People v. Guevara

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA BARBARA COUNTY,

Respondent;

EDGARDO ORTIZ GUEVARA,

Real Party in Interest.

S283305

Second Appellate District, Division Six

B329457

Santa Barbara County Superior Court

1183843

October 9, 2025

Justice Evans authored the opinion of the Court, in which

Justices Liu, Kruger, Groban, and Jenkins concurred.

Justice Corrigan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief

Justice Guerrero concurred.

PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (GUEVARA)

S283305

Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

In 2009, the trial court sentenced Edgardo Ortiz Guevara

to an indeterminate term of 28 years to life following his third

strike conviction, as then required by the “Three Strikes” law.

(See Pen. Code, former §§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subd.

(c)(2).)1 In 2012, voters enacted the Three Strikes Reform Act of

2012. (Prop. 36, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012)

(Reform Act or Act).) The Reform Act limited indeterminate life

sentences for nonserious, nonviolent third strike offenses.

Under the Reform Act, a defendant convicted of a nonserious,

nonviolent third strike instead receives a sentence of double the

term of the current felony. (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1), (2)(C).) The

Reform Act authorizes defendants “presently serving an

indeterminate term of imprisonment” pursuant to the Three

Strikes law for a third nonserious, nonviolent strike to file a

petition for a recall of sentence and request resentencing in

accordance with the Reform Act. (§ 1170.126, subd. (a).) The

Reform Act provides that courts may deny petitions of

defendants determined to pose an unreasonable risk of danger

to public safety. (Id., subd. (f).) The trial court denied Guevara’s

2013 petition for resentencing under section 1170.126 after

determining that his release would pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to public safety.

1

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (GUEVARA)

Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

In 2021, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 483

(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, §§ 1, 3), which

retroactively invalidated certain sentencing enhancements and

requires courts to recall and resentence defendants with invalid

enhancements. In newly enacted Penal Code section 1172.75,

the Legislature directed resentencing courts to apply “the

sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and . . . any other

changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial

discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to

promote uniformity of sentencing.” (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12; §

1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) “Resentencing pursuant to this section

shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed

as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement,

unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that

imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.”

(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).)

Guevara sought resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75

due to his now-invalid prior prison term enhancements. The

trial court recalled Guevara’s sentence and resentenced him on

his third strike offense according to current law to a determinate

term of eight years.2 (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1), (2)(C).) The Santa

Barbara District Attorney sought a writ of mandate and

prohibition based on its view that section 1172.75

unconstitutionally amended section 1170.126 of the Reform Act.

Appearing as amicus curiae in the Court of Appeal, the Attorney

General conceded that the trial court correctly held that section

1172.75 did not unconstitutionally amend section 1170.126. The

2

The trial court also resentenced Guevara to a concurrent

180-day term for the child endangerment misdemeanor, with

credit for time served.

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

Court of Appeal majority rejected the Attorney General’s

concession and held that the trial court’s construction of section

1172.75 unconstitutionally amended voter-enacted section

1170.126.

We granted review to consider whether Penal Code section

1172.75, by permitting recall and resentencing of indeterminate

third strike sentences, amends Penal Code section 1170.126, in

violation of article II, section 10 of the California Constitution.

We hold that, as a matter of constitutional avoidance, section

1172.75 incorporates section 1170.126’s discretionary public

safety override as a condition for nonserious, nonviolent third

strike offenders to obtain resentencing under the revised

penalty provisions of the Reform Act. Because section 1172.75

and section 1170.126, thus interpreted, operate harmoniously,

the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act may

constitutionally apply at a resentencing pursuant to section

1172.75.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Background.

As originally enacted, the Three Strikes law provided that

a defendant previously convicted of a serious or violent felony

would be sentenced to a term of “twice the term otherwise

provided as punishment for the current felony conviction.”

(Former § 1170.12, subd. (c)(1), added by Prop. 184, as approved

by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1994).)3 For defendants previously

3

“Enacted ‘to ensure longer prison sentences and greater

punishment for those who commit a felony and have been

previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses’

(Pen. Code, former § 667, subd. (b), as amended by Stats.1994,

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PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (GUEVARA)

Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

convicted of two or more serious or violent felonies, upon

conviction of any subsequent felony, the Three Strikes law

provided for sentencing of “an indeterminate term of life

imprisonment with a minimum term of” at least 25 years.

(Former § 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A).)

In 2012, voters enacted the Reform Act (Proposition 36),

which amended state law to authorize indeterminate third

strike life sentences only when the third felony conviction is

“serious or violent,” subject to enumerated disqualifying factors.

(§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1), (2)(C).) Instead of receiving an

indeterminate term for a subsequent nonserious, nonviolent

felony, the Reform Act provides that, under current law,

defendants will be sentenced to “twice the term otherwise

provided as punishment for the current felony conviction.” (Id.,

subd. (c)(1).)

The Reform Act’s prospective provisions exclude certain

defendants from this change in law. A “defendant does not

qualify for this ameliorative change, however, if his current

offense is a controlled substance charge involving large

quantities ([§ 1170.12], subd. (c)(2)(C)(i)), one of various

enumerated sex offenses (id., subd. (c)(2)(C)(ii)), or one in which

he used a firearm, was armed with a firearm or deadly weapon,

ch. 12, § 1, pp. 71, 72), the Three Strikes law ‘consists of two,

nearly identical statutory schemes.’ [Citation] The first of these

schemes was enacted by the Legislature in March 1994. (Pen.

Code, former § 667, subds. (b)–(i).) The second was enacted by

ballot initiative in November of the same year. (Pen. Code,

former § 1170.12, added by Prop. 184, as approved by voters,

Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1994) (Proposition 184).) The two statutes

differ only in minor respects not relevant here.” (People v.

Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 652 (Conley).)

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

or intended to cause great bodily injury (id., subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii)).

The ameliorative provisions of the Reform Act also do not apply

in cases in which the defendant was previously convicted of

certain enumerated offenses, including those involving sexual

violence, child sexual abuse, homicide or attempted homicide,

solicitation to commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a

peace officer or firefighter, possession of a weapon of mass

destruction, or any serious or violent felony punishable by life

imprisonment or death. (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iv)(I)–

(VIII).)” (Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 653.) The prosecution

bears the burden of pleading and proving disqualifying factors

under section 1170.12 beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v.

Frierson (2017) 4 Cal.5th 225, 234 (Frierson).)

Retrospectively, the Reform Act establishes a

resentencing procedure “intended to apply exclusively to

persons presently serving an indeterminate term of

imprisonment pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of

Section 667 or paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section

1170.12, whose sentence under this act would not have been an

indeterminate life sentence.” (§ 1170.126, subd. (a).) Section

1170.126, subdivision (b) provides that defendants “may file a

petition for a recall of sentence, within two years after the

effective date of the act that added this section or at a later date

upon a showing of good cause.” (Id., subd. (b).) Upon receiving

a recall petition, the statute directs courts to determine whether

a petitioner is eligible for resentencing. (Id., subd. (f).) The

People bear the burden of establishing ineligibility beyond a

reasonable doubt. (Frierson, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 229.) If the

defendant is eligible, he or she “shall be resentenced . . . unless

the court, in its discretion, determines that resentencing the

petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

safety.” (§ 1170.126, subd (f).) The People must prove the facts

upon which the court’s public safety determination is based by

a preponderance of the evidence. (Frierson, supra, 4 Cal.5th at

p. 239.) Relevant factors for the court’s public safety

determination include a defendant’s criminal conviction

background, disciplinary history, and rehabilitative record. (§

1170.126, subd. (g).) Section 1170.126, subdivision (k)

establishes, with respect to these retrospective provisions, that

“[n]othing in this section is intended to diminish or abrogate any

rights or remedies otherwise available to the defendant.” (Id.,

subd. (k).)

Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020

Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1) prospectively limited the

application of one-year prior prison term enhancements to

individuals convicted of sexually violent felonies. In 2021, the

Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)

(Stats. 2021, ch. 728, §§ 1, 3), which codified Penal Code section

1171.1, later renumbered without substantive change as section

1172.75. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.) Effective January 1, 2022,

Senate Bill No. 483 “retroactively appl[ied]” Senate Bill No. 136

to persons “currently serving a term for a judgment that

includes” such an enhancement. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1;

§ 1172.75, subd. (b).)

Under Senate Bill No. 483, where a now-invalid

enhancement was imposed, “the court shall recall the sentence

and resentence the defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).)4 Similar

4

Effective January 1, 2025, section 1172.75, subdivision (f)

establishes that defendants “convicted of a sexually violent

offense . . . and sentenced to death or a life term without the

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PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (GUEVARA)

Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

to the Reform Act, Senate Bill No. 483 restricts resentencing in

the event that a lower sentence poses a risk to public safety.

However, Senate Bill No. 483 applies a different burden of proof.

The resentencing “shall result in a lesser sentence than the one

originally imposed . . . unless the court finds by clear and

convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would

endanger public safety.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1), italics added.)

The statute directs that the resentencing “court shall apply the

sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other

changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial

discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to

promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ Id., subd. (d)(2).)

B. Facts.

In 2009, Guevara was convicted of felony corporal injury

to a coparent and misdemeanor child endangerment under

section 273.5, subdivision (a) and section 273a, subdivision (b).

(People v. Guevara (Sept. 13, 2010, B218153) [nonpub. opn.],

typed opn. at p. 1 (Guevara I).) Guevara admitted two prior

strike convictions within the scope of the Three Strikes law and

three prior prison terms. (People v. Superior Court (Guevara)

(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 978, 982 (Guevara II); §§ 667, subd.

(e)(2)(A); 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A); former § 667.5, subd. (b).)

Because of Guevara’s prior strike convictions, he was sentenced

to 25 years to life under the original Three Strikes law for the

felony, with three one-year prior prison term enhancements

under section 667.5, subdivision (b). On direct review, the Court

of Appeal affirmed. (Guevara I, supra, typed opn. at p. 1.)

possibility of parole” are ineligible for recall and resentencing.

(Stats. 2024, ch. 979, § 2; § 1172.75, subd. (f).)

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PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (GUEVARA)

Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

In 2013, after the passage of the Reform Act, Guevara

petitioned for resentencing under section 1170.126 because his

third strike conviction does not qualify as a violent or serious

felony under the Three Strikes law as amended by the Reform

Act. The trial court denied Guevara’s petition, concluding his

release would pose an “unreasonable risk of danger to public

safety.” (§ 1170.126, subd. (f).) The Court of Appeal affirmed in

2016. (People v. Guevara (Apr. 7, 2016, B262954) [nonpub opn.],

typed opn. at p. 2.)

In 2023, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

identified Guevara as a “person[] in their custody currently

serving a term for a judgment that includes” now-invalid prior

prison term enhancements. (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) In the trial

court, Guevara argued that because section 1172.75 required

that his sentence be recalled and that he be resentenced

“apply[ing] any other changes in law that reduce sentences,” he

was entitled to the application of the Reform Act’s prospective

change in law. (Id., subd. (d)(2).) Guevara thus argued he

should be resentenced to a determinate term of eight years,

double the upper term for his current felony. (Guevara II, supra,

97 Cal.App.5th at p. 981.) The People, represented by the Santa

Barbara District Attorney, agreed that the prior prison term

enhancements should be stricken, but argued that, to the extent

section 1172.75 required setting aside the third strike sentence,

it unconstitutionally amended section 1170.126. (Guevara II, at

p. 983.) The trial court held that notwithstanding concerns

about public safety, it was required by section 1172.75 to recall

Guevara’s sentence and resentence him under current law,

including section 1170.12, subdivision (c). Accordingly, the trial

court sentenced Guevara to a determinate term of eight years

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PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (GUEVARA)

Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

for the spousal abuse count (double the upper term of four

years).

The People sought a stay, a writ of mandate or prohibition

to direct the trial court to reinstate Guevara’s indeterminate

sentence, and appealed the resentencing. (Guevara II, supra, 97

Cal.App.5th at p. 983.) The Court of Appeal granted a

temporary stay and issued an order to show cause. (Id. at

p. 988.) In an informal response to the petition for a writ of

mandate and in a subsequent amicus curiae brief, the Attorney

General conceded that section 1172.75 is a permissible

alternative resentencing method for third strike offenders, and

upon recall, defendants like Guevara were no longer “presently

serving” indeterminate third strike sentences.

The Court of Appeal reversed. Writing for the majority,

Justice Gilbert, joined by Justice Yegan, concluded that the trial

court’s interpretation of section 1172.75 unconstitutionally

amended the Reform Act. Under Guevara’s interpretation of

section 1172.75, “contrary to the express words of section

1170.126, subdivision (f), the trial court must release Guevara

even though his release has been found to pose an unreasonable

risk of danger to public safety.” (Guevara II, supra, 97

Cal.App.5th at p. 984.) Reasoning that this interpretation

“would result in a wholesale repeal of section 1170.126 for those

inmates serving an indeterminate term with a prior prison

enhancement,” the majority held that Guevara’s interpretation

“unconstitutionally eliminates the public safety” element of

section 1170.126. (Guevara II, at p. 985.) The court concluded

that under section 1172.75, “Guevara’s three prior prison term

enhancements were vacated, but not his 25-year-to-life term

mandated by the Reform Act.” (Guevara II, at p. 986.)

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

In dissent, Justice Baltodano argued that section 1172.75

did not unconstitutionally amend section 1170.126. Justice

Baltodano reasoned that section 1170.126 applies “exclusively”

to persons “presently serving” an indeterminate term pursuant

to the original Three Strikes law and who sought relief under

Proposition 36, not to defendants whose sentences had been

recalled under separate resentencing statutes like section

1172.75. (Guevara II, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 991 (dis. opn.

of Baltodano, J.).)

We granted review to consider whether the revised

penalty provisions of the Reform Act may constitutionally apply

at a resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75 of a

nonserious, nonviolent third strike offender. 5

II. DISCUSSION

The Santa Barbara District Attorney, respondent in this

court, accepts that section 1172.75 is a permissible act of

legislative power to the extent that it allows for recall and

resentencing to eliminate now-invalid enhancements for prior

prison terms. However, to the extent that section 1172.75

allows defendants to avoid the petition process established by

the Reform Act to obtain relief from an indeterminate third

5

The narrow issue presented in this case is whether the

revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act may

constitutionally apply at a resentencing pursuant to section

1172.75 of a nonserious, nonviolent third strike offender whose

strikes remain intact. We do not consider or resolve whether

trial courts may strike prior strike offenses pursuant to People

v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 and section

1385, subdivision (a) at a section 1172.75 resentencing. (People

v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340.)

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

strike sentence, respondent urges that it is an unconstitutional

legislative amendment of Proposition 36. Real Party in Interest

Guevara and the Attorney General disagree. They argue that

the trial court’s application of section 1172.75 to this case leaves

the Reform Act intact and is therefore constitutional.

We solicited supplemental briefing regarding whether

construing section 1170.126’s discretionary public safety

override as applicable at a resentencing pursuant to section

1172.75 would harmonize the statutory schemes and eliminate

any constitutional doubt. Real Party in Interest proposes

construing section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2)’s instruction to

apply “changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for

judicial discretion” as incorporating section 1170.126’s

discretionary public safety determination at a nonserious,

nonviolent third strike offender’s resentencing pursuant to

section 1172.75. The Attorney General agrees to the extent

Guevara proposes interpreting “changes in law that reduce

sentences” as incorporating the Reform Act’s public safety

inquiry.6 Respondent contends that notwithstanding any such

harmonization, applying the revised penalty provisions of the

Reform Act through section 1172.75 would unconstitutionally

amend the Reform Act.

A. Legal Standard.

1. Amendment of Voter Initiatives.

We begin with the governing standards. “The Legislature

may amend or repeal an initiative statute by another statute

6

Real Party in Interest and the Attorney General do not

concede that constitutional avoidance requires such an

interpretation of section 1172.75.

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that becomes effective only when approved by the electors

unless the initiative statute permits amendment or repeal

without the electors’ approval.” (Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd.

(c); accord, People v. Rojas (2023) 15 Cal.5th 561, 568 (Rojas).)

The Reform Act allows legislative amendment “[b]y statute

passed in each house of the Legislature, by rollcall entered in

the journal, with two-thirds of the membership and the

Governor concurring.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec.

(Nov. 6, 2012) text of Prop. 36, § 11, subd. (a), p. 110.) As the

parties agree, because section 1172.75 was enacted by less than

a two-thirds majority of the Legislature, an application of the

statute that amends section 1170.126 is unconstitutional.

A statute amends a voter initiative where it “prohibits

what the initiative authorizes, or authorizes what the initiative

prohibits.” (People v. Superior Court (Pearson) (2010) 48 Cal.4th

564, 571 (Pearson).) An amendment “change[s] an existing

initiative statute by adding or taking from it some particular

provision.” (People v. Cooper (2002) 27 Cal.4th 38, 44.) But “this

does not mean that any legislation that concerns the same

subject matter as an initiative, or even augments an initiative’s

provisions, is necessarily an amendment for these purposes.”

(Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 571.) “[T]he Legislature

remains free to enact laws addressing the general subject

matter of an initiative, or a ‘related but distinct area’ of law that

an initiative measure ‘does not specifically authorize or

prohibit.’ ” (People v. Kelly (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1008, 1026, fn. 19.)

2. Statutory Interpretation Principles.

Whether section 1172.75 unconstitutionally amends

section 1170.126 is a question of statutory interpretation, which

we review de novo. “When we interpret an initiative, we apply

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the same principles governing statutory construction. We first

consider the initiative’s language, giving the words their

ordinary meaning and construing this language in the context

of the statute and initiative as a whole.” (Pearson, supra, 48

Cal.4th at p. 571.) “ ‘ “[T]he statutory language is generally the

most reliable indicator of legislative intent.” ’ ” (People v. King

(2006) 38 Cal.4th 617, 622.) “[O]ur ‘[t]ask is simply to interpret

and apply the initiative’s language so as to effectuate the

electorate’s intent.’ ” (Robert L. v. Superior Ct. (2003) 30 Cal.4th

894, 901 (Robert L.).)

“If the language is not ambiguous, we presume the voters

intended the meaning apparent from that language, and we may

not add to the statute or rewrite it to conform to some assumed

intent not apparent from that language.” (Pearson, supra, 48

Cal.4th at p. 571; accord, Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45

Cal.3d 727, 735.) Where the text is ambiguous, courts may

consider “ ‘ “other indicia of the voters’ intent,” ’ ” including

“ ‘ “the analyses and arguments contained in the official ballot

pamphlet.” ’ ” (Robert L., supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 901.)

Our background principles of statutory interpretation also

demonstrate respect for the legislative process. “ ‘[S]tatutes or

statutory sections relating to the same subject must be

harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent

possible.’ ” (People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 357

(Valencia).) This may involve “ ‘reconcil[ing] seeming

inconsistencies in’ ” statutory schemes. (Pacific Palisades Bowl

Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 783,

805 (Pacific Palisades).) And because we presume “the

Legislature intended, not to violate the Constitution, but to

enact a valid statute within the scope of its constitutional

powers,” “ ‘ “a court, when faced with an ambiguous statute that

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raises serious constitutional questions, should endeavor to

construe the statute in a manner which avoids any doubt

concerning its validity.” ’ ” (Miller v. Municipal Court of Los

Angeles (1943) 22 Cal.2d 818, 828; People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.

4th 498, 506–507 (Leiva).)

B. Voters Did Not Intend for the Reform Act To Be

the Sole Vehicle for Nonserious, Nonviolent

Third Strike Defendants To Seek Recall and

Resentencing.

Respondent argues the Reform Act is the sole avenue for

third strike defendants to pursue recall and resentencing relief

from an indeterminate term of imprisonment imposed pursuant

to the Three Strikes law. Respondent cites language from the

Reform Act indicating that its petition process is “intended to

apply exclusively to persons presently serving an indeterminate

term of imprisonment pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision

(e) of Section 667 or paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section

1170.12, whose sentence under this act would not have been an

indeterminate life sentence.” (§ 1170.126, subd. (a), italics

added.) Respondent argues that this language means “[t]he

voters intended that the Reform Act serve as the exclusive

means for recall and resentencing persons serving a three-

strikes sentence.” We disagree. “The words of the statute must

be construed in context.” (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment

& Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387 (Dyna-Med).)

“Exclusively” modifies “persons presently serving an

indeterminate term of imprisonment.” (§ 1170.126, subd. (a).)

While the statutory text thus describes the petition process as

exclusively available to certain persons, it does not characterize

the procedure as the exclusive means of relief available to those

persons. Rather, section 1170.126, subdivision (b) establishes

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that defendants presently serving an indeterminate third strike

sentence “may file a petition for recall”; it does not require such

a filing to obtain relief. (§ 1170.126, subd. (b), italics added.)

The Reform Act’s savings clause bolsters this

interpretation. Section 1170.126, subdivision (k) establishes

that alternative “rights or remedies” are consistent with the

Reform Act. The subdivision establishes that “[n]othing in this

section is intended to diminish or abrogate any rights or

remedies otherwise available to the defendant.” (§ 1170.126,

subd. (k).) Subdivision (k) guarantees that defendants for whom

section 1170.126 is an available remedy are nonetheless entitled

to access “rights or remedies” available through other

mechanisms. The text of section 1170.126 thus expressly

indicates the voters did not intend for the petition process to be

the sole avenue for defendants sentenced to an indeterminate

term of imprisonment under the original Three Strikes law to

seek resentencing relief.

A conclusion that section 1170.126’s petition process is the

“exclusive means” for defendants like Guevara to obtain relief

from an indeterminate third strike sentence would require

reading section 1170.126, subdivision (k) out of the Reform Act.

But the “voters should get what they enacted, not more and not

less.” (Hodges v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 109, 114.) A

better reading “ ‘accord[s] significance . . . to every word, phrase

and sentence’ ” of the statute. (Valencia, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p.

357, quoting Dyna-Med, Inc., supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1387.)

Notably, the majority below did not grapple with the role

of section 1170.126, subdivision (k). Respondent, for its part,

concedes that subdivision (k) permits resentencing of

defendants subject to section 1170.126 by some alternative

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means. This concession is well taken. For example, as we

observed in Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 661, a defendant may

seek relief for reasons unrelated to the Reform Act by filing a

petition for habeas corpus. Subdivision (k) thus evinces a

legislative intent that a petition for a recall of sentence under

section 1170.126 is not meant to displace “other legal remedies

to which [defendants] might be entitled (e.g., petition for habeas

corpus).” (People v. Yearwood (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 161, 178.)

As respondent acknowledges, other recall and

resentencing avenues were available to defendants like Guevara

at the time of the enactment of Proposition 36. For example,

former section 1170, subdivision (d) permitted recall of a

sentence upon recommendation of the Secretary of the

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation “at any time.”

(Stats. 2012, ch. 43, § 27.) Recall upon recommendation of the

Board of Parole Hearings was likewise permitted “at any time.”

(Id.) Superior courts could also recall a defendant’s sentence

“within 120 days of the date of commitment on its own motion”

for “any reason rationally related to lawful sentencing.” (Id.; Dix

v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 456.) Likewise, former

section 1170, subdivision (e) allowed for the recall of sentences

for inmates with certain severe medical conditions. (Stats. 2012,

ch. 43, § 27.) As “[t]he voters are presumed to have been aware

of existing laws at the time the initiative was enacted,” we

assume the voters anticipated other avenues for recall and

resentencing would remain available to defendants subject to

section 1170.126. (Professional Engineers in California

Government v. Kempton (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1016, 1048.)

Concluding that the Reform Act was the exclusive means

to obtain sentencing relief would require ignoring section

1170.126, subdivision (k) and finding the voters, by enacting

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

Proposition 36, impliedly repealed the application of these

statutory provisions to third strike offenders. But “all

‘ “ ‘ “presumptions are against a repeal by implication” ’ ” ’

[citation], including partial repeals that occur when one statute

implicitly limits another statute’s scope of operation.” (Even

Zohar Constr. & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC

(2015) 61 Cal. 4th 830, 838.) Accordingly, an initiative should

be construed as repealing a prior statute “ ‘ “ ‘ “only when there

is no rational basis for harmonizing the two potentially

conflicting statutes [citation], and the statutes are

‘irreconcilable, clearly repugnant, and so inconsistent that the

two cannot have concurrent operation.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (State

Department of Public Health v. Superior Court (2015) 60 Cal.4th

940, 955–956.) The Reform Act was expressly intended as an

act of ameliorative legislation. (Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p.

658 [“There can be no doubt that the Reform Act was motivated

in large measure by a determination that sentences under the

prior version of the Three Strikes law were excessive”].) An

assumption that an initiative intended to curb unduly harsh

sentences silently repealed all other coexisting applications of

ameliorative relief statutes merely because relief might be

available to the same defendants is untenable.

Nor does section 1170.126, subdivision (k) solely protect

alternative rights and remedies that existed at the time of the

enactment of the Reform Act. “[W]here a statute adopts by

specific reference the provisions of another statute, regulation,

or ordinance, such provisions are incorporated in the form in

which they exist at the time of the reference . . . in the absence

of a clearly expressed intention to the contrary. [Citations] . . .

[W]here the reference is general instead of specific, such as a

reference to a system or body of laws or to the general law

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

relating to the subject in hand, the referring statute takes the

law or laws referred to not only in their contemporary form, but

also as they may be changed from time to time.” (Palermo v.

Stockton Theatres, Inc. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 53, 58–59 (Palermo); see

also In re Jovan B. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 801, 816; Rojas, supra, 15

Cal.5th at p. 570.)

The statutory reference to “any rights or remedies

otherwise available to the defendant” is a prototypical reference

to a general “body of laws.” (§ 1170.126, subd. (k); Palermo,

supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 59.) It neither invokes specific statutory

provisions nor describes limited classes of remedies. Rather

than referencing relevant preexisting remedies, such as former

section 1170, subdivision (d) or section 1473, the voters

employed broad language — protecting “any rights or remedies

otherwise available.” (§ 1170.126, subd. (k), italics added.) This

language is readily understood as a reference “to the general law

relating to the subject in hand.” (Palermo, supra, 32 Cal.2d at

p. 59.) Thus, “the referring statute takes the law . . . referred to

not only in their contemporary form, but also as they may be

changed from time to time.” (Ibid.)

Nor, despite Real Party’s assertions, does Conley, supra,

63 Cal.4th 646 suggest section 1170.126 is the exclusive remedy

for nonserious, nonviolent third strike offenders. In Conley, we

considered whether the Reform Act’s change in law applied

automatically to defendants “presently serving” indeterminate,

nonfinal sentences pursuant to the Three Strikes law. (Id. at

p. 651.) Because section 1170.126 “create[d] a special

mechanism” for persons “presently serving” sentences to access

the “benefits of the Act retroactively,” we found inapplicable the

traditional In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada)

presumption that ameliorative reforms automatically apply on

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direct appeal. (Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 657–658.) We

likewise rejected petitioner’s argument that section 1170.126,

subdivision (k) compelled a different result, observing that

“[s]ubdivision (k) contains no indication that automatic

resentencing — as opposed to, for example, habeas corpus

relief — ranks among the ‘rights’ the electorate sought to

preserve.” (Id. at p. 661.)

Conley’s reasoning does not compel the conclusion that

section 1170.126 is the exclusive remedy to resentence third

strike offenders. The defendant in Conley invoked the Estrada

presumption, seeking to apply ameliorative laws on direct

review. Guevara instead relies upon a legislative statute,

independent of section 1170.126, which requires a court, upon

determining that “the current judgment includes” a now-invalid

enhancement, to “recall the sentence and resentence the

defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) This separate statute

constitutes a separate “right[] or remed[y]” protected by

subdivision (k), unlike the untethered “automatic resentencing”

which the defendant in Conley attempted to use to circumvent

the section 1170.126 petition process. (§ 1170.126, subd. (k);

Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 656–657.)

The dissent suggests that the section 1172.75

resentencing process, initiated by a notice from the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and not by the

defendant, is similarly “automatic.” (Dis. opn. of Corrigan, J.,

post, at pp. 3, 12.) However, the construction harmonizing

section 1172.75 and section 1170.126 we adopt bears little

similarity to the rule of automatic appellate reversal proposed

by the defendant in Conley. Resentencing is not “automatic” as

in Conley because, as we discuss below, Guevara must satisfy

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

the substantive requirements of section 1170.126 in order to be

resentenced.

But defendant’s reliance on Conley is also misplaced.

Defendant argues that our acknowledgement in Conley that

section 1170.126, subdivision (k) protects alternative rights and

remedies supports a finding of entitlement to relief under

section 1172.75 without a discretionary public safety

determination. (Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 661–662

[contrasting defendant’s request for “automatic resentencing”

with a right to obtain resentencing through another vehicle,

such as habeas corpus].) Our recognition in Conley that section

1170.126 is not the exclusive means of relief for indeterminate

third strike offenders does not settle whether the Reform Act

might nonetheless impose substantive requirements applicable

to new resentencing mechanisms, such as section 1172.75, that

require the incorporation of “changes in law” like the Reform

Act. (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) The legislative history of

Proposition 36 suggests the voters likely understood the

discretionary public safety override of section 1170.126 as one

such substantive requirement. At a minimum, interpreting

section 1172.75 to alter the Reform Act’s substantive

prerequisite to relief — a discretionary public safety

determination — raises substantial constitutional questions. In

light of the constitutional concerns raised by Guevara’s

interpretation, we hold that section 1172.75, when applied to

Third Strike defendants seeking relief from their indeterminate

terms under the Reform Act’s ameliorative provisions,

incorporates the substantive requirements of section 1170.126.

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C. As a Matter of Constitutional Avoidance, Section

1172.75 Incorporates Section 1170.126’s

Discretionary Public Safety Determination.

Pursuant to section 1172.75, when a court determines a

defendant’s judgment includes a now-invalid prior prison term

enhancement, the judgment is recalled, and the defendant is

resentenced. (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) At resentencing, section

1172.75 provides that courts shall “apply any other changes in

law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial

discretion.” (Id., subd. (d)(2).) Guevara argues that the

resentencing court must apply the provisions of the Reform Act

which reduce his punishment, namely that defendants convicted

of a nonserious, nonviolent third strike receive sentences of

double the term of the current felony, instead of an

indeterminate term. (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1), (2)(C).) However,

he proposes that he is not bound by the Reform Act’s other

requirements, delineated in section 1170.126, because he is

neither “presently serving” an indeterminate third strike

sentence nor filing a petition for resentencing under that

section. The language in section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2) is

ambiguous. Guevara’s proposed construction threatens to

undermine the voters’ intent in passing the Reform Act.

Consistent with our mandate to construe statutes, where

reasonably possible, to eliminate constitutional doubt, we

interpret section 1172.75 as incorporating section 1170.126’s

discretionary public safety override, as proposed by Real Party

in Interest and the Attorney General.

1. Constitutional avoidance principles.

“ ‘If a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of

which will . . . raise serious and doubtful constitutional

questions, the court will adopt the construction which, without

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doing violence to the reasonable meaning of the language used,

will render it . . . free from doubt as to its constitutionality.’ ”

(Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 548

(Wendland).) In these circumstances, courts have a “ ‘ “duty . . .

to construe [the] statute as to save its constitutionality.” ’ ”

(Palermo, supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 60.) “[A] statute should not be

construed to violate the Constitution ‘ “ ‘if any other possible

construction remains available.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Garcia (2017) 2

Cal.5th 792, 804 (Garcia); accord, People v. Miracle (2018) 6 Cal.

5th 318, 339 (Miracle) [“ ‘[A] statute must be construed, if

reasonably possible, in a manner that avoids a serious

constitutional question’ ”].)

“This approach not only reflects the prudential concern

that constitutional issues not be needlessly confronted, but also

recognizes that [the Legislature], like this Court, is bound by

and swears an oath to uphold the Constitution. The courts will

therefore not lightly assume that [the Legislature] intended to

infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power

constitutionally forbidden it.” (Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.

Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (1988) 485 U.S.

568, 575 (DeBartolo); see also Garcia, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 804,

quoting DeBartolo, at p. 575.)

2. Constitutional doubt.

Proposition 36’s legislative history suggests the voters

were distinctly aware of the threat to public safety posed by any

blanket repeal of the Three Strikes Law. Ballot materials

assured voters that the Reform Act’s public safety valve

addressed these concerns. Ballot arguments in support of the

initiative told voters: “Criminal justice experts and law

enforcement leaders carefully crafted Prop. 36 so that truly

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

dangerous criminals will receive no benefits whatsoever from the

reform.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, argument

in favor of Prop. 36, p. 52, italics added.) Likewise, the analysis

of the Legislative Analyst explained that a court would be

required to resentence otherwise eligible defendants “unless it

determines that resentencing the offenders would pose an

unreasonable risk to public safety. . . [o]ffenders whose requests

for resentencing are denied by the courts would continue to

serve out their life terms . . . .” (Voter Information Guide, Gen.

Elec., supra, analysis of Prop. 36 by Legis. Analyst, p. 50, italics

added.) The Attorney General’s Official Title and Summary of

the Reform Act similarly described the measure as

“[a]uthoriz[ing] re-sentencing for offenders currently serving life

sentences if third strike conviction was not serious or violent

and judge determines sentence does not pose unreasonable risk

to public safety.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra,

Official Title and Summary of Prop. 36, p. 48.)

There can be no question that the voters who enacted the

Reform Act were focused on reforming Three Strikes sentencing

without undermining public safety. Section 1170.126 was

“designed to strike a balance between the[] objectives of

mitigating punishment and protecting public safety by . . .

making resentencing subject to the trial court’s evaluation of

whether, based on their criminal history, their record of

incarceration, and other relevant considerations, their early

release would pose an ‘unreasonable risk of danger to public

safety.’ ” (Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 658, quoting

§ 1170.126, subd. (f).) Proposition 36’s legislative history

suggests the voters understood that previously sentenced

nonserious, nonviolent third strike offenders would not be

entitled to resentencing on their indeterminate sentence if the

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

trial court, in its discretion, determined that resentencing would

pose an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.”

(§ 1170.126, subd. (f).)

Taking as a given that the voters were concerned with

public safety, section 1170.126, subdivision (k) nonetheless

guarantees that defendants entitled to seek relief under section

1170.126 may access “rights or remedies otherwise available.”7

(§ 1170.126, subd. (k).) As discussed above, the reading

proposed by respondent would fail to “ ‘give force and effect to

all of the[] provisions’ ” of section 1170.126. (Pacific Palisades,

supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 805.)

The dissent recognizes that the Reform Act contemplated

“and was not intended to exclude other recognized rights and

remedies like habeas corpus.” (Dis. opn. of Corrigan, J., post, at

p. 12.) Had Guevara had his sentence vacated or recalled under

such vehicles, he might also have obtained resentencing under

Proposition 36. (See People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152

[current law, namely Prop. 57, applied at resentencing where

defendant’s sentence had been vacated in habeas corpus

7

That ballot materials do not analyze every subdivision or

application of an initiative does not provide license to read those

provisions out of the enacted law. It was the Reform Act that

was enacted, “not any of the documents within its legislative or

initiative history. A statute, of course, must prevail over any

summary. Were it not so, no statute could ever be enacted whole

and entire. For every summary, by definition, is incomplete . . .

The summary must yield to the statute, not the statute to the

summary.” (In re Cervera (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1073, 1079–1080;

Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of

Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 243–244; Santa Clara

County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11

Cal.4th 220, 237 [“Ballot arguments are not legal briefs and are

not expected to cite every case the proposition may affect”].)

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

proceedings].) The dissent claims that this case is different from

vehicles such as habeas corpus, because Guevara “is not

invoking a right or remedy ‘otherwise available’ to him through

other potential avenues for relief. He is relying on Prop. 36

itself.” (Dis. opn. of Corrigan, J., post, at p. 11.) Yet Guevara is

relying on “other potential avenues for relief,” namely

resentencing under section 1172.75. To be sure, at resentencing

under this section he invokes the reforms of Proposition 36. But

a defendant serving an indeterminate Three Strikes term who

obtained resentencing through a successful habeas corpus

petition or via recall under former section 1170 subdivision (d)

might also have invoked Proposition 36’s ameliorative reforms

at resentencing. (Cf. dis. opn. of Corrigan, J., post, at pp. 12–13

[“What the electorate did not contemplate is that the relief

available under Prop. 36 would be available without going

through the procedures mandated in section 1170.126”].) The

dissent’s distinction between resentencing as a result of a

section 1172.75 proceeding and a resentencing through a

successful habeas corpus petition or other resentencing

mechanism is unavailing.

But adopting Real Party in Interest’s reading of section

1172.75 — entirely exempting defendants from section

1170.126’s discretionary public safety override — would

arguably nullify the amendment provision of the Reform Act.

Section 11 of the Reform Act establishes that “[e]xcept as

otherwise provided in the text of the statutes, the provisions of

this act shall not be altered or amended except by one of the

following: (a) By statute passed in each house of the Legislature,

by rollcall entered in the journal, with two-thirds of the

membership and the Governor concurring; or (b) By statute

passed in each house of the Legislature, by rollcall vote entered

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

in the journal, with a majority of the membership concurring, to

be placed on the next general ballot and approved by a majority

of the electors; or (c) By statute that becomes effective when

approved by a majority of the electors.”8 (Voter Information

Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012) text of Prop. 36, § 11.)

Guevara’s reading would allow the Legislature, by a simple

majority, to eliminate section 1170.126’s conditioning of relief

upon a court’s discretionary public safety determination,

arguably contravening the Act’s express amendment limitation.

Indeed, by Guevara’s logic, the Legislature could enact a statute,

absent a two-thirds vote, providing for global recall and

resentencing of all nonviolent, nonserious third strike

sentences, without any consideration of public safety. Such an

enactment would plainly contravene voter intent and the

express amendment limitation provision of the Reform Act.

The dissent claims that, under our holding, the

Legislature could, by a bare majority, simply “do away with” the

good cause requirement for late-filed section 1170.126 petitions,

or even do away with the petition process altogether. (Dis. opn.

of Corrigan, J., post, at p. 14.) Not so. Such a direct amendment

of the Reform Act would unquestionably create an

unconstitutional conflict. As we discuss below, we merely hold

that, when a defendant is being resentenced pursuant to a

separate vehicle, section 1172.75 (one that did not exist at the

8

The opening of the Reform Act’s amendment limitation

provision — “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in the text of the

statutes” — introduces ambiguity regarding the proper

interpretation of section 11 in relation to section 1170.126,

subdivision (k), which we do not address in light of our

interpretation of section 1172.75. (Voter Information Guide,

Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012) text of Prop. 36, § 11.)

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time that section 1170.126’s two-year filing deadline had

expired in the absence of good cause), allowing resentencing

outside of the two-year window without establishing the good

cause necessary to file a late section 1170.126 petition does not

unconstitutionally amend the Reform Act.

Ultimately, we need not establish the precise relationship

of section 1170.126, subdivision (k) and section 11 of the Reform

Act. We decline to find a conflict between section 1172.75 and

section 1170.126 where a “ ‘reasonably possible’ ” alternate

interpretation “ ‘give[s] force and effect to all of their

provisions’ ” and “ ‘reconcile[s] seeming inconsistencies in

them.’ ” (Miracle, supra, 6 Cal. 5th at p. 339; Pacific Palisades,

supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 805.) Construing the discretionary public

safety determination of section 1170.126 as applicable at a

section 1172.75 resentencing “ ‘ “ ‘ “maintain[s] the integrity of

both statutes,” ’ ” ’ ” such that “ ‘ “ ‘ “the two may stand

together.” ’ ” ’ ” (Schatz v. Allen Matkins Leck Gamble &

Mallory LLP (2009) 45 Cal.4th 557, 574.)

3. Interpreting section 1172.75 to avoid constitutional

doubt.

The Attorney General argues that construing section

1172.75, subdivision (d)(2)’s direction that resentencing courts

apply “changes in law that reduce sentences” as incorporating

section 1170.126’s discretionary public safety override would

eliminate any constitutional doubt. Under this reading, for

defendants like Guevara, who was originally sentenced in 2009,

the Reform Act itself is a “change[] in law that reduce[s]

sentences.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) The legislative history

suggests the voters understood that where a court conducting a

resentencing inquiry for Third Strike defendants serving an

indeterminate term found relief “would pose an unreasonable

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risk of danger to public safety,” the defendant would not be

entitled to resentencing. (§ 1170.126, subd. (f).) We conclude,

consistent with the Attorney General’s proposal, that

interpreting section 1172.75 as incorporating the discretionary

public safety determination of section 1170.126 would honor this

concern and thus eliminate constitutional doubt. 9

Guevara argues that he is entitled to the application of the

revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act without a

discretionary public safety inquiry, because section 1172.75,

subdivision (d)(2) instructs courts to apply “changes in law that

reduce sentences,” and the prospective revised penalty

provisions of the Reform Act constitute one such “change[] in

law.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) But Guevara’s proposed

incorporation is selective: Section 1170.126 is also a “change[]

in law that reduce[s] sentences” for defendants like Guevara.

(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) The critical question is, if section

9

As we have explained, the legislative history suggests

section 1170.126’s discretionary public safety override was a key

element in the balance struck by the voters. (§ 1170.126, subd.

(f).) In exercising this discretion, the voters established that the

resentencing court may consider: “(1) The petitioner’s criminal

conviction history, including the type of crimes committed, the

extent of injury to victims, the length of prior prison

commitments, and the remoteness of the crimes; (2) The

petitioner’s disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation

while incarcerated; and (3) Any other evidence the court, within

its discretion, determines to be relevant in deciding whether a

new sentence would result in an unreasonable risk of danger to

public safety.” (§ 1170.126, subd. (g)(1)–(3).) To harmonize the

statutes, we construe the discretionary public safety

determination and the factors the voters deemed relevant to

that determination as operational through section 1172.75.

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1172.75’s language incorporates the ameliorative provisions of

the Reform Act under 1170.126, why would it not also

incorporate its substantive limitations?

Guevara finds support for his proposed selective

incorporation in former section 1170, subdivisions (d)–(e) and

habeas corpus, alternative resentencing mechanisms that

existed at the time of the Reform Act’s enactment. Guevara

suggests that because defendants obtaining relief from Three

Strikes sentences under these mechanisms are not required to

satisfy section 1170.126’s requirements to obtain resentencing,

neither should he. This argument overlooks key differences

between the relevant statutory schemes. For one, habeas corpus

and former section 1170, subdivisions (d) and (e) predated the

Reform Act’s enactment. As we have described, the voters did

not intend for the Reform Act to repeal or supersede preexisting

resentencing mechanisms. Thus, there existed no constitutional

conflict in the differing requirements of preexisting remedies,

even where such remedies could conceivably be applied to third

strike defendants.

But that the voters were aware of these narrow,

preexisting resentencing mechanisms does not mean they

anticipated the kind of mass resentencing relief, untethered to

section 1170.126’s substantive requirements, that Guevara’s

reading would sanction. Rather, Proposition 36’s legislative

history suggests the voters chose to moderate the Reform Act’s

retrospective changes through section 1170.126’s discretionary

public safety override, animated by a concern that dangerous

third strike offenders would otherwise be released.

Perhaps more importantly, Guevara’s analogy fails to

grapple with the fact that the canon of constitutional avoidance

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applies in cases involving an “ ‘ “ambiguous statute that raises

serious constitutional questions.” ’ ” (Leiva, supra, 56 Cal. 4th

at p. 507.) Section 1172.75’s instruction to apply “changes in

law that reduce sentences” is ambiguous. (§ 1172.75, subd.

(d)(2).) The statute does not specify how to determine the

relevant “change[] in law” in the context of the Three Strikes

law’s parallel prospective and retrospective provisions. (Id.)

The dissent takes issue with our conclusion that there

exists ambiguity in section 1172.75’s command that

resentencing courts apply “changes in law that reduce

sentences” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2)), necessitating application of

the constitutional avoidance doctrine. In the dissent’s reading,

“the relevant provisions that actually reduce a defendant’s

sentence are the amended portions of the Three Strikes law that

generally preclude a third strike sentence for those with a

current conviction for a felony that is not serious or violent.”

(Dis. opn. of Corrigan, J., post, at p. 8, citing §§ 667, subd.

(e)(2)(c), 1170.12 subd. (c)(2)(C).) The dissent reasons that the

public safety inquiry required by section 1170.126 cannot be

construed as a “change[] in law that reduce[s] sentences”

because this section instead merely “constrained courts in their

ability to reduce the sentences imposed under the prior Three

Strikes law.” (Dis. opn. of Corrigan, J., post, at p. 7, italics in

original.)

This interpretation does not eliminate the ambiguity we

have identified. The dissent’s recognition that different

provisions of the Reform Act appear to have different primary

focuses — one aimed at retroactive relief and one aimed at

prospective reform — in fact highlights why this interpretive

question is a difficult one. How and whether these different

components should be applied in a resentencing mechanism

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

entirely distinct from the Reform Act is precisely why

uncertainty exists in construing the Legislature’s directive to

apply “changes in law that reduce sentences” in section 1172.75

proceedings that involve indeterminate Three Strikes

sentences.

Nor is it accurate to read section 1170.126 as merely

“constrain[ing]” the ability of resentencing courts to grant relief.

(Dis. opn. of Corrigan, J., post, at p. 7, italics omitted.) Section

1170.126, read as a whole, does not merely constrain the

availability of relief. The Reform Act’s petition process exists

because the voters envisioned a mechanism that would “reduce[]

[the] sentences” (§ 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2)), of prisoners

presently serving indeterminate sentences under the Three

Strikes law.10

Even assuming the dissent’s characterization — that only

section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(2)(C) and subdivision (e) of

section 667 are the “changes in law that reduce sentences” —

section 1170.126 directly incorporates these changes in law by

express textual reference. Section 1170.126 provides that a

previously sentenced Third Strike defendant may “request

resentencing in accordance with the provisions of subdivision (e)

of Section 667, and subdivision (c) of Section 1170.12, as those

statutes have been amended by the act that added this section.”

10

The dissent seems to suggest that section 1172.75 requires

courts to proceed subdivision by subdivision within a particular

“change in law” and only apply those subdivisions which directly

“reduce” sentences and ignore all contrary requirements, even if

substantive. But we do not believe this is the only way to

construe section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2).

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(§ 1170.126, subd. (b), italics added.)11 Thus, in applying

1172.75’s “changes in law” provision, we must grapple with how

to apply section 1170.126.

The dissent asserts that we are misapplying the doctrine

of constitutional avoidance by “rewriting” section 1172.75. (Dis.

opn. of Corrigan, J., post, at pp. 3, 4, 15.) Yet the dissent accepts

the premise that “choice [is] permitted under the constitutional

avoidance doctrine” when there are reasonable “competing

interpretations of the statutory language.” (Dis. opn. of

Corrigan, J., post, at p. 6.) The canon of constitutional avoidance

instructs that courts “ ‘will adopt the construction which,

without doing violence to the reasonable meaning of the

language used, will render it valid in its entirety, or free from

doubt as to its constitutionality, even though the other

construction is equally reasonable.’ ” (In re Friend (2021) 11

Cal.5th 720, 734.) Given the inherent ambiguity in how to apply

the ambiguous “changes in law” provision of section 1172.75 in

this context, and the constitutional questions raised by not

incorporating section 1170.126’s substantive requirements, the

case to incorporate the public safety exception is “not only

11

The dissent claims that section 1170.126, though clearly

incorporating changes in law that reduce sentences, “simply

gives a procedural path to seek relief under those referenced

provisions as the voters amended them.” (Dis. opn. of Corrigan,

J. at p. 8.) But a “procedural path to seek relief” may also

plausibly be considered a law that reduces sentences. (People v.

Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 856 [discussing “recently enacted

ameliorative statutes” which allow for recall and resentencing,

including section 1172.6 and former section 1170, subdivision

(d)].) Assuming arguendo that the distinction proposed by the

dissent is a plausible one, the existence of two reasonable

interpretations does not eliminate ambiguity.

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plausible, but compelled by the canon of constitutional

avoidance.” (Ibid.)

In sum, as a matter of constitutional avoidance, we decline

to adopt Guevara’s interpretation of section 1172.75,

subdivision (d)(2). Applying the revised penalty provisions of

the Reform Act at a section 1172.75 resentencing without the

substantive limitations contemplated by the voters would pose

a “difficult constitutional question[].” (In re Smith (2008) 42

Cal.4th 1251, 1255.) Because ambiguity exists, construing the

Reform Act’s substantive limitations as operational through

section 1172.75’s instruction to apply relevant “changes in law”

harmonizes the two statutes and renders section 1172.75 “ ‘free

from doubt as to its constitutionality.’ ” (Wendland, supra, 26

Cal.4th at p. 548.)

4. Other provisions of section 1170.126 do not conflict

with section 1172.75.

Respondent argues that simply construing section 1172.75

as incorporating section 1170.126’s discretionary public safety

inquiry does not eliminate doubts as to that section’s

constitutionality. This argument echoes the reasoning of the

Court of Appeal below, which concluded that applying the

ameliorative penalty provisions of section 1170.12 at a section

1172.75 resentencing would constitute an impermissible

amendment of the Reform Act because it would “render[] void

. . . the provisions of section 1170.126[] requiring the filing of a

petition, [and] the deadline for filing the petition.” (Guevara II,

supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 984.)

We agree with respondent that it would raise significant

constitutional questions to interpret section 1172.75 as

permitting resentencing of third strike defendants absent the

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

Reform Act’s substantive conditions on entitlement to relief.

But the substantive criteria we have construed as operational

through section 1172.75 differ from the ancillary procedural

requirements, identified by respondent and amici curiae, that

defendants must satisfy to obtain relief through a standalone

section 1170.126 petition. Harmonization does not require the

incorporation of the provisions of section 1170.126 that merely

establish the manner of pursuing relief by petition.

a. The filing of a petition under section 1170.126.

The Court of Appeal concluded that allowing Guevara to

proceed under section 1172.75 to seek resentencing on his

indeterminate third strike sentence, without separately filing a

petition under 1170.126, itself violates the commands of the

Reform Act. (Guevara II, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 984.) This

argument fails. Through section 1170.126, subdivision (k), the

voters expressly authorized nonserious, nonviolent third strike

offenders like Guevara to seek relief through “any rights or

remedies otherwise available.” (§ 1170.126, subd. (k).)

Alternative remedies, such as section 1172.75, a petition for

habeas corpus, or recall and resentencing under former section

1170, subdivision (d) (now contained in section 1172.1,

subdivision (a)), invariably have distinct procedures from those

associated with a standalone section 1170.126 petition. Our

interpretation harmonizes the statutes by construing section

1172.75 as incorporating the substantive requirements of

section 1170.126. But honoring the voters’ intent does not

require reading the procedural requirements of a standalone

section 1170.126 petition into all other resentencing

mechanisms.

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Respondent attempts to obviate this distinction, equating

various procedures relevant to defendants seeking relief

through a section 1170.126 petition as substantive

requirements.12 For instance, respondent contends that the

timing of recall pursuant to section 1172.75 unconstitutionally

amends the Reform Act. Respondent argues that section

1170.126 requires a dangerousness determination before a

nonserious, nonviolent third strike defendant’s sentence is

recalled for resentencing, while recall under section 1172.75

precedes this determination. (§ 1170.126, subd. (f).)

Harmonization does not require that section 1172.75

mirror the nonsubstantive order of operations relevant to

defendants pursuing relief through section 1170.126 petitions.13

12

The parties do not raise whether the manner of

disqualification is a substantive or procedural provision of

section 1170.126. We therefore do not decide whether section

1172.75, subdivision (d)(2) incorporates section 1170.126,

subdivision (f)’s method of disqualification of nonserious,

nonviolent third strike offenders from second strike sentencing.

(§§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C), 1170.126, subd. (f).)

13

The dissent criticizes our ruling as an effort to “pick and

choose which requirements to apply” which it claims runs

“directly counter to the voters’ intent that Prop. 36 be applied as

a cohesive whole.” (Dis. opn. of Corrigan, J., post, at pp. 13–14.)

But several of the requirements of the section 1170.126 recall

petition process are clearly specific to those petitions, and are

not reasonably incorporated under section 1172.75, subdivision

(d)(2)’s “changes in law” language. For instance, one subdivision

of section 1170.126 sets forth specific pleading requirements for

petitions under that section. (§ 1170.126, subd. (d).) Another

sets forth procedures for a defendant to waive his appearance in

court. (§ 1170.126, subd. (i).) The dissent does not claim, and

could not plausibly assert, that each of these procedural

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Section 1170.126’s technical processes are inapplicable at a

resentencing pursuant to other mechanisms, like section

1172.75, which have separate procedural requirements that

defendants must fulfill. (§ 1170.126, subd. (f); § 1172.75, subds.

(b)–(d).) Indeed, it would make little sense to construe section

1172.75 as incorporating the procedural provisions of a

standalone section 1170.126 petition, given that defendants

seeking relief through alternative remedies are simply not filing

section 1170.126 petitions. Various procedural vehicles may

contain distinct technical details, but this does not suggest that

the voters intended for these procedures to serve as conditions

on relief for other vehicles. Rather than impose such a

limitation, the voters expressly contemplated and preserved

alternative procedural vehicles through section 1170.126,

subdivision (k). (§ 1170.126, subd. (k).)

The question of whether the voters intended a given

provision as a substantive requirement for relief can only be

answered by determining whether satisfying a particular

condition fulfills the twin purposes of the statute we have

previously identified — effecting ameliorative reform while

protecting public safety. (Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 658

minutiae “are necessary predicates for relief under that

initiative.” (Dis. opn. of Corrigan, J., post, at p. 12.) In short,

not all of the mechanics specific to a 1170.126 petition speak to

the core inquiries of whether a petitioner is eligible for, and

entitled to retroactive resentencing as, an individual who poses

no threat to public safety. As a result, we are left with the

admittedly difficult task of ascertaining which requirements the

voters would consider substantive conditions on relief and which

were procedural requirements specific to those seeking relief

through the section 1170.126 resentencing process.

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[finding that the voters enacted the Reform Act to “strike a

balance between these objectives of mitigating punishment and

protecting public safety”].) Interpreting section 1172.75 as

incorporating section 1170.126’s public safety override honors

the voters’ substantive concern. Defendants whose third strike

sentences are recalled pursuant to section 1172.75, but whom

the resentencing court determines, in its discretion, would pose

an unreasonable risk to public safety are not entitled to

resentencing pursuant to the revised penalty provisions of the

Reform Act. (§§ 1172.75, subd. (c), 1170.126, subd. (f).)

Respondent provides no explanation for how permitting recall

before or after determining eligibility has any effect on public

safety.

Nor does the legislative history offer support for such a

claim. Proposition 36’s legislative history discusses the timing

of eligibility determinations only in relation to permitting

resentencing, and does not even mention recall of sentence. (See

Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012) analysis of

Prop. 36 by Legis. Analyst, p. 50 [“Courts conducting these

resentencing hearings would first determine whether the

offender’s criminal offense history makes them eligible for

resentencing. The court would be required to resentence eligible

offenders unless it determines that resentencing the offenders

would pose an unreasonable risk to public safety”].) The timing

of recall under section 1172.75 does not undermine the

electorate’s substantive public safety objectives; rather, the

statute’s incorporation of section 1170.126’s discretionary public

safety override maintains the balance struck by the voters

between reform and safety.

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b. Two-year deadline.

Respondent and amici curiae suggest that the statutes

cannot be harmonized by construing section 1170.126’s public

safety inquiry as operational at a section 1172.75 resentencing,

because the two-year deadline in section 1170.126 was intended

as a critical limitation on relief.

Although not conclusive evidence, the language of the good

cause provision itself, contained in section 1170.126, subdivision

(b), suggests that it was meant to apply only to the petition

process, and not globally to alternate vehicles for resentencing

carved out by section 1170.126, subdivision (k). Section

1170.126, subdivision (b) explains that defendants serving

indeterminate terms under the Three Strikes law “may file a

petition for a recall of sentence, within two years after the

effective date of the act that added this section or at a later date

upon a showing of good cause[.]” (§ 1170.126, subd. (b), italics

added.) The language specific to a “petition for recall of

sentence” itself suggests that the two-year deadline and good

cause exception were procedural requirements for defendants to

bring a recall and resentencing petition under section

1170.126.14 Thus, these provisions appear to focus the timing of

14

Section 1170.126, subdivision (f), which contains the

operative public safety determination, has similar language

referencing a “recall of sentence under this section.”

(§ 1170.126, subd. (f).) However, as we have discussed, the

entire purpose of the 1170.126 petition process is to allow

retroactive, ameliorative relief while ensuring that public safety

is protected. Thus, unlike the two-year deadline and good cause

exception, provisions related to public safety cannot be

described as mere procedural requirements limited to recall and

resentencing petitions under section 1170.126. They are instead

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

recall and resentencing petitions under section 1170.126, and

would not apply to other resentencing vehicles preserved by

subdivision (k). Moreover, as the dissent notes, section 1172.75

does not require a defendant to “file” any request for relief. (Dis.

opn. of Corrigan, J., post, at p. 3 [“under section 1172.75, the

defendant does not file a petition to invalidate a prison prior

enhancement; the CDCR initiates the process”], italics added.)

Respondent and the dissent point to the Legislative

Analyst’s analysis, which described a “one-time cost to the state

and counties related to the resentencing provisions of this

measure,” and anticipated that “counties would incur jail costs

to house inmates during resentencing proceedings. These costs

could be a few million dollars statewide over a couple of years.”

(Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012) analysis of

Prop. 36 by Legis. Analyst, p. 50.) Both argue that the voters

therefore understood there would be “one-time” resentencing

expenses, and those expenses would only last “a couple of years.”

(Ibid.; see dis. opn. of Corrigan, J., post, at p. 2)

This legislative history does not suggest the electorate

understood the two-year petition deadline as a condition on

resentencing for defendants like Guevara, who sought relief

under a distinct statutory mechanism. The Legislative Analyst’s

estimate reflects the anticipated expenses associated with

standalone petitions for resentencing under section 1170.126.

The voters contemplated that the petition process would result

in “one-time” expenses that would last approximately two years.

But the Legislative Analyst did not purport to provide cost

estimates for alternative remedies expressly preserved by

the substantive foundations of the Reform Act’s retroactive

provisions.

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

section 1170.126, subdivision (k). Rather than evince a

constitutional conflict, the legislative history materials invoked

by respondent and the dissent reflect the electorate’s

understanding of the costs and timing for adjudicating

standalone section 1170.126 petitions.

The Reform Act itself contemplated that resentencings

pursuant to the revised penalty provisions of the Three Strikes

law would be conducted beyond the two-year window. Section

1170.126 expressly permits resentencing beyond a “couple of

years” — notwithstanding the Legislative Analyst’s categorical

characterization — upon a showing of “good cause.” (Voter

Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012) analysis of Prop.

36 by Legis. Analyst, p. 50; § 1170.126, subd. (b); Carman v.

Alvord (1982) 31 Cal.3d 318, 330 (Carman) [“Election materials

may be helpful but are not conclusive in determining the

probable meaning of initiative language”]; San Francisco

Taxpayers Assn. v. Bd. of Supervisors (1992) 2 Cal.4th 571, 580

[“The case for rejecting the Legislative Analyst’s views is . . .

more compelling . . . where the contradiction is in the language

of the initiative”].) A narrow reading of the Legislative Analyst’s

description of “one-time costs” would also require ignoring

section 1170.126, subdivision (k), which expressly protects “any

rights or remedies otherwise available to the defendant” without

superimposing a two-year deadline on defendants’ access to pre-

existing resentencing mechanisms. (§ 1170.126, subd. (k).) The

statutory text — as relevant here, the “good cause” provision

and subdivision (k) — must prevail over ballot materials that

offer incomplete summaries of the enacted law, “regardless of

any insufficient recitals in the instructions to voters or the

arguments . . . accompanying the text of the proposed measure.”

(Wright v. Jordan (1923) 192 Cal. 704, 713.)

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Moreover, analyses of a law’s fiscal impact cannot always

anticipate costs that might arise due to laws not in effect at the

time such analyses were undertaken. Such estimates are,

instead, merely a snapshot in time. For instance, the dissent

accepts that habeas corpus petitions might lead to resentencing

of defendants serving indeterminate terms under the Three

Strikes law. (Dis. opn. of Corrigan, J., post, at p. 12.) Yet when

the Reform Act was enacted in 2012, no one foresaw the

significant expansion of the scope of habeas corpus later created

as a result of the Racial Justice Act and its subsequent

amendments, for example. (See §1473, subd. (e); Assem. Bill No.

2542 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.); Assem. Bill No. 256 (2021–2022

Reg. Sess.).) Similarly, here, the Legislative Analyst who

analyzed the fiscal impacts of the Reform Act did not account for

additional costs, outside the two-year window, that might arise

because of Senate Bill No. 483 and its interaction with the

Reform Act, events that would not occur for over a decade.

Other legislative history materials suggest that costs

beyond the two-year window were contemplated. For example,

the Attorney General’s circulating Official Title and Summary

anticipated continuing costs beyond the two-year petition

deadline, observing that the measure would result in

“[i]ncreased state and county costs in the millions to low tens of

millions of dollars annually in the first few years, likely declining

substantially in future years, for state court activities and county

jail, community supervision, and court-related activities.” (Cal.

Secretary of State Certification, June 11, 2012, italics added.)

The circulating Title and Summary thus contemplated that

costs would persist after the “first few years,” while finding it

“likely” that in “future years” there would be a reduction — but

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

not elimination — of costs associated with “state court

activities” like resentencing. (Id.)

Legislative history materials and the statutory text

enacted by the voters thus counsel against “assum[ing] that [the

Legislative Analyst’s] brief comments,” as narrowly construed

by respondent, “accurately reflected the full intent of the

drafters or the understanding of the electorate.” (Carman,

supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 331.)

In sum, the two-year deadline in the Reform Act is most

naturally understood as a procedural deadline for filing

petitions under section 1170.126 itself. Thus, Guevara need not

satisfy the two-year deadline to seek relief under section

1172.75.15

15

Even assuming, however, that the two-year deadline is a

substantive requirement that should apply, its “good cause”

exception may well be satisfied here. (§ 1170.126, subd. (b).) As

articulated by Justice Greenwood in her concurring and

dissenting opinion in People v. Superior Court (Williams) (2024)

102 Cal.App.5th 1242, 1264 (Williams), “ ‘resentencing under

section 1172.75 may constitute “good cause” for the petitioner to

file . . . past the two-year filing deadline of subdivision (b).’ ” (Id.

at p. 1268 (conc. and dis. opn. of Greenwood, J.).) As Justice

Greenwood notes, “[u]pon recall, the resentencing court was

required to consider the entire judgment anew; the court’s

consideration was not limited to that portion of the aggregate

sentence attributable to the prior conviction enhancements

invalidated by section 1172.75.” (Id. at p. 1271.) Indeed, section

1170.126 itself requires that the trial court, in making the public

safety determination, assess the defendant’s entire “criminal

conviction history.” (§ 1170.126, subd. (g)(1).) Because the

elimination of the one-year prior prison term enhancement

changes Guevara’s “conviction history,” it arguably provides

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D. The Counterarguments Raised by Real Party in

Interest and Amici Curiae Are Unpersuasive.

1. Harmonizing sections 1170.126 and 1172.75 is

consistent with subdivision (l).

As amicus curiae, the California District Attorneys

Association, suggests applying the revised penalty provisions of

the Reform Act through section 1172.75 would contravene

subdivision (l) of section 1170.126. Subdivision (l) establishes

that “[n]othing in this and related sections is intended to

good cause to request reconsideration of the public safety

determination outside the Reform Act’s two-year window.

The dissent, citing People v. Valencia (2021) 64

Cal.App.5th 641, 649, which held that “rehabilitative progress”

alone does not constitute good cause under section 1170.126,

subdivision (b), contends that “if the Legislature’s mere

enactment of section 1172.75 provides blanket ‘good cause’ for

reassessment of the court’s prior finding that a defendant posed

an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety (§ 1170.126,

subd. (f)), then the majority has allowed the Legislature to do

indirectly what it could not do directly, i.e., to simply eliminate

the good cause requirement without a proper amendment of

Prop. 36.” (Dis. opn. of Corrigan, J., post, at p. 15, fn. 4.) We

have no need to express an opinion on the holding of Valencia,

as we have held that Guevara is not required to satisfy the two-

year deadline for filing a petition to recall his sentence under

the Reform Act. Regardless, this case is distinguishable from

Valencia. In that case, defendant’s claim of “rehabilitative

progress” was a universal exception available to all Three Strike

defendants. Here, there is no such global exception that could

be characterized as “erasing the limitations period” for the

statute. (Valencia, at p. 649.) Instead, we merely recognize that

a legislative change affecting a defendant’s conviction history

may arguably supply “good cause” to temporarily extend the

limitations period for a select group of indeterminate Third

Strike defendants, whose resentencing was permissible under

1170.126, subdivision (k).

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

diminish or abrogate the finality of judgments in any case not

falling within the purview of this act.” (§ 1170.126, subd. (l).)

Section 1170.126, subdivision (l) does not bolster amici curiae’s

position, because it is section 1172.75 by its express terms — not

any section of the Reform Act — that reopens sentencing, by

requiring the elimination of now-invalid prison priors and

providing for a full resentencing.

Furthermore, section 1170.126, subdivision (l) ensures the

Reform Act and “related sections” do not diminish the finality of

only those cases falling beyond the scope of “this act” — that is,

the Three Strikes law as amended by the Reform Act.

(§ 1170.126, subd. (l).) But the nonserious, nonviolent third

strike cases at issue are prototypical Three Strikes law cases;

they cannot be characterized as “case[s] not falling within the

purview of this act” under subdivision (l). (Id., italics added.)

2. The meaning of “presently serving” in section

1170.126.

Real Party in Interest and the Attorney General argue

that “the plain terms of [section 1170.126] do not apply to Mr.

Guevara.” They echo the position of the dissent below. Upon

verifying Guevara was serving a term with now-invalid prior

prison term enhancements, the trial court was “required to

recall Guevara’s sentence,” at which point he was no longer a

defendant “presently serving an indeterminate term of

imprisonment” and thus not subject to the substantive

conditions in section 1170.126. (Guevara II, supra, 97

Cal.App.5th at pp. 990–991 (dis. opn. of Baltodano, J.).) Instead,

Guevara argues, he is entitled to resentencing under only the

prospective provisions of the Reform Act.

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Respondent initially argued that “ ‘presently serving an

indeterminate term of imprisonment’ refers to individuals who

were serving such a term in 2012 when the Reform Act took

effect.” (Williams, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 1263.)

Respondent subsequently argued that even if “presently

serving” means “currently serving,” defendants like Guevara

“were both ‘presently serving an indeterminate term’ on the

effective date of section 1170.126 and are ‘currently serving such

an indeterminate term.’ ”

The phrase “presently serving” is ambiguous. In ordinary

parlance, “present” means “now existing or in progress,” “being

in view or at hand,” “now existing; at hand” and “presently”

means “at once,” “at the present time,” or “now.” (Merriam-

Webster’s Collegiate Dict. (11th ed. 2012) p. 982; Black’s Law

Dict. (9th ed. 2009) p. 1302.) “Current” means “presently

elapsing” or “occurring in or existing at the present time.”

(Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dict. (11th ed. 2012) p. 306.)

Because these dictionary definitions overlap, Guevara concludes

that “presently serving” means “currently serving.” But

“currently serving” could either refer to defendants “currently

serving” at the time the Reform Act took effect, or those

“currently serving” at the time of their section 1172.75

resentencing. Dictionary definitions alone thus shed little light

on the meaning of “presently serving” in section 1170.126.

Guevara argues that the two-year deadline in section

1170.126, subdivision (b) establishes that the drafters knew how

to impose a limit by reference to the “effective date of the act”

when they wished to do so. Subdivision (b) establishes that

petitions for a sentence recall may be filed “within two years

after the effective date of the act that added this section or at a

later date upon a showing of good cause.” (§ 1170.126, subd. (b).)

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Because section 1170.126, subdivision (a) applies to those

“presently serving” rather than defendants “serving as of the

effective date of the Act,” Guevara argues we should construe

“presently serving” to mean defendants serving indeterminate

third strike terms at the time of a resentencing pursuant to

section 1172.75. But “our cases do not ‘dictate to legislative

drafters the forms in which laws must be written.’ ” (Conley,

supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 656.) Instead, we “require ‘that the

[legislative body] demonstrate its intention with sufficient

clarity that a reviewing court can discern and effectuate it.’ ”

(Id. at pp. 656–657.)

The neighboring provisions of section 1170.126 arguably

support the opposite interpretation of “presently serving.”

(Dyna-Med, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1387 [“The words of the

statute must be construed in context”].) Section 1170.126,

subdivision (a) establishes that only persons “presently serving”

indeterminate terms pursuant to the Three Strikes law, who

would not have received an indeterminate life sentence under

the Reform Act, may file a petition pursuant to section 1170.126.

(§ 1170.126, subd. (a).) Section 1170.126, subdivision (b)

describes the process by which those defendants may file a

petition: “Any person serving an indeterminate term of life

imprisonment imposed pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision

(e) of Section 667 or paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section

1170.12 upon conviction, whether by trial or plea, of a felony or

felonies that are not defined as serious and/or violent felonies by

subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 or subdivision (c) of Section

1192.7, may file a petition for a recall of sentence, within two

years after the effective date of the act that added this section

or at a later date upon a showing of good cause.” (§ 1170.126,

subd. (b).) That subdivision (b) sets a filing deadline for “[a]ny

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Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

person serving” an indeterminate third strike sentence to file a

petition by reference to “the effective date of the act” arguably

suggests the voters likewise intended for subdivision (a) to refer

to those defendants serving as of the effective date of the Reform

Act. (Id., subds. (a)–(b).)

Ultimately, we need not decide this question. The

ambiguity of the phrase “presently serving” does not disturb the

initiative’s legislative history, which suggests the electorate

contemplated that previously sentenced nonserious, nonviolent

third strike offenders would not be entitled to resentencing

under the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act if the

trial court, in its discretion, determined that resentencing would

pose an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.”

(§ 1170.126, subd. (f).) At minimum, resentencing Guevara

under the prospective provisions of the Reform Act without a

discretionary public safety determination would be in strong

tension with voter intent in enacting Proposition 36. Our

interpretation of section 1172.75’s ambiguous instruction to

apply “changes in law that reduce sentences” as incorporating

the Reform Act’s retrospective public safety inquiry eliminates

this constitutional doubt, and in doing so, obviates the need to

resolve the meaning of “presently serving” in section 1170.126,

subdivision (a). (§§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2), 1170.126, subd. (a).)

3. Real Party in Interest’s reading is not required to

avoid absurd results.

Guevara argues that it would be an absurd result for

“people convicted of extremely violent crimes,” albeit people not

previously sentenced to Third Strike indeterminate terms, to be

“eligible for ‘full resentencing’ consideration by virtue of section

1172.75” but for Real Party in Interest, convicted of a

nonserious, nonviolent crime, to be prohibited from “avail[ing]

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himself of the same resentencing opportunity.” As we interpret

section 1172.75, Real Party in Interest is entitled to a full

resentencing provided that he can satisfy the substantive

eligibility criteria established in section 1170.126 to obtain

resentencing pursuant to the revised penalty provisions of the

Reform Act. This is not an absurd result. In enacting the

Reform Act, the voters struck a balance between mitigating

harsh punishment and protecting public safety. While

reasonable minds may differ on the wisdom of the balance they

struck, the choice is one appropriately reserved to the voters.

(Superior Court v. County of Mendocino (1996) 13 Cal.4th 45, 53

[“The judiciary, in reviewing statutes . . . may not undertake to

evaluate the wisdom of the policies embodied in such

legislation”].)

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. The case is

remanded to the Court of Appeal with instructions to remand

the case to the superior court.16 If the superior court determines

that resentencing Real Party in Interest pursuant to the revised

penalty provisions of the Reform Act would “pose an

16

Where “a sentencing court was not fully aware of the scope

of its discretionary powers, ‘the appropriate remedy is to remand

for resentencing unless the record “clearly indicate[s]” that the

trial court would have reached the same conclusion “even if it

had been aware that it had such discretion.” ’ ” (People v.

Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 425.) The record does not “clearly

indicate” the trial court would have resentenced Real Party in

Interest pursuant to the revised penalty provisions of the

Reform Act “ ‘ “even if it had been aware that it had such

discretion.” ’ ” (Id.) Rather, the trial court expressed “concern[]

. . . for public safety,” but concluded that it had “no choice but to

resentence him under Penal Code Section 1172.75.”

48

PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (GUEVARA)

Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

unreasonable risk of danger to public safety,” the court shall

reimpose an indeterminate term.17 (§ 1170.126, subds. (f)–(g).)

If the superior court does not determine that resentencing Real

Party in Interest would “pose an unreasonable risk of danger to

public safety,” and Real Party in Interest is otherwise eligible

under the Reform Act, the court shall resentence Real Party in

Interest pursuant to the revised penalty provisions of the

Reform Act.18 (§§ 1170.126, subds. (f)–(g), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1),

(2)(C), 1172.75, subd. (c).)

17

The resentencing court is not bound by the prior

dangerousness determination associated with Guevara’s section

1170.126 petition. Rather, section 1172.75 requires that the

resentencing court makes a new determination as to whether a

defendant’s resentencing would “pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to public safety” as of the present day. (§ 1170.126, subd.

(f).) A prior finding that a particular defendant poses a risk to

public safety under section 1170.126, subdivision (f) is

unquestionably relevant, and will no doubt be given

consideration by a court subsequently resolving a resentencing

under section 1172.75 involving an indeterminate Three Strikes

sentence. However, given significant passage of time, it is

possible that a defendant who once presented a threat to public

safety may no longer do so. For instance, not only may

defendants present evidence that they have significantly

rehabilitated since a prior section 1170.126 proceeding, but

serious illness or advanced age may have substantially reduced

the danger to public safety they once posed. Realistically

assessing such changed circumstances is appropriately left to

the trial court on remand.

49

PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (GUEVARA)

Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

EVANS, J.

We Concur:

LIU, J.

KRUGER, J.

GROBAN, J.

JENKINS, J.

50

PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (GUEVARA)

S283305

Dissenting Opinion by Justice Corrigan

The voters by initiative enacted the Three Strikes Reform

Act of 2012 (Prop. 36, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6,

2012)) (Prop. 36 or the Initiative) “to reduce the punishment

prescribed for certain third strike defendants.” (People v. Conley

(2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 651 (Conley).) Conley held the voters

intended that those defendants who had already been sentenced

by the time of the Initiative’s passage “are not entitled to

automatic resentencing, but instead may seek resentencing by

petitioning for recall of sentence under [Penal Code] section

1170.126.” (Id. at p. 652; see id. at pp. 654–662.) Penal Code1

section 1170.126, added by the Initiative, created a petition

procedure that allowed defendants to request a recall of their

Three Strikes sentences “within two years after the effective

date of the act that added this section or at a later date upon a

showing of good cause” (§ 1170.126, subd. (b)). Under Prop. 36’s

petitioning procedure, qualified defendants are entitled to

resentencing “unless the court, in its discretion, determines that

resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to public safety” (§ 1170.126, subd. (f)). As the majority

notes, Guevara’s 2013 petition for resentencing under section

1170.126, which was filed within the specified two-year filing

window, was denied. The trial court concluded that if his Three

1

Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.

1

PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (GUEVARA)

Corrigan, J., dissenting

Strikes sentence were modified, he would pose an unreasonable

risk of danger to public safety. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 8.)

The principles of In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 and

its progeny are not involved here. Guevara’s sentence has long

been final. It is also important to note that the Initiative added

a statute providing for a single two-year petition procedure.

Voters were explicitly told they were voting for a temporally

defined, one-time resentencing system. The Legislative

Analyst’s statement described the resentencing procedure as a

“one-time cost” that would only last for “a couple of years.”

(Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012) analysis of

Prop. 36 by Legis. Analyst, p. 50; see People v. Superior Court

(Williams) (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1242, 1263; People v.

Valencia (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 641, 650 (Valencia).)

Section 1172.75 is a statute enacted by the Legislature

years after the passage of Prop. 36. The question here is

whether that later action improperly amends Prop 36. It does.

Under section 1172.75, if a court determines that a defendant’s

sentence includes a now-invalid prior prison term enhancement,

the court “shall recall the sentence and resentence the

defendant” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c)) and “shall apply the sentencing

rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law

that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to

eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of

sentencing” (id., subd. (d)(2), italics added). The legislative

provision does not simply remove additional one-year terms

based on its invalidation of state prison prior enhancements. It

specifically attempts to authorize full resentencing of Three

Strikes defendants in a manner not provided for by Prop. 36.

The majority’s application of section 1172.75, as permitting full

Three Strikes resentencing, beyond the removal of a one-year

2

PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (GUEVARA)

Corrigan, J., dissenting

enhancement term, endorses this legislative overreach and is

contrary to the intent of the voters when they passed the

Initiative. In permitting the statute to allow full resentencing,

including modification of a properly imposed Three Strikes

sentence, the majority adopts an interpretation which violates

the explicit requirements of the Initiative.

Under the Legislature’s newly-added code section, a recall

and resentencing procedure is automatic when the court

receives notice from the California Department of Corrections

and Rehabilitation (CDCR). (See § 1172.75, subd. (c).) Indeed,

under section 1172.75, the defendant does not file a petition to

invalidate a prison prior enhancement; the CDCR initiates the

process. As drafted by the Legislature, there is also no need for

the defendant to file a resentencing petition under section

1172.126, as Prop. 36 requires. Because no petition is required,

there is no need to demonstrate that there is good cause for filing

a resentencing request beyond the two-year window set out in

the Initiative.

In rewriting the statute to permit full resentencing of pre-

Prop. 36 Three Strikes cases under the guise of constitutional

avoidance, the majority allows the Legislature to change the

Initiative in constitutionally prohibited ways. The majority

permits the Legislature to do something that was never

intended by the voters and to take that action without the

Legislative procedures constitutionally required to amend the

electorate’s Initiative.

The issue here is that section 1172.75 was neither passed

with a two-thirds vote of both legislative houses nor approved

by a majority of the electorate as the Initiative requires for

amendment of its provisions. (See Prop. 36, as approved by

3

PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (GUEVARA)

Corrigan, J., dissenting

voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012), § 11.) Thus, to the extent that

section 1172.75 purports to allow automatic resentencing that

goes beyond removal of the now-nullified state prison prior

enhancement, the Legislature’s action constitutes an

unconstitutional attempt to amend an initiative statute. “The

Legislature may amend or repeal an initiative statute by

another statute that becomes effective only when approved by

the electors unless the initiative statute permits amendment or

repeal without the electors’ approval.” (Cal. Const., art. II, § 10,

subd. (c), italics added.)

The majority purports to solve this problem by simply

rewriting section 1172.75 to include the same public safety

inquiry applicable under Prop. 36’s section 1170.126. The

majority suggests this is proper under the doctrine of

constitutional avoidance. Yet we have cautioned that “ ‘[i]t is

our task to construe, not to amend, the statute. “In the

construction of a statute . . . the office of the judge is simply to

ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained

therein, not to insert what has been omitted or omit what has

been inserted . . . .” [Citation.] We may not, under the guise of

construction, rewrite the law or give the words an effect

different from the plain and direct import of the terms used.’ ”

(People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1008.) But this is exactly

what the majority has done. For the reasons discussed below,

the majority misapplies the tool of constitutional avoidance to

support its novel statutory interpretation. The attempt is also

flawed because it fails to actually solve the constitutional

problem presented here. The majority’s decision today will give

Guevara, 12 years after his section 1170.126 petition was

denied, another bite at the same apple, all without having to

petition for resentencing or to show good cause for a late or

4

PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (GUEVARA)

Corrigan, J., dissenting

successive petition as the Initiative mandates. The majority’s

decision exceeds our role as a court and subverts the initiative

process itself. As a result, I cannot join my colleagues in the

majority.

It is important to be clear just what constitutional

principle is involved here. The various changes to the Three

Strikes schemes on which Guevara relies do not flow from

constitutional provisions barring excessive punishment or to

any other challenge to its alternative sentencing scheme. (Cf. In

re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524, 560.) Instead, in 2012, the

electorate passed the Initiative to mitigate some of the more

stringent provisions of the original Three Strikes scheme. It did

so, however, by exercising its authority to limit legislative

attempts to further modify the specific reforms contained in

Prop. 36. The voters’ authority to do so, by requiring a specified

legislative majority, is not contested here. It is the legislative

attempt to undermine the voters’ action that is the

constitutional issue.

The initiative power is “not . . . a right granted the people,

but . . . a power reserved by them. Declaring it ‘the duty of the

courts to jealously guard this right of the people’ [citation], the

courts have described the initiative and referendum [authority]

as articulating ‘one of the most precious rights of our democratic

process.’ [Citation.] ‘[I]t has long been our judicial policy to

apply a liberal construction to this power wherever it is

challenged in order that the right be not improperly annulled.

If doubts can reasonably be resolved in favor of the use of this

reserve power, courts will preserve it.’ ” (Associated Home

Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 591

(Associated Home Builders); see Castellanos v. State of

California (2024) 16 Cal.5th 588, 601–602.)

5

PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (GUEVARA)

Corrigan, J., dissenting

A. THERE IS NO STATUTORY AMBIGUITY JUSTIFYING

APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE

Constitutional avoidance is an established approach that

aids courts in interpreting statutes. “When a question of

statutory interpretation implicates constitutional issues, we are

guided by the precept that ‘ “[i]f a statute is susceptible of two

constructions, one of which will render it constitutional and the

other unconstitutional in whole or in part, or raise serious and

doubtful constitutional questions, the court will adopt the

construction which, without doing violence to the reasonable

meaning of the language used, will render it valid in its entirety,

or free from doubt as to its constitutionality, even though the

other construction is equally reasonable.” ’ ” (People v. Gutierrez

(2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1373.) But the choice permitted under

the constitutional avoidance doctrine is between competing

plausible interpretations of the statutory language.

Constitutional avoidance does not encompass judicial authority

to amend an otherwise clear but improperly enacted statute,

like the one here.

The high court has repeatedly warned that “this canon

‘has no application in the absence of statutory ambiguity.’ ”

(United States v. Palomar-Santiago (2021) 593 U.S. 321, 329;

see also Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam

(2020) 591 U.S. 103, 133; McFadden v. United States (2015) 576

U.S. 186, 187; Warger v. Shauers (2014) 574 U.S. 40, 50.) “The

canon is not a method of adjudicating constitutional questions

by other means. [Citations.] Indeed, one of the canon’s chief

justifications is that it allows courts to avoid the decision of

constitutional questions. It is a tool for choosing between

competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text, resting on

the reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the

6

PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (GUEVARA)

Corrigan, J., dissenting

alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts.” (Clark

v. Martinez (2005) 543 U.S. 371, 381, second italics added.) To

apply the doctrine, “the statute must be realistically susceptible

of two interpretations . . . .” (People v. Anderson (1987) 43

Cal.3d 1104, 1146; see United States v. Stevens (2010) 559 U.S.

460, 481 (Stevens).)

The majority finds ambiguity in section 1172.75,

subdivision (d)(2): “Section 1172.75’s instruction to apply

‘changes in law that reduce sentences’ is ambiguous. (§ 1172.75,

subd. (d)(2).) The statute does not specify how to determine the

relevant ‘change[] in law’ in the context of the Three Strikes

law’s parallel prospective and retrospective provisions.” (Maj.

opn., ante, at pp. 29–30.) The majority suggests “[o]ur

interpretation of section 1172.75’s ambiguous instruction to

apply ‘changes in law that reduce sentences’ as incorporating

the [Initiative’s] retrospective public safety inquiry

eliminates . . . constitutional doubt . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at

p. 47.)

This strained search for ambiguity is neither a fair nor

plausible reading of section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2). Simply

put, the public safety inquiry referenced by the majority did not

constitute a “change[] in law that reduce[s] sentences . . . .”

(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) Instead, the public safety inquiry

constrained courts in their ability to reduce the sentences

imposed under the prior Three Strikes law. The section in which

the public safety inquiry appears clarified the voters’

determination to modify the Three Strikes sentencing scheme

going forward and to allow those serving Three Strikes

sentences to petition for resentencing under delineated

circumstances and within a limited time frame unless good

cause is shown. A section 1170.126 petition allows an already-

7

PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (GUEVARA)

Corrigan, J., dissenting

sentenced defendant to “request resentencing in accordance

with the provisions of subdivision (e) of Section 667, and

subdivision (c) of Section 1170.12, as those statutes have been

amended by the act that added this section.” (§ 1170.126,

subd. (b).) Thus, under Prop. 36, the relevant provisions that

actually reduce a defendant’s sentence are the amended

portions of the Three Strikes law that generally preclude a third

strike sentence for those with a current conviction for a felony

that is not serious or violent. (See §§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C),

1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C).) Its petition procedure, and the public

safety inquiry described therein, simply gives certain offenders

a procedural path to seek relief under those referenced

provisions as the voters amended them. (See Conley, supra, 63

Cal.4th at p. 653.) It does not, itself, constitute a “change[] in

law that reduce[s] sentences” under section 1172.75, subdivision

(d)(2).

Further, as noted, the Legislature’s section 1172.75

includes its own and different public safety inquiry, providing

the court must impose a lesser sentence “unless the court finds

by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence

would endanger public safety.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).) When

enacting section 1172.75, the Legislature created a different

public safety inquiry with its own delineated factors (see

§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3)) and burden of proof that would supplant

the approach set out in Prop. 36. It is not plausible that the

Legislature simultaneously intended to adopt Prop. 36’s public

safety inquiry as well, thus creating a statutory scheme with two

conflicting standards of proof.

Constitutional avoidance is a tool for choosing between

competing interpretations of a statute as written. Even if an

interpretation of a statute would remove some potential

8

PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (GUEVARA)

Corrigan, J., dissenting

constitutional doubt, “we may adopt it only if we can see it in

the statutory language.” (Iancu v. Brunetti (2019) 588 U.S. 388,

397.) Here, section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2)’s command to

apply “any other changes in law that reduce sentences” cannot

plausibly be understood to include the public safety provision of

a petition procedure that itself applies a different statute to

reduce sentences. “We cannot press statutory construction ‘to

the point of disingenuous evasion’ even to avoid a constitutional

question.” (United States v. Locke (1985) 471 U.S. 84, 96.) The

majority misapplies constitutional avoidance as a device to

simply rewrite section 1172.75 in an attempt “ ‘ “to conform it to

constitutional requirements . . . .” ’ ” (Stevens, supra, 559 U.S.

at p. 481.) The attempt fails to do so for two reasons. First, as

noted, there are not two competing plausible interpretations for

the statutory language. The Legislature made its intent quite

clear in the language it chose. Second, as explained below, it

does not solve the problem that the Legislature’s statute was not

passed as the Initiative requires.

B. THE MAJORITY OPINION DOES NOT AVOID THE

CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM IN ANY CASE

The constitutional problem the majority seeks to avoid is

that the Legislature overstepped its authority to amend a voter

initiative by ignoring the constitutional requirements for doing

so. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (c).) But the proper way to

avoid that problem, if possible, is to interpret section 1172.75 in

a manner that does not constitute an amendment. Even after

the majority has engrafted section 1170.126’s public safety

inquiry onto a resentencing under section 1172.75, this new,

judicially created statute still improperly amends the

Initiative’s careful delineation of when a previously sentenced

9

PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (GUEVARA)

Corrigan, J., dissenting

defendant may receive retroactive application of the amended

Three Strikes provisions.

Under “article II, section 10, subdivision (c) [of the

California Constitution], an amendment includes a legislative

act that changes an existing initiative statute by taking away

from it.” (People v. Kelly (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1008, 1026–1027; see

People v. DeLeon (2017) 3 Cal.5th 640, 651.) The majority

properly rejects as an improper amendment Guevara’s position

that he should be fully resentenced without Prop. 36’s public

safety inquiry. It reasons: “Guevara’s reading would allow the

Legislature, by a simple majority, to eliminate section

1170.126’s conditioning of relief upon a court’s discretionary

public safety determination, arguably contravening the Act’s

express amendment limitation. Indeed, by Guevara’s logic, the

Legislature could enact a statute, absent a two-thirds vote,

providing for global recall and resentencing of all nonviolent,

nonserious third strike sentences, without any consideration of

public safety. Such an enactment would plainly contravene

voter intent and the express amendment limitation provision of

the [Initiative].” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 26.)

Yet the majority then purports to eliminate other express

conditions for relief under section 1170.126, based on an

artificial distinction between “substantive criteria,” such as the

public safety inquiry, and what it calls “ancillary procedural

requirements,” such as the need to timely file a resentencing

petition or to show good cause for filing a petition outside the

two-year window. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 33–34; see also id. at

pp. 34–42.) This characterization, in itself, works an improper

amendment of the Initiative because these conditions are

mandated by Prop. 36 in the same way as the public safety

inquiry. The majority suggests that these conditions, which it

10

PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (GUEVARA)

Corrigan, J., dissenting

seeks to eliminate as “nonsubstantive,” need not be given the

effect the voters intended because “defendants seeking relief

through alternative remedies are simply not filing section

1170.126 petitions,” and “the voters expressly contemplated and

preserved alternative procedural vehicles through section

1170.126, subdivision (k).” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 35, 36; see

also id. at pp. 15–19.)

Section 1170.126, subdivision (k) does not assist the

majority. That provision states: “Nothing in this section is

intended to diminish or abrogate any rights or remedies

otherwise available to the defendant.” (§ 1170.126, subd. (k),

italics added.) By its plain terms, this provision simply means

that the petition procedure under section 1170.126 was not

intended to preclude a defendant from gaining relief from a third

strike sentence by means other than application of Prop. 36. We

said as much in Conley, where the defendant, who was

sentenced before the Initiative’s passage, argued he was entitled

to automatic retroactive application of the new law because his

case was still pending on appeal under the rule of In re Estrada,

supra, 63 Cal.2d at pages 744–748. We rejected the claim:

“Subdivision (k) contains no indication that automatic

resentencing — as opposed to, for example, habeas corpus

relief — ranks among the ‘rights’ the electorate sought to

preserve. A careful reading of the statute points to the opposite

conclusion: The voters authorized defendant and others

similarly situated to seek resentencing under the recall

provisions of section 1170.126, but they did not intend to confer

a right to automatic resentencing under the amended penalty

provisions of the [Initiative].” (Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at

pp. 661–662.)

11

PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (GUEVARA)

Corrigan, J., dissenting

Here, Guevara is not invoking a right or remedy

“otherwise available” to him through other potential avenues for

relief. He is relying on Prop. 36 itself. The majority admits this

fact by importing Prop. 36’s public safety inquiry into section

1172.75’s recall and resentencing scheme. But it cannot do so

selectively. Prop. 36’s procedures are necessary predicates for

relief under that initiative. It is inaccurate for the majority to

characterize the two-year window and showing of good cause

requirements as nonsubstantive. It is certainly true that the

voters intended to create a procedural avenue for relief under

the Initiative. That avenue was not intended to exclude other

recognized rights and remedies like habeas corpus. But the

specific remedy the voters enacted was the one they articulated

and which was explained in the Legislative Analyst’s statement:

a petition filed within two years or a showing of good cause for

the failure to do so. The voters manifestly did not contemplate

an open-ended opportunity for the Legislature to undo their

enactment except as the Initiative requires.

The majority attempts to distinguish Conley, suggesting

that section 1172.75 constitutes “a separate ‘right[] or remed[y]’

protected by subdivision (k), unlike the untethered ‘automatic

resentencing’ which the defendant in Conley attempted to use to

circumvent the section 1170.126 petition process.” (Maj. opn.,

ante, at p. 19.) This is a distinction without a difference. Conley

teaches that the voters who enacted Prop. 36 “did not intend to

confer a right to automatic resentencing under the amended

penalty provisions of the [Initiative],” full stop. (Conley, supra,

63 Cal.4th at p. 662.) But that is exactly what the Legislature

intended to achieve with section 1172.75’s mandate to apply

“changes in law that reduce sentences.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).)

Through section 1170.126, subdivision (k), the voters

12

PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (GUEVARA)

Corrigan, J., dissenting

acknowledged that other laws might result in a defendant’s

third strike sentence being overturned. What the electorate did

not contemplate is that relief under Prop. 36 would be available

without going through the procedures mandated in section

1170.126.2 Conley recognized the Estrada rule must yield to the

will of the voters who enacted the Initiative. But so too must

section 1172.75. And so too must this court in discharging its

duty to “ ‘jealously guard the right of the people’ ” by honoring

the initiative and referendum process as “ ‘one of the most

precious rights of our democratic process.’ ” (Associated Home

Builders, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 591.)

Section 1170.126, subdivision (k) does not support the

majority’s distinction between “substantive” and “procedural”

requirements of section 1170.126’s petition procedure. The

majority suggests that “[t]he question of whether the voters

intended a given provision as a substantive requirement for

relief can only be answered by determining whether satisfying

a particular condition fulfills the twin purposes of the statute we

have previously identified — effecting ameliorative reform

2

The majority acknowledges that “at resentencing under

this section [i.e., section 1172.75,] [defendant] invokes the

reforms of Proposition 36,” but insists application of section

1172.75 is akin to habeas relief and the “distinction between

resentencing as a result of a section 1172.75 proceeding and a

resentencing through a successful habeas corpus petition or

other resentencing mechanism is unavailing.” (Maj. opn., ante,

at p. 25.) Regardless of what potential remedies might be

available to a defendant through habeas corpus, the question

here is whether the Legislature, without a proper amendment of

Prop. 36, may enact a statute that purports to allow retroactive

application of the amended penal provisions of the Three Strikes

law that circumvents the petition procedure of section 1170.126.

For the reasons discussed, it may not constitutionally do so.

13

PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (GUEVARA)

Corrigan, J., dissenting

while protecting public safety.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 36.) Not

so. The answer to this question is found in the language enacted

by the voters, which makes no such distinction and provides that

any amendment of its provisions requires a statute passed by

two-thirds of the Legislature or by a majority vote of the

electorate. (Prop. 36, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6,

2012), § 11.) In passing Prop. 36, voters took care to distinguish

it from some other initiatives that allow future legislative

amendments so long as they further its goals. (See, e.g., Prop.

57, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016), § 5 [The

Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016]; Prop. 9, as

approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2008), § 9 [Victims’ Bill

of Rights Act of 2008: Marsy’s Law].) The majority’s effort to

pick and choose which requirements to apply runs directly

counter to the voters’ intent that Prop. 36 be applied as a

cohesive whole.3

3

Noting other minor requirements of the petition procedure

under section 1170.126, the majority suggests “not all of the

mechanics specific to a 1170.126 petition speak to the core

inquiries of whether a petitioner is eligible for, and entitled to

retroactive resentencing as, an individual who poses no threat

to public safety. As a result, we are left with the admittedly

difficult task of ascertaining which requirements the voters

would consider substantive conditions on relief and which were

procedural requirements specific to those seeking relief through

the section 1170.126 resentencing process.” (Maj. opn., ante,

pp. 35–36, fn. 13.) But pointing to the absurdity of incorporating

all the requirements of section 1170.126 into a resentencing

under 1172.75 only serves to underscore that we should not be

attempting to determine what aspects of section 1170.126 are

“core” provisions, a distinction the electorate did not make in

enacting Prop. 36 and its petition procedure for retroactive

application of the amended Three Strikes law.

14

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Corrigan, J., dissenting

By the majority’s logic, the Legislature, by a bare majority,

could simply do away with the good cause requirement for late

section 1170.126 petitions or, indeed, the requirement of a

petition for relief altogether, because they are merely judicially

dubbed “procedural” requirements.4 But by creating a “special

mechanism for application of the new lesser punishment to

persons who have previously been sentenced” (Conley, supra, 63

Cal.4th at p 658), the electorate clearly contemplated that its

enacted mechanism would be the means by which already-

sentenced third strikers could receive retroactive application of

the Initiative’s provisions. Yet by rewriting section 1172.75 to

incorporate only the public safety provision of section 1170.126,

the majority has done what the Legislature could not

4

The majority reasons that, even assuming the good cause

showing needed for a late petition under section 1170.126

constituted a substantive requirement, the enactment of section

1172.75 provides such good cause: “Because the elimination of

the one-year prior prison term enhancement changes Guevara’s

‘conviction history,’ it arguably provides good cause to request

reconsideration of the public safety determination outside the

[Initiative’s] two-year window.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 42, fn. 15;

see § 1170.126, subd. (g)(1).) But if the Legislature’s mere

enactment of section 1172.75 provides blanket “good cause” for

reassessment of the court’s prior finding that a defendant posed

an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety (§ 1170.126,

subd. (f)), then the majority has allowed the Legislature to do

indirectly what it could not do directly, i.e., to simply eliminate

the good cause requirement without a proper amendment of

Prop. 36. The majority’s result is “ ‘tantamount to erasing the

limitations period from the statute . . . .’ ” (Valencia, supra, 64

Cal.App.5th at p. 649.)

15

PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (GUEVARA)

Corrigan, J., dissenting

constitutionally do directly: circumvent the requirements of

section 1170.126 without a proper amendment of the Initiative.5

C. THE PROPER DISPOSITION

The majority’s engrafting of section 1170.126’s public

safety provision onto a section 1172.75 resentencing does

violence to the language of both statutes. The majority has

added an extra requirement for relief that appears nowhere in

the Legislature’s statute while allowing a defendant to receive

full resentencing without following the resentencing procedure

set out in the Initiative. Ultimately, a proper disposition

requires we interpret section 1172.75 in a manner that does not

infringe upon the carefully constructed petition procedure

established by section 1170.126. This approach is readily

available but eschewed by the majority.

Section 1172.75 declared that prior prison term

enhancements for a non-sexually violent offense imposed before

January 1, 2020, are “legally invalid” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a)), and

a new sentence generally “shall result in a lesser sentence than

5

The majority asserts that “when a defendant is being

resentenced pursuant to a separate vehicle, section

1172.75[,] . . . allowing resentencing outside of the two-year

window without establishing the good cause necessary to file a

late section 1170.126 petition does not unconstitutionally

amend the [the Initiative].” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 26–27.)

However, as discussed, that “separate” vehicle, as interpreted

by the majority, allows retroactive application of the amended

Three Strikes law’s lesser penalty provisions without the need

for a resentencing petition under section 1170.126, a remedy not

contemplated by the electorate when enacting Prop. 36. This

result contravenes the Initiative and falls outside the scope of

“any rights or remedies otherwise available to the defendant” as

stated in section 1170.126, subdivision (k).

16

PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (GUEVARA)

Corrigan, J., dissenting

the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the

repealed enhancement” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1)). As we recently

observed in People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050 (Rhodius):

“The reference to a ‘lesser’ sentence is reasonably understood to

mean, as a general matter, that courts must lessen the burdens

of the sentence relative to ‘the one originally imposed as a result

of the elimination of the repealed enhancement’ (§ 1172.75,

subd. (d)(1)) — in other words, the new sentence must eliminate

the adverse effects flowing from the now-invalid section 667.5(b)

enhancements.” (Id. at p. 1060.)

Cases involving section 1172.75 resentencing of Three

Strikes defendants sentenced before the Initiative have allowed

the trial court to strike the now-invalid prior prison term

enhancements. This approach furthers the legislative intent to

eliminate “the adverse effects flowing” from those additional

one-year terms. (Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1060.)

However, as some courts have recognized, a defendant need not

be resentenced as if “writing on a blank slate.” (People v. Kimble

(2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 746, 757 (Kimble); see People v.

Terwilligar (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 585, 601.) As Terwilligar

reasoned: “Keeping in mind the presumption that the

Legislature was aware of the [Initiative’s] resentencing

provision [citation], and that application of the [Initiative’s]

revised penalty provisions outside the two-year window and

without the mandated determination of dangerousness would

constitute an unconstitutional amendment of Proposition 36, it

makes sense that section 1172.75 allows for the possibility that

a sentence of the original length will be reimposed. Therefore,

we believe section 1172.75 and section 1170.126 are best

harmonized by construing section 1172.75 not to authorize

imposition of a sentence contrary to section 1170.126, which

17

PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (GUEVARA)

Corrigan, J., dissenting

itself specifies the prospective scope of application of the

revisions to third-strike defendants sentenced before its

enactment.” (Terwilligar, at p. 602.)

The proper remedy here is to allow the trial court to strike

the now-invalid prior prison term enhancements but reinstate

the previously imposed Three Strikes sentence. This approach

would both effectuate the intent of the Legislature while

honoring that of the electorate. Numerous courts, including the

majority below, have recognized this as the proper disposition.

(See People v. Superior Court (Williams), supra, 102 Cal.App.5th

at p. 1267; People v. Santos (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 666, 677;

Kimble, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 750, 759; People v. Superior

Court (Guevara) (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 978, 983, 988, review

granted Mar. 12, 2024, S283305.) By contrast, no court has

reached the conclusion arrived at by the majority today, not

even the separate opinion in People v. Superior Court

(Williams), supra, 102 Cal.App.5th 1242, upon which we

solicited supplemental briefing. (See id. at pp. 1268–1274 (conc.

& dis. opn. of Greenwood, P. J.).) I would affirm the judgment

of the Court of Appeal below.

In sum, our precedents are clear: We may not rewrite

statutes “ ‘merely to eliminate a potential constitutional

conflict.’ ” (Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609,

635, quoting Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 826.)

The majority misapplies the doctrine of constitutional avoidance

to rewrite section 1172.75 in a manner that facilitates the result

it seeks. In doing so, the majority also fails in its duty to

“ ‘jealously guard this right of the people’ ” reflected in the

initiative and referendum process. (Associated Home Builders,

supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 591.) I respectfully dissent.

18

PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (GUEVARA)

Corrigan, J., dissenting

CORRIGAN, J.

I Concur:

GUERRERO, C. J.

19

See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who

argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Superior Court (Guevara)

__________________________________________________________

Procedural Posture (see XX below)

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted (published) XX 97 Cal.App.5th 978

Review Granted (unpublished)

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S283305

Date Filed: October 9, 2025

__________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: Santa Barbara

Judge: Von T. Nguyen Deroian

__________________________________________________________

Counsel:

John T. Savrnoch, District Attorney, and Marguerite Clipper Charles,

Deputy District Attorney, for Petitioner.

Gregory D. Totten and David R. Boyd, Deputy District Attorney

(Sacramento), for the California District Attorneys Association as

Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Tracy Macuga, Public Defender, Laura Arnold, Deputy Public

Defender; Michael S. Romano and Susan Champion for Real Party in

Interest.

Michael S. Romano; David Mills; George Gascón; Heidi Rummel; and

Michael Vitiello for Three Strikes Project as Amicus Curiae on behalf

of Real Party in Interest.

Molly O’Neal and Damon Silver, Public Defenders (Santa Clara),

Brandon Li, Deputy Public Defender; Brian Matthews, Alternate

Defender (Santa Clara); Sylvia Perez MacDonald; and William Safford

for the Santa Clara County Public Defender, Alternate Defender and

Independent Defense Counsel Office as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real

Party in Interest.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant

Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General,

Idan Ivri, Theresa A. Patterson, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Christopher

G. Sanchez, Deputy Attorneys General, for the Attorney General as

Amicus Curiae, upon the request of the Court of Appeal.

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for

publication with opinion):

Marguerite Clipper Charles

Deputy District Attorney

1112 Santa Barbara Street

Santa Barbara, CA 93101

(805) 568-2445

David R. Boyd

Deputy District Attorney

901 G Street

Sacramento, CA 95814

(916) 591-0294

Susan Champion

Three Strikes Project

Stanford Law School

559 Nathan Abbott Way

Stanford, CA 94305

(650) 736-7757