JONES v. United States

Page 1 of 19

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

GAINESVILLE DIVISION

CHARLES ANTHONY JONES,

Plaintiff,

vs. Case No. 1:24cv54-MW-MAF

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

____________________________/

SECOND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION1

Pro se Plaintiff Charles Anthony Jones filed a first amended

complaint, ECF No. 6, on April 11, 2024. Defendant initially filed a motion

to dismiss, ECF No. 15, which was denied, ECF No. 25. Defendant then

filed an answer, ECF No. 26, and the parties were provided a discovery

period. ECF No. 28.

While discovery was ongoing, Defendant filed a motion for summary

judgment, ECF No. 31, seeking judgment as to Plaintiff’s medical

malpractice claim and partial summary judgment on Plaintiff’s abuse claim.

1 The first Report and Recommendation, ECF No. 23, was entered on

Defendant’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 15. The Report and Recommendation was

accepted in part and rejected in part. ECF No. 25.

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Defendant separately filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s discrimination

claim. ECF No. 35. Plaintiff initially filed a combined response in

opposition to both the motion for summary judgment and the motion to

dismiss. ECF No. 39. However, Plaintiff then filed an amended response,

ECF No. 44, to the partial summary judgment motion, ECF No. 31. Plaintiff

was then given additional time in which to file amended responses to the

Defendants’ motions if he desired to do so. ECF No. 45 at 4. Alternatively,

Plaintiff was permitted to stand on the amended responses already filed.

See ECF Nos. 39 and 44.

Plaintiff then filed a second amended response, ECF No. 46, to the

motion for partial summary judgment and an amended response, ECF No.

47, to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. As an amended response

completely replaces a prior response, only those two responses have been

reviewed, ECF Nos. 46-47, in opposition to the two pending motions, ECF

Nos. 31 and 35.

Plaintiff’s Allegations, ECF No. 6

Plaintiff filed this case under the Federal Tort Claims Act [“FTCA”],

see ECF No. 6 at 9 and 13, and asserted three claims: sexual assault and

abuse, discrimination, and medical malpractice. Id. at 7. The claims stem

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from Plaintiff’s June 24, 2022, appointment at the VA medical facility2 in

Gainesville, Florida. Id. at 4. Plaintiff was suffering from a urinary

blockage and the doctor recommended placement of a catheter. Id. at 4-5.

Plaintiff went “to the nurse[‘s] office to get it done,” and a white

female nurse asked Plaintiff if he wanted a male nurse to insert the

catheter. Id. at 5. Plaintiff said yes and the nurse left, returning with “a

black male nurse” who Plaintiff believed would insert the catheter. Id.

However, the female placed the catheter instead. Id. Plaintiff contends

that was against his will and constitutes sexual assault and abuse as the

male nurse stood idly by and “did nothing to stop it.” Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff

claims the nurse sought to inflict pain by “violently” pressing, poking, and

prodding the catheter against his will. Id. at 6. Plaintiff alleged that his

belief that “race had something to do with it,” stating that the white female

nurse “was outraged” because a black man was “telling her what to do.” Id.

2 Plaintiff’s first case concerning this incident was more clear in showing that

Plaintiff “visited a doctor at the VA Hospital in Gainesville, Florida on June 24, 2022.”

Jones v. United States, No. 1:23CV54/MW/ZCB, 2023 WL 6798877, at *1 (N.D. Fla.

Sept. 15, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:23CV54-MW/ZCB, 2023

WL 6795291 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 13, 2023). Plaintiff’s first case was dismissed because he

did not exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing the lawsuit. Id. After doing so,

Plaintiff initiated this second case.

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Plaintiff said the procedure caused “intense bleeding, paid, and scar

tissue” in his penis and he “had to have surgery on [his] bladder and a

superpubic tube3 [sic] had to be placed in [his] bladder.” Id. at 6. Plaintiff

asserted a “medical malpractice” claim “because the nurse was not

competent” to insert the catheter. Id. at 7.

As noted above, Defendant filed both a motion to dismiss, ECF No.

35, and a motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 31. The motion to

dismiss is addressed first.

Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 35

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(1), arguing that Plaintiff’s discrimination claim is barred by sovereign

immunity and should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

ECF No. 35 at 1-2. Defendant contends that the Government’s waiver of

sovereign immunity pursuant to the FTCA does not waive immunity for

claims of constitutional violations. Id. at 5.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges this Court’s

subject-matter jurisdiction to decide Plaintiff’s claim. McElmurray v.

3 The Court takes judicial notice that a “suprapubic urinary catheter” may be

required for patients with severe urinary retention or incontinence issues.

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Consol. Gov't of Augusta–Richmond Cnty., 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir.

2007). Defendant has presented the motion only as a “facial attack.” ECF

No. 35 at 3. In a facial attack4 to subject matter jurisdiction, the Court must

determine if Plaintiff’s complaint “sufficiently alleged a basis of subject

matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint are taken as true for

the purposes of the motion.” Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 733

F.3d 1323, 1335-36 (11th Cir. 2013).

To be clear, in ruling on Defendant’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 35,

the Court has reviewed only the motion, Plaintiff’s amended complaint,

ECF No. 6, and Plaintiff’s response, ECF No. 47. See Douglas v. United

States, 814 F.3d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing to McElmurray, 501

F.3d at 1251 (deciding that a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

was facial because “[t]he district court did not decide any issues of disputed

fact”), and Stalley ex rel. United States v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys.,

Inc., 524 F.3d 1229, 1233 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (deciding that a

subject matter jurisdiction challenge was “a facial attack on the complaint”

4 On the other hand, a “factual attack challenges the existence of subject matter

jurisdiction in fact, and a court is ‘free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the

existence of its power to hear the case.’” Rocha-Jamarillo v. Madrigal, 727 F. Supp. 3d

1370, 1382 (M.D. Ga. 2024) (quoting Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528–29

(11th Cir. 1990)).

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because “the record establishes that the district court considered only the

complaint and the attached exhibits”)). The Court is also mindful that

Plaintiff is a pro se litigant and pro se filings are “held to a less stringent

standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys” and must be “liberally

construed.” Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003).

“The federal government is entitled to sovereign immunity from civil

lawsuits, except to the extent that it consents to be sued.” United States v.

Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538, 100 S. Ct. 1349, 1351 (1980) (cited in Hill v.

United States, No. 23-11970, 2024 WL 1326791, at *1 (11th Cir. Mar. 28,

2024)). “The FTCA provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for tort

claims.” Hill, 2024 WL 1326791, at *1 (citation omitted). The FTCA

“confers on federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction to hear claims

against the United States for money damages ‘caused by the negligent or

wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting

within the scope of his office or employment.’” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)

(quoted in Hill, 2024 WL 1326791, at *1). However, “the United States has

not waived its sovereign immunity under the FTCA” for a discrimination

claim. Philippeaux v. United States, No. 1:18-CV-25238-RNS, 2023 WL

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2266243, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2023), aff'd, No. 23-10968, 2024 WL

750308 (11th Cir. Feb. 23, 2024)).

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has made clear “that ‘a state

tort cause of action is a sine qua non of FTCA jurisdiction,” and that Court

has “dismissed FTCA suits that have pleaded breaches of federal duties

without identifying a valid state tort cause of action.” Zelaya v. United

States, 781 F.3d 1315, 1324 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoted in Philippeaux, 2023

WL 2266243, at *4). Here, Plaintiff has not identified a state tort cause of

action which would support his discrimination claim. Plaintiff’s amended

response, ECF No. 47, argues the facts of his case, but does not address

the necessary state-law tort analog which must be presented to support an

FTCA claim. This Court is unaware of a sufficient analog tort under Florida

law. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s discrimination claim

should be granted and that claim dismissed without prejudice for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. See Philippeaux, 2023 WL 2266243, at *4

(dismissing retaliation and discrimination claims asserted under the FTCA).

Moreover, although not raised by the Defendant, the Court notes that

Plaintiff’s requested relief in this case is for “punitive damages for pain and

suffering and future pain and suffering damages in the amount of 15 million

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dollars . . . .” ECF No. 6 at 7. While not artfully articulated, it is apparent

that Plaintiff’s only request for relief in this case is punitive damages.

Punitive damages, however, “are not available under the FTCA.” Martinez

v. United States, 192 F. App’x 839, 841 (11th Cir. 2006); 28 U.S.C. §

2674.5

Summary Judgment and Partial Summary Judgment, ECF No. 31

Defendant has moved for summary judgment in its favor on Plaintiff’s

medical malpractice claim, and partial summary judgment concerning

Plaintiff’s claim of sexual abuse and assault. ECF No. 31 at 1-2. “The

court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is

proper “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party

who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the

burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106

5 The statute provides in relevant part: “The United States shall be liable,

respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to

the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable

for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.” 28 U.S.C. § 2674.

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S. Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). Here, the parties were

provided adequate time to conduct discovery. See ECF No. 28.

The “party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S. Ct. at 2553. The non-moving

party must then show6 though affidavits or other Rule 56 evidence “that

there is a genuine issue for trial” or “an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325, 106 S. Ct. at 2554; Beard v. Banks,

548 U.S. 521, 529, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2578, 165 L. Ed. 2d 697 (2006).

An issue of fact is “material” if it could affect the outcome of the case.

Hickson Corp. v. Northern Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th

6 "Rule 56(e) . . . requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and

by her own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.' " Owen

v. Wille, 117 F.3d 1235, 1236 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 522 U.S. 1126 (1998)

(quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S. Ct. at 2553) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c),

(e))). The nonmoving party need not produce evidence in a form that would be

admissible as Rule 56(e) permits opposition to a summary judgment motion by any of

the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c). Owen, 117 F.3d at 1236; Celotex,

477 U.S. at 324, 106 S. Ct. at 2553.

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Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Additionally, “the issue of fact must be

‘genuine’” and the non-moving party “must do more than simply show that

there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348,

1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986) (other citations omitted). “The mere

existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless

that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the

case.” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th

Cir. 2003) (quoting Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir.

2000)). All reasonable inferences must be resolved in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256,

1262-63 (11th Cir. 2020), and the Court must decide “whether the evidence

presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or

whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”

Hickson Corp., 357 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477

U.S. 242, 252, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)).

“Summary judgment is not a time for fact-finding; that task is reserved

for trial.” Sconiers, 946 F.3d at 1263 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Tolan v.

Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655-57, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 188 L. Ed. 2d 895 (2014)).

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Put simply, at the summary judgment stage of litigation, a judge must not

“weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter” but should only

determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 249, 106 S. Ct. at 2511 (quoted in Sears v. Roberts, 922 F.3d 1199,

1205 (11th Cir. 2019)).

A. The Medical Malpractice Claim

Plaintiff asserted a medical malpractice claim which, pursuant to the

FTCA, is brought against the United States. ECF No. 6 at 7. “The Federal

Tort Claims Act was designed to provide redress for ordinary torts

recognized by state law.” Stone v. United States, 373 F.3d 1129, 1130

(11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted) (quoted in Chiarino v. United

States, 189 F. Supp. 3d 1371, 1382 (S.D. Fla. 2016)). Medical malpractice

cases are appropriately brought under the FTCA. McCullough v. United

States, 607 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing to Price v. United

States, 775 F.2d 1491, 1494 (11th Cir.1985) (“[A] medical malpractice

claim under the FTCA accrues when the plaintiff is, or in the exercise of

reasonable diligence should be, aware of both [his] injury and its

connection with some act of the defendant.”)).

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Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s FTCA medical malpractice claim

cannot proceed because Plaintiff cannot establish the standard of care or

breach of that standard without expert testimony. ECF No. 31 at 4.

Further, Defendant says that Plaintiff cannot prove that he was damaged

by the nurses’ placement of the catheter without expert testimony. Id. at 7.

Here, Plaintiff’s FTCA medical malpractice claim7 is governed by

Florida law as Plaintiff alleged that a female nurse at the Gainesville VA

facility inserted his catheter and was “not competent to do it.” See 28

U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (liability under the FTCA for “personal injury caused by

the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the

Government” is determined “in accordance with the law of the place where

the act or omission occurred”); see also Jerrett v. United States, No.

5:20-CV-134-KKM-PRL, 2022 WL 599200, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 11, 2022).

“[T]o to prove medical malpractice in Florida, the plaintiff must

establish ‘by the greater weight of evidence that the alleged actions of the

health care provider represented a breach of the prevailing professional

7 Plaintiff’s claim is indeed one of medical malpractice and not ordinary

negligence as he was in the process of receiving medical treatment and services when

he was injured. See Sapp v. United States, No. 1:18-CV-176-AW-GRJ, 2021 WL

4987182, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2021) (distinguishing between medical malpractice and

ordinary negligence).

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standard of care for that health care provider.’” Jerrett, 2022 WL 599200 at

*2 (quoting Fla. Stat. §§ 766.102(1)). “Generally, the standard of care in

medical malpractice cases is determined through expert testimony.”

Lambert v. United States, 198 F. App’x 835, 839 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoted in

Harley v. United States, No. 18-22001-CIV, 2020 WL 11421218, at *3 (S.D.

Fla. Mar. 9, 2020)); see also Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So.2d 278, 281 (Fla.

1995) (“In medical malpractice cases, the standard of care is determined

by a consideration of expert testimony”) (cited in Chirillo v. Granicz, 199

So. 3d 246, 252 (Fla. 2016)). It is only when “the duty and its breach are

so obvious as to be apparent to persons of common experience” that

expert testimony is not required. Chirillo, 199 So. 3d at 252; see also

Jerrett, 2022 WL 599200 at *2. A plaintiff’s “own conclusory allegations

about what the medical record means in the context of the standard of care

are not enough to support his claim.” Jerrett, 2022 WL 599200 at *2

(granting summary judgment in favor of the United States because plaintiff

did not present any expert medical testimony).

Here, Plaintiff claimed that the female nurse negligently inserted a

catheter which caused damage “inside” his penis. ECF No. 6 at 6. He

claimed that the alleged damage required him to have bladder surgery and

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required placement of a “suprapubic tube” in his bladder. Id. Those are

not facts which are apparent or obviously understood to the average

person without testimony from an expert witness. Expert testimony would

be required to establish the propert standard of care in inserting a catheter.

In this case, an Initial Scheduling Order was entered on January 6,

2025. ECF No. 28. It required Plaintiff to initiate arrangements for a

conference with counsel for the Defendant within 30 days, and after

conferral, the parties were required to file a joint report with 14 days of the

conference. Id. at 3. Plaintiff did not provide feedback to opposing counsel

when formulating the Rule 26 Joint Report and discovery plan, so

Defendant submitted a proposed Report unilaterally. ECF No. 29. That

Report was adopted by the Court when the Final Scheduling Order was

entered. ECF No. 30.

Importantly, Plaintiff did not request changes to the deadlines

suggested by the Defendant in the Report, the Initial Scheduling Order, or

to deadlines “required pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

26(a)(2).” ECF No. 29 at 1, 3. Rule 26(a)(1)(C) required Plaintiff to provide

his “initial disclosures” to the Defendant “within 14 days” of the Rule 26(f)

conference. The Initial Scheduling Order required Plaintiff to disclose his

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“expert witnesses and their opinions . . . within 60 days from the date” of

the Initial Scheduling Order. ECF No. 28 at 6. That deadline expired on

March 7, 2025. Plaintiff did not identify an expert witness. ECF No. 31 at

6. Plaintiff also did not dispute that he failed to do so. See ECF No. 46 at

2. Plaintiff merely argues that this “not a definitive reason to dismiss” this

case. Plaintiff is not correct.

“In medical malpractice cases, summary judgment is appropriate

‘when the moving party conclusively demonstrates that the non-moving

party is unable to produce an expert who will testify that the defendant was

negligent.’” Cruz v. United States, 2013 WL 395460 at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan.

31, 2013) (citation omitted) (quoted in Harley, 2020 WL 11421218 at *3

(S.D. Fla. Mar. 9, 2020)); see also Nelson v. United States, 478 F. App'x

647, 648 (11th Cir. 2012) (because the plaintiff “never disclosed a medical

expert,” he “did not support his medical malpractice claim with evidence of

the applicable medical standard of care, and his claim was due to be

dismissed on this basis”); Whittaker v. Sanchez, 2021 WL 4495808, at *3

(11th Cir. Oct. 1, 2021) (affirming grant of summary judgment where

plaintiff “did not present any expert medical testimony to establish the

standard of care that FCC Coleman owed him, so he was unable to show

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that FCC Coleman breached any standard of care, and, as a result, was

unable to establish the elements of medical malpractice”); Jerrett, 2022 WL

599200 at *2 (“because Jerrett has not provided expert testimony on the

standard of care element of his medical malpractice claim, the United

States is entitled to summary judgment”).8 Because Plaintiff has not

disclosed an expert witness, he cannot establish the evidence necessary to

support his medical malpractice claim. Therefore, summary judgment

should be granted in Defendant’s favor as to this claim.

B. The Sexual Abuse Claim

Defendant seeks partial summary judgment as to “a portion” of

Plaintiff’s claim of sexual assault and abuse. ECF No. 31 at 2. Again, the

reason is that Plaintiff has not provided an expert witness and, according to

the Defendant, expert testimony is needed to establish damages. Id. at 8.

Plaintiff alleged that he was “violated and abused” by the nurse who

inserted the catheter into his penis without his consent. ECF No. 6 at 6.

8 The failure to provide an expert opinion would also require dismissal for another

reason; that is - Plaintiff did not comply with pre-suit investigation requirements. In

Florida, medical malpractice law requires a pre-suit investigation to determine if

reasonable grounds exist to proceed with a malpractice action. The pre-suit

investigation requires corroboration through a verified medical expert opinion which

supports the claim. Johnson v. McNeil, 278 Fed. Appx. 866, 871 (11th Cir. 2008); Fla.

Stat. § 766.206(2). There is no indication Plaintiff completed a pre-suit investigation;

otherwise, he would presumably have been able to disclose an expert witness.

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While Plaintiff labeled this as sexual assault and abuse, see ECF No. 6 at

5, the Court recognizes that Plaintiff is a pro se litigant. The claim is more

appropriately deemed to be a claim for sexual battery as explained below

because it necessarily involves touching and physical contact.

“Under Florida law, the elements for a battery claim are ‘(1) the intent

to cause a harmful or offensive contact with another person [ ] and (2) an

offensive contact that directly or indirectly results.’” Brown v. J.C. Penney

Corp., 521 F. App’x 922, 923 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Chorak v. Naughton,

409 So. 2d 35, 39 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)) (quoted in Romero v. Agent Au

Pair, Inc., No. 6:24-CV-1749-JSS-RMN, 2025 WL 2110244, at *3 (M.D. Fla.

July 24, 2025), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Monterroso

Romero v. Franklin, No. 6:24-CV-1749-JSS-RMN, 2025 WL 2369270 (M.D.

Fla. Aug. 14, 2025)). Furthermore, Plaintiff’s claim is for “battery of a

sexual nature” because the touching necessarily occurred on Plaintiff’s

penis and Plaintiff alleged it was against his will. See Romero, 2025 WL

2110244, at *3 (finding the complaint sufficiently stated “a claim for battery

of a sexual nature”); Yule v. Ocean Reef Cmty. Ass’n, No. 19-10138-CIV,

2020 WL 3051505, at *5 (S.D. Fla. June 8, 2020) (concluding the plaintiff

“plausibly alleges claims for battery and sexual assault”). Defendant has

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not shown there is a separate requirement for Plaintiff to demonstrate

physical damages to support such a claim, much less that expert witness

testimony is required. Thus, it is recommended that the motion for partial

summary judgment as to the sexual assault and abuse claim, ECF No. 31,

be denied.

RECOMMENDATION

In light of the foregoing, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that: (1)

the Defendant’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 35, be GRANTED and

Plaintiff’s discrimination claim be DISMISSED without prejudice; (2) that the

motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 31, be GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s

medical malpractice claim; (3) but the motion for partial summary judgment,

ECF No. 31, be DENIED as to the sexual assault/battery claim and this

case be REMANDED to the undersigned for further proceedings.

IN CHAMBERS at Tallahassee, Florida, on September 9, 2025.

S/ Martin A. Fitzpatrick

MARTIN A. FITZPATRICK

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this

Report and Recommendation, a party may serve and file specific written

objections to these proposed findings and recommendations. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A copy of the objections shall be served upon all other

parties. A party may respond to another party’s objections within

fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 72(b)(2). Any different deadline that may appear on the electronic

docket is for the Court’s internal use only and does not control. If a

party fails to object to the Magistrate Judge’s findings or

recommendations as to any particular claim or issue contained in this

Report and Recommendation, that party waives the right to challenge on

appeal the District Court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and

legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.

Case No. 1:24cv54-MW-MAF