Davis v. Alabama Bureau of Pardons and Paroles (INMATE 1)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

THOMAS LASHAWN DAVIS, )

AIS # 170984, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:23-CV-725-WKW

) [WO]

ALABAMA BUREAU OF )

PARDONS AND PAROLES; )

GABRELLE SIMMONS, in her )

individual and official capacities; )

DARRYL LITTLETON, in his )

individual and official capacities; )

LEIGH GWATHNEY, in her )

individual capacity; and HAL NASH, )

in his official capacity, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Thomas Lashawn Davis, who currently is incarcerated following the

revocation of his state parole, brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the

Alabama Bureau of Pardons and Paroles, two of its current board members (Gabrelle

Simmons and Darryl Littleton), and the board’s former chair (Leigh Gwathney).1

1 Leigh Gwathney no longer serves as the board’s chair. Her successor is Hal Nash. Accordingly,

pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Hal Nash is substituted as the

defendant for the official-capacity claims. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to amend the caption

as set forth above.

(Doc. # 1.) Plaintiff’s claims arise from the hearing that resulted in the revocation

of his previously granted state parole. (See Doc. # 1 at 2–3.) He seeks the

reinstatement of his parole, the reactivation of his application for a pardon, and

financial compensation for each day of his alleged unlawful imprisonment. (Doc.

# 1 at 4.)

For the reasons to follow, Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed prior to service

of process pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii) and 1915A(b)(1).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Plaintiff, a prisoner, is proceeding in forma pauperis (IFP). (Doc. # 4.) Under

the IFP provisions of § 1915, any complaint filed is subject to mandatory court

review. Because Plaintiff is seeking redress from state governmental officers or

employees, the complaint also is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Sections 1915 and 1915A require the court to dismiss a complaint, or any part of it,

on its own initiative, if the allegations are frivolous, fail to state a claim on which

relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

such relief. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii); § 1915A(b)(1)–(2).2

2 The language in § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii) is nearly identical to the language in § 1915A(b)(1)–(2).

The Eleventh Circuit applies the same standards when evaluating complaints under both statutes.

See Hutchinson v. Wexford Health Servs., Inc., 638 F. App’x 930, 932 (11th Cir. 2016) (per

curiam) (observing that even if the district court had screened the complaint under the wrong

statute, the outcome would be the same because the standards under §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and

1915A(b) are effectively identical). Therefore, this court applies the Eleventh Circuit’s

interpretation of one statute to the other.

A complaint is subject to dismissal “for both frivolousness and failure to state

a claim” if it “lacks even an arguable basis in law.” Toussaint v. U.S. Attorney’s

Off., 2025 WL 2237376, at *3 (11th Cir. Aug. 6, 2025) (per curiam) (quoting Neitzke

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989)). A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law

when it relies on “an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.

Such claims include those where “it is clear that the defendants are immune from

suit” and claims alleging infringement of a legal interest that “clearly does not exist.”

Id. (internal citation omitted).

A court also may dismiss a claim as frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and

§ 1915A(b)(1) as frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in fact. Toussaint, 2025 WL

2237376, at *3 (citing Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)). A

claim lacks an arguable basis in fact “if the facts alleged are clearly baseless, a

category encompassing allegations that are fanciful, fantastic, and delusional.”

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992) (cleaned up).

Moreover, a complaint can be dismissed at the statutory screening stage if it

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This review follows the

same standard governing dismissals for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1320

(11th Cir. 2008). Hence, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(internal quotation marks omitted). The plausibility standard “asks for more than a

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. To meet the plausibility

standard, the plaintiff must plead factual content that “allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

The allegations should present a “plain statement possessing enough heft to show

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557

(2007) (cleaned up). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Furthermore, although pro se pleadings “are held to a less stringent standard

than pleadings drafted by attorneys and are liberally construed,” Bingham v. Thomas,

654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up), the allegations still “must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 557. The court cannot “rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading [by a pro se

litigant] in order to sustain an action.” GJR Invs. v. Escambia Cnty., Fla., 132 F.3d

1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by, Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662.

III. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint was docketed on December 15, 2023.

(Doc. # 1.) On December 6, 2024, the court entered an Order directing Plaintiff to

show cause why his action should not be dismissed for failure to comply with the

Order directing Plaintiff to keep the court informed of any change of address. (Doc.

# 7.) After Plaintiff failed to respond to the Order, the Magistrate Judge

recommended that Plaintiff’s action be dismissed without prejudice. (Doc. # 8.) The

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation was adopted, without objection, by Order

dated March 25, 2025, and Plaintiff’s action was dismissed without prejudice. (See

Docs. # 10 & 11.) On April 21, 2025, Plaintiff’s motion to reinstate his petition, was

docketed. (Doc. # 12.) Thereafter, the court, construing Plaintiff’s motion to

reinstate his petition as a motion to vacate the judgment, reopened this action. (Doc.

# 14.)

B. Plaintiff’s Claims and Requested Relief

The complaint centers on the revocation of Plaintiff’s parole, alleging a

violation of due process rights. Plaintiff claims he was detained on June 8, 2023, for

a parole violation and that a preliminary revocation hearing was held on July 6, 2023.

He asserts that a “final hearing” was not conducted within the twenty business days

required by Alabama Code § 15-22-32(a). Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that he

“was not given the finding of facts for revocation” following the hearing, that he

“[has] yet to receive any documentation of revocation or any type of paperwork from

said hearing,” and that he “only attended the preliminary revocation[,] not the final

hearing when and if one was held.” (Doc. # 1 at 3.) Plaintiff requests an order

reinstating his parole and “reactivat[ing]” his “application for a pardon,” and he

requests financial compensation for each day that he “was unlawfully imprisoned.”

(Doc. # 1 at 4.)

The named Defendants are the Alabama Bureau of Pardons and Paroles

(Bureau), its current board members (Simmons and Littleton), and its former board

chair (Gwathney). While Plaintiff does not specify the capacity in which he sues the

individual Defendants, it is presumed for screening purposes that they are sued in

both their individual and official capacities. Additionally, since Gwathney is no

longer the board’s chair, her successor, Hal Nash, is substituted as Defendant for the

official-capacity claims, in accordance with Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s claims will now be reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and

§ 1915A(b). As explained, all claims fail the statutory screening requirements.

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims Against the Bureau

The Bureau cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, regardless of the relief

sought. First, as an arm of the State of Alabama, the Bureau is not considered a

“person” under § 1983. Stroud v. McIntosh, 2011 WL 6838046, at *3 (M.D. Ala.

Dec. 29, 2011) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)), aff’d,

722 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2013). Second, as a state agency, the Bureau is shielded

from federal lawsuits by the Eleventh Amendment. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S.

781, 781 (1978) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from

entertaining suits by private parties against States and their agencies.”); see also

Fenderson v. Ala. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 2013 WL 1908407, at *1 (M.D. Ala.

May 7, 2013) (“[T]he law is clear that state agencies are absolutely immune from

suit under § 1983.” (citing Pugh, 438 U.S. at 782)). The only exceptions are where

the state has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Pennhurst State Sch. &

Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984), or Congress has abrogated the state’s

immunity, see Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996). “Alabama has

not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity in § 1983 cases, nor has Congress

abrogated it.” Holmes v. Hale, 701 F. App’x 751, 753 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Carr

v. City of Florence, Ala., 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1990)); see also Ala. Const.

Art. I, § 14 (“[T]he State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court

of law or equity.”). Therefore, all claims against the Bureau are subject to dismissal

under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (iii) and 1915A(b)(1). See Selensky v.

Alabama, 619 F. App’x 846, 848 (11th Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of a

prisoner’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint as frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) where

the Eleventh Amendment prevented the lawsuit).

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims Against the Individual Defendants in Their

Official and Individual Capacities for Monetary Damages and Injunctive

Relief

Plaintiff has sued the individual Defendants—Simmons, Littleton, and

Nash—in their official capacities, seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief.

He also has sued Simmons, Littleton, and Gwathney in their individual capacities,

seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief.

1. Official-Capacity Claims for Monetary Damages Against Simmons,

Littleton, and Nash

Simmons, Littleton, and Nash are sued in their official capacities for monetary

damages. “[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit

against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” Will v. Mich.

Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (citation omitted). In other words,

official-capacity lawsuits are “in all respects other than name . . . treated as a suit

against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. 159, 166 (1985). For this reason,

the Eleventh Amendment bars 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions seeking monetary damages

brought in federal court against state officers in their official capacities. See Will,

491 U.S. at 66–71; accord Cross v. State of Ala., State Dep’t of Mental Health &

Mental Retardation, 49 F.3d 1490, 1503 (11th Cir. 1995). And, as already discussed,

Alabama’s Eleventh Amendment immunity has not been waived or abrogated.

Here, Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims for monetary damages against

Simmons, Littleton, and Nash are tantamount to claims against the State of Alabama

itself. Therefore, these claims must be dismissed under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (iii) and 1915A(b)(1)–(2).

2. Individual-Capacity Claims for Monetary Damages Against

Simmons, Littleton, and Gwathney

Simmons, Littleton, and Gwathney are sued in their individual capacities for

monetary damages. Parole board members engage in tasks functionally similar to

those of judges when deciding to grant, deny, or revoke parole. When parole board

members are sued for their inherently adjudicative functions, quasi-judicial

immunity protects them from liability for damages claims in their individual

capacities. See Holmes v. Crosby, 418 F.3d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)

(collecting cases); see also Sultenfuss v. Snow, 894 F.2d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir. 1990)

(per curiam) (“[W]e have long recognized that parole board members are entitled to

quasi-judicial immunity from suits requesting damages based upon the decision to

grant or withhold parole.”) (citing Fuller v. Ga. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 851

F.2d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 1988)); Walrath v. United States, 35 F.3d 277, 281 (7th

Cir. 1994) (“Most federal courts . . . have consistently held that parole board

members are absolutely immune from suit for their decisions to grant, deny, or

revoke parole.”); Henderson v. Gwathney, 2020 WL 4514657, at *2 (M.D. Ala. July

14, 2020) (finding that the defendants were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for

damages in their individual capacities because the plaintiff’s challenge to the parole

revocation was “inextricably intertwined with [the defendants’] decision-making

authority as members of the parole board”), report and recommendation adopted,

2020 WL 4514579 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 5, 2020).

Plaintiff alleges that Simmons, Littleton, and Gwathney failed to follow

required procedures during his parole revocation proceedings. (Doc. # 1 at 3.)

Because the allegations pertain to their adjudicative duties, these Defendants are

protected by quasi-judicial immunity. Therefore, Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims

for monetary damages against Simmons, Littleton, and Gwathney in their individual

capacities must be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) and

1915A(b)(2).

3. Individual-Capacity Claims for Injunctive Relief Against Simmons,

Littleton, and Gwathney

Simmons, Littleton, and Gwathney are sued in their individual capacities for

injunctive relief that aims to reinstate Plaintiff’s parole and reactivate his pardon

application. (Doc. # 1 at 4.) Subject matter jurisdiction over these claims is absent

for lack of Article III standing. “Without redressability, there is no standing.” Gilley

v. Gwathney, 2025 WL 2154305, at *2 (M.D. Ala. July 29, 2025) (collecting cases).

Redressability means that the court’s judgment as to the defendant will compensate

for the plaintiff’s injury, whether directly or indirectly. Lewis v. Governor of Ala.,

944 F.3d 1287, 1301 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (citation omitted). Under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, the law is well-settled that “a plaintiff cannot sue an official in her individual

capacity for injunctive or declaratory relief.” Gilley, 2025 WL 2154305, at *2

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “This is because public officials in

their individual capacities lack the power to comply with equitable orders.” Id.

(citations omitted).

Each of Plaintiff’s demands for injunctive relief can only be accomplished by

public officials acting within their official capacity. Neither Simmons nor Littleton

nor Gwathney, acting in their individual capacities, has the power to take any action

with respect to the board’s parole and pardon decisions. A judgment against these

Defendants in their individual capacities would not compensate for Plaintiff’s

alleged injuries. Therefore, the redressability requirement of Article III standing is

missing, and Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for injunctive relief against Simmons,

Littleton, and Gwathney in their individual capacities must be dismissed for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction and as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and

1915A(b)(1).

C. Review Under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1): Frivolity and

Failure to State a Claim

At this stage of the screening process, the remaining claims are Plaintiff’s due

process claims against Simmon, Littleton, and Nash in their official capacities for

injunctive relief. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989)

(“A state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would

be a person under § 1983 because official-capacity actions for prospective relief are

not treated as actions against the State.” (citation modified)). Plaintiff’s due process

claims are twofold: one addresses the revocation of parole without due process,

while the other concerns the denial of a pardon without due process. Neither claim

survives screening.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 permits private citizens to file lawsuits against state officials

for violations of federal laws. The statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or

other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or

other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

§ 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: first,

he must allege a violation of a right protected by federal laws; and second, he must

allege that the violation was committed by a person acting under color of law. See

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); accord Beaubrun v. Dodge State Prison,

2025 WL 2490396, at *3 (11th Cir. Aug. 29, 2025) (per curiam).

Plaintiff’s claims are based on alleged violations of the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects against deprivations of “life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Plaintiff’s

allegations seek to invoke the deprivation of a liberty interest. Such an interest may

originate from the United States Constitution itself or be established through state

law. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005).

1. Alleged Liberty Interest in Parole Grants and the Heck Bar

a. Liberty Interest: Generally

The United States Constitution does not recognize a liberty interest in the right

to parole. See Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 945 (11th Cir. 2001) (“It . . . is well-

settled that there is no federal constitutional right to parole.” (citing Greenholtz v.

Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (“There is no

constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released

before the expiration of a valid sentence.”))). Additionally, Alabama law has not

created such a liberty interest. See Monroe v. Thigpen, 932 F.2d 1437, 1441 (11th

Cir. 1991) (“[W]e have previously determined that the Alabama parole statute, Ala.

Code § 15-22-26 (1975), does not confer a liberty interest in parole that is protected

by the Due Process Clause because the statute provides that parole may be granted

at the Board’s discretion.”); see also Thomas v. Sellers, 691 F.2d 487, 489 (11th Cir.

1982) (per curiam) (holding that the Alabama parole statute is discretionary, not

mandatory, and does not create a liberty interest (citations omitted)). In short, there

is no liberty interest in the expectation of parole.

Here, though, Plaintiff asserts a liberty interest not merely in the expectation

of parole, but in the parole that was previously granted. This factual distinction

makes a legal difference. Alabama parolees possess a liberty interest in maintaining

their parole status. More than fifty years ago, the United States Supreme Court in

Morrissey v. Brewer underscored the liberty interest a parolee has in his or her

granted parole status. 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). The Court held:

[T]he liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes many of the

core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a ‘grievous

loss’ on the parolee and often on others. . . . By whatever name, the

liberty is valuable and must be seen as within the protection of the

Fourteenth Amendment.

Id. Therefore, once a state grants parole to a prisoner, its revocation of that parole

must comply with federal due process. Id. at 483–90 (explaining the nature of the

informal process required). Additionally, following Morrissey, the Eleventh Circuit

in Ellard v. Alabama Board of Pardons & Paroles held that the Alabama parole

board’s decision to grant parole created a constitutionally protected liberty interest.

824 F.2d 937, 944–45 (11th Cir. 1987).

In this case, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated procedural safeguards

in revoking his parole thus infringing upon his due process rights. He asserts that he

was detained on June 8, 2023, for a parole violation and attended a preliminary

revocation hearing on July 6, 2023. He further contends that a final hearing was not

held within the twenty business days required by Alabama law and that he did not

receive the findings of fact or any related documentation. (Doc. # 1 at 3–4.)

However, he has not claimed that his parole revocation has been “reversed,

expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck

v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489 (1994). Therefore, his claim is “Heck-barred,” as

now will be explained.

b. The Heck Bar

Although Plaintiff’s § 1983 due process claims alleging procedural errors in

his parole revocation proceeding might “come within the literal terms of § 1983,”

the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck precludes such claims. Heck, 512 U.S. at 481.

According to Heck, claims challenging the legality of a prisoner’s confinement

cannot be brought under § 1983 “unless and until the conviction or sentence is

reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas

corpus.” Id. at 489. The relevant inquiry is “whether a judgment in favor of the

plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Id.

at 487. Claims that necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed are

barred by the Heck rule, whether the relief sought is monetary damages, injunctive

relief, or a declaratory judgment. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997).

The Heck rule extends to challenges regarding the fact or duration of parole

revocation. In Green v. McGill-Johnston, the Eleventh Circuit held that Heck barred

the prisoner’s § 1983 claims alleging procedural deficiencies in his parole

revocation. The claims, “if proven true, would have necessarily implied the

invalidity of his parole revocation . . . and his resulting imprisonment.” 685 F. App’x

811, 812 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).

In Heck, the Court also explained that “[h]abeas corpus is the exclusive

remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement

and seeks immediate or speedier release.” 521 U.S. at 481 (citation omitted). The

Court spoke in clear terms, emphasizing that its holding was “den[ying] the

existence of a cause of action” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 489.

Here, a favorable ruling from this court on Plaintiff’s due process claims

raising procedural errors in his parole revocation necessarily would undermine that

revocation and resulting sentence. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts indicating that

his parole revocation or current sentence has been overturned or otherwise

invalidated through appropriate legal action. Hence, Plaintiff’s claims, if proven

true, would necessarily imply the invalidity of his parole revocation and subsequent

imprisonment and are Heck-barred. Accordingly, these claims must be dismissed

under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) and instead must be raised in

a petition for writ of habeas corpus.3

3 During the pendency of this action, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28

U.S.C. § 2241. See Davis v. Simmons, 2:25-cv-365-ECM-SMD (M.D. Ala. May 13, 2025). This

Memorandum Opinion and Order expresses no opinion on the merits or propriety of that petition.

2. Alleged Liberty Interest in a Pardon

Plaintiff’s due process claim seeking reactivation of his pardon application

also does not survive the mandatory screening requirements but for a different

reason. Plaintiff lacks a constitutionally protected liberty interest in securing a

pardon. See Johnson v. Wynne, 2019 WL 7501337, at *5–6 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 9, 2019)

(detailing the reasons the Alabama inmate did not have a “constitutionally protected

liberty interest in receiving a pardon”), report and recommendation adopted, 2020

WL 96579 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 8, 2020). Because Plaintiff is attempting to invoke a

nonexistent liberty interest in parole, this due process claim is frivolous and fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.

319, 327 (1989). Therefore, it must be dismissed under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).

D. Amendment Would Be Futile

Generally, the district court will afford a pro se prisoner an opportunity to

amend his complaint at least once. See Johnson v. Boyd, 568 F. App’x 719, 723 (11th

Cir. 2014). However, a district court is not required to allow an amendment that

would be futile. Jenkins v. Walker, 620 F. App’x 709, 711 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing

Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007)). An amendment is

considered futile, if the complaint, as amended, “would still be properly dismissed.”

Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1133 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing

Cockrell, 510 F.3d at 1310).

Based on the applicable immunity doctrines and the Heck bar, this § 1983

action is not permitted. Any amendment to the § 1983 complaint would not cure

these defects. Accordingly, leave to amend will not be granted.

V. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint fails to survive the mandatory

screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii) and § 1915A(b)(1)–(2) for

these reasons:

(1) All claims against the Alabama Bureau of Pardons and Paroles are

frivolous under §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (iii) and 1915(b)(1);

(2) The official-capacity claims for monetary damages against Simmons,

Littleton, and Nash are subject to dismissal under §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) and

1915A(b)(2);

(3) The individual-capacity claims against Simmons, Littleton, and

Gwathney for monetary damages are subject to dismissal under §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii)

and 1915A(b)(2);

(4) The individual-capacity claims against Simmons, Littleton, and

Gwathney for injunctive relief are subject to dismissal for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and as frivolous under §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 1915A(b)(1);

(5) The Fourteenth Amendment due process claim based on an alleged

liberty interest in his previously granted (now revoked) parole status is barred by

Heck and subject to dismissal under §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1); and

(6) The Fourteenth Amendment due process claim based on an alleged

liberty interest in a pardon is frivolous and fails to state a claim under

§§ 1915(e)(2)(i)–(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED without

prejudice prior to service of process pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii)

and § 1915A(b)(1)–(2).

It further ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall amend the caption as set

forth on page one of this Memorandum Opinion and Order.

Final judgment will be entered separately.

DONE this 8th day of October, 2025.

/s/ W. Keith Watkins

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE