“Judges sometimes err, but this does not show that the procedures are inadequate; it shows only that people are fallible. How often to rerun a search for error is a question to which § 2255 speaks directly”
How later courts described this case
- “Judges sometimes err, but this does not show that the procedures are inadequate; it shows only that people are fallible. How often to rerun a search for error is a question to which § 2255 speaks directly”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION
JESUS RUIZ
Petitioner,
v. Case No. 1:25-cv-1342-JEH
Warden, FCI Pekin,
Respondent.
Order
Before the Court is Petitioner Jesus Ruiz’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1), Motion for Leave to File Document
Under Seal (Doc. 2), Motion to Expedite Petition (Doc. 4), and Motion for Leave to
File Supplemental Brief (Doc. 5). Ruiz has been in prison since 1997 when a federal
jury found him guilty of numerous crimes related to his participation in a deadly
kidnapping scheme designed to collect drug debts. Since then, he has filed
numerous postconviction petitions seeking relief; all have failed and this one fares
no better. For the reasons below, the Court SUMMARILY DISMISSES Petitioner’s
§ 2241 Petition for lack of jurisdiction.
I
A
In 1997, a federal jury convicted Ruiz of conspiracy to commit racketeering
(18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)), conspiracy to commit kidnapping (18 U.S.C. § 1201(c)),
kidnapping resulting in death (18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)), assaulting a federal officer (18
U.S.C. § 111), four counts of violating the Hostage Act, including one count
resulting in death (18 U.S.C. § 1203(a)), and three counts of using a firearm during
and in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). Ruiz v. United States, 990
F.3d 1025, 1027, 1028 (7th Cir. 2021). The indictment listed a different predicate
offense for each of the three § 924(c) counts—specifically, the underlying
conspiracy to commit kidnapping, kidnapping, and assault on a federal officer
charges. Id. The sentencing court sentenced him to seven concurrent life sentences,
a 10-year concurrent sentence, and—for the three § 924(c) convictions—an
additional 45-year consecutive sentence. Two of the seven life sentences were the
result of the judge’s determination that a “death results” enhancement applied,
making life imprisonment the mandatory sentence for those two counts.
Ruiz’s convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Torres v.
United States, 199 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 1999). In 2001, he filed his first Motion to Set
Aside, Vacate, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court
denied the petition, Ruiz v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928 (N.D. Ill. 2006),
and the Seventh Circuit declined to issue a certificate of appealability, Ruiz v.
United States, No. 06-4024 (7th Cir. 2007). Ruiz’s motion included a claim that the
“death results” enhancement which made two life sentences mandatory was
imposed in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2001), but the district
court found the argument procedurally defaulted. Ruiz, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 927.
Ruiz filed a number of other postconviction motions and petitions over the
ensuing decades, all of which were denied.
Notably, in January 2016, Ruiz filed an application for permission to file a
second or successive § 2255, arguing that his § 924(c) convictions were invalid in
light of Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). Ruiz v. United States, 990 F.3d
1025, 1028 (7th Cir. 2021). While his application to file a successive § 2255 motion
was approved, the district court denied the § 2255 motion without reaching the
merits after concluding that any error related to the § 924(c) convictions was
harmless in light of Ruiz’s seven life sentences. Id. The Seventh Circuit affirmed
and agreed that given the unique circumstances of the case the error was harmless:
“[a]bsent some extraordinary and unexpected change in the law with retroactive
application, Ruiz’s seven life sentences will remain in place.” Id. at 1035.
B
Ruiz has now filed this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) on August 14, 2025. Relying on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466 (2000), and Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, (2013), Ruiz argues that
the two life sentences the sentencing judge found were mandatory—one for
kidnapping resulting in death (18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)) and one for violating the
Hostage Act resulting in death (18 U.S.C. § 1203(a))—are unconstitutional because
the “death results” finding was made by the sentencing judge and not the jury.
(Doc 1 at 20–22). He also reiterates his argument from his 2016 successive § 2255
Motion that his three § 924(c) convictions and resulting 45-year consecutive
sentences are invalid. Finally, he argues he is entitled to immediate release under
the “sentencing package rule.” Id. at 31–38.
II
A
In the Court’s discretion, this matter is now before the Court for preliminary
review of the § 2241 petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243 and Rule 1(b) and Rule
4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings for the United States District
Courts. A federal district court, upon receiving a petition for writ of habeas corpus,
must promptly undertake a preliminary review of the petition and dismiss it “[i]f
it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is
not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in
the United States District Courts, Rule 4.
The Court finds that Ruiz’s Petition must be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. As Ruiz acknowledges, generally, federal prisoners who seek to
collaterally attack their conviction or sentence must proceed by way of motion
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the so-called “federal prisoner’s substitute for habeas
corpus.” Camacho v. English, 872 F.3d 811, 813 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Brown v. Rios,
696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012)). Section 2255(h) provides that a federal prisoner
may not bring a second or successive motion challenging his sentence unless (1)
there is newly discovered evidence sufficient to establish the petitioner’s
innocence; or (2) there is a new, retroactive rule of constitutional law that
undermines the petitioner’s conviction. See Mangine v. Withers, 39 F.4th 443, 447
(7th Cir. 2022). Nonetheless, pursuant to § 2255(e), a federal prisoner may petition
under § 2241 if the remedy under § 2255 “is inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).
Ruiz argues that § 2255(e) must apply when a petitioner has (1) already
applied for relief under § 2255; (2) his underlying claim was not previously denied
by the sentencing court on the merits; (3) “none of the § 2255’s subsections provide
jurisdiction to the sentencing court to consider his constitutional claim due to a
structural limitation, such as, the timing in filing which may make [§] 2255
incapable to provide the seeking remedy, and; (4) he is in custody in violation of
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” (Doc. 1 at 13). However,
the Supreme Court has adopted a much narrower framework for § 2255(e), and
has held that “the saving clause does not authorize such an end-run around
[§ 2255(h)].” Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465, 478 (2023). Rather, “the saving clause
preserves recourse to § 2241 in cases where unusual circumstances make it
impossible or impracticable to seek relief in the sentencing court, as well as for
challenges to detention other than collateral attacks on a sentence.” Id.
After Jones, it is unclear what, if any, collateral attacks on a conviction or
sentence will realistically pass through the § 2255(e) gateway, but Ruiz’s argument
that he did not get relief because the Seventh Circuit erred was certainly an
insufficient argument to reach this high bar even before Jones. See Taylor v. Gilkey,
314 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Judges sometimes err, but this does not show
that the procedures are inadequate; it shows only that people are fallible. How
often to rerun a search for error is a question to which § 2255 speaks directly”).
Ruiz may be arguing that combining on his Apprendi/Alleyne claim and his
“sentencing package” argument changes the analysis. He is incorrect, not least of
all because any of these arguments could have been made in his successive § 2255
motion when arguing against the harmlessness analysis. Moreover, to the extent
Apprendi or Alleyne entitled him to relief, Jones makes clear that Ruiz would have
needed to include this claim in his initial § 2255 motion or meet the requirements
for a successive § 2255 motion under § 2255(h). Accordingly, the Court finds that
Ruiz’s claims cannot proceed through the § 2255(e) gateway and the Court
therefore does not have jurisdiction to consider his claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
B
Alternatively, the Court would note that this case could be dismissed as an
abuse of the writ. A petitioner abuses the federal writ of habeas corpus “by raising
a claim in a subsequent petition that he could have raised in his first, regardless of
whether the failure to raise it earlier stemmed from a deliberate choice.” McCleskey
v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 489 (1991). The federal courts generally decline “to entertain
successive petitions under § 2241 or § 2255, unless the law [has] changed or new
facts . . . come to light.” Arnaout v. Marberry, 351 F. App’x 143, 144 (7th Cir. 2009).
For the most part, these claims were already raised and addressed in Ruiz’s
successive § 2255 Motion. Moreover, Ruiz filed a § 2241 Petition in the District
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin in January 2023. See Ruiz v. Keyes, No.
23-cv-00037 (W.D.Wis.). The law has not changed, nor have new facts come to life
since the filing of either of these habeas corpus proceedings. Accordingly, Ruiz’s
Petition here also amounts to an abuse of the writ.
III
For the reasons above, the Court SUMMARILY DISMISSES Petitioner Ruiz’s
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) for lack
of jurisdiction. The Clerk is DIRECTED to issue judgment in favor of the
Respondent.
Petitioner also filed a Motion to Seal (Doc. 2), seeking to seal some of his
exhibits that include a plea agreement from a codefendant. This motion is granted.
Petitioner’s remaining motions (Doc. 4, 5) are DISMISSED as moot. This case is
CLOSED.
It is so ordered.
Entered on October 8, 2025.
s/Jonathan E. Hawley
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE