M.L. v. Board of Education of Bourbon County

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

CENTRAL DIVISION

(at Lexington)

M.L., by and through her next friends, )

her parents D.L. and M.L., )

)

Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No. 5: 25-279-DCR

)

V. )

)

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF ) MEMORANDUM OPINION

BOURBON COUNTY, et al., ) AND ORDER

)

Defendants. )

*** *** *** ***

Defendants Board of Education of Bourbon County (“Board”) and Larry Begley, in his

individual and official capacity as Superintendent of Bourbon County Schools, have moved to

dismiss all claims asserted against them under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. [Record No. 7] They also move to dismiss Superintendent Begley as a

party, in his individual and official capacity. [Record No. 6] The motions will be granted

regarding the federal claims because Plaintiff M.L., by and through her next friends and

parents, has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and has failed to plausibly allege

that she has a right of entitlement to re-enrollment in Bourbon County schools. M.L.’s state

law claims against Begley also will be dismissed for similar reasons.

I. Background

M.L. is a fifth grader who resides with her parents in the Nicholas County School

District; however, she has attended Bourbon County Schools since 2020.1 [See Record Nos.

1 But see infra note 2 discussing the conflicting dates and facts provided by the plaintiff.

7 at 2; 7-2 at 1–3; 8 at 2.] M.L. was able to attend in that district, in part, because her mother

was/is employed by the Bourbon County School District (“District”). [Record Nos. 1 at 4; 7

at 2; 7-2 at 1] The Board’s non-resident pupil policy provides that “[n]onresident pupils will

only be enrolled when they can be assigned to classes where the enrollment is below the

allowable maximum or programs currently exist to meet educational needs.” [Record No. 7-

3 at 2] the policy further provides that, “[w]hen the number of nonresident students must be

limited due to enrollment capacity. . . ., [s]tudents of district employees will have priority over

new applicants.” Id.

M.L. was determined previously to be a child with a disability and “eligible for

specially designed instruction under the categorical disability of attention deficit hyperactivity

disorder, anxiety mood disorder, unspecified and fetal alcohol syndrome.” [Record No. 1 at

4] Her disability frequently presents as “aberrant in-school behavior.” Id. M.L.’s mother

provided an affidavit which explained that M.L. had an Individualized Education

Plan/Program (“IEP”) while attending Nicholas County Schools during the 2019–2020

academic year. [Record No. 8] But once she was enrolled in the Bourbon County School

District, her mother was informed that she no longer qualified for an IEP. Id. During M.L.’s

second grade year, and while attending Bourbon County Schools, her behavior prompted the

creation of an individual § 504 plan to address her support needs. Id.

Despite the § 504 plan, M.L. claims that she was “isolat[ed] her from her non-disabled

peers while in the school setting” due to her unmanaged behaviors. [Record No. 1 at 4] The

Board ultimately changed her school “placement from in-school to virtual home school.” Id.

M.L.’s parents responded by filing a due process complaint under 34 CFR § 300.507 on

November 14, 2024. Id. The parties, however, settled their dispute rather than proceed with

a due process hearing and potential appeal. Id. They agreed that M.L. would be permitted to

“return to school but not spend the whole day in an isolated setting.” Id. She was placed in a

hybrid educational environment when she returned, but roughly one week later she was again

allegedly in a segregated placement. Id.

The parties created an IEP for M.L. on March 20, 2025.2 [Record No. 7 at 7] The IEP

provided for special education services in a highly structured special education classroom for

420 minutes daily. [Record No. 7-4 at 1] But M.L. was again removed from the in-school

setting and placed in virtual home school about two months later. [Record No. 1 at 5] The

following day (May 8, 2025), M.L.’s parents withdrew her from the Bourbon County School

District to begin homeschooling. [Record Nos. 1 at 5 and 7-1]

In the past, M.L.’s mother was sent a form yearly indicating her intent to have M.L.

attend in the District for the upcoming school year. [Record No. 8 at 4] However, because

M.L. had withdrawn, in early July 2025, her mother submitted an enrollment form attempting

to have M.L. returned to the District for the 2025–2026 school year. [Record Nos. 1 at 5 and

7-2 at 1–2] Rather than keep M.L. at her previous school, her mother sought placement at a

different elementary school in the District. [See Record No. 7-2 at 1–2.] Bourbon County

Superintendent Begley denied M.L.’s re-enrollment, allegedly stating “it was his decision” and

that she was being denied due to academic behavior and attendance. [Record Nos. 1 at 5 and

8 at 2]

2 M.L.’s mother provides in her affidavit that M.L. had an IEP in Nicholas County

Schools in 2019–2020. However, when she enrolled in Bourbon County Schools, she was told

that she did not qualify for an IEP. [Record No. 8] The dates are conflicting because other

pleadings (and even the affidavit) state that M.L. has been in Bourbon County Schools since

2019.

M.L. alleges that Begley denied her re-enrollment due to her disability and in retaliation

for her 2024 due process complaint. [Record No. 1 at 5] She brings claims against the

defendants for purportedly violating 29 U.S.C. § 794 (i.e., § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act)

(Count I); the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) (Count II); the Individuals with

Disabilities Act (“IDEA”) (Count III); KRS 344.130 (Count IV); KRS 159.010 and Article II

of the Kentucky Constitution (Count V); and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count VII).3 [Record No. 1]

Oral argument was held on M.L.’s motion for injunctive relief on August 25, 2025.

[Record Nos. 3 and 5] M.L. sought an order compelling the defendants to re-enroll her in the

Bourbon County School District for the 2025–2026 school year which had already

commenced. [Record No. 5] The Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order following

the hearing, denying M.L.’s motion for a preliminary injunction. [Record No. 14]

Defendant Begley moves to dismiss all claims against him in his official capacity,

arguing that the plaintiff’s claims may only be brought against the Board. [Record No. 6] And

with respect to the claims asserted against him in his individual capacity, Begley contends they

are redundant to those made against the Board. Id. In any event, he insists that the claims are

barred by governmental and qualified immunity. Id. M.L. concedes that the claims against

Begley in his official capacity should be dismissed but insists that he is not entitled to qualified

immunity for the individual capacity claims. [Record No. 15 at 2]

The defendants also move to dismiss the Complaint under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [Record No. 7] They contend that M.L.’s federal

3 Her Complaint does not include a Count VI.

claims require exhaustion under the IDEA and, in any event, she has no legal right of access

to Bourbon County Schools. Id. at 9. M.L. argues that her Complaint solely concerns access

to that school district, not her educational services and that she is being denied access because

of her disability. [Record No. 12 at 1–2]

II. Legal Standard

A 12(b)(1)4 motion to dismiss “can either attack the claim of jurisdiction on its face, in

which case all allegations of the plaintiff must be considered as true, or it can attack the factual

basis for jurisdiction, in which case the trial court must weigh the evidence and the plaintiff

bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists.” DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 516

(6th Cir. 2004). A facial challenge to the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction “merely questions

the sufficiency of the pleading.” Ohio Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325

(6th Cir. 1990). “In reviewing such a facial attack, a trial court takes the allegations in the

complaint as true, which is a similar safeguard employed under 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss.”

Id. “[T]he party claiming jurisdiction bears the burden of demonstrating that the court has

jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Id. at 324.

A plaintiff’s complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible upon its face’” to survive a motion to dismiss under

Rule 12(b)(6). Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

4 But see Zdrowski v. Rieck, 119 F. Supp. 3d 643, 661–62 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (making

the case that the IDEA exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional despite Metropolitan Board

of Public Education v. Guest, 193 F.3d 457, 463 (6th Cir. 1999), because of the subsequent

Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007)); see also L.G. by & through

G.G. v. Bd. of Educ. of Fayette Cnty., 775 F. App’x 227, 231 n.3 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding that

“[t]his circuit has not determined whether exhaustion under the IDEA is a jurisdictional

requirement”).

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). And while the Court need not accept legal conclusions

or unwarranted factual inferences, the allegations contained in the complaint are accepted as

true and all reasonable inferences are construed in the plaintiff’s favor. Bassett v. Nat’l

Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). However, the Court will dismiss

a complaint if the factual allegations are insufficient “to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Courts are generally limited to considering the pleadings in addressing a motion to

dismiss, but they may consider certain items without converting the motion to one for summary

judgment. This includes materials such as public records, exhibits attached to the complaint,

and those attached to the motion to dismiss “so long as they are referred to in the complaint

and are central to the claims contained therein.” Bassett, 528 F.3d at 430.

III. Analysis

A. Federal Claims

The defendants argue that all M.L.’s federal claims require exhaustion under IDEA

because the gravamen of her Complaint is a denial of a free appropriate public education

(“FAPE”). [Record No. 7 at 3] They further contend that M.L. “has no legal right to

enrollment in the Board’s District” because she is not a resident of that district. [Record No.

7 at 9] Conversely, M.L. argues that Begley’s decision not to re-enroll her was based solely on

her disability and that denial of access to the public-school systems in Bourbon County because

of her disability violates federal statutes. [Record No. 12 at1]

The IDEA requires recipients of federal funds to provide a free appropriate public

education to children with disabilities. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) (2012). And this guarantee

is protected with certain procedural safeguards. Id. at § 1415. Parties may present a due

process complaint alleging a FAPE violation and may be entitled to a “due process hearing”

before an impartial hearing officer. Id. at § 1415(a)(6), (f). A party aggrieved by the result of

an IDEA due process hearing may appeal the result to the state educational agency. Id. at §

1415(g). The outcome of the administrative review hearing may then be challenged in district

court. Id. at § 1415(i)(2).

These exhaustion requirements also apply to claims brought under other federal laws

such as the ADA, § 504, and Section 1983 when plaintiffs seek “relief that is also available

under [the IDEA].” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). The United States Supreme Court has provided that

such claims must comply with the IDEA’s exhaustion requirements when, at bottom, they seek

relief for the denial of a free appropriate public education. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580

U.S. 154, 168 (2017) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l)).

In determining whether a lawsuit seeks relief for the denial of a FAPE, a court “should

look to the substance, or gravamen, of the plaintiff’s complaint.” Id. at 165. If the plaintiff

alleges the denial of a FAPE, “the plaintiff cannot escape § 1415(l) merely by bringing her suit

under a statute other than the IDEA.” Id. at 168. “But if, in a suit brought under a different

statute, the remedy sought is not for the denial of a FAPE, then exhaustion of the IDEA’s

procedures is not required.” Id. To assess the gravamen of the complaint, “a court should

attend to the diverse means and ends of the statutes covering persons with disabilities—the

IDEA on the one hand, the ADA and Rehabilitation Act (most notably) on the other.” Id. at

170. “[T]he IDEA guarantees individually tailored educational services, while Title II and §

504 promise nondiscriminatory access to public institutions.” Id. at 170–71.

A court considers two hypothetical questions in aid of this determination: (1) “could

the plaintiff have brought essentially the same claim if the alleged conduct had occurred at a

public facility that was not a school,” and (2) “could an adult at the school have pressed

essentially the same grievance?” Id. at 171 (emphasis in original). For example, a

discrimination suit against a school for failing to provide wheelchair access ramps would not

be subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirements, because it could be brought against any

public facility that lacked access ramps, and could be brought against the school by an adult.

See id. at 171–72. Whereas a claim against a school for failing to provide remedial mathematics

tutoring to a student with a disability could not be brought against another public facility, nor

could it be brought by an adult at the school, rendering it subject to exhaustion. See id. at 172–

73.

The United States Supreme Court has further clarified that when a plaintiff’s lawsuit’s

gravamen is the denial of a FAPE, but the relief sought is not available under the IDEA, then

exhaustion of the administrative remedies is not required. Perez v. Sturgis Pub. Schs., 598

U.S. 142, 146–47 (2023) (holding that the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement did not preclude an

Americans with Disabilities Act lawsuit because the plaintiff sought compensatory damages

that the Act did not provide). Other exceptions to the exhaustion requirements include when:

“‘(1) exhaustion would be futile or inadequate; (2) the issue presented is purely a legal

question; (3) the administrative agency cannot grant relief; and (4) exhaustion would cause

severe or irreparable harm.’” J.A. by & through S.A. v. Williamson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 731 F.

Supp. 3d 938, 951 (M.D. Tenn. 2024) (quoting M.M. v. Paterson Bd. of Educ., 736 F. App'x

317, 319–20 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal citation omitted) (and citing Donoho ex rel. Kemp v. Smith

Cty. Bd. of Educ., 21 F. App’x 293, 297 (6th Cir. 2001)). Otherwise, exhaustion is required,

and parents may not circumvent it by unilaterally removing their child from public school. See

Doe By & Through Doe v. Smith, 879 F.2d 1340, 1343 (6th Cir. 1989).

As discussed previously in the Memorandum Opinion and Order denying M.L.’s

motion for a preliminary injunction, M.L. has failed to show that she has a statutory right to

access Bourbon County Schools. [Record No. 14 at 9–10] At best, she has established a policy

under which she may be enrolled as a child of a Bourbon County School teacher. The lack of

entitlement to access the District is problematic for her argument that she is being denied

access because of her disability. And her unilateral removal from the District to homeschool

undercuts potential access rights she may have had if she remained enrolled. Put simply,

M.L.’s argument that exhaustion is not required because she claims a denial of access fails

because she shows no entitlement to access in the first place.

In support of M.L.’s claim that she was denied reenrollment because of her disability,

her mother contends that Begley told her that she was being denied due to academic behavior

and attendance issues. [Record No. 12-2 at 2] The defendants assert that once she was

unilaterally withdrawn, Nicholas County Schools became the district with the statutory duty

to provide her a public education. [Record No. 7 at 2] They further insist that she was denied

reenrollment due to a lack of programs, staff, and facility space, resulting from increased

enrollment. Id. But M.L. argues that this stated basis establishes that she was denied access

because of her disability as her IEP required a highly structured classroom.

Here, M.L. has not met her burden in showing that exhaustion of her administrative

remedies would be futile or inadequate, her issue is purely a legal one, the administrative

agency cannot grant relief, or exhaustion would cause severe or irreparable harm. J.A. by &

through S.A., 731 F. Supp. 3d at 951. She offers no reason what she could not avail herself of

the process set forth in the nonresident student enrollment policy which allowed her to appeal

Begley’s denial to the Board. Likewise, she provides no explanation for failing to file a due

process complaint.

Exhaustion is required, in part, because courts benefit from a developed administrative

record when reviewing educational agency decisions. This process also allows states to

remedy their own mistakes without interference from courts. In summary, M.L. had remedies

available to challenge the defendants’ decisions but rather than avail herself of those avenues,

she filed this lawsuit in federal court. Her Section 504, ADA, IDEA, and Fourteenth

Amendment equal protection claims will be dismissed for the reasons discussed in the Court’s

prior order and because she has not demonstrated a legal right to access and has not exhausted

her remedies under the IDEA. [Record No. 14]

B. State Law Claims

The plaintiff concedes that she cannot bring state law claims against the Bourbon

County Board of Education or Superintendent Begley in his official capacity.5 [See Record

No. 15 at 2.] The defendants insist that M.L. fails to state a claim against Begley in his

individual capacity and, in any event, the state law claims fail as he is entitled to official

qualified immunity because he was exercising a discretionary function when he denied M.L.

re-enrollment in the Bourbon County School District. [Record Nos. 6 and 16]

While M.L.’s Kentucky Civil Rights Act (“KCRA”) (KRS 344.130) and KRS 159.010

and Article II of the Kentucky Constitution claims do not have exhaustion requirements, the

reasoning set forth above dismissing M.L.’s federal claims support dismissal of her remaining

5 M.L. failed to address the defendants’ argument that claims under the IDEA, ADA,

and Section 54 could not be brought against individuals, indicating that she is abandoning

those claims against Begley.

state claims. As an initial matter, it is unclear what exactly she is claiming under KRS 344.130.

That statute defines exceptions to places of public accommodation. As discussed previously,

M.L. has not shown any right of entitlement to access the Bourbon County Schools; therefore,

notwithstanding that she cited definitions, her denial of entry does not analogize well with a

place of public accommodation.

Her claim under KRS 159.010 and Article II of the Kentucky Constitution likewise

lacks a basis. That statute requires parents to send children to public schools in the “district in

which the child resides.” KRS 159.010(1)(a). M.L.’s Complaint references Article II of the

Kentucky Constitution in asserting that her denial of enrollment in Bourbon County schools

was an arbitrary use of the defendants’ power. [Record No. 1 at 8–9] Perhaps she meant

Section 2 of the Bill of Rights which provides that “[a]bsolute and arbitrary power over the

lives, liberty and property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest

majority.” Either way, she fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because she

resides in Nicholas County.

Finding no viable claim against Begley, the undersigned declines to address his

qualified immunity defense.

IV. Conclusion

Based upon the analysis set forth in the Memorandum Opinion and Order denying

M.L.’s motion for a preliminary injunction and the analysis herein, it is hereby

ORDERED as follows:

1. The Defendants Board of Education of Bourbon County and Larry Begley, in

his individual and official capacity as Superintendent of Bourbon County Schools’ motions to

dismiss [Record Nos. 6 and 7] are GRANTED.

2. Plaintiff M.L.’s claims against the defendants are DISMISSED in their entirety,

with prejudice.

Dated: October 9, 2025.

AY} mea = Danny C. Reeves, District Judge

\ —sUnited States District Court

mk Eastern District of Kentucky

-12-