The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LAFAYE GASKINS :
:
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : 2:25-cv-01187
:
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM
I. Background
At this stage, the Court accepts Plaintiff’s well-pled factual allegations as true.
On December 10, 1991, Plaintiff Lafaye Gaskins (Gaskins) was sentenced to life
without parole for the 1989 Philadelphia murder of Albert Dodson and other related
crimes. At trial, the Commonwealth’s star witness, Gloria Pittman (Pittman),
testified that she heard gun shots and then witnessed, from her second-floor window,
Gaskins flee the abandoned home where Dodson’s frozen body was eventually found.
See Pl.’s Am. Compl. at ¶ 19. Separately, the Commonwealth’s witness Edward
Clyburn (Clyburn) testified that he was in the same car as Dodson and Gaskins on
the day of the murder and witnessed Dodson exit the car with Gaskins and get into
another car containing a third individual. Id. at ¶ 31. In its closing argument, the
Commonwealth leaned heavily on the eyewitness identifications by Pittman and
Clyburn as the link between Gaskins and the murder. Id. at ¶ 35.
While incarcerated, Gaskins maintained his actual innocence and persisted in
his search for new evidence. In 2012, Gaskins was able to make contact with Pittman.
Ultimately, Pittman signed a notarized affidavit, stating that she was coerced by
Philadelphia detectives into making false statements. In her affidavit, Pittman
indicated that she was pressured for months by Detectives James McNesby and John
Cimino to identify Gaskins as the man she saw running from the abandoned house
where Dodson’s remains were eventually found, even though she had previously
repeatedly told them she could not identify anyone. Id. at ¶¶ 38, 41. Pittman’s
affidavit further states that the police threatened to arrest her if she did not identify
Gaskins in court at his preliminary hearing. Id.
According to the Complaint, these were not idle threats as Pittman had an
extensive criminal history1 and was actively addicted to illegal drugs. Id. at ¶ 65.
Because of the pressure and her fear of being imprisoned, she identified Gaskins at
his preliminary hearing. Id. at ¶¶ 41, 65-66. After this initial identification, Pittman
again identified him in open court during a suppression hearing and the April 1990
murder trial. Id. at ¶ 41.
The Pittman affidavit, amounting to a recantation of the Commonwealth’s
principal eyewitness testimony, was the primary support for Gaskins’ Post Conviction
Relief Act (PCRA) petition. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541, et seq. A Philadelphia Court of
Common Pleas judge held a two-day PCRA hearing on April 14 and May 12, 2022. At
1 According to the Amended Complaint, Pittman was “arrested for robbery less than one year
before the Dobson murder, and had completed a sentence for a murder conviction only seven years
before.” Pl.’s Am. Compl. at ¶ 65.
the hearing, Gaskins successfully argued his diligence in pursuing his PCRA claims
as well as the merits of those claims. Pl.’s Am. Compl. at ¶ 37. Pittman testified at
the hearing and expressly disavowed her 1990 trial testimony and identification of
Gaskins and credibly testified that she had never seen Gaskins outside of a
courtroom. See id. at ¶¶ 42-43.
Gaskins presented additional testimony from a Pennsylvania Innocence
Project Investigator, John Butler (Butler), and an expert witness, Professor Jules
Epstein (Epstein). In 2019 Butler visited and took updated photos of the area around
the 1989 crime scene and examined photos from the original investigation file. With
this foundation, he testified regarding Pittman’s ability to view the suspect at the
time of Dodson’s murder. Id. at ¶¶ 47-50.
Epstein was accepted as an expert in eyewitness identification and presented
testimony regarding certain estimator and system variables that raise the risk of
misidentifications. Epstein testified that these variables would have negatively
impacted Pittman’s ability to identify Gaskins. Epstein further testified that certain
system variables2 could negatively impact the ability of eyewitness Clyburn to testify
accurately as well. Id. at ¶¶ 51-64.
In 2023, the PCRA court granted Gaskins’ petition and vacated his murder
conviction. Unfortunately, the April 14, 2022, testimony of witnesses Pittman and
Butler was either lost or unrecorded due to a technical problem with the Court’s
transcription service. Without this record evidence, and the Philadelphia District
2 Based on the complaint “system variables” refers broadly to the government’s procedures
with respect to eyewitness identifications after a crime but before the trial.
Attorney’s apparent posture on a retrial, Gaskins accepted a plea to third degree
murder. Gaskins was sentenced to time-served and released after more than 30 years
in prison. Id. at ¶ 2-3.
On March 5, 2025, Gaskins filed the instant matter seeking relief under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Philadelphia (City) and individual police officers
(Individual Defendants) James McNesby (McNesby), John Cimino (Cimino), Joe
Walsh (Walsh), Michael Duffy (Duffy), and Chester Koscinski (Koscinski), for alleged
police misconduct in violation of his constitutional rights. Specifically, Gaskins’
Amended Complaint asserts claims for (Count 1) deprivation of liberty without due
process of law and denial of a fair trial, (Count 2) civil rights conspiracy, and (Count
3) failure to intervene against all Individual Defendants. Gaskins’ Amended
Complaint further alleges (Count 4) supervisory liability against Koscinski only and
(Count 5) a municipal liability against the City.
Before this Court are two motions to dismiss – one from the City and a separate
motion from officers McNesby and Walsh, only. Dkts. 31, 32 (hereinafter, City’s
Motion/Brief and Officers’ Motion/Brief, respectively). Defendants’ Motions assert
several grounds for dismissal which are addressed below. Plaintiff has lodged his
responses to each, and the Defendants’ Motions are now ripe for decision.
II. Legal Standard
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, (2009) (internal quotation omitted). The Third
Circuit has a three-step process to evaluate the plausibility of a claimant’s grounds
for relief. Lutz v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 49 F.4th 323, 327 (3d Cir. 2022).
First, the Court observes the elements that the claimant must plead to state a claim.
Id. Second, the Court must disregard any formulaic recitation of the elements of a
claim or other allegations that are “so threadbare or speculative that they fail to cross
the line between conclusory and the factual.” Id. at 327-328 (citation omitted). Third,
the Court takes the remaining allegations and – assuming their veracity – construes
them in the light most favorable to the claimant and draws all reasonable inferences
in their favor. See id. at 328.
III. Gaskins’ municipal claim against the City is adequately pled and
may proceed to discovery
A municipal claim, commonly referred to as a Monell3 claim, may proceed
against a municipality in two ways: (1) the claimant alleges that they were injured
by an unconstitutional policy or custom of the municipality; or (2) the claimant alleges
that their injuries were caused by a failure or inadequacy by the municipality that
reflects deliberate or conscious indifference on the part of the municipality. See
Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105 (3d. Cir. 2019). Gaskins seeks to proceed under
both theories. Notably, Monell claims are generally not amenable to resolution at the
motion to dismiss stage and plaintiffs are entitled to a highly favorable standard of
review. Hicks v. City of Philadelphia, No. CV 22-977, 2023 WL 5278713, at *11 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 16, 2023) (Murphy, J.).
3 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
To proceed under a policy/custom theory, a plaintiff must demonstrate a given
course of conduct so well-settled and permanent as to virtually constitute law. See
Forrest, 930 F.3d at 105-106. The plaintiff must further allege the government’s
policy or custom is the proximate cause of their injury. Est. of Roman v. City of
Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019). “This requires an affirmative link between
the custom and the constitutional violation alleged, which in turn occurs when the
City knew of similar unlawful conduct in the past ... failed to take precautions against
future violations, and that its failure, at least in part, led to [the] injury.” Hicks, 2023
WL 5278713, at *9 (cleaned up).
To proceed under a failure or inadequacy claim, a plaintiff must establish the
municipalities actions amount to “deliberate indifference.” Forrest, 930 F.3d at 106.
This requires a showing that: “(1) municipal policy makers know that employees will
confront a particular situation, (2) the situation involves a difficult choice or history
of employees mishandling, and (3) the wrong choice by an employee will frequently
cause deprivation of constitutional rights.” Id. Allegations of a failure to train,
supervise, or discipline can establish a viable cause of action under this alternative
Monell framework. See Hicks, 2023 WL 5278713 at *9.
a. Policy or custom theory
Gaskins’ Amended Complaint specifically alleges unconstitutional misconduct
on the part of the City, including the use of coercive techniques in interviews, the
fabrication of inculpatory evidence and the fabrication of incriminating statements
from witnesses, suspects, and arrestees by coercion. Pl.’s Am. Compl at ¶ 116. As
evidence of the City’s unlawful customs, Gaskins cites a plethora of similar
investigations – spanning roughly 30 years – alleging similar unconstitutional
misconduct. See id. at ¶ 76.
In its Motion to Dismiss, the City posits that Gaskins cites “temporally and
substantively irrelevant and remote examples of police misconduct that fail to
plausibly state a Monell claim.” City’s Br. at 6. The City further argues that Gaskins’
Amended Complaint fails to plausibly state that the City was deliberately indifferent
toward the specific constitutional violations alleged and that it fails to support a
plausible inference that the City was the moving force behind his harm. Id. at 12, 16.
This Court disagrees. The examples Gaskins cites clearly square with his
assertions regarding Pittman’s affidavit, and PCRA testimony, specifically that the
police repeatedly questioned her after she stated that she did not see the suspect well
and that they threatened her with incarceration unless she identified Gaskins as the
suspect. Pl.’s Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 37-38. Even if this Court were to accept the City’s
position that this sample, viewed in its entirety, is temporally and substantively
irrelevant in light of Gaskins’ specific allegations of misconduct, the Court finds that
investigations beginning in 1980 are sufficiently proximate to Gaskins’ investigation
and trial to infer an awareness on the part of the City of similar unlawful conduct.
See Thomas v. City of Philadelphia, No. CV 17-4196, 2019 WL 4039575, at *19-*21
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2019) (Pratter, J.); cf. Diaz v. City of Philadelphia, 670 F. Supp. 3d
174, 182-183 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (finding alleged unconstitutional conduct that occurred
after decedents death insufficient to demonstrate custom or causation). It cannot be
said that these incidents are so qualitatively dissimilar that when considered in the
aggregate, the City would have been unaware of potential unconstitutional activity
on the part of its officers.4
Gaskins further cites a history of watchdog reporting covering public
investigations of police corruption and misconduct, the likes of which he alleges
caused his wrongful incarceration here.5 Id. at ¶¶ 81-82. According to Gaskins, it
follows that the City would have been on actual or constructive notice of this
unconstitutional misconduct but repeatedly failed to make any meaningful changes.
Id. at ¶¶ 116-117. Based on a reasonable reading of the Amended Complaint, there
are sufficient factual allegations at this stage to support Gaskins’ claim that the City
knew from prior instances that its officers were engaging in the unconstitutional
conduct of coercing false statements and testimony from witnesses.6
4 This Court is hesitant to adopt the City’s narrow view in this regard. See Dennis v. City of
Philadelphia, No. CV 18-2689, 2024 WL 1604207, at *1-*3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 12, 2024) (Sánchez, J.)
(rejecting defendants’ motions in limine seeking to preclude evidence of police misconduct defendants
believed to be too remote or dissimilar) (appeal pending, 3d Cir. Case No. 24-2670).
5 Similar reporting has recently been cited in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to advance
cases to the next stage of litigation. See Hicks, 2023 WL 5278713, at *10; Thomas, 2019 WL 4039575,
at *19 (holding that news reporting combined with other evidence, including expert testimony, was
sufficient to send the pattern of misconduct question to a jury).
6 It is worth noting that this is not the first case brought in this district alleging fabrication of
evidence, generally, to make it past the motion to dismiss stage. See Oliver v. City of Philadelphia,
No. CV 25-197, 2025 WL 1902298, at *11 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 2025) (Beetlestone, C.J.); Hicks, supra;
Maldonado v. City of Philadelphia, No. CV 22-3474, 2023 WL 4685967, at *10 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 2023)
(Murphy, J.); Gladden v. City of Philadelphia, No. CV 21-4986, 2022 WL 605445, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Feb.
28, 2022) (Kearney, J.); Dennis v. City of Philadelphia, 379 F. Supp. 3d 420, 436 (E.D. Pa. 2019), aff'd
in part, appeal dismissed in part, 19 F.4th 279 (3d Cir. 2021).
b. Deliberate indifference theory
In addition to the specific criminal prosecutions cited for Mr. Gaskins’
policy/custom theory, he also points to several other indicators that the Philadelphia
Police Department (PPD) had a pattern or practice of violating constitutional rights
and failed to provide meaningful internal discipline to remediate publicly-known
misconduct on the part of its officers. Pl.’s Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 85, 88. This includes a
reference to a relatively recent Philadelphia Inquirer interview with former PPD
homicide detective Michael Chitwood who suggested that detectives sometimes did
things they should not have done. Id. at ¶ 86. This tends to indicate that training
may have been an issue or that the PPD was deliberately indifferent to this
malfeasance.
Further, Gaskins points to the 39th District Corruption Scandal in the 1990’s
as representative evidence of the City’s awareness and deliberate indifference to
officer misconduct. Id. at ¶¶ 81-82. According to Gaskins these “widespread practices
… of which the [City] has actual or constructive notice, were allowed to flourish
because the [PPD] … declined to implement sufficient training and/or any legitimate”
oversight. Pl.’s Am. Compl. at ¶ 119.
In response, the City asserts that Gaskins’ allegations are too broad, “lack
factual enhancements,” and are generally without factual support sufficient to form
more than conclusory claims. See City’s Br. at 12-16. In particular, the City takes
exception to Gaskins’ broad use of news reporting to support his inference that the
City was aware of unconstitutional conduct. See id. at 13. While this Court
acknowledges that Gaskins has, in some parts of his Amended Complaint, taken a bit
of a scattershot approach, discovery is the appropriate vehicle to narrow the focus.
Additionally, other courts in this district have pointed to the same or similar public
reporting as indicative of a failure to train or deliberate indifference on the part of
the PPD.7 See supra, n.5, (citing Hicks, 2023 WL 5278713, at *10 (collecting cases)).
In light of the foregoing, Gaskins has made a plausible showing that police
officers who were properly trained and supervised would not have violated his
constitutional rights. Accordingly, all aspects of Gaskins’ municipal claim against
the City may proceed to discovery.
IV. Gaskins’ claims against Individual Officers
As an initial matter, in his response to the Officers’ Brief, Gaskins asks this
Court to dismiss his Failure to Intervene claim against the Individual Officers. Pl.’s
Resp. in Opp’n to Officers, at 20 (Dkt. 41-1). Additionally, Koscinski has not moved
to dismiss Gaskins’ supervisory liability claim. Accordingly, the Court does not
engage the merits of these claims.
The balance of Gaskins’ Amended Complaint asserts claims for deprivation of
liberty without due process of law and denial of a fair trial, and a civil rights
conspiracy against all Individual Defendants. Officers McNesby and Walsh move to
dismiss these claims under several theories, including preclusion under the favorable
7 While the Court recognizes that it is up to each individual Plaintiff to properly plead their
cause of action, the Court wonders at which point these cases might establish a preclusive effect on
the City’s ability to defeat these sorts of deliberate indifference claims at this stage.
termination rule established by the Supreme Court in Heck v. Humphrey,8 failure to
sufficiently plead a deliberate deception and civil rights conspiracy claims, and
qualified immunity.
Count 1 of Gaskins’ Complaint is titled “42 U.S.C. § 1983 Deprivation of
Liberty without Due Process of Law and Denial of a Fair Trial under the Fourteenth
Amendment (Against All Individual Defendants)\ [sic].”9 Pl.’s Am. Compl., at ¶¶ 97-
100. Specifically, Gaskins alleges that the Individual Officers, in their capacity as
employees for the City, deprived him of a fair trial through deliberate deception by
way of obtaining false evidence from witnesses Clyburn and Pittman. To state a claim
for deliberate deception, a plaintiff must allege an officer’s “knowing use of false
testimony or other fabricated evidence or from concealing evidence to create false
testimony to secure a conviction.” Dennis v. City of Philadelphia, 19 F.4th 279, 291
(3d Cir. 2021) (emphasis in original).10 To the extent a plaintiff’s claims rely on the
fabrication of evidence, they must show there is a reasonable likelihood that, without
the use of that evidence, they would not have been convicted. See Gladden, 2022 WL
605445, at *6 (citing Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 294 (3d Cir. 2014).
8 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
9 For ease, this Court will refer to Count 1 as the Deliberate Deception claim.
10 Throughout this opinion the Court cites to several iterations of Dennis. There has been a final
judgment rendered in that case, and it is currently on appeal before the Third Circuit at Case Nos. 24-
2596, 24-2670.
a. Gaskins’ claims against the Individual Officers are not barred
under Heck v. Humphrey
The favorable termination rule, commonly referred to as the Heck Doctrine
precludes a plaintiff from recovering on their Section 1983 action in some
circumstances.
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction
or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983
plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed
on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a
state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28
U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a
conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable
under § 1983.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-487 (emphasis in original). Stated differently, courts must
evaluate whether a Section 1983 judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily
imply the invalidity of an extant conviction or sentence – if it would, the complaint
must be dismissed. See id. at 487; see also Herrera v. Agents of Pennsylvania Bd. of
Prob. & Parole, 132 F.4th 248, 255-256 (3d Cir. 2025).
Here, the PCRA court vacated Gaskins’ first-degree murder conviction.
Instead of standing trial, Gaskins then accepted a plea to the lesser charge of third-
degree murder and was sentenced to time served. The Officers argue11 that Gaskins’
third-degree murder conviction for Dodson’s death arises out of the same facts and
circumstances as his vacated first-degree murder conviction for the same. Officer’s
11 The City and Individual Officers McNesby and Walsh are represented by the same counsel
however the City does not make any arguments in its brief with respect to Heck. No one has entered
an appearance as counsel of record for the other Individual Defendants (Cimino, Duffy, and Koscinski).
Br., at 7. Their argument follows that “[u]nder Heck a plaintiff cannot plead guilty
for a murder and then file a lawsuit claiming that the evidence that supports his still-
intact murder conviction is invalid.” Id., at 6 (citing Moore v. Pennsylvania, No. 22-
1945, 2022 WL 7375509, at *3 (3d Cir. Oct. 13, 2022)).
The Court concedes that the Heck Doctrine presents an interesting quandary
in the context of a defendant whose original sentence was properly invalidated, but
who, in the face of a new trial, subsequently pleads to a lesser charge – the elements
of which overlap the original invalid conviction. Neither the Supreme Court nor the
Third Circuit have addressed how Heck applies these so called two-conviction cases.
However, the Third Circuit appears poised to engage this issue directly in the near
term. See Dennis, 3d Cir. Case Nos. 24-2596, 24-2670. In the interim, this Court is
unwilling to part with the common-sense approach applied by the handful of district
courts within this circuit that have had the opportunity to address two-conviction
cases. See Bey v. Hediger, No. CV 24-702, 2025 WL 2636424, at *6-*7 (W.D. Pa. Sept.
12, 2025); Natividad v. Raley, No. CV 22-5061, 2025 WL 1550740, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May
30, 2025) (Pappert, J.); Thomas v. City of Philadelphia, No. CV 24-4914, 2025 WL
607544, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2025) (Pappert, J.); Carson v. City of Philadelphia,
No. CV 23-2661, 2024 WL 3792223, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2024) (Sánchez, J.);
Maldonado, 2023 WL 4685967, at *5-6; Gladden, 2022 WL 605445, at *4-5; Dennis,
379 F. Supp. 3d at 436.
In applying Heck, courts use a two-step inquiry to determine: “(1) what is the
effect, if any, of the particular § 1983 action as well as the second conviction; and (2)
has the conviction or sentence been invalidated[?]” Gladden, 2022 WL 605445, at *4
(citing Dennis, 379 F. Supp at 429) (cleaned up); see also Herrera, 132 F.4th at 256
(explaining Heck’s favorable termination requirement). District courts within this
circuit have explained that fabrication of evidence claims only bear on the conviction
in which the alleged violation occurred and not on a subsequent conviction. Bey, 2025
WL 2636424, at *6. Courts have further understood the subsequent conviction to be
a “clean conviction” – entirely insulated from previous violations because defendants
are aware of those violations when the plead to a subsequent lesser offense. See id.
at *7.
Here, Gaskins’ initial first-degree murder conviction was properly invalidated
by the PCRA court’s vacatur. See Maldonado, 2023 WL 4685967, at *6; see also
Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 49 (2022) (finding that favorable termination does
not require plaintiff to show that criminal prosecution ended with some affirmative
indication of innocence). Whether or not Gaskins’ hand was forced in his subsequent
plea for third-degree murder due to misplaced PCRA testimony is of no moment. It
is a clean conviction on which the alleged violations of his constitutional right to a
fair trial would not bear. Accordingly, Heck does not bar Gaskins’ claims against the
Individual Officers for fabrication of evidence.
Finally, the Court observes that it would be a confounding state of the law for
a municipality or its agents to be able to disclaim Section 1983 liability by presenting
the wrongfully convicted with the Hobson’s choice of: (1) hazard a new trial; or (2)
accept release by way of pleading to a lesser charge – waiving the right to redress for
civil rights violations that precipitated the incarceration in the first place. If this
were so, the municipality would always opt for this sort of procedural immunity in
two-conviction cases – permitting release but shielding itself from liability with the
subsequent “release-plea.” By way of further observation, a criminal defendants
acceptance of a plea prior to a lengthy setntence, after having weighed the costs and
benefits of going to trial, is worlds apart from accepting a plea after decades in prison
when that plea guarantees freedom.
b. Officers McNesby and Walsh are not entitled to Qualified
Immunity on Gaskins’ remaining claims
Gaskins’ only surviving claims against the Individual Officers McNesby and
Walsh are his fabrication of evidence and conspiracy of the same. Qualified immunity
protects government officials performing discretionary functions “from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Halsey,
750 F.3d at 287. A Constitutional right is clearly established when it would be clear
to a reasonable official that what they are doing is violative of that right. Oliver, 2025
WL 1902298, at *6. This tends to require “either closely analogous caselaw
establishing that a defendant’s conduct was unlawful or evidence that the defendant’s
conduct was so patently violative of the right that reasonable officials would know it
to be a violation without guidance from the Court.” Id. (citing Mack v. Yost, 63 F.4th
211, 231-232) (3d Cir. 2023) (cleaned up).
McNesby and Walsh attempt to recast Gaskins’ complaint as alleging a Brady
violation. See Officers’ Br. at 13. Defendants likely do this to move the operative
“established right” date to 1995 – years after Gaskins’ conviction. See Thomas v. City
of Philadelphia, 290 F. Supp. 3d 371, 384 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (Pratter, J.) (observing that
Brady obligations were not clearly established until Kyles v. Whitely, 514 U.S. 419
(1995)). While Gaskins’ Amended Complaint occasionally refers to the “withholding
of exculpatory evidence,” that phrase is always accompanied with allegations that the
officers coerced witnesses and fabricated evidence against him. As discussed above,
Count 1 of Gaskins’ Amended Complaint is best described as a deliberate deception
claim. See supra, n.7. As such, Defendants’ attempt to recharacterize Gaskins’ claims
are unavailing.
The Court will not belabor the qualified immunity analysis in this matter.
Criminal defendants have had a clearly established right to the due process
protection against investigators fabricating inculpatory evidence in furtherance of a
prosecution for decades. See Oliver, 2025 WL 1902298, at *6 (citing Halsey, 750 F.3d
at 295-296); see also Maldonado, 2023 WL 4685967, at *3 n.4. The Officers attempt
to couch Gaskins’ claims as simply alleging inconsistent statements to prosecutors
does not accurately account for the allegations of Pittman’s coercion. Compare Pl.’s
Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 41, 66, with Officers’ Br. at 13-14. In sum, according to both the
Pittman affidavit and testimony from his PCRA hearing, at least some of the
Individual Officers coerced Pittman into lying under oath and employed overly
suggestive identification procedures to solicit Clyburn’s identification of Gaskins as
well. Gaskins posits that this deprived him of a fair trial and led to his incarceration
for over 30 years. These facts, accepted as true, are sufficient to state a claim for
deliberate deception.
c. Gaskins’ civil rights conspiracy claim may proceed to discovery
but claims against Officer Walsh are dismissed without
prejudice
i. Civil Rights Conspiracy Claim
“To state a claim for conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish (1) the
existence of a conspiracy involving state action; and (2) a deprivation of civil rights in
furtherance of the conspiracy by a party to the conspiracy.” Oliver, 2025 WL 1902298,
at *9. (citation omitted). This generally requires a plaintiff to plead the existence of
an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate their constitutional rights. Id. The
complaint must assert the “how, why, or when” of the alleged conspiracy. See id. The
fact that detectives worked on the same case, absent any other allegation, is generally
not enough to infer a meeting of the minds. See Natividad, 2025 WL 1550740, at *12.
First, the Court observes that “[c]ivil rights conspiracy claims normally survive
a motion to dismiss where the constitutional claims do too.” Maldonado, 2023 WL
4685967, at *8 (collecting cases); cf. Thomas, 2019 WL 4039575, at *1 n.2 (denying
summary judgment on conspiracy claims where valid underlying claims survived
summary judgment). However, in his response to the Officers’ Motion to Dismiss,
Gaskins points only to paragraph ¶ 68 of his Amended Complaint in defense of his
conspiracy claim. See Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Officers, at 21. Paragraph 68 asserts
that “all individual Defendants were involved in the Dodson murder investigation …
[and] that all individual Defendants learned of the misconduct alleged above by virtue
of their working on the same investigation and their sharing of information with one
another.” Pl.’s Am. Compl. at ¶ 68.
Gaskins’ conspiracy claim is weakly pled. But in light of the overarching story
told in the light most favorable to Gaskins, primarily through Pittman’s affidavit and
alleged PCRA testimony, Gaskins has plausibly alleged a conspiracy on the part of
the Individual Officers. In paragraph 66 of the Amended Complaint Gaskins asserts
that there were “various interrogations” in which Pittman “was threatened, coerced
and forced to provide false information” and that those interrogations were personally
conducted by McNesby and Cimino. Id. at ¶ 66. The Amended Complaint also asserts
that the Individual Officers recognized the particular leverage they had over her due
to her prior record and drug addiction and only engaged this pressure point after
Pittman’s repeated statements that she did not recognize Gaskins. Id. at, ¶¶ 41, 65.
These sections read together sufficiently contemplate the how, when, and why of the
alleged conspiracy. It will be incumbent on Gaskins to develop sufficient record
evidence through discovery to bring these claims to trial.
ii. Claims against Walsh
On much weaker footing, Gaskins’ Amended Complaint states that detectives
Duffy, Walsh, and Kosinski were involved in “various interrogations of Mr. Clyburn
[in which] they engaged in overly suggestive identification procedures[.]” Pl.’s Am.
Compl. at ¶ 67. While there may have been a meeting of the minds to coerce certain
testimony out of Pittman, alleged constitutional violations vis-à-vis Clyburn’s
interrogations, and subsequent testimony are less obvious. Against this backdrop,
the Court observes that Walsh participated in a single interrogation of Clyburn on
April 27, 1989. Pl.’s Am. Compl. at ¶ 22. Based on this Court’s reading of the
Amended Complaint, officer Walsh was not a party to the repeated suggestive
interviews, but instead only participated in one interview of Clyburn where he
happened to identify Gaskins. Being present at this single interview is not enough
to maintain a cause of action on these facts against Walsh. Accordingly, the
Individual Officers’ Motion is granted as to Walsh only. Because the underlying
constitutional claim against Walsh is dismissed, the attendant civil conspiracy claim
is dismissed as well.
V. Conclusion
By way of review the parties are left with the following: (1) Gaskins’ Monell
claim against the City may proceed to discovery; (2) Gaskins’ claims against Walsh
are dismissed without prejudice; (3) Gaskins’ claims against Individual Officers
McNesby, Cimino, Duffy, and Koscinski may proceed to discovery. The Court
reiterates that this case is in its early stages and that some of Gaskins claims require
him to plead facts that may be outside of his personal knowledge. See Hicks, 2023
WL 5278713, at *11. Plaintiff has much work to do in discovery. If during discovery
record evidence is uncovered that inculpates Walsh in the alleged violations, Gaskins
may seek leave to amend his complaint for the limited purpose of including Walsh.
In conclusion, the City’s Motion to Dismiss is denied in toto and the Officers’
Motion is granted in part and denied in part. An appropriate order will follow.
DATED: October 8, 2025 BY THE COURT:
GAIL WEILHEIMER J.
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