Bey v. Scott Sr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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PARVIN BEY,

Plaintiff,

ORDER

-against-

25-CV-4970 (NRM) (JAM)

PHILLIP SCOTT SR.; JOHN S.

LANDEN, MAGISTRATE OF THE

QUEENS CIVIL COURT

MUNICIPALITY,

Defendants.

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NINA R. MORRISON, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Parvin Bey, proceeding pro se, filed this action on August 29, 2025,

challenging her eviction from the rental property located at 153-11 123rd Avenue,

Jamaica, New York (“Queens Rental Property”) pursuant to a 2022 judgment entered

in the Queens County Civil Court (“Queens Housing Court”). Plaintiff’s request to

proceed in forma pauperis, submitted on September 23, 2025, ECF No. 8, is granted

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. However, for the reasons explained below, the

Complaint is dismissed.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff provides minimal information about her claim in her Complaint. It

is primarily composed of information related to her identification as a Moorish

National Citizen. See ECF No. 1 at 1–9. To the extent it contains factual

allegations related to her lawsuit, her Complaint concerns the eviction proceedings

regarding the basement apartment at the Queens Rental Property filed by her

landlord, Phillip Scott, and heard in the Queens Housing Court. Id. at 7–8, 10. She

attaches the Queens Housing Court judgment which indicates Phillip Scott’s holdover

petition, filed on February 13, 2020, was granted on December 06, 2022, and a

warrant of eviction was issued removing Plaintiff, the undertenant, from the Queens

Rental Property. Id. at 10–12. She seeks damages. Id. at 8.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Although courts must read pro se complaints with “special solicitude” and

interpret them to raise the “strongest arguments that they suggest,” Triestman v.

Federal Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474–76 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation modified), a

complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). While “detailed factual

allegations” are not required, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Similarly, a complaint is insufficient to state a claim “if

it tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (citation

modified) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), district courts shall dismiss an in forma

pauperis complaint action that “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim

on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, “subject-matter

jurisdiction, because it involves the court’s power to hear a case, can never be forfeited

or waived.” United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002).

Moreover, the party bringing the action must demonstrate that the court has

subject matter jurisdiction over the action. “[F]ailure of subject matter jurisdiction

is not waivable and may be raised at any time by a party or by the court sua sponte.

If subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, the action must be dismissed.” Lyndonville

Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 700–01 (2d Cir. 2000). There are

two primary types of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Under the first type,

federal question jurisdiction, the complaint must have a claim that arises “under the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The other

type is called diversity jurisdiction, and it allows federal courts to consider legal

claims arising under state laws, but only if the money value of the lawsuit is greater

than $75,000 and all the defendants live in a different state than the plaintiff. See

28 U.S.C. § 1332. If the court “determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see also

Chestnut v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 11-CV-5369, 2012 WL 1657362, at *3

(E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2012) (“Notwithstanding the liberal pleading standard afforded pro

se litigants, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may not preside over

cases if subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.”).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges both diversity jurisdiction and federal question jurisdiction,

but the Complaint fails to establish either. The diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332,

provides federal jurisdiction over state law causes of action involving conflicts

between citizens of different states. In this case, complete diversity of citizenship

does not exist between Plaintiff and all Defendants, as Plaintiff and all Defendants

are located in New York. See Handelsman v. Bedford Vill. Assocs., 213 F.3d 48, 51

(2d Cir. 2000) (“Diversity jurisdiction requires that all of the adverse parties in a suit

. . . be completely diverse with regard to citizenship.” (citation modified) (citations

omitted)).1

As for federal question jurisdiction, Plaintiff cites multiple provisions of the

United States Constitution, and to the “Treaty of Peace and Friendship” and the

“Zodiac Constitution,” ECF No. 1 at 1, 7–8, but does not assert any valid basis for

federal question jurisdiction. “Simply raising a federal issue in a complaint will not

automatically confer federal question jurisdiction.” Perpetual Sec., Inc. v. Tang, 290

1 To the extent that Plaintiff may be attempting to premise diversity on her

status as a “Free Moorish National,” see, e.g., ECF No. 1 at 4–6, this claim does not

change her domicile for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. See Allah El v. Avesta

Homes, LLC, 520 F. App'x 806, 809 (11th Cir. 2013) (rejecting claim that status as

“Moorish Nationals” renders a party diverse from others residing in the same state);

Bey v. Jones, No. 19-CV-2577 (RRM), 2019 WL 2028703, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 8, 2019)

(“If [plaintiff] is in fact a Moorish-American domiciled in New York, he is precluded

from bringing a suit under the guise of diversity jurisdiction against defendants also

domiciled in New York.”); Bey v. United States Legislature, No. 17-CV-7569 (CM),

2017 WL 6611052, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2017) (“[Plaintiff’s] purported status as a

. . . ‘Moorish-American’ does not create diversity jurisdiction where all parties are

domiciled in the same state.”).

F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group,

438 U.S. 59, 70 (1978)); see also Bey v. United States Legislature, No. 17-CV-7569

(CM), 2017 WL 6611052, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2017) (“Mere invocation of federal

jurisdiction, without any facts demonstrating a federal law claim, does not create

federal subject matter jurisdiction.” (citing Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension

Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1188-89 (2d Cir. 1996))). There is no subject matter jurisdiction

if “the purported federal claim is clearly ‘immaterial and made solely for the purpose

of obtaining jurisdiction’ or is ‘wholly insubstantial and frivolous.’” Southern New

England Tel. Co. v. Global NAPs Inc., 624 F.3d 123, 132 (2d Cir. 2010) (citations

omitted). Each of Plaintiff’s purported federal claims falls into this category.

The facts alleged in the Complaint suggest only state law claims. The Court

lacks federal question jurisdiction over Bey’s state law claims in this landlord-tenant

matter. “[I]t is well settled that the landlord-tenant relationship is fundamentally a

matter of state law.” Kheyn v. City of New York, Nos. 10-CV-3233–34 (SLT), 2010

WL 3034652, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2010) (citing cases); see also Cain v. Rambert,

No. 13-CV-5807 (MKB), 2014 WL 2440596, at *3 (E.D.N.Y May 30, 2014) (noting that

federal courts lack jurisdiction over landlord-tenant claims); McMillan v. Dep’t of

Bldgs., No. 12-CV-318 (ENV), 2012 WL 1450407, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2012)

(noting that, as a general rule, “[w]rongful eviction claims, whether for a temporary

or final eviction, are state law claims, and this [federal court] lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over them.”); Rosquist v. St. Marks Realty Assoc., LLC, No. 08-CV-2764

(NGG), 2008 WL 2965435, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2008) (finding no subject-matter

jurisdiction over claims arising from plaintiff’s disputes with his landlord and an

eviction proceeding). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot challenge eviction proceedings in

federal court.

Even if the Court had subject matter jurisdiction, the claims against Queens

Housing Court Judge John S. Lansden, who has immunity from this suit seeking

money damages, would be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). See

Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1999) (“It is . . . well established that

officials acting in a judicial capacity are entitled to absolute immunity against § 1983

actions, and this immunity acts as a complete shield to claims for money damages.”).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, this case is dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Generally, a court should not dismiss a

pro se complaint “without [the Court] granting leave to amend at least once when a

liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be

stated.” Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (alteration in original)

(quoting Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir. 1991)). The Court has

considered whether to grant Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint but finds that

amendment would be futile. See Leonard J. Strandberg & Assocs. v. Misan Constr.

Corp., No. 08-CV-2939 (SJF) (ETB), 2010 WL 1565485, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2010)

(denying leave to amend where complete diversity did not exist at filing, reasoning

that an amendment cannot cure jurisdictional defects grounded in facts rather than

pleadings); Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 241 B.R. 63, 65 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), appeal

dismissed, 229 F.3d 1135 (2d Cir.2000) (“Courts can ‘remedy inadequate

jurisdictional allegations, but not defective jurisdictional facts [by authorizing

amendments].’” (quoting Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 832

(1989))).

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from

this order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is

denied for purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–

45 (1962).

The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment and close this

case. The Clerk of Court is also respectfully directed to mail a copy of this Order to

Plaintiff and to note the mailing on the docket.

/s/ Nina R. Morrison

NINA R. MORRISON

United States District Judge

Dated: October 6, 2025

Brooklyn, New York