The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
VALERIE COWEN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 21-cv-3205
)
CHOICE HOTELS )
INTERNATIONAL SERVICE )
CORPORATION, )
)
Defendant. )
OPINION AND ORDER
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
Before the Court is Defendant Choice Hotels International
Service Corporation’s Motion for Reconsideration (d/e 45), Plaintiff
Valerie Cowen’s Memorandum in Opposition (d/e 47), and
Defendant’s Reply (d/e 48). Because Defendant is not entitled to
summary judgment on either of the grounds raised, Defendant’s
Motion for Reconsideration (d/e 45) is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 24, 2021, Plaintiff filed a two-count Complaint
with this Court against Defendant. See d/e 1. Plaintiff alleged in
Count I that Defendant violated her rights under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 by discriminating against her on the basis
of her gender. See d/e 1. Plaintiff alleged in Count II that Defendant
misclassified her as an independent contractor, depriving her of
benefits under the Unemployment Insurance Act (“Unemployment
Act”), 820 ILCS 405/212, and the Illinois Wage Payment and
Collection Act (“Wage Act”), 820 ILCS 115/2. See d/e 1.
On August 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed a one-count Amended
Complaint with this Court, alleging that Defendant misclassified her
as an independent contractor, depriving her of benefits under the
Unemployment Act, 820 ILCS 405/212, and the Wage Act, 820
ILCS 115/2. See d/e 37. On January 15, 2025, the parties filed a
Joint Status Report and Mutual Renewed Requests for Summary
Judgment requesting that this Court revisit the parties’ previously
filed cross motions for summary judgment on Count II. See d/e 43
(referencing d/e 19, 20, 22, 24, 26, 29, 33, 34).
On April 4, 2025, this Court entered an Opinion and Order
(d/e 44) granting Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(d/e 19) as to Plaintiff's status as an employee of Defendant under
§ 212 of the Unemployment Act, 820 ILCS 405/212, and § 2 of the
Wage Act, 820 ILCS 115/2 and denying Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment (d/e 22).
On May 2, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration
(d/e 45). On May 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in
Opposition (d/e 47), to which Defendant filed a Reply (d/e 48) on
June 6, 2025.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment due to
Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust the required administrative
process on her Unemployment Act claim.
Defendant argues that because Plaintiff did not introduce any
Illinois Department of Employment Security (“Department”) “filing
by Plaintiff, let alone a determination made by” the Department’s
Board of Review as to her benefits eligibility, Plaintiff “fails to allege
or establish she exhausted the [Department’s] administrative
process before seeking review by this Court” such that “summary
judgment in Defendant’s favor is appropriate[.]” d/e 45, pp. 2, 4.
Defendant cites to the Unemployment Act provision stating that
judicial review of Department Board of Review benefits decisions
“shall be permitted only after any party claiming to be aggrieved
thereby has exhausted his administrative remedies as provided by
this Act.” 820 ILCS 405/1100; see also d/e 45, pp. 4-5.
Defendant also cites to Angelo v. Board of Review, Department
of Labor, 58 Ill. App. 3d 50 (1978), in which the Illinois Fourth
District Court of Appeals found the plaintiffs “failed to take timely
appeal from the orders of the claims adjudicator and the referee,
respectively, ruling that they were not entitled to benefits.” Id. at 51;
see also d/e 45, p. 5. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff does not
“provide a legitimate basis” for her failure to exhaust the
administrative process or any caselaw allowing “her to file a
substantive claim seeking unemployment benefits in court without
first having engaged in the statutorily required [Department]
processing of her claims.” Id.
Pursuant to the Illinois Administrative Code, “an initial claim
for unemployment insurance benefits may be filed in person at any
local office or over the telephone or on the internet at the
Department's website.” Ill. Admin. Code tit. 56, § 2720.100(b).
Plaintiff alleged material facts, which Defendant does not dispute,
that she attempted to apply for unemployment benefits:
Several days after April 21, 2020, Cowen attempted to
make [an] application for unemployment benefits with the
[Department] … Because of the pandemic, the local office
of the Department was closed. Cowen attempted to apply
for unemployment benefits electronically on the
Department’s website. In that process she was able to
complete the first screen of the application. However, the
second screen listed her employer as Lincoln Land
Community College, not Choice Hotels [¶23 Cowen
Affidavit]. Cowen could not get beyond the second screen
to complete the application since her employer was Choice
Hotels, not Lincoln Land Community College. She
attempted to reach out to the Department telephonically
on a number of occasions for guidance. Each time she left
a voicemail. Her calls were never returned [¶24 Cowen
Affidavit]. Prior to accepting employment with the
Chatham School District, Cowen made a number of efforts
to complete the application for unemployment benefits.
Because she could not complete the form electronically
and none of her calls were returned, she was unsuccessful
[¶25 Cowen Affidavit].
d/e 26, pp. 11-12; d/e 34, p. 9.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s name, Choice Hotels, “did not
appear on the application screen [] because [Defendant] failed to do
what was required of it.” d/e 47, p. 4. Plaintiff points to Defendant’s
acknowledgment that it “did not and would not have made any
quarterly unemployment insurance contributions for someone who
was not its employee,” see id. at p. 5 (quoting d/e 34, p. 13), and to
the Illinois Administrative Code provision requiring employers to
report their employees’ names and wages to the Department
pursuant to the Unemployment Act. See Ill. Admin. Code tit. 56,
§ 2760.125.
The Court finds that Plaintiff “exhausted [her] administrative
remedies as provided by” the Unemployment Act to the extent that
the provided avenues allowed her. 820 ILCS 405/1100. Based on
the undisputed facts, the parties agree that pandemic closures
precluded Plaintiff from filing “an initial claim for unemployment
insurance benefits…in person at any local [Department] office[.]”
See d/e 26, p. 12; d/e 34, p. 9; see also Ill. Admin. Code tit. 56,
§ 2720.100(b). Plaintiff tried to file “over the telephone,” but the
parties agree her calls were never returned. Id. Plaintiff tried to file
“on the internet at the Department's website,” but the application’s
“second screen listed her employer as Lincoln Land Community
College, not [Defendant] Choice Hotels.” Id.
In Angelo, the claims adjudicator and referee were able to
issue orders that the plaintiffs were not entitled to benefits, such
that the plaintiffs must have successfully filed claims—something
that Plaintiff was unable to do. See Angelo v. Bd. of Rev., Dep’t of
Lab., 58 Ill. App. 3d 50 (1978); see also d/e 26, pp. 11-12; d/e 34,
p. 9. The Illinois Administrative Code does not require claimants to
compel Department offices to open, Department employees to
answer the phone, or Department online systems to run smoothly—
especially during an unprecedented pandemic.
Defendant cites to the statutory remedies offered under the
Unemployment Act, but they do not cut in favor of Defendant. While
the Unemployment Act may not provide jury trials, this Court is
capable of calculating benefits based on the evidence provided by
the parties. As to damages, both parties can argue how to weigh the
portion of unemployment benefits typically paid by the State.
The Court declines to penalize Plaintiff for the administrative
consequences of the pandemic and of Defendant’s own actions.
Therefore, Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration (d/e 45) on the
grounds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust all administrative remedies
with the Department is DENIED.
B. Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment based
on Plaintiff’s requested relief under her Wage Act claim.
Defendant then argues that Plaintiff “failed to show Defendant
owed her the items she sought under the Wage Act” or “manifested
any assent to provide the identified retirement, benefits, health
insurance benefits, vacation pay, and expense reimbursements to
Plaintiff, who Defendant considered an independent contractor.”
d/e 45, pp. 6-7.
Pursuant to the Illinois Administrative Code provisions
promulgating the Wage Act:
“Agreement” means the manifestation of mutual assent on
the part of two or more persons. An agreement is broader
than a contract and an exchange of promises or an
exchange is not required for an agreement to be in effect.
An agreement may be reached by the parties without the
formalities and accompanying legal protections of a
contract and may be manifested by words or by any other
conduct, such as past practice. Company policies and
policies in a handbook create an agreement even when the
handbook or policy contains a general disclaimer such as
a provision disclaiming the handbook from being an
employment contract, a guarantee of employment, or an
enforceable contract.
Ill. Admin. Code tit. 56, § 300.450.
Defendant acknowledges that it maintained a “Retirement
Saving & Investment Plan” that “specifically excludes individuals
such as [Plaintiff] who have executed a contract with [Defendant]
acknowledging their status as an independent contractor.” See d/e
22, p. 22; see also d/e 22-27, p. 2. Defendant also acknowledges
that it maintained an “Employment Termination Policy” noting that
“[a]ny monies owed for time worked and/or available unused
vacation leave will be paid out as determined by state law. Available
unused sick leave and unused personal time is not paid out, unless
otherwise mandated by state law.” See d/e 22, p. 7; see also d/e
22-16, pp. 2-4.
As the Court noted in its prior Opinion and Order, under the
Unemployment Act, “the designation or description which the
parties apply to their relationship is not controlling.” d/e 44, p. 20
(quoting Ill. Admin. Code tit. 56, § 2732.200(b) (2013)). This Court
determined in its prior order that Plaintiff was an employee of
Defendant. See d/e 44, p. 36. That Defendant did not contract with
Plaintiff by name and provide her the applicable benefits under its
policies does not change the fact that Defendant was bound to its
obligations under those policies to provide its employees with
retirement benefits and vacation pay. Damages calculations as to
the amount and extent of those benefits are questions of fact to be
determined at trial.
Defendant also alleges Plaintiff did not provide any evidence
that Defendant owed Plaintiff health insurance benefits and
expense reimbursements. See d/e 45, p. 7. Illinois courts have
found benefits related to health insurance to be subject to the Wage
Act, but Plaintiff does not cite to any evidence in the record of an
applicable agreement as required under the Wage Act. See d/e 47,
pp. 5-9; see also Maas v. Bd. of Educ. of Peoria Pub. Sch. Dist. 150,
2024 IL App (4th) 231064-U, ¶ 24,
While Plaintiff may not ultimately prove that she is owed
damages on some of the employment benefits she seeks, whether
from a lack of an agreement or other applicable policy, that does not
merit summary judgment on her Wage Act claims as a whole when
the parties agree that Defendant maintained written policies on
providing Defendant’s employees with retirement benefits and
vacation pay. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration
(d/e 45) on the grounds of Plaintiff’s requested relief under the
Wage Act is DENIED.
III. CONCLUSION
Because Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust the required administrative process
under the Unemployment Act nor on Plaintiff’s requested relief
under the Wage Act, Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration (d/e
45) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: October 9, 2025.
FOR THE COURT
/s/ Sue E. Myerscough____________
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE