Parker v. Village of Promise Inc

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

ELIZABETH PARKER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Civil Action No. 5:23-cv–1237-CLS

)

VILLAGE OF PROMISE, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Elizabeth Parker, who is a white female, was hired by the defendant, Village of

Promise, to serve as its Executive Director in March of 2020. Her employment was

terminated by defendant on December 15, 2021. Plaintiff asserts claims of race

discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et

seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. This opinion addresses the defendant’s motion for

summary judgment. Doc. no. 18.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Village of Promise is an Alabama non-profit corporation located in Huntsville.1

It was co-founded in 2011 by Bobby Bradley, who served in various roles, including

1 Doc. no. 20 (Bradley decl.), ¶ 2, at ECF 5. “ECF” is an acronym formed from the initial

letters of the name of a case filing system that allows parties to file and serve documents

electronically (i.e., “Electronic Case Filing”). When this court cites to pagination generated by the

ECF header, it will, as here, precede the page number(s) with the letters ECF.

as a member of the defendant’s Governing Board.2 The organization operates a family

advancement center, the mission of which is to assist families in overcoming

generational poverty through education.3

James Gilbert, M.D., who was the Chairman of defendant’s Governing Board

on the date of plaintiff’s employment, offered plaintiff the position of Executive

Director in a letter dated March 24, 2020. Plaintiff accepted the offer the following

day.4

During plaintiff’s tenure, the Board formed an “Executive Director and

Evaluation Support Committee” to provide feedback to plaintiff.5 The record does not

identify the members of that committee, nor does it describe the manner by which the

committee provided “support” to plaintiff.

Sometime during March of 2021, the parent of a child who attended one of the

defendant’s programs wrote to Dr. Gilbert with a “Statement of Concern.”6 The

parent complained about her interactions with plaintiff, and stated her belief that

2 Id.

3 Doc. no. 20 (Plaintiff dep.), at 65-66. The record does not more clearly define the

organization’s mission. However, its website explains that: “Village of Promise empowers children

and their families to break the cycle of poverty through education and multi-generational support,

helping them succeed in school, work, and life.” Village of Promise Home Page,

https://www.villageofpromise.org/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2025). Village of Promise offers early

childhood and adult and family programs in furtherance of its mission. Id.

4 Doc. no. 20 (Letter from James Gilbert, MD, to Elizabeth Parker), at ECF 162.

5 Doc. no. 20 (Bradley decl.) ¶ 5, at ECF 6.

6 Doc. no. 20 (“Statement of Concern”), at ECF 191-92.

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plaintiff had treated her with disrespect.7 Dr. Gilbert forwarded the statement to

plaintiff by electronic mail (“email”) for her review and response.8 Plaintiff testified

in deposition that she had “multiple follow-up communications” with Chairman

Gilbert and the Village of Promise’s co-founder Bobby Bradley, but the substance of

those communications is not contained in the record.9

Dr. Gilbert also shared the parent’s complaint with other Board members via

email message on March 10, 2021.10 Jane Daniel, one of the Board members to whom

the complaint was forwarded, suggested the following to Dr. Gilbert:

Since this letter came to you, I would recommend you address it with

[plaintiff] directly, hear her side of things and see what she recommends

in terms of next steps. She needs to be able to deal with parent concerns,

and we need to ensure that we are comfortable in how she plans to do

that. If we are, we support her position and approach. If we are not, we

discuss that with her. After talking with her, you could then report your

take-aways from the conversation to this group, as part of our overall

mid-year assessment.

Doc. no. 23-1 (Plaintiff’s evidentiary submission), at ECF 14. The record contains no

further information about the resolution of the parent’s complaint.

Later that same month, Dr. Gilbert and plaintiff met for a “mid-year

7 Id.

8 Doc. no. 20 (Plaintiff dep.), at 193-94.

9 Id. at 194.

10 Doc. no. 23-1 (Plaintiff’s evidentiary submission), at ECF 13-15. The individuals to whom

the email was addressed were: Jane Daniel; Wendy Yang; Kandy Gardner; and Bobby Bradley.

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discussion.”11 Dr. Gilbert summarized the meeting in an email message to plaintiff

dated March 25, 2021, and reading as follows:

Summary of Mid-Year Discussion:

1. The full board recognizes the tremendous work you have put forth

. . . especially in a Covid year.

2. Concern with timeliness to meetings for a smooth transition as you

are always on the top of the agenda.

3. Critical listening. “I never learned anything when talking,” Larry

King.

4. Optimal Team Communication at VoP: Employees as customers

too.

5. Managing Growth

a. You have permission to slow down and focus on processes

rather than growth.

b. Critical New Hires: Finance and Education Directors.

c. Continue to optimize your personal growth with mentor

relationships.

6. Develop a strategy to work with disagreeable colleagues

Libby [i.e., the nickname of plaintiff, Elizabeth Parker]: You really

help[ed] me to understand how some members of your team will see

your focus on metrics as threatening. This is clearly a need to grow the

team toward a better understanding of the big picture of the VoP and

their role in making the promise possible. The change in mindset that we

desire for our families must first start with us.

Doc. no. 20, at ECF 197 (ellipsis in original, alterations supplied).

11 Doc. no. 20 (Plaintiff dep.), at 198-202.

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Plaintiff responded by sending a lengthy email message on that same date to Dr.

Gilbert and Board member Wendy Yang.12 Plaintiff detailed her accomplishments,

and expressed her disappointment that, in her opinion, her accomplishments were not

appropriately recognized during the “mid-year discussion.” The following excerpt

from plaintiff’s response distills her dissatisfaction:

Honestly, I’m concerned after reading your summary that the board does

not realize the tremendous work that was put forth and how challenging

it was to get others on board in order to accomplish these things. With

everything that has happened this year, and looking at where we were to

where we are now, this summary of my performance is missing

something. I find it a bit underwhelming and hurtful.

Doc. no. 20, at ECF 196 (boldface type in original).

During July of 2021, at plaintiff’s suggestion, the Village engaged Higher

Echelon, a consulting group, to evaluate and advise the organization for strategic

planning.13 Dr. Gilbert explained the process to plaintiff and Board members in a July

20, 2021 email message, reading as follows:

The Strategic Planning Committee had a very good virtual meeting with

the Higher Echelon team (Joe Ross, Donnie Horner, Rene Elliott, Chang

Ko, and Sarah Milz). The structure, in brief, begins with a private in-

person 2 ½ hour process interview with [plaintiff]. This is then followed

by a similar in-person interview with the Board. There will be another

process interview with the VoP senior leadership. This is followed by

a fourth process interview with relevant key stakeholders. We then have

12 Doc. no. 20, at ECF 194-97. It is not clear from the record why Wendy Yang was included

as a recipient of plaintiff’s response.

13 Doc. no. 20 (Plaintiff dep.), at 207-09; see also id. (Bradley decl.), ¶ 6, at ECF 6.

5

four virtual meetings drilling down on vision alignment, preparing a

SWOT [i.e., Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats]

analysis, market analysis, system and structure analysis, and outreach

analysis. We will also define strategies, implementing tactics, and

responsibilities for implementing the approach. After this 3-month

process, we will emerge with a Strategic Plan.

Doc. no. 20, at ECF 211 (alterations supplied). Dr. Gilbert proposed dates during

August to begin the evaluation.14

During that same timeframe, plaintiff received an annual review conducted by

the “Board Chair and members of the Executive Director Support & Evaluation

Committee, with input from the Board of Directors.”15 Plaintiff received the

following “Overall Leadership Effectiveness Rating,” which was based upon a scale

of 1 to 5, with 5 signifying “very effective”:

Mission-driven leadership and strategic visioning 4

Community engagement and development 4

Effective communication/interactions with constituents 3

Operational and Financial Management 4

Personnel Management 3

Doc. no. 20, at ECF 201-04. The review contained “highlights” for the rating period,

and detailed plaintiff’s significant accomplishments in the areas of: “Mission Driven

14 Doc. no. 20, at ECF 211-12.

15 Doc. no. 20, at ECF 201-04. Other than Dr. Gilbert, who signed the review, the names of

the reviewers are not contained in the record.

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Leadership and Visioning”; “Operational and Financial Management”; and,

“Community Engagement and Development.”16 The review also addressed “Areas of

Focus/Improvement for Coming Year.” Specifically, the review provided plaintiff

with suggestions for her improvement in the areas of “critical listening and

communication,” “staffing,” and “culture of trust and transparency.” The review

concluded with the following summary:

[Plaintiff] has been a strong operational leader in a challenging year.

She has worked with passion and determination to address numerous

needs and to ensure successful delivery and growth of programs in

support of the VoP mission, all while operating under unprecedented

conditions resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic and constrained

facility space. With careful consideration of the needed areas of focus,

strong leadership in a critical period of strategic planning, and

strengthened partnership with the Board of Directors, the Board looks

forward to supporting and positioning [plaintiff] for continued success

in leading the Village of Promise forward.

Doc. no. 20, at ECF 204 (alterations supplied). Plaintiff signed the review on August

18, 2021, but added the following notation: “I do not feel the scores reflect the

magnitude of what was accomplished vs. what was inherited. I will work hard to

improve these scores.”17

On September 8, 2021, Board member Kandy Gardner notified plaintiff via

email of the details of an upcoming audit.18 Plaintiff forwarded the message on that

16 Id. at ECF 202-03.

17 Id. at 204.

18 Doc. no. 20, at ECF 223-24.

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same date to Beth Richardson — who had assumed the role of Board chairperson

following the conclusion of Dr. Gilbert’s term — and expressed concerns about the

audit.19 She stated:

Did you know that Kandy made this commitment? Has the board (full

board) voted? We have now committed 5K-6,500 more than other non-

profits pay for the same services. We are starting in September when

October was what was discussed with me and requested by me with no

explanation.

It would at least be nice to be asked about days to begin. I am booked

most of the 14th. If she [Kandy Gardner] is not going to be here, will

she have the items needed for [the auditor] to get started?

I’d like to know what is expected of me and my staff. What documents

do we need to have ready?

There was supposed to be a list requested. If she has been given that list

by [the auditor], I haven’t seen it. Would be helpful.

I still don’t have a FINAL copy of the approved budget, only the

abbreviated budget given to the board for a vote.

I do not have access to Quickbooks. Never have.

So what is my role and what is the role of the board? Are you a

governing board or operational? If you are operational, there are several

items that I’ve been handling that should be taken off my plate and given

to the proper people — whomever they may be.

I need clarity.

Doc. no. 20, at ECF 221-22 (alterations supplied). New Board Chairperson Beth

19 Id. at ECF 221-22.

8

Richardson responded to plaintiff as follows:

Hi Dr. Parker,

I hope all is well with you and the Village.

As you may recall in the executive committee meeting the

recommendation was to move forward with the increased fee for this

year’s audit based on the need to support grant applications, the current

vacancy in the financial director position which Kandy is currently

filling and meeting the needs, and the current auditor’s familiarity with

the organization versus the learning curve any new auditor [would have].

Kandy’s work and keeping you in the loop is in keeping with the

recommendation. The full board has approved the budget. There are

approved budgeted line items that have not been used this year that will

cover and offset cost of the increased audit fee. We also discussed

requesting bids and proposals from auditors next year.

The larger question of a governing versus operational board is one you

raise regularly. As we’ve discussed, this is a process, not a sudden

switch that we will flip to change governance models. This was also

discussed in your most recent review. Your questions warrant a meeting

to further discuss and provide clarity. Lynne [presumably, this is a

reference to Board member Lynne Berry20] and I would like to meet with

you the week of September 20. Please let me know your availability.

Id. at ECF 219-20 (alterations supplied).

Board Chairperson Richardson then forwarded copies of all of the foregoing

messages to her predecessor, Dr. Gilbert, who responded as follows:

I like your response. It is appropriate and clear. The question of

governance or operating board centers around control. Our

responsibility at this point in the VoP lifecycle is as an operating board.

Personally, my confidence in Libby to carry out crucial decisions does

20 See doc. no. 20, at ECF 11.

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not allow us to venture into the realm of a governing board. Libby does

not have sufficient senior leadership counsel to navigate the landscape.

We have to remain operational.

Id. at ECF 218.

Also on September 8th, Richardson sent an email message to all Board

members21 in which she stated, in relevant part, that she was:

writing confidentially to let you know of continued concerns with our

executive director. There have been a number of instances in the last

few weeks that have highlighted the concerns mentioned in our initial

strategic planning sessions. Lynne [again, presumably Lynne Berry22]

and I feel a need to have a conversation with Dr. Parker to try and bring

clarity and understanding. Her relationship with the board seems to be

deteriorating. Please let me know what specific concerns or questions

you would like for Lynne and I [sic] to address with her by Friday noon.

We are moving forward with the audit and should receive a draft by

October 15. . . .

Doc. no. 20, at ECF 11-12 (alterations supplied).

Dr. Gilbert responded to Richardson’s message on September 9, 2021, saying

that:

My observation is that Libby [plaintiff] has trouble in receiving

suggestions, observations, or feedback that may improve the

performance at the VoP, develop the talent of her staff, align

expectations at the VoP, and promote the culture of the organization.

These suggestions or feedback are too often taken as personal criticisms

of her leadership and this stifles the conversation. This has occurred in

my communications with her but I have also witnessed it at Executive

21 The recipients of the message were: Lynne Berry; Kandy Gardner; Alice Lanier; Jane

Daniel; Bobby Bradley; Dr. Gilbert; Wendy Yang; Peggy Sammon; and, Marshanne Castro. Id.

22 See note 20, supra.

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Committee and board meetings. I believe Board members do make the

well-intentioned suggestions in an effective and noncritical manner;

however, Libby has not always taken it as such. At times, her responses

have been inappropriately defensive. There is a needed relationship

discussion concerning the Board and the Executive Director and how to

develop trust. Her responses reflect she believes we are, at times, off

base, and she responds out of her feelings: indignant, wronged, or

exasperated. She will often ask are we a governing board or an

operational board, which I interpret [as saying]: stay in your lane.

During her evaluation, we did touch on the subject of communication,

both verbally and via email. In reviewing her performance, we were

very careful to place the praise of her performance in front of any

perceived critical feedback. Libby should appreciate the viewpoint of

the Board, which is supportive, and [that] our suggestions, observations,

and feedback are given in support of her and the organization (this too

was emphasized during the evaluation process). We never, however,

explored her relationship with her past boards and this may shed light

regarding her present posture.

Thank you for exploring this as it is critical for the continued growth of

the VoP. I am hoping your discussions may untangle the “what” from

the “who” and allow more appropriate sorting and filtering of the VoP

board discussions for her. It is essential that Libby be able to grow as the

ED [Executive Director] and have complete trust between the Board and

her. Her ability to pull value from criticism and feedback in site of her

natural tendencies (which we all have) to reject it, even to truthfully seek

it out from the Board, senior leadership, and staff is critical to

establishing a healthy culture at the VoP.

Doc. no. 20, at ECF 10-11 (alterations supplied). There is no indication in the record

whether the Board’s concerns with Dr. Parker’s performance were further addressed.

Higher Echelon, the consulting firm engaged by the Village’s Board to develop

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a strategic plan, presented its report to the Board on October 13, 2021.23 The report

as prepared was based in part upon two “strategic vision sessions,” during which

plaintiff, the Board, the “senior leadership team,” and “other relevant key

stakeholders” were interviewed.24 In all, 41 individuals participated in the

assessment.25

The company’s findings with respect to plaintiff were summarized in terms of

“positive” and “negative” considerations. The positive aspects of plaintiff’s

performance as Executive Director were stated as follows:

• Better organized: processes and procedures improving

• Financial tracking and expenditures

• Grant writing and awards

• Organization becoming more disciplined

• Good at running programs

• Building document trail and infrastructure (legitimacy)

Doc. no. 20 (“Strategic Planning — Assessment”), at ECF 36. The “positive” section

also included what appears to be a compilation of participants’ comments:

“What Dr. Parker inherited was a train wreck. No processes. No

knowledge. No procedures. Unqualified workers. Bad payroll

23 Doc. no. 20 (Bradley decl.)¶ 8, at ECF 6.

24 Id. (“Strategic Planning — Assessment”), at ECF 19.

25 Id. at ECF 23.

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practices. No metrics. No transparency. Last minute procurement with

no intentionality. Mixed pots of monies wrongly spent. Sloppy to say

the least. We’re still in transition. We’re getting better.”

Id. (boldface type in original).

The “negative” aspects of plaintiff’s performance as Executive Director were

summarized as follows:

• Poor people skills

• Show up late to events

• Misses opportunities to tell the VoP story

• Not a relationship builder

• Educator mindset vs. a community builder mindset

• Internal and external communications lacking.

Id. The compilation of “negative” comments reads as follows:

“She’s hard to deal with and does not do relationships well. Tardy on

phone calls. Not the face you’d want for VoP. Still, she has bolstered

the staff, added structure and added processes. She can run programs.”

Id.

Higher Echelon included a recommendation to “redesign the current Executive

Director position.”26 Specifically, the company suggested that the Village of Promise

do the following things:

1. Convert the existing Executive Directorship to 2 positions: Chief

26 Id. at ECF 69.

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Executive Officer (CEO) and COO (Chief Operating Officer).

2. Make the CEO the face — internal and external — of VoP with

primary roles of fundraising, lobbying, community engagement,

media relations, and public appearances/speaking.

3. Make the COO responsible for managing the staff, day to day

operations, program management, and grant/proposal writing.

Id. at 69.

The Board met on December 9, 2021, to address, among other matters, the

Strategic Planning Assessment and plaintiff’s performance as Executive Director.27

During the meeting, the Board voted to terminate plaintiff’s employment.28 A few

days thereafter, Lynne Berry and other Board members met with plaintiff and

informed her that the Board had voted to terminate her employment.29 Plaintiff was

offered the opportunity to resign, but she declined to do so. Therefore, her

employment was terminated.30

Board member Lynne Berry did not provide the exact date of the meeting in her

declaration, but plaintiff stated in her EEOC charge of discrimination and in the

complaint that her employment was terminated on December 15, 2021.31

Following plaintiff’s termination, the Board voted to offer Bob Ludwig, who

27 Id. (Bradley decl.) ¶ 12, at ECF 7.

28 Id.

29 Doc. no. 20-2 (Berry decl.) ¶ 4, at ECF 13.

30 Id. at ECF 13-14.

31 See doc. no. 1-1 (Charge of Discrimination), at ECF 2; doc. no. 1 (Complaint), ¶ 40.

14

is a white male, the position of Interim Executive Director.32 He accepted the offer

and served in that position until June of 2022, when the Village hired Dana Gillis, a

black male, as Chief Executive Officer.33

Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission on June 13, 2022.34 The EEOC issued a notice of right to

sue on June 21, 2023,35 and this lawsuit followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a court “shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In

other words, summary judgment is proper “after adequate time for discovery and upon

motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear

the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “In

making this determination, the court must review all evidence and make all reasonable

inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Chapman v. AI

32 Doc. no. 23-1 (Plaintiff’s evidentiary submission), at ECF 17.

33 Doc. no. 23-1 (Defendant’s Responses to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories and Requests for

Production), at ECF 38.

34 Doc. no. 1-1 (EEOC Charge of Discrimination).

35 Doc. no. 1-2 (Notice of Right to Sue).

15

Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Haves v. City of

Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995)). Inferences in favor of the non-moving

party are not unqualified, however. “[A]n inference is not reasonable if it is only a

guess or a possibility, for such an inference is not based on the evidence, but is pure

conjecture and speculation.” Daniels v. Twin Oaks Nursing Home, 692 F.2d 1321,

1324 (11th Cir. 1983) (alteration supplied). Moreover,

[t]he mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary

judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the

outcome of the case. The relevant rules of substantive law dictate the

materiality of a disputed fact. A genuine issue of material fact does not

exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for

a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor.

Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1023 (quoting Haves, 52 F.3d at 921) (alteration and emphasis

supplied). See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986)

(asking “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require

submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a

matter of law”).

III. DISCUSSION

Both 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e et seq., provide a federal remedy against discrimination (disparate treatment)

in private employment on the basis of race. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421

U.S. 464, 459-60 (1975); Caldwell v. National Brewing Co. 443 F.2d 1044, 1046 (5th

16

Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 916 (1972). Both statutes prohibit racial

discrimination against white persons, as well as nonwhite individuals. McDonald v.

Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280, 286-87 (1976). Indeed,

Section 1981 has been described as “a parallel remedy against [racial] discrimination

which . . . derive[s] its legal principles from Title VII.” Crawford v. Western Electric

Co., Inc., 614 F.2d 1300, 1315 n.27 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp.,

597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979)).36 In other words, because “[b]oth of these statutes have

the same requirements of proof and use the same analytical framework, . . . [courts

within the Eleventh Circuit] explicitly address the Title VII claim with the

understanding that the analysis applies to the § 1981 claim as well.” Standard v.

A.B.E.L. Services, Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998) (ellipsis and alteration

supplied); see also, e.g., Lincoln v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia,

697 F.2d 928, 935 n.6 (11th Cir. 1983) (“When, as in this case, the plaintiff predicates

liability under Title VII on disparate treatment, the legal elements of a claim are

identical to those of a claim under § 1981.”); Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1296

n.20 (11th Cir. 2009) (observing that race discrimination claims brought under Title

VII and § 1981 “are subject to the same standards of proof and employ the same

analytical framework”); Whiting v. Jackson State University, 616 F.2d 116, 121 (5th

36The Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit

handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981, in Bonner v. City of Prichard,

661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

17

Cir. 1980) (“When section 1981 is used as a parallel basis for relief with Title VII

against disparate treatment in employment, its elements appear to be identical to those

of section 706 [of Title VII, i.e., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5].”) (alteration supplied, citations

omitted)).

The analytical framework applicable to both Title VII and § 1981 claims is the

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, which places the initial burden of

establishing a prima facie case of race discrimination on the employee. See, e.g.,

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Vessels v. Atlanta

Independent School System, 408 F.3d 763, 767-68 (11th Cir. 2005) (describing the

elements of “the familiar McDonnell Douglas framework”)

Under that framework, plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of

disparate treatment. If she does so, that gives rise to a presumption of discrimination,

which the employer must rebut by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for the disputed employment action. If the employer satisfies its burden, the

presumption of discrimination drops from the case, and the burden shifts back to the

plaintiff, to show that the employer’s proffered reason is merely a pretext for unlawful

discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-05; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-

56.

In order to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment based upon the

18

plaintiff’s race, she must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she

was qualified to perform the duties of her position; (3) she was subjected to an adverse

employment action; and (4) her employer treated similarly situated employees outside

her protected class more favorably, or that she was replaced by a person outside her

protected class. See, e.g., Maynard v. Board of Regents, 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th

Cir. 2003).

The first three elements are not contested. With respect to the final element, the

defendant contends that plaintiff has failed to show that she was treated less favorably

than a similarly situated employee outside her protected class. Plaintiff does not

dispute that contention but, instead, argues that she was ultimately replaced by a

person outside her protected class.

Following plaintiff’s termination as Executive Director in December of 2021,

the defendant’s Board selected Bob Ludwig, who is a white male, to serve as Interim

Executive Director.37 Six months later, during June of 2022, the defendant hired Dana

Gillis, a black male, for the position of “Chief Executive Officer.”38 Plaintiff, who is

a white female, argues that she was “replaced” by Gillis, and that she established a

prima facie case of discrimination.

37 Doc. no. 23-1 (Defendant’s Responses to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories and Requests for

Production), at ECF 38.

38 Id.

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The defendant disputes that contention, citing plaintiff’s failure to proffer

evidence that Gillis performed the same duties that plaintiff had performed as the

defendant’s Executive Director. While that contention is correct, a large logical leap

is not required to conclude that Gillis, who assumed the Village’s top administrative

position, performed as “Chief Executive Officer” at least some of the same job duties

that plaintiff had performed as “Executive Director.” See, e.g., Rollins v. TechSouth,

Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff established prima facie case even

where the successor employee performed only some of the terminated plaintiff’s job

duties); Smith v. Euro-Pro Operating, LLC, No. 3:05-cv-1186-MEF, 2007 WL

735674 at *5 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 7, 2007) (observing that, even if another employee “did

not completely fill [the plaintiff’s shoes], [he] put his foot far enough in to replace [the

plaintiff] for a short period of time.”). Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff has

made a sufficient showing that she was replaced by a person outside her protected

group — i.e., by Dana Gillis, a black male. Therefore, plaintiff has established a

prima facie case of unlawful race discrimination under the McDonnell-Douglas

burden-shifting framework.

The burden now shifts to defendant to rebut the inference of race discrimination

raised by plaintiff’s presentation of a prima facie case by presenting legitimate, non-

discriminatory reasons for plaintiff’s termination. See Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d

20

1555,1564 (11th Cir. 1997). “This intermediate burden is ‘exceedingly light.’” Turnes

v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 36 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 1994).

The record amply demonstrates that the Board was dissatisfied with plaintiff’s

performance. During March of 2021, Dr. Gilbert identified for plaintiff, as part of

their “mid-year discussion,” areas where her performance could improve. In

particular, he noted critical listening, communication, and timeliness.39 Plaintiff’s

annual review, while largely positive, also suggested that there was room for plaintiff

to improve her performance in the areas of “critical listening and communication,”

“staffing,” and developing a “culture of trust and transparency.”40 In October of 2021,

the independent consultant engaged to assist the defendant in developing a strategic

plan reported to the Board, based upon its interviews with leadership, staff, and other

stakeholders, that plaintiff had “poor people skills,” was late to meetings, missed

opportunities to “tell the VoP story,” was “not a relationship builder,” and that

“internal and external communications [were] lacking.”41

Additionally, the record contains evidence that plaintiff’s interactions with the

Board and others were contentious. For instance, during March of 2021, the Board

received a complaint from a parent that plaintiff had not treated her with respect. The

39 Doc. no. 20, at ECF 197.

40 Id. at ECF 201-04.

41 Doc. no. 20, at ECF 36 (alteration supplied).

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record also contains electronic mail messages among Board members and plaintiff

reflecting concerns with plaintiff’s interactions with them, staff, and the public. The

record reflects that the Board addressed those issues with plaintiff, but that their

concerns were not corrected to the Board’s satisfaction. Accordingly, on December

9, 2021, the Board voted to terminate plaintiff’s employment. The court concludes

that the defendant’s proffered reasons for plaintiff’s termination were legitimate and

nondiscriminatory.

Therefore, the burden shifts back to plaintiff to demonstrate that the Village’s

stated reasons for her termination were a pretext for discrimination. She may do so

by “producing sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable finder of fact to conclude that

the defendant’s articulated reasons for its decision are not believable.” Howard v. BP

Oil Co., 32 F.3d 520, 526 (11th Cir. 1994).

When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he district court must

evaluate whether the plaintiff has demonstrated such weaknesses, implausibilities,

inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered

legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy

of credence.” Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997)

(alteration supplied, internal quotations and citations omitted).

Plaintiff contends that the defendant’s position statement to the Equal

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Employment Opportunity Commission creates such an inconsistency because the

statement did not include the fact that Dana Gillis, who is a black male, had been hired

as Chief Executive Officer and, instead, only referred to the defendant’s retention of

an interim Executive Director, who was a white male, following plaintiff’s

termination.42 Such an “inconsistency,” if it even is such, does not cast doubt on the

credibility of the defendant’s stated reasons for plaintiff’s termination.

Finally, plaintiff argues that the defendant offered “after the fact” justifications

for her termination, because at the time of her termination, she was told only that she

was “not a good fit.” While plaintiff may not have been told all of the reasons for her

termination, the record is clear that the Board was dissatisfied with plaintiff’s

performance over a period of several months preceding her termination, and directly

addressed with her the shortcomings in her performance. Accordingly, the court

cannot conclude that the defendant was not actually motivated by its proffered

legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for terminating plaintiff’s employment, and her

claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 must fail.

IV. CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is

due to be granted. A separate order consistent with this memorandum opinion will be

42 Doc. no. 23-1 (EEOC Position Statement), at ECF 8.

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entered contemporaneously herewith.

DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of October, 2025.

United States District Judge

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