Kirby v. Buekers

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

DAVID L. KIRBY, III,

Plaintiff, 5:25-cv-362

(ECC/DJS)

v.

KATELYN BUEKERS,

Defendant.

Appearances:

David L. Kirby, III, Plaintiff, pro se

Hon. Elizabeth C. Coombe, United States District Judge:

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Pro se Plaintiff David Kirby filed this civil rights action alleging violations of his right to

due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis

(IFP). Dkt. Nos. 1, 3. This matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Daniel J. Stewart who, on

April 25, 2025, granted Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP and issued a Report-

Recommendation, recommending that Plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed with prejudice. Dkt.

Nos. 6, 7. Plaintiff filed objections to the Report-Recommendation. Dkt. No. 8.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts the Report-Recommendation in its

entirety.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo those portions of the Magistrate Judge’s findings and

recommendations that have been properly preserved with a specific objection. Petersen v. Astrue,

2 F. Supp. 3d 223, 228 (N.D.N.Y. 2012); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). “A proper objection is one

that identifies the specific portions of the [report-recommendation] that the objector asserts are

erroneous and provides a basis for this assertion.” Kruger v. Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd., 976 F. Supp.

2d 290, 296 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (citation omitted). Properly raised objections “must be specific and

clearly aimed at particular findings in the” report. Molefe v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 602 F.

Supp. 2d 485, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citation omitted). “[E]ven a pro se party’s objections to a

Report and Recommendation must be specific and clearly aimed at particular findings in the

magistrate’s proposal.” Machicote v. Ercole, No. 6-cv-13320, 2011 WL 3809920 at *2 (Aug. 25,

2011) (citation omitted). Findings and recommendations as to which there was no properly

preserved objection are reviewed for clear error. Kruger, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 296 (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Defendant Buekers prosecuted Plaintiff in a state-court

criminal action and “used gross coercion video footage of self-incrimination” against Plaintiff at

trial to convict him, in violation of his constitutional rights. Dkt. No. 1 at 4. In his Report-

Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Stewart noted that the doctrine of absolute immunity applies

broadly to shield a prosecutor from liability for money damages in a § 1983 lawsuit. Dkt. No. 7

at 4 (quoting Anilao v. Spota, 27 F.4th 855, 863 (2d Cir. 2022)). He further noted that this

immunity “‘attaches to prosecutorial functions that are intimately associated with initiating or

presenting the State’s case.’” Id. (quoting Harris v. Tioga Cnty., 663 F. Supp. 3d 212, 239

(N.D.N.Y. 2023)) (quotation omitted). Here, recognizing that Plaintiff’s allegations “relate

directly to Defendant’s actions in prosecuting a criminal matter against Plaintiff,” Magistrate Judge

Stewart recommended that the Complaint be dismissed on the basis of absolute immunity. Id. at

5.

Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge Stewart’s recommendation because Defendant “knew

using gross-coercion self-incrimination [sic] to get a[] conviction would lead to violating [his]

rights.” Dkt. No. 8. Plaintiff refers to a week-old injury that he appears to have been on medication

for, presumably at the time the purported self-incriminating video footage was taken. Id.

Nevertheless, even assuming the truth of Plaintiff’s allegations, Magistrate Judge Stewart correctly

determined that the Defendant is entitled to absolute immunity. Defendant’s alleged knowledge

or state of mind does not negate her entitlement to absolute immunity under these circumstances.

See Shmueli v. City of New York, 424 F.3d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 2005) (“prosecutor is shielded from

liability for damages for commencing and pursuing the prosecution, regardless of any allegations

that his actions were undertaken with an improper state of mind or improper motive”); Dory v.

Ryan, 25 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 1994) (prosecutorial immunity covers virtually all acts associated

with the prosecutor’s function, regardless of motivation).

Moreover, even liberally construed, Plaintiff’s allegations do not suggest that Defendant

performed any investigative functions in connection with the “gross-coercion self-incrimination.”

“[P]rosecutors receive only qualified immunity when performing ‘administrative duties and those

investigatory functions that do not relate to an advocate’s preparation for the initiation of a

prosecution or for judicial proceedings.’” Simon v. City of New York, 727 F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir.

2013) (quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993)). “Investigation, arrest, and

detention have historically and by precedent been regarded as the work of police, not prosecutors,

and they do not become prosecutorial functions merely because a prosecutor has chosen to

participate.” Id. (interior quotation marks and citations omitted); see Giraldo v. Kessler, 694 F.3d

161, 166 (2d Cir. 2012) (“‘[A]ctions taken as an investigator enjoy only qualified immunity.’”)

(quoting Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 346 (2d Cir. 2000)). “Under a functional approach,

actions are not shielded by absolute immunity merely because they are performed by a prosecutor.

‘A prosecutor’s administrative duties and those investigatory functions that do not relate to an

advocate’s preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings are not entitled

to absolute immunity.’” Giraldo, 694 F.3d at 166 (quoting Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273). Here,

Plaintiff's allegations are specifically tethered to the Defendant’s use of objectionable evidence at

trial to secure a conviction. Because the Complaint fails to allege that Defendant functioned in

any way that would prevent immunity from attaching, the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Stewart’s Report-Recommendation, Dkt. No. 7, is

ADOPTED in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint, Dkt. No. 1, is DISMISSED with prejudice; and

it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to close this case; and it is

further

ORDERED that the Clerk serve a copy of this Order on the Plaintiff in accordance with

the Local Rules.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 8, 2025

fa

Elizabeth C. Coombe

U.S. District Judge