 15-566-KD-M, 2016 WL

3188926, at *8, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73665, at *21 (S.D. Ala. May 11, 2016) (“[The

p]laintiff should clearly state under each count the law under which he is proceeding[,]

clearly list what facts apply to that count[,] clearly explain under each count how the

legal right implicated by that count was violated (including how each element of the

cause of action is alleged)[,] and clearly articulate the relief requested—all with

statements of relevant facts rendering the claims plausible but without excessive

tangential or irrelevant material.”), report and recommendation adopted by 2016 WL

3189244, at *1, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73663, at *1 (S.D. Ala. June 7, 2016). “Plaintiff

shall incorporate into each count only those factual allegations necessary to support

the count.” Pringle, 2025 WL 20019, at *7.

Finally, if Plaintiff repleads, Plaintiff is advised to list all facts in chronological

order and in a separate fact section using numbered paragraphs as required by Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 10, rather than presenting the facts for the first time under

each of the claims in narrative form. Plaintiff should then mention the relevant

numbered paragraphs under each count so Defendants and the court can determine

which facts are relevant to which claims. Further, Plaintiff must comply with the

typography requirements outlined in Middle District of Florida Local Rule 1.08(a) in

all filings. Plaintiff should also clarify how many Plaintiffs there are in the case. If

Plaintiff intends to bring this action on behalf of an estate, Plaintiff must plead or

otherwise allege authority to bring such an action. See Veltmann v. Walpole Pharmacy,

Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1161, 1161 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (dismissing a complaint based on the

plaintiffs’ lack of standing to bring a wrongful death action because the plaintiffs failed

to allege that they were bringing the suit as personal representatives, as opposed to

merely relatives, of the deceased); see also Reshard v. Britt, 839 F.2d 1499, 1501 (11th

Cir. 1988) (“[U]nder Florida law, the personal representative is the only person who

may bring a wrongful death action on behalf of a decedent’s estate and survivors; a

person proceeding merely as a survivor, for example, cannot maintain a wrongful

death suit.” (emphasis omitted)).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly:

1. The motions to dismiss (Dkts. 13, 15) are GRANTED in part and DENIED in

part. Plaintiff’s amended complaint (Dkt. 4) is DISMISSED without prejudice

as a shotgun pleading. The motions are otherwise DENIED without prejudice.

2. Plaintiff may file a second amended complaint on or before October 31, 2025.

The court cautions Plaintiff: “[A]n order dismissing a complaint with leave to

amend within a specified time becomes a final judgment if the deadline to

amend expires without the plaintiff amending its complaint or seeking an

extension of time.” Auto. Alignment & Body Serv., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

Ins. Co., 953 F.3d 707, 719–20 (11th Cir. 2020).

3. If the second amended complaint fails to correct the deficiencies identified in

this order or to comply with any of this order’s directives, the court may dismiss

the second amended complaint without notice to Plaintiff.

ORDERED in Orlando, Florida, on October 8, 2025.

. —_

JULIE S. SNEED

NITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

Unrepresented Party

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