Suarez v. Royal Coach FMHC, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT September 09, 2025

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

HOUSTON DIVISION

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Antonio Hernandez Suarez and §

Sanjuana Botella Aldama, §

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Plaintiffs, § Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-00905

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v. §

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Royal Coach FMHC, LLC; Cirrus §

Group, LLC; Fairfax Home §

Holdings Company, LLC; and §

Shamira Navarro, §

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Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

In this personal injury suit, Plaintiffs Antonio Hernandez Suarez and

Sanjuana Botella Aldama filed a motion to remand, asserting that their

inclusion of Sharmia Navarro as a defendant defeats complete diversity under

28 U.S.C. § 1332. See Dkt. 17; see also Dkt. 20 (referral order). After carefully

considering the motion, the response from Defendants Royal Coach FMHC,

LLC, Cirrus Group, LLC, Fairfax Home Holding Company, LLC, and Navarro

(collectively, “Defendants”), Dkt. 18, Plaintiffs’ reply, Dkt. 19, the record, and

the applicable law, it is recommended that the motion to remand be denied,

and that Plaintiffs’ claims against Navarro be dismissed without prejudice.

Background

On June 21, 2023, Suarez was tragically injured when a tree fell through

the roof of his home. See Dkt. 1-1 at 5. The accident left him paralyzed. See

id. Saurez lived at a mobile home park owned by Royal Coach FMHC, LLC.

See id. Royal Coach employed Navarro as a property manager. See id.

Suarez and co-plaintiff Sanjuana Botello Aldama1 filed this suit in state

court, asserting negligence and premises liability claims against Royal Coach,

Fairfax Home Holdings Company, LLC, Cirrus Group, LLC, and Navarro. Id.

at 6-7. Botello Aldama is a citizen of Mexico, Dkt. 22, whereas Royal Coach,

Fairfax Home, and Cirrus Group are citizens of Nevada, Utah, and Delaware

(based on the citizenships of their respective members). See Dkt. 6 at 5-6. But

Suarez maintains that he is a citizen of Texas, see Dkt. 22, the same state

where Navarro is domiciled, Dkt. 6 at 2.

Royal Coach and Fairfax removed the case to this Court based on

diversity jurisdiction, alleging that Navarro was improperly joined. Dkt. 1 at

2-5; see also Dkt. 6 at 2-5 (amended notice of removal). Plaintiffs filed an

amended complaint, Dkt. 7, and then moved to remand, Dkt. 17. In the

interim, Cirrus Group and Navarro were served and joined the other

1 The pleadings do not explain the nature of Suarez and Botello Aldama’s

relationship.

defendants in responding to the motion to remand. See Dkt. 18. Plaintiffs also

filed a reply in support of remand. Dkt. 19. The motion is ripe for resolution.

Legal standard

A defendant can remove to federal court an action that was filed in state

court if the action could originally have been filed in federal court. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1441(a). Federal courts, in turn, are authorized to hear cases that either

(1) involve questions of federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or (2) “where the matter

in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and

costs, and is between ... citizens of different States,” id. § 1332(a)(1).

The removal statute must “be strictly construed and any doubt as to the

propriety of removal should be resolved in favor of remand.” In re Hot-Hed

Inc., 477 F.3d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). “The jurisdictional facts

that support removal must be judged at the time of the removal.” Gebbia v.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 233 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 2000). The party invoking

federal jurisdiction bears the burden to establish that the case is properly

removable. Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 231 F.3d 165, 178 n.25 (5th Cir. 2000).

Any doubts about the propriety of removal are resolved in favor of remand.

Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002).

Analysis

According to the parties’ submissions, both Plaintiff Suarez and

Defendant Navarro are citizens of Texas for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.2

See Dkt. 1 at 2 (notice of removal); Dkt. 22 (Plaintiffs’ disclosure of their

domiciles). Plaintiffs thus assert that the lack of complete diversity defeats

subject-matter jurisdiction and necessitates remand. See Dkt. 17 at 11-13.

Defendants, however, argue that Navarro was improperly joined, such that her

citizenship should be disregarded for jurisdictional purposes.

As explained below, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiffs have no

possibility of recovering on their claims against Navarro. Because Navarro

was improperly joined, Plaintiffs’ motion to remand should be denied.3

2 Defendants now suggest that Plaintiff Suarez may be domiciled in Mexico, rather

than Texas (as he maintains). See Dkt. 23 (disputing Dkt. 22). If so, then both he

and co-Plaintiff Botello Aldama could be citizens of a foreign state, thereby satisfying

the diversity requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). This issue, while an

appropriate subject for discovery, is unnecessary to resolve at this time.

3 Plaintiffs included an extensive foray into “snap removal” under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

See Dkt. 17 at 16-22. Those arguments have nothing to do with the propriety of

removal here. Snap removal merely permits non-forum defendants—here, Royal

Coach and Fairfax—to remove a case on the basis of diversity jurisdiction before a

forum defendant—like Navarro—has been served. See Tex. Brine Co. L.L.C. v. Am.

Arb. Ass’n, Inc., 955 F.3d 482, 485 (5th Cir. 2020) (construing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2)

to require a forum defendant to be both joined and served to render the case non-

removable on the basis of diversity jurisdiction). It also eliminates the need to obtain

consent from defendants who have yet to be served. See Dkt. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A)

(consent necessary from “all defendants who have been properly joined and served”)

(emphasis added). Here, Royal Coach and Fairfax removed this case before Navarro

and Cirrus were served. See Dkt. 1 at 8 (February 28, 2025 notice of removal); Dkt.

17-1 at 2 (March 12, 2025 service on Navarro).

I. Legal standard: Improper joinder

Federal courts have jurisdiction over actions between citizens of different

states that involve an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332. Because Section 1332 requires complete diversity, no plaintiff can

share the same state of citizenship as any defendant. See generally

Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806); Flagg v. Stryker Corp., 819 F.3d 132,

136 (5th Cir. 2016). But there is a narrow exception to the complete diversity

requirement: if a “plaintiff improperly joins a non-diverse defendant, then the

court may disregard the citizenship of that defendant, dismiss the non-diverse

defendant from the case, and exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the

remaining diverse defendant.” Flagg, 819 F.3d at 136.

There are two ways to establish that a non-diverse defendant was

improperly joined: “(1) actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts, or

(2) inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the non-

diverse party in state court.” Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 385 F.3d 568, 573

(5th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendants

invoke the second theory, which requires them to “demonstrat[e] that there is

But as Defendants acknowledge, see Dkt. 18 at 3, snap removal does not override the

requirement that complete diversity of citizenship exist, even between the plaintiffs

and a defendant who has yet to be served. See In re Levy, 52 F.4th 244, 246-47 (5th

Cir. 2022) (per curiam). That is where the improper joinder doctrine comes in. The

dispositive question is whether Navarro, the non-diverse defendant, was improperly

joined, such that her citizenship can be disregarded for jurisdictional purposes.

no possibility of recovery by the plaintiff against [the] in-state defendant ....”

Id.; see also Gasch v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 491 F.3d 278, 281 (5th Cir.

2007) (removing party bears burden of proof).

Because Defendants have not submitted any extrinsic evidence, the

Court will conduct a “Rule 12(b)(6)-type analysis, looking initially at the

allegations of the complaint to determine whether the complaint states a claim

under state law against the in-state defendant,” Navarro. See Smallwood, 385

F.3d at 573; see also Int'l Energy Ventures Mgmt., LLC v. United Energy Grp.,

Ltd., 818 F.3d 193, 208 (5th Cir. 2016) (when evaluating improper joinder, “[a]

federal court must apply the federal pleading standard”). Under this test, if

the claims against Navarro “can survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, there is no

improper joinder.” Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573. Given the “significant

federalism concerns” involved, “all contested factual issues and ambiguities of

state law” must be resolved “in favor of the plaintiff,” and “any doubt about the

propriety of removal must be resolved in favor of remand.” Gasch, 491 F.3d at

281-82 (quotation and footnotes omitted).

II. Navarro was improperly joined because Plaintiffs cannot show

that she owed them a duty of care.

In their notice of removal and in response to the motion to remand,

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs cannot recover on their negligence-based

claims against Navarro because Navarro owed no duty of care apart from her

role as Royal Coach’s employee. See Dkt. 1 at 2-5; Dkt. 18 at 5-8. Plaintiffs

dispute that position, arguing that they have sued Navarro for “her own

personal acts and omissions that proximately caused Plaintiffs’ injuries.” Dkt.

19 at 8. Whether Navarro owed a duty of care presents a question of law. See

Tri v. J.T.T., 162 S.W.3d 552, 563 & n.25 (Tex. 2005) (citing Humble Sand &

Gravel, Inc. v. Gomez, 146 S.W.3d 170 (Tex. 2004)).

In Texas, an individual officer or agent is not categorically immunized

from liability for negligence merely because she was performing work for an

employer. See Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. 1996). But such

“individual liability arises only when the officer or agent owes an independent

duty of reasonable care to the injured party apart from the employer’s duty.”

Id. (emphasis added). This limitation applies equally to premises liability

claims. See Tri, 162 S.W.3d at 562.

Many courts within this Circuit have rejected claims against non-diverse

defendant employees absent allegations that they “personally directed or

participated in any of the allegedly negligent acts.” See Byars v. Walmart Inc.,

2023 WL 4485934, at *4 (N.D. Tex. July 10, 2023) (rejecting claims against

store manager); see also, e.g., Monreal v. Walmart Inc., 2022 WL 500588 (S.D.

Tex. Feb. 18, 2022) (denying motion to remand because the plaintiff failed to

state a viable claim against a store manager based solely on the manager's

employment); Gipson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2008 WL 4844206, at *2, 5 (S.D.

Tex. Nov. 3, 2008) (plaintiff who was arrested at a store that allegedly failed to

conduct a proper investigation could not bring a negligence claim against the

employee who accused plaintiff of presenting fake money orders); Bourne v.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 2d 828, 838 (E.D. Tex. 2008) (rejecting

contention that store manager owed the plaintiff a duty of care independent

from the store’s duty). This case is no exception.

Plaintiff’s amended complaint asserts that, before the accident, other

tenants had told Navarro about the dangers posed by the tree and asked her

to remove it, but Navarro “failed to take corrective action ....”4 Dkt. 7 at 4, 7.

There is no allegation that that Navarro “personally create[d] a dangerous

situation” that caused injury. In re Butt, 495 S.W.3d 455, 466 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi 2016, no pet.). Nor is there any indication that Navarro took

actions that caused the tree to fall. Although Plaintiffs tout Navarro’s role as

“property manager with property maintenance and safety oversight

responsibilities,” Dkt. 19 at 8, that underscores why Navarro’s duties are not

independent from but instead derive solely from her employment. See

Schaeffer v. Albertson’s LLC, 2021 WL 4822159, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 15, 2021)

4 The Court may consider the allegations in the amended complaint, at least to the

extent they merely “‘clarify’ [Plaintiff’s] already averred jurisdictional allegations

after removal for purposes of an improper joinder analysis.” See Palmquist v. Hain

Celestial Grp., Inc., 103 F.4th 294, 304 (5th Cir. 2024). As noted infra, however, the

Court will disregard Plaintiffs’ addition of new claims after removal. See id. at 302.

(store supervisor’s responsibility to ensure proper maintenance of the systems

that caused injury arose solely from the supervisor’s “capacity as an employee”

of that store); Dougay v. Dolgencorp of Tex. Inc., 2019 WL 13141530, at *3 (E.D.

Tex. Nov. 21, 2019) (store manager’s failures to properly staff and oversee

employees fell within the scope of employment).

Plaintiffs’ characterization of Navarro as “directly involved” with and

“voluntar[ily] undertaking” actions regarding the tree does not change the

result. See Dkt. 7 at 9-10; Dkt. 17 at 26. Those contentions relate to a new

negligent undertaking claim, which was raised post-removal in Plaintiffs’

amended complaint. Compare Dkt. 1-1 at 6-7 (alleging only negligence,

premises liability, and gross negligence against Defendants collectively), with

Dkt. 7 at 8 (asserting new negligent undertaking claim against Navarro).

Under Fifth Circuit law, this Court “will not consider the negligent-

undertaking claim, a theory not raised in state court, in [its] analysis of

whether [Navarro] was improperly joined.” Palmquist v. Hain Celestial Grp.

Inc., 103 F.4th 294, 302 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing Griggs v. State Farm Lloyds, 181

F.3d 694, 700 (5th Cir. 1999)).

Moreover, the negligent undertaking claim is not tenable even if it were

considered.5 A negligent-undertaking duty “is only implicated when the

5 Specifically, Texas has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323, which

states:

complained-of undertaking is an affirmative course of action; liability for a

negligent undertaking cannot be predicated on an omission.” In re First Rsrv.

Mgmt., L.P., 671 S.W.3d 653, 660 (Tex. 2023) (orig. proceeding); see also, e.g.,

Torres v. Pasadena Ref. Sys., Inc., 695 S.W.3d 392, 412 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.) (defendant’s failures to control placement of

scaffolding and to follow its own policies and procedures did not constitute

“affirmative undertakings”). “Nor can liability for negligent undertaking be

predicated on a promise to render a service that is not accompanied by either

performance or reliance on the promise by the injured party.” In re First Rsrv.

Mgmt., L.P., 671 S.W.3d at 660.

According to Plaintiffs, Navarro gave “verbal assurances” to other

tenants and neighbors that the tree would be addressed. See Dkt. 7 at 9. But

Plaintiffs base their claim on Navarro’s failure to follow through by removing

the tree. Such an omission does not qualify as an affirmative undertaking.

One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render

services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the

protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to the

other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable

care to perform his undertaking, if

(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm,

or

(b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the

undertaking.

Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 838 (Tex. 2001) (quoting Restatement

(Second) of Torts § 323 (1965)).

See, e.g., In re First Rsrv. Mgmt., L.P., 671 S.W.3d at 662 (explaining that “an

undertaking duty cannot be predicated on an omission” like defendants’ refusal

to authorize certain actions).

Plaintiffs also allude to Navarro’s prior actions repairing or directing

other unrelated repairs of the property. See Dkt. 7 at 9. Those previous

undertakings did not obligate Navarro to take future actions with respect to

this tree. See Ft. Bend Cnty. Drainage Dist. v. Sbrusch, 818 S.W.2d 392, 397

(Tex. 1991) (“A person’s duty to exercise reasonable care in performing a

voluntarily assumed undertaking is limited to that undertaking, and will not

normally give rise to an obligation to perform additional acts of assistance in

the future.”). In addition, the complaint concedes that Navarro gave

assurances about the tree to individuals other than Plaintiffs, see Dkt. 7 at 9,

which negates the possibility of reliance. See, e.g. In re First Rsrv. Mgmt., L.P.,

671 S.W.3d at 660 (requiring that the “injured party” rely on the defendant’s

“promise to render a service”); Sbrusch, 818 S.W.2d at 396-97 (defendant’s

promise to repair a bridge did not constitute an affirmative undertaking and

was not communicated to plaintiff, which negated reliance).

As a matter of law, Plaintiffs’ allegations do not show that Navarro owed

a duty of care. This forecloses their negligence-based claims against Navarro,

as a matter of law. Plaintiffs’ failure to show a possibility of recovery means

that Navarro was improperly joined in this suit. This Court should deny

Plaintiffs’ motion to remand and dismiss without prejudice all claims against

Navarro. See Intl Energy Ventures Mgmt., L.L.C. v. United Energy Grp., Ltd.,

818 F.3d 198, 209 (5th Cir. 2016) (an improperly joined nondiverse party “must

be dismissed without prejudice’).

Recommendation

For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiffs

Antonio Hernandez Suarez’s and Sanjuana Botello Aldama’s motion to remand

(Dkt. 17) be DENIED, and that their claims against Defendant Shamira

Navarro be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for want of jurisdiction.

The parties have fourteen days from service of this Report and

Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.

R. Civ. P. 72(b). Failure to file timely objections will preclude

appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions, except for

plain error. Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 825

(5th Cir. 2015).

Signed on September 9, 2025, at Houston, Texas.

of Y. 5

hited States Magistrate Judge

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