Jose Montanez v. Paula Price

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________________

No. 23-2669

_______________

JOSE MONTANEZ,

Appellant

v.

PAULA PRICE, Health Care Administrator SCI-Huntingdon;

RAJINDER MAHLI, SCI-Huntingdon; GABRIELLE

NALLEY, Physician’s Assistant SCI-Huntingdon;

NURSE MEL; DR. VERNON PRESTON, SCI-Rockview;

RICHARD ELLERS, Healthcare Administrator

SCI-Rockview; DR. DAVID EDWARDS, SCI-Smithfield;

MARY PATTON, SCI-Smithfield; C. WAKEFIELD,

Superintendent SCI-Smithfield; N. DAVIS, Registered

Nursing Supervisor SCI-Huntingdon; JOHN RIVELLO;

WELLPATH CARE; STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 3:22-cv-01267)

District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani

________________

Argued on September 24, 2024

Before: KRAUSE, BIBAS, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: October 8, 2025)

Samuel Weiss

Lilian Novak [ARGUED]

Rights Behind Bars

1800 M Street NW

Front 1 #33821

Washington, DC 20033

Counsel for Appellant

Samuel H. Foreman

Keanna A. Seabrooks [ARGUED]

Weber Gallagher Simpson Stapleton Fires & Newby

6 PPG Place, Suite 1130

Pittsburgh, PA 15222

Counsel for Medical Appellees/Appellees Rajinder

Mahli, Gabrielle Nalley, Dr. Vernon Preston, Dr.

David Edwards, Wellpath Care

Jacob A. Frasch [ARGUED]

Sean A. Kirkpatrick

Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania

Strawberry Square 15th Floor

Harrisburg, PA 17120

Claudia M. Tesoro

Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania

1600 Arch Street

2

Suite 300

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Counsel for Commonwealth Appellees/Appellees

Paula Price, Nurse Mel, Richard Ellers, Mary Patton,

C. Wakefield, N. Davis, John Rivello, Commonwealth

of Pennsylvania

________________

OPINION OF THE COURT

________________

KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

The protections afforded by the Eighth Amendment, the

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et

seq., and the Rehabilitation Act (RA), 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.,

do not stop at the prison gates. So when an inmate, whether

counseled or pro se, claims that prison officials ignored his

serious medical needs and failed to accommodate his

disability, the courthouse doors must be open for a fair hearing.

That was not the case for Appellant Jose Montanez, whose

claims were dismissed with prejudice even though his

complaint, liberally construed, states an Eighth Amendment

claim against several defendants in their individual capacities,

a claim under the RA against Wellpath Care LLC, and a claim

under both the ADA and RA against the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania. As to his other claims, Montanez’s pleading

was insufficient, but his briefs in opposition to the defendants’

motions to dismiss make clear that amendment would not have

3

been futile, so the District Court erred by not granting him

leave to amend. We will therefore affirm the District Court in

part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions to allow

Montanez to amend his complaint in accordance with this

opinion.

I. Factual and Procedural History1

On August 28, 2021, Jose Montanez stood up in his cell

at SCI-Huntingdon and suddenly collapsed, his body numb

from the chest down. Lying on the cell floor, Montanez alerted

a nearby guard to his condition, and the guard soon returned

with another prison officer. Montanez was then forced to “drag

his body over to the cell door” before he was eventually taken

to the medical unit in a wheelchair by Appellee Nurse Melanie

Wagman. App. 37.

Once in the medical unit, Nurse Wagman took

Montanez’s vitals and felt around his legs. She then phoned

Appellee Dr. Rajinder Mahli, who instructed her to move

Montanez from his third-floor cell to a cell on the first floor

and said he would evaluate Montanez the next day. When

Montanez—still paralyzed from the waist down—learned that

he would not be evaluated or treated until the next day, he

1

Evidence adduced in discovery may not support or may

affirmatively disprove the allegations in Montanez’s

complaint. In reviewing the dismissal of a complaint,

however, we must accept the allegations as true. Stringer v.

Cnty. of Bucks, 141 F.4th 76, 84, 90 (3d Cir. 2025). We

therefore recount the facts below as set forth in the complaint,

drawing all reasonable inferences in Montanez’s favor, as

required at this stage. Id.

4

asked to be taken to the hospital, but Nurse Wagman

responded, “you’re not going to the hospital,” and laughed at

the request. App. 38. Nurse Wagman then wheeled Montanez

to the door of his new cell, where she ordered him to “get out

of the wheelchair,” offering him no assistance, forcing him to

drag his limp body “across [his] cell to the bed,” and leaving

him “exhausted and in so much pain.” App. 38.

The next day, Dr. Mahli came to examine Montanez, but

he, too, did not enter the cell, and ordered Montanez to “walk

for him.” App. 38. Montanez was still unable to stand, let

alone walk, so he again dragged his paralyzed body across the

cell floor as Dr. Mahli watched. And when Montanez informed

Dr. Mahli that he was also involuntarily urinating on himself,

Dr. Mahli simply “nodded” and “walked off,” doing nothing to

help Montanez with his sudden paralysis or incontinence. App

38-39.

Montanez was then left alone in his cell in this

condition—paralyzed from his chest to his feet and

uncontrollably urinating on himself—for another three days

before receiving medical attention. At that point, Montanez

was finally given an MRI that revealed spinal cord stenosis and

spinal cord edema, requiring expedited back surgery in

September 2021. Following surgery, Montanez was

transferred to a private rehabilitation facility.

A mere two weeks into rehabilitation and still unable to

stand, Montanez was returned to detention, this time to the

infirmary of a different Pennsylvania state prison,

SCI-Rockview. There, he continued his recovery until he took

a serious fall that caused him intense pain in his spine.

Nonetheless, the doctor on staff, Appellee Dr. Vernon Preston,

5

refused to give him adequate pain medication. An x-ray

revealed that Montanez had herniated a disc in his back in the

fall, but SCI-Rockview’s Healthcare Administrator, Appellee

Richard Ellers, “lied” to his doctor “about the results of the

x-ray” to delay his treatment. App. 39.

Two months later, Montanez was transferred back to

SCI-Huntingdon, where he continued to suffer mobility issues

and intense discomfort from his recent spinal surgery and

subsequent spinal injury. So he requested certain

accommodations, including a double mattress to control his

back pain while sleeping, a cane or crutches to facilitate

walking, stronger medication for pain management, and access

to physical therapy. Those requests were repeatedly denied by

prison personnel.

Eventually, Montanez looked to the courts for relief,

filing a pro se complaint2 in the United States District Court for

the Middle District of Pennsylvania that sought compensatory

and injunctive relief. The Complaint asserted claims under the

Eighth Amendment, Title II of the ADA (Title II), 42 U.S.C.

§ 12132, and Section 504 of the RA (Section 504), 29 U.S.C.

§ 794. The defendants fell into two categories: (1) the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and seven of its employees

(collectively, the Commonwealth Defendants),3 and

2

Montanez filed an initial complaint in August 2022 and an

amended complaint, removing one defendant and adding

another, in January 2023. For ease of reference, we will refer

to the second filing as the “Complaint.”

3

The Commonwealth Defendants include the Pennsylvania

Department of Corrections (Commonwealth) and (1) Paula

6

(2) Wellpath Care LLC (Wellpath), a private company

contracted by the Commonwealth to provide medical services

in its prisons, and four Wellpath employees (collectively, the

Medical Defendants).4

What Montanez was permitted to say about these

defendants and the facts supporting his claims, however, was

Price, the Health Care Administrator at SCI-Huntingdon;

(2) Melanie Wagman, a nurse at SCI-Huntingdon;

(3) SCI-Rockview Healthcare Administrator Richard Ellers;

(4) Mary Patton, an employee at SCI-Smithfield;

(5) SCI-Smithfield Superintendent C. Wakefield; (6) N. Davis,

the registered nurse supervisor at SCI-Huntingdon; and (7)

SCI-Huntingdon Superintendent John Rivello (collectively,

the Individual Commonwealth Defendants).

4

The Medical Defendants include Wellpath and (1) Dr.

Rajinder Mahli; (2) Physician Assistant (PA) Gabrielle Nalley;

(3) Dr. Vernon Preston; and (4) Dr. David Edwards

(collectively, the Individual Medical Defendants). Although

the Individual Medical Defendants are private contractors

employed by a large, for-profit company, their work within the

state prison system makes them state actors subject to suit

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 55

(1988). Unlike the Individual Commonwealth Defendants,

however, the Individual Medical Defendants cannot assert

qualified immunity. Sanchez v. Oliver, 995 F.3d 461, 467 &

n.1 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding that Wellpath employees working

in state facilities are “categorically ineligible for qualified

immunity”); Tanner v. McMurray, 989 F.3d 860, 862 n.1, 870

(10th Cir. 2021) (same); Davis v. Buchanan Cnty., 11 F.4th

604, 622 (8th Cir. 2021) (similar); Clark v. Walker, 865 F.3d

544, 550-51 (7th Cir. 2017) (similar).

7

strictly limited. At the time, the Middle District required pro

se prisoners bringing civil rights claims to file their actions

using a specific, court-issued complaint form. That document,

entitled “FORM TO BE USED BY A PRISONER IN FILING

A CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT IN THE UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF

PENNSYLVANIA,” directed the filer, under the “statement of

claim” section, to “[d]escribe how each defendant is involved,

including dates and places,” and to do so “as briefly as

possible.” App. 33, 36. And by “briefly,” it meant within the

twelve lines provided, or, if prisoners needed to say more, they

could “[a]ttach no more than three extra sheets.” Id. at 36.

Montanez complied, filling out all twelve lines and writing out

exactly three additional pages of allegations.

Not surprisingly, both the Commonwealth Defendants

and the Medical Defendants then moved to dismiss the

Complaint, arguing the allegations were insufficient to state a

claim. Montanez’s briefs in opposition to those motions

included over 50 pages with new factual allegations about the

ordeal he allegedly endured at SCI-Huntingdon,

SCI-Rockview, and SCI-Smithfield since becoming paralyzed

in 2021. But to no avail. The District Court granted the

Commonwealth and Medical Defendants’ motions to dismiss

in full. Limiting its consideration to the “facts . . . expressly

set forth in the . . . [C]omplaint,” the Court concluded that

Montanez failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim because

he did not “allege facts from which it can reasonably be

inferred that” any defendant “exhibited a deliberate

indifference to his medical needs.” App. 8 n.3, 22. It also

dismissed Montanez’s disability law claims on the grounds that

Montanez failed to plausibly allege (1) that he was denied

access to a covered program, service, or activity, as required to

8

state a claim under Title II or Section 504, see 42 U.S.C.

§ 12132; 29 U.S.C. § 794; or (2) that any defendant acted with

deliberate indifference toward his right to be free from

disability discrimination, as required to claim compensatory

damages under those statutes. Finally, the District Court

denied Montanez’s request for leave to amend, concluding that

amendment “would be futile based on the factual and legal

defects identified in” the Complaint. App. 29.

Montanez timely appealed and is now represented by

counsel.

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331 and this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review an order granting a motion to dismiss de novo,

meaning we “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and

determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the

complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Kedra v.

Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 440-41 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting

Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir.

2008)). Because Montanez’s Complaint was filed pro se, we

also must construe it “liberally” and hold it to “less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson

v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Finally, we review a

district court’s denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion

and its determination of futility de novo. U.S. ex rel. Schumann

v. Astrazeneca Pharms. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 849 (3d Cir. 2014).

9

III. Discussion

Montanez raises three claims on appeal. He contends

that the District Court erred by: (1) dismissing his Eighth

Amendment claims; (2) dismissing his disability law claims

under Title II and Section 504; and (3) dismissing the

Complaint with prejudice rather than granting him leave to

amend. We address each claim in turn.

A. Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment requires prisons to provide

humane conditions of confinement, including adequate food,

shelter, clothing, and—as relevant to this appeal—medical

care. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); Estelle,

429 U.S. at 104. An Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate

medical care has both objective and subjective elements: A

prisoner “must show (i) a serious medical need, and (ii) acts or

omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate

indifference to that need.” Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr.

Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).

As for the first element, a medical need is sufficiently

serious if it is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as

requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person

would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”

Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro

(MCCII), 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987) (internal quotation

omitted). As for the second, a prison official acts with

“deliberate indifference” if he knows of the serious medical

need yet disregards it by failing to act reasonably. Farmer, 511

U.S. at 837. That knowledge can be inferred from

circumstantial evidence, including the obviousness of the

10

serious health need, id. at 842, and we have found deliberate

indifference in various contexts, “including where (1) prison

authorities deny reasonable requests for medical treatment, (2)

knowledge of the need for medical care is accompanied by the

intentional refusal to provide it, (3) necessary medical

treatment is delayed for non-medical reasons, and (4) prison

authorities prevent an inmate from receiving recommended

treatment for serious medical needs,” Pearson v. Prison Health

Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 538 (3d Cir. 2017).

Mere negligence, however—even if it constitutes

medical malpractice—falls short of deliberate indifference.

Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). So does

mere disagreement between the prisoner and medical

personnel over the proper course of treatment. Spruill v. Gillis,

372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).

Here, Montanez’s spinal cord stenosis and edema

(which caused paralysis requiring surgery), his sudden

incontinence, and the herniated disc he suffered after falling at

SCI-Rockview easily qualify as serious medical needs. See,

e.g., Durham v. Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 222, 229 (3d Cir. 2023)

(lumbar stenosis is a serious medical need); Spruill, 372 F.3d

at 236 (back condition that caused both “excruciating pain” and

multiple falls was serious medical need); McDaniel v. Syed,

115 F.4th 805, 816, 832-33 (7th Cir. 2024) (prisoner with

“spine and incontinence issues, resulting in significant back

pain and difficulty controlling urination,” had serious medical

needs). Thus, Montanez’s ability to state a claim for

inadequate medical care turns on whether he has sufficiently

pleaded deliberate indifference to any of these serious medical

needs.

11

i. The Medical Defendants

a) The Individual Medical

Defendants

The District Court concluded that Montanez did not

plausibly allege that any Individual Medical Defendant was

deliberately indifferent to his health needs. That

determination, at least as it pertains to Dr. Mahli, was simply

incorrect.

According to the Complaint, Dr. Mahli, despite

knowing that Montanez was suddenly paralyzed and

uncontrollably urinating on himself, provided no medical

treatment and instead abandoned Montanez in this state for

three days. Taken as true, these allegations do not represent

mere disagreement with Dr. Mahli’s “medical judgment” or a

particular “course of treatment.” Montanez v. Price, No.

3:22-CV-1267, 2023 WL 5435616, at *9-*10 (M.D. Pa. Aug.

23, 2023). Rather, where “knowledge of the need for medical

care is accompanied by the intentional refusal to provide that

care,” as alleged here, “the deliberate indifference standard has

been met.” MCCII, 834 F.2d at 346 (citation modified). That

standard can also be met by a defendant abandoning a prisoner

in a condition that unreasonably exposes him to “the threat of

tangible residual injury,” as may be inferred from the

allegations in the Complaint against Dr. Mahli. Spruill, 372

F.3d at 235 (quoting MCCII, 834 F.2d at 346).

On top of stating an Eighth Amendment claim against

Dr. Mahli for inadequate medical care, the Complaint

adequately pleads a second type of Eighth Amendment

violation. Construing Montanez’s pro se Complaint “liberally,

12

as we must,” Durham, 82 F.4th at 230, the facts alleged against

Dr. Mahli—deserting Montanez in his cell with nothing to do

but drag his urine-soaked, paralyzed body around his cell floor

for three days before help arrived—are also sufficient to make

out an unsanitary conditions-of-confinement claim, see Taylor

v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 8 (2020) (per curiam) (forcing prisoner

to live in his excrement for six days obviously violated the

Eighth Amendment); Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 365 (3d

Cir. 1992) (“It would be an abomination of the Constitution to

force a prisoner to live in his own excrement for four

days . . . .”).

Yet while the Complaint states an Eighth Amendment

claim against Mahli, it fails to state such a claim, even when

liberally construed, against the remaining Individual Medical

Defendants—namely, Dr. Preston, Dr. Edwards, and PA Nalley.

As to these defendants, the Complaint alleges (1) that Dr.

Preston denied Montanez “proper or adequate pain

medication” after he fell and herniated his disc; (2) that PA

Nalley refused to give him a double mattress (which Montanez

believed would help his back pain), denied him “stronger pain

medication,” “lied to [him]” about being referred to physical

therapy, and allowed him to “walk around without a cane or

crutches”; and (3) that Dr. Edwards denied his requests for

“stronger pain medication and a double mattress,” and refused

to order an MRI for Montanez’s left hip. App. 39-40. But

those allegations reflect differences in judgment between

Montanez and these medical personnel about appropriate

medical treatment, or at most amount to medical malpractice,

neither of which is cognizable under the Eighth Amendment.

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Spruill, 372 F.3d at 235.

13

b) Wellpath

The District Court correctly determined that Montanez

failed to state a claim under § 1983 against Wellpath. The

Complaint mentions Wellpath once, alleging merely that it is

the “entity contracting the medical staff who is also in this

case.” App. 40. But Wellpath cannot be held vicariously liable

for the acts of its employees—Dr. Mahli, Dr. Preston, Dr.

Edwards, and PA Nalley—under a theory of respondeat

superior. See Natale, 318 F.3d at 583-84. Rather, like

municipalities, private corporations under contract to provide

prison health services are liable only if their policies or

customs caused the constitutional violation. See id.; Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Because

Montanez does not tie any of the alleged Eighth Amendment

violations back to Wellpath’s policies or customs, he has failed

to state a claim against that entity.

* * *

In sum, the District Court erred by dismissing

Montanez’s Eighth Amendment claim against Dr. Mahli.

While it correctly determined that Montanez’s

three-and-a-half-page, handwritten Complaint failed to state

Eighth Amendment claims against Dr. Preston, Dr. Edwards,

PA Nalley, and Wellpath, the District Court erred in dismissing

those claims with prejudice. Instead, as discussed further

below, Montanez should have been granted an opportunity to

amend. See infra Section III.C.

14

ii. The Commonwealth Defendants

The District Court properly dismissed Montanez’s

Eighth Amendment claims insofar as Montanez sought

damages against the Commonwealth and the Individual

Commonwealth Defendants in their official capacities. See

Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989);

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). It erred,

however, in its treatment of the Individual Commonwealth

Defendants in their personal capacities.

a) Nurse Wagman

The District Court dismissed Montanez’s Eighth

Amendment claim against Nurse Wagman, reasoning that the

allegations against her “amount[] to a mere disagreement with

[the] medical treatment” she provided. Montanez, 2023 WL

5435616, at *7. Not so.

After Montanez collapsed and lost sensation from the

chest down, Nurse Wagman allegedly provided no medical

treatment other than briefly feeling around Montanez’s legs.

Nor did she try to diagnose Montanez’s sudden paralysis.

Instead, according to the Complaint, she laughed at his request

to go to the hospital and, after transporting him to his new

first-floor cell, did not help him into his cell and bed. As even

the Commonwealth acknowledged at oral argument, assuming

the truth of Montanez’s allegations, Nurse Wagman simply

“dumped him in [his] cell,” leaving Montanez to drag his limp

body as he crawled across his cell floor. Oral Arg. Transcript

35:18. The Commonwealth itself “[could]n’t defend [that]

decision to make him crawl,” Oral Arg. Transcript 37:3-4,

which unnecessarily exposed Montanez “to the possible risks

15

of a permanent disability or . . . serious injury,” Spruill, 372

F.3d at 237.

That is textbook deliberate indifference. Such conduct,

as described, “entails the obduracy and wantonness that is

proscribed by the Eighth Amendment” and is thus sufficient to

state a claim against Nurse Wagman. Pearson, 850 F.3d at 537,

541 (holding that a prisoner’s claim that a nurse forced him “to

crawl to a wheelchair despite indicating that he was unable to

walk” created a genuine issue of fact as to whether the nurse

“acted with deliberate indifference” to the prisoner’s serious

medical needs).

b) Non-Medical Prison Officials

Non-medical personnel generally will not be found

deliberately indifferent for purposes of an Eighth Amendment

inadequate-medical-care claim unless they have “a reason to

believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their

assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner.” Spruill,

372 F.3d at 236. Put differently, when a “prisoner is under the

care of medical experts . . . , a non-medical prison official will

generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable

hands.” Id.

Here, it is undisputed that Ellers, Price, Rivello,

Wakefield, and Patton are not medical personnel, and that

Montanez was under the care of medical professionals during

his time at FCI-Huntingdon and FCI-Rockview. So to sustain

his Eighth Amendment claims against those five individuals,

Montanez had to allege that they had “reason to believe or

(actual knowledge)” that the medical staff were “mistreating

(or not treating)” him. Id. Even Montanez concedes that he

16

failed to make such allegations as to four of the five, namely,

Price, Rivello, Patton, and Wakefield.5

Ellers is a different story. According to the Complaint,

although Montanez’s x-ray after the fall showed that he had

herniated a disc in his back, Ellers knew and “lied about the

results of the x-ray,” misinforming Montanez’s doctors that the

results were negative and thus preventing Montanez from

receiving timely treatment. App. 39. Those allegations, taken

as true, are sufficient to show that Ellers had “actual knowledge

. . . that prison doctors or their assistants [were] mistreating (or

not treating)” Montanez’s serious medical need. Spruill, 372

F.3d at 236; see also Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197 (deliberate

indifference sufficiently pleaded where defendant knew of

plaintiff-prisoner’s “need for medical treatment” and prevented

him “from receiving [that] treatment” for “a non-medical

reason”).

The District Court thus erred in dismissing the Eighth

Amendment claims against Wagman and Ellers. And although

it correctly determined that Montanez had failed to state claims

against the other Individual Commonwealth Defendants, those

claims, too, should not have been dismissed with prejudice.

See infra Section III.C.

B. Disability Law Claims

For decades, the ADA and the RA have served as “twin

pillars of federal disability discrimination law,” working in

5

Similarly, although Davis is a medical professional at

SCI-Huntingdon, Montanez concedes that he failed to include

any specific allegations as to Davis in the Complaint.

17

tandem to “secure the rights of individuals with disabilities to

independence and full inclusion in American society.”

Berardelli v. Allied Servs. Inst. of Rehab. Med., 900 F.3d 104,

109-10 (3d Cir. 2018). Functionally, the ADA and the RA

impose the “same prohibition,” but they cover different

entities. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. 154, 159

(2017). Along with proscribing discriminatory animus, both

statutes also impose on covered entities an affirmative

obligation to make “reasonable accommodations” for persons

with disabilities so that they can meaningfully access their

programs, services, and activities. Alexander v. Choate, 469

U.S. 287, 301 (1985); see Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509,

532-33 (2004). As then-Judge Jackson has observed, this duty

is at its apex in the prison context “because inmates necessarily

rely totally upon [prisons] for all of their needs while in

custody and do not have the freedom to obtain such services

(or the accommodations that permit them to access those

services) elsewhere.” Pierce v. District of Columbia, 128 F.

Supp. 3d 250, 269 (D.D.C. 2015).

i. Who Can Be Sued Under Title II and

Section 504

Here, the District Court dismissed Montanez’s Title II

and Section 504 claims against all of the defendants—the

Individual Commonwealth Defendants, the Individual Medical

Defendants, the Commonwealth, and Wellpath. In reviewing

that decision, we consider first which defendants, if any, are

subject to suit under either statute.

As relevant here, Title II of the ADA prohibits a “public

entity” from discriminating against disabled people, including

by denying them equal access to their “services, programs, or

18

activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. “Public entity” includes “(A)

any State or local government; (B) any department, agency,

special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or

States or local government; and (C) the National Railroad

Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority.” Id.

§ 12131(1).

Section 504, in contrast, reaches only recipients of

“[f]ederal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). This

“covers those who receive the aid” directly from the federal

government or indirectly through another recipient of that aid.

U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S.

597, 606-07 (1986); see 28 C.F.R. § 42.540(e) (“Recipient

means any . . . public or private entity . . . to which Federal

financial assistance is extended directly or through another

recipient . . . .”). “[F]ederal financial assistance,” in turn,

includes federal grants, loans, non-procurement contracts, and

“reimbursement through Medicare and Medicaid.” Cummings

v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., 596 U.S. 212, 217 (2022);

see 28 C.F.R. § 42.540(f) (defining “Federal financial

assistance” as “any grant, cooperative agreement, loan,

contract (other than a direct Federal procurement contract or a

contract of insurance or guaranty), . . . or any other

arrangement by which” the recipient receives federal funds,

services, or property); 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(h) (similar); 45

C.F.R. § 84.10 (similar). And the purpose for which that

financial assistance was intended is irrelevant because a

recipient of federal financial assistance must comply with

Section 504 in “all of [their] operations,” not just the program

or activity receiving the funding. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)

(emphasis added); see Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,

Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 4, 102 Stat. 28, 29-30 (1988).

19

Given these limitations, the Individual Commonwealth

and Individual Medical Defendants are not subject to suit in

their personal capacities.6 Neither state employees nor

contractors are “public entities,” so they cannot be sued under

Title II. See Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir.

2002) (per curiam) (dicta); see also Stanek v. St. Charles Cmty.

Unit Sch. Dist. No. 303, 783 F.3d 634, 644 (7th Cir. 2015);

Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr., 280 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir.

2001). And because “the individual defendants do not receive

federal aid,” they also cannot be liable under Section 504.

Emerson, 296 F.3d at 190.

The Commonwealth, on the other hand, is a public

entity and receives federal funds, so it is a proper defendant

under both Title II and Section 504. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v.

Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998) (“State prisons fall squarely

within the statutory definition of ‘public entity.’”); Furgess v.

Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 933 F.3d 285, 288-93 (3d Cir. 2019)

(allowing Title II and Section 504 claims against the

Commonwealth to proceed).

As for Wellpath, the results are mixed. There is no

question that it cannot be sued under Title II. Even though

Wellpath contracts with the Commonwealth to perform a

traditional government function—providing medical services

to state prisoners—that alone is not enough to transform a

private corporation into an “instrumentality of a State.” 42

6

Although individuals can be sued for damages in their official

capacities under Section 504 and Title II, these claims are

simply treated as if they are against the public entity or

recipient of federal funds that employs the individual. Durham

v. Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 224 n.11, 227 & n.33 (3d Cir. 2023).

20

U.S.C. § 12131(1); see Edison v. Douberly, 604 F.3d 1307,

1309-10 (11th Cir. 2010) (concluding that a private prison

management corporation operating a state prison is not a public

entity); Green v. City of New York, 465 F.3d 65, 78-79 (2d Cir.

2006) (holding that a private hospital providing services

pursuant to a municipal contract is not a public entity). So the

ADA claim against Wellpath was properly dismissed.

But unless and until discovery establishes otherwise,

Wellpath remains a proper defendant on the Section 504 claim.

Montanez’s Complaint alleges that, on “information and belief,

SCI-Huntingdon [and the] Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections receive[] federal funding,” App. 44, and that

Wellpath is the “Medical Contractor at SCI-Huntingdon,” App.

35. Thus, liberally construed, the Complaint alleges that

Wellpath is an indirect recipient of federal funds. See Smith v.

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 266 F.3d 152, 161 & n.7 (3d

Cir. 2001) (explaining that “an entity may receive federal

financial assistance indirectly and still be considered a

recipient for purposes of Title IX,” which “prohibits

discrimination based on disability in substantially the same

terms” as Section 504). Wellpath disputes this point, but that

cannot be resolved at the motion-to-dismiss stage, where we

21

must accept the allegations as true.7 See Stringer v. Cnty. of

Bucks, 141 F.4th 76, 84, 90 (3d Cir. 2025). As it currently

stands, Wellpath is a proper defendant under Section 504. See

29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(3)(A)(ii) (requiring a “corporation . . . or

other private organization . . . which is principally engaged in

the business of providing . . . health care” to refrain from

disability discrimination in “all of [its] operations” if it directly

or indirectly receives any “Federal financial assistance”).

7

On the one hand, in its answering brief, Wellpath represented

that it does not “receive federal funds.” Medical Appellees’

Answering Br. 20 n.2. On the other hand, that statement

conflicts with court filings and government websites that

indicate Wellpath directly receives federal financial assistance.

See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Distance Learning &

Telemedicine Grants FY 2023, at 4, https://perma.cc/5Y5S-

54A5 (awarding “Wellpath, LLC” a federal grant); see also

Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189, 205 n.16 (3d Cir.

2017) (explaining that we can take judicial notice of “publicly

available [information] on government websites”). In advance

of oral argument, this Court advised the parties to be prepared

to address this issue. But oral argument did not bring clarity.

Instead, Wellpath’s counsel, after initially representing that

Wellpath has never directly or indirectly received federal funds

of any kind, then acknowledged that she could not explain the

public documents to the contrary and that she had not, in fact,

investigated the matter. And after representing that she would

follow up with her client and submit supplemental briefing, she

failed to do so, requiring us, two weeks later, to formally order

Wellpath to submit that briefing. What Wellpath then provided

also failed to engage, much less resolve, the conflict between

its blanket denials and the public records.

22

ii. Montanez States Disability Law Claims

Against the Commonwealth and Wellpath

Except for causation, the substantive standards for

determining liability under Section 504 and Title II are

identical, and the same remedies are available under both

Acts.8 Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 275

(3d Cir. 2014); 29 U.S.C. § 794a (authorizing injunctive relief

and money damages) 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (same). To state a

claim for disability-based discrimination, a plaintiff must show

that: (1) he is a qualified individual; (2) with a disability; (3)

who was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits

of the services, programs, or other activities for which a public

entity is responsible, or was otherwise subjected to

discrimination by a public entity; (4) by reason of his disability.

Harberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 178 (3d Cir. 2018). In this

case, the District Court erred in dismissing the disability law

claims against the Commonwealth and Wellpath because the

Complaint establishes a prima facie case of disability

discrimination.

We agree with the District Court that the first two

elements are satisfied. Montanez, like all state prisoners, is a

qualified individual covered by Title II and Section 504.

Durham, 82 F.4th at 225. And a “disability” is any “physical

or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more

major life activities,” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A), which

8

“[U]nder the RA, the disability must be the sole cause of the

discriminatory action, while the ADA only requires but-for

causation.” Durham, 82 F.4th at 226. This distinction is

irrelevant here, however, because the Complaint establishes

causation under either standard.

23

includes, among other things, “caring for oneself, . . . sleeping,

walking, standing,” id. § 12102(2)(A), and “the operation of a

major bodily function,” such as “functions of the . . . bladder,”

id. § 12102(2)(B). So Montanez’s spinal cord stenosis, spinal

edema, incontinence, and herniated disc undoubtedly qualify

as disabilities. See Durham, 82 F.4th at 225 (“lumbar stenosis”

is a disability).

As to the third element, however, we cannot agree with

the District Court’s conclusion that Montanez “wholly fails to

allege that he was denied or excluded from any services,

programs, or activities.” Montanez, 2023 WL 5435616, at *11.

The phrases “service, program, or activity” under Title II and

“program or activity” under Section 504 are “extremely broad

in scope and include[] anything a public entity does.” Furgess,

933 F.3d at 289 (quoting Disability Rts. N.J., Inc. v. Comm’r,

N.J. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 796 F.3d 293, 301 (3d Cir. 2015));

see also 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1)(A) (defining “program or

activity” under Section 504 as “all of the operations of . . . a

department, agency, . . . or other instrumentality of a State”).

Under this “all-encompassing” definition, Yeskey v. Com. of

Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 118 F.3d 168, 170 (3d Cir. 1997), aff’d sub

nom. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, the Complaint plausibly alleges

that Montanez was denied equal access to at least three

different programs or services.

First, health care is a quintessential service prisons must

provide to prisoners. See Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 210. True, as the

Commonwealth points out, failure to provide adequate medical

care to a disabled inmate does not, on its own, give rise to

24

liability under the ADA or RA.9 Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d

246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he [ADA] would not be violated

by a prison’s simply failing to attend to the medical needs of

its disabled prisoners. . . . The ADA does not create a remedy

for medical malpractice.”). But Montanez alleges not merely

that he was denied specific medical care for his disabilities.

Rather, according to the Complaint, Montanez had to drag his

paralyzed body on two different occasions to get access to

medical care—once to get access to the medical unit on the day

he became paralyzed, and again the next day to reach Dr.

Mahli, who refused to enter his cell to examine him. Put

differently, Montanez alleges he was denied meaningful access

to “medical care” because of his disabilities, which is

cognizable under Section 504 and Title II. See United States v.

Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 157 (2006).

Second, the necessities for hygiene, including, showers,

sinks, and toilets, are basic services prisons must provide. See

id. at 155, 157; Furgess, 933 F.3d at 289-90. According to

Montanez’s Complaint, he was abandoned in his cell for at

least three days, paralyzed and urinating on himself, neither

able to reach a toilet nor given an alternative way to relieve

himself with dignity. This is a textbook example of a disabled

prisoner being denied access to fundamental prison service.

9

Of course, because Title II gives disabled individuals a cause

of action whenever they are denied equal access to “the

services, programs, or activities of a public entity” because of

their disability or “subjected to discrimination by any such

entity,” if a prison’s failure to provide treatment was fueled by

discriminatory animus toward a prisoner’s disability, that

would give rise to liability under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.

25

See McDaniel, 115 F.4th at 823 (“In a prison, qualifying

programs and activities include meals, medical care, showers,

toilets, and the like.”); Shaw v. Kemper, 52 F.4th 331, 334 (7th

Cir. 2022) (“We have no difficulty concluding that a

handicapped-accessible toilet for disabled prisoners amounts

to a service, the denial of which could establish a claim under

either statute.”).

Third, given that all people need sleep, providing

prisoners with accessible beds and “appropriate and adequate

bedding . . . are ‘services’ of” a prison. Pierce v. Cnty. of

Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1224 n.44 (9th Cir. 2008); see Hall v.

Higgins, 77 F.4th 1171, 1181 (8th Cir. 2023) (“[A j]ail’s

toilets, beds, and medical care are a ‘service’ under the

ADA.”). Here, Montanez alleges that, on the first day of his

paralysis, Nurse Wagman, rather than helping him to his bed

or providing him with a handicap-accessible sleeping

arrangement, simply dumped him in his cell and forced him to

drag his paralyzed body across the floor and into his bed. And

when he returned to SCI-Huntingdon after herniating a disc

while recovering from major back surgery, his back

condition—coupled with the lack of adequate pain

medication—caused significant pain whenever he lay on his

single mattress. That, in turn, interfered with his ability to

sleep. But his requests for an accommodation, such as a double

mattress, were repeatedly denied. So construing the Complaint

liberally, Montanez adequately pleaded that he could not

access a bed on the same basis as “able-bodied inmates” and

was denied a reasonable accommodation necessary for him to

sleep without significant pain—“just like able-bodied inmates”

could. Furgess, 933 F.3d at 291.

26

A plaintiff can meet the fourth element of a prima facie

case—discrimination “by reason of his disability”—by

showing invidious discrimination or a failure to provide

reasonable accommodations. Harberle, 885 F.3d at 179-80.

Montanez proceeds down the second path, arguing

persuasively that the Commonwealth and Wellpath had an

obligation to reasonably accommodate his disabilities and that

its repeated failure to do so was the reason he could not

meaningfully access various prison services.

The duty to accommodate is triggered when a disabled

person’s need for an accommodation becomes known, either

because (1) he requests an accommodation or (2) his disability

and concomitant need for an accommodation are open and

apparent. See Chisolm v. McManimon, 275 F.3d 315, 330 (3d

Cir. 2001); Robertson v. Las Animas Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 500

F.3d 1185, 1197-98 (10th Cir. 2007) (collecting cases). Here,

once Montanez suddenly became paralyzed, his disability and

resulting limitations were obvious to prison staff, including Dr.

Mahli and Nurse Wagman. And during his second stint at

FCI-Huntingdon, his accommodation requests, including for

mobility aids and a double mattress or other bedding

accommodations, “were repeatedly refused.” Durham, 82

F.4th at 226. So the Commonwealth and Wellpath had an

affirmative duty to accommodate Montanez, and its failure to

do so was “tantamount to denying [him] access” to those prison

services “on the same basis as other inmates.” Id.

In sum, a prison’s “toilets, beds, and medical care are a

‘service’” or program under Title II and Section 504, and

Montanez has adequately pleaded that he was denied access to

all three by reason of his disability. Hall, 77 F.4th at 1181. The

Complaint therefore states a Title II and Section 504 claim

27

against the Commonwealth and a Section 504 claim against

Wellpath, and the dismissal of those claims was error.

iii. Montanez Has Pleaded Entitlement to

Compensatory Damages

To recover compensatory damages for a Section 504 or

Title II violation, a plaintiff must plead, in addition to the

elements of a prima facie case, that the discrimination was

“intentional” in the sense that it was more than mere disparate

impact. S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729

F.3d 248, 261-62 (3d Cir. 2013). Deliberate indifference

satisfies this requirement, which, in the disability law context,

consists of (1) knowledge that the plaintiff’s federally

protected right to be free from disability discrimination was

likely to be violated, and (2) “failure to act despite that

knowledge.” Id. at 263-65 (emphasis omitted); see also

Furgess, 933 F.3d at 292.

Montanez’s Complaint sufficiently pleads that various

prison and medical staff had the requisite knowledge yet failed

to act. According to the Complaint, for instance, Nurse

Wagman knew Montanez was paralyzed but abandoned him

on the floor of his cell, and Dr. Mahli—despite knowing that

Montanez could neither stand nor walk and was involuntarily

urinating on himself—took no steps to assist or accommodate

Montanez. Likewise, Price, PA Nalley, and Dr. Edwards

allegedly knew of Montanez’s disabilities but denied his

requests for accommodations and did not provide him with any

alternatives. These allegations, if proven, amount to deliberate

indifference. See Durham, 82 F.4th at 226 (prisoner with

“lumbar stenosis” pleaded deliberate indifference by alleging

that “[h]e made numerous prison officials aware that he . . .

28

needed a cane to walk[] and was in severe pain without it” but

“was continuously denied his cane and shower

accommodations”); Furgess, 933 F.3d at 292 (prisoner

successfully pleaded Commonwealth was deliberately

indifferent by alleging medical and prison staff “knew that [he]

required a handicapped-accessible shower” and they “did not

provide him with any accommodation that would allow him to

shower” for months).

The Commonwealth contends that it cannot be liable for

any Title II and Section 504 violations of the Medical

Defendants because they are contractors, not government

employees. But that misapprehends the reach of those

remedial statutes. As our sister circuits have consistently

recognized and as we hold today,10 both their text and purpose

confirm the Commonwealth’s obligation to ensure compliance

10

See, e.g., Marks v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 976 F.3d 1087,

1097-98 (10th Cir. 2020) (explaining that the state prison

“farm[ing] out operations to others . . . would not prevent

liability” under the ADA or RA); Armstrong v.

Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058, 1065-67, 1074 (9th Cir.

2010) (concluding that “even in the absence of a regulation

explicitly saying so,” the “fairest reading” of Title II and

Section 504 required state defendants to ensure private and

local prison operators complied with both statutes because “a

State cannot avoid its obligations under [either Act] by

contracting with a third party to perform its functions”);

Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 286-87 (2d Cir.

2003) (holding that Section 504 imposes “supervisory

liability” on states accepting federal funds to “guarantee that

those it delegates to carry out its programs . . . compl[y] with”

the RA).

29

with Title II and Section 504 even when it contracts out the

operation of their programs, services, or activities to third

parties.

We start with the text.11 Title II’s and Section 504’s

broad language—covering all public-entity “services,

programs, or activities” and “any” federally funded “program

or activity”—contains no exception when such programs,

services, or activities are administered through contractors.

Said differently, Congress wanted to give people with

disabilities an affirmative right to access all covered programs

and services no matter how or through whom the government

or federally funded entity elects to deliver them. Regardless of

the medium of delivery, those programs and services must be

accessible to people with disabilities.

Congress’s use of the “passive voice (‘no qualified

individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability,

be excluded . . .’) only reinforces that conclusion.” A. J. T. v.

Osseo Area Schs., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 279, 605 U.S. 335, 358

(2025) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting 42 U.S.C.

11

Title II states: “[N]o qualified individual with a disability

shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from

participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,

programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to

discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132.

Section 504 likewise provides, in relevant part: “No otherwise

qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason

of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in,

be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination

under any program or activity receiving Federal financial

assistance . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).

30

§ 12132). Here, both statutes “focus[] on an event” that

constitutes a type of prohibited disability discrimination—a

disabled person being excluded from participating in or being

denied the benefits of a covered program, service, or activity

because of their disability—“without respect to a specific

actor.” Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 572 (2009). This

linguistic choice to “pull[] the actor off the stage” reflects

Congress’s “agnosticism” as to who does the excluding or

denial of benefits—be they government employees or

government contractors. Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, 598 U.S.

69, 75-76 (2023).

The second clause of Title II, which goes on to

separately protect people from being “subjected to [disability]

discrimination by any” public entity, 42 U.S.C. § 12132,

demonstrates that “Congress knew how to write . . . a law” that

cabined liability in the way the Commonwealth proposes and

deliberately “did not do so” in the first clause of Title II.

Marietta Mem’l Hosp. Emp. Health Benefit Plan v. DaVita

Inc., 596 U.S. 880, 887 (2022). Thus, as we recently observed

as to Title II, covered entities “may not, directly or through

contractual or other arrangements, utilize criteria or methods

of administration that have the effect of . . . discriminating on

the basis of disability.” Williams v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr.,

117 F.4th 503, 548 (3d Cir. 2024) (citation modified); see also

28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1) (prohibiting a public entity under

Title II from discriminating on the basis of disability “directly

or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements”); 28

C.F.R. §§ 41.51(b)(1), 42.503(b)(1) (same for federal funding

recipients under Section 504).

Finally, the Commonwealth’s attempt to evade the

language of the statutes would also undermine their goals. As

31

“a remedial statute, meant to bring an end to discrimination

against individuals with disabilities in all aspects of American

life,” the ADA “must be construed with all the liberality

necessary to achieve [its] purpose[].” Disabled in Action of Pa.

v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 635 F.3d 87, 94 (3d Cir. 2011).12

Section 504, which we interpret in lockstep, must likewise be

broadly construed to effectuate its remedial purpose of

eliminating disability discrimination wherever federal funds

are involved. 29 U.S.C. § 701(a)-(c); see Yeskey, 118 F.3d at

170 (“Congress has directed that Title II of the ADA be

interpreted in a manner consistent with Section 504 . . . .”).

And state prisons are quintessential covered entities under both

statues: only the states—public entities that receive federal

funds—have the power to incarcerate people in prisons within

their borders.

Yet, as this case illustrates, states often contract with

private companies to provide prison services and programs,

including medical and mental health care, pharmaceutical

services, drug treatment and substance abuse programs,

transportation services, facility operations, vocational

programs, food services, and security. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 35,

App. A (effective Mar. 11, 2011). So if states could evade their

statutory duties merely by outsourcing the operation of such

programs, Title II and Section 504 would become dead letter

within state prisons—an outcome antithetical to Congress’s

“unmistakabl[e]” intent to “include[] State prisons and

prisoners within” the statutes’ coverage. Yeskey, 524 U.S. at

12

See also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (explaining that the ADA’s

“purpose” is to “provide a clear and comprehensive national

mandate for the elimination of discrimination against

individuals with disabilities”).

32

209. And the Commonwealth’s interpretation is not limited to

the prison context. Under the Commonwealth’s reading, a

state could avoid complying with either statute and

simultaneously insulate itself from liability simply by

contracting out the operation of all its programs, services, and

activities and burying its head in the sand. But as the statutory

text and case law make clear, “Congress did not design the

ADA or the RA so that a public entity could forever prevent a

qualified individual with a disability from utilizing a service,

program, or activity.” Hamer v. City of Trinidad, 924 F.3d

1093, 1107 (10th Cir. 2019).

* * *

In short, whether or not they use contractors, states

remain responsible for ensuring that disabled prisoners can

access their prisons’ services, programs, and activities on the

same basis as non-disabled prisoners. See Williams, 117 F.4th

at 548.13 And as applied here, that means the Commonwealth

was “obligated to ensure that [Wellpath and its employees]—

like all other State contractors—complie[d] with federal laws

prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability.” Castle v.

Eurofresh, Inc., 731 F.3d 901, 910 (9th Cir. 2013). It was

therefore error for the District Court to dismiss the ADA and

13

See also 28 C.F.R. § 35.152(a) (Title II applies to “public

entities that are responsible for the operation or management

of . . . correctional facilities . . . either directly or through

contractual, licensing, or other arrangements with public or

private entities, in whole or in part . . . .”); 28 C.F.R. pt. 35,

App. A (“If a prison is occupied by State prisoners and is

inaccessible, the State is responsible under title II of the

ADA.”).

33

RA claims against the Commonwealth and the RA claim

against Wellpath. Those claims, including Montanez’s request

for compensatory damages, survive the motions to dismiss.

C. Leave to Amend

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) directs courts

to grant motions for leave to amend “when justice so requires.”

So leave to amend should be liberally given unless amendment

would be inequitable or futile. Long v. Wilson, 393 F.3d 390,

400 (3d Cir. 2004); Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245. And because

courts have a special obligation to be “more forgiving of pro

se litigants,” Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d

Cir. 2019), this Circuit has a “longstanding policy of allowing

pro se plaintiffs to amend their complaints before the court

rules upon defendants’ motions to dismiss,” Roman v. Jeffes,

904 F.2d 192, 196 n.8 (3d Cir. 1990) (collecting cases).

Despite correctly reciting this standard, the District

Court nonetheless denied Montanez’s request for leave to

amend, concluding that amendment “would be futile based on

the factual and legal defects” in Montanez’s Complaint.

Montanez, 2023 WL 5435616, at *11. This was an abuse of

discretion for two reasons.

First, the inadequacies in Montanez’s pleading largely

stemmed from the Middle District’s own procedures.

Montanez was required to file his complaint on the “FORM

TO BE USED BY A PRISONER IN FILING A CIVIL

RIGHTS COMPLAINT IN THE UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF

PENNSYLVANIA.” App. 33. And at the time, that form

instructed pro se prisoners to state “as briefly as possible the

34

facts of your case,” provided twelve lines on the form in which

to do so, and warned that the prisoner could “[a]ttach no more

than three extra sheets if necessary” to detail his allegations.

App. 36-37. That constraint was particularly problematic for

plaintiffs like Montanez, who were attempting to assert

complex constitutional and statutory civil rights claims against

numerous defendants based on conduct that occurred in

different facilities.

Perhaps recognizing the due process implications of

such a restriction, the Middle District has since eliminated the

page limit.14 But that change was too little, too late, for

Montanez. By forcing him to state his claims in under four

handwritten pages, the Court itself set him up for failure at the

motion-to-dismiss stage, so Montanez should have the chance

to amend as to any potentially viable claims. See Fed. R. Civ.

Pro. 15(a)(2).

Second, this is not a situation where amendment would

be futile.15 Leave to amend is futile if “the complaint, as

amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could

be granted.” Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir.

2000). But as we explained above, even Montanez’s

14

The form now instructs prisoners to include “all the facts you

consider important” and permits them to attach as many

“additional pages [as] needed.” U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Middle

Dist. Pa., Instructions for Filing a Complaint Pro Se, at 8,

https://perma.cc/3T8W-DWTQ.

15

The District Court’s failure to provide any substantive

analysis supporting its futility conclusion also borders on an

abuse of discretion. See Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic

Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 276 (3d Cir. 2001).

35

artificially truncated Complaint stated cognizable claims under

Title II, Section 504, and the Eighth Amendment against some

defendants. Thus, granting him leave to amend to bolster these

claims would not have been futile. See Geness v. Cox, 902

F.3d 344, 361 (3d Cir. 2018) (no futility if plaintiff has already

stated a claim).

Plus, Montanez’s briefs in opposition to the motions to

dismiss included over 50 pages with additional factual

allegations in support of his claims against all named

defendants, including those defendants whom Montanez could

not adequately discuss in his Complaint due to the page limit.

Although these briefs cannot amend the Complaint directly,

see McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083, 1089 (3d Cir. 1992),

they function, in effect, as a proffer of the additional allegations

Montanez could make if permitted, see Gordon v. Kartri Sales

Co., No. 3:17-CV-00320, 2018 WL 1123704, at *3 (M.D. Pa.

Mar. 1, 2018) (collecting cases where courts “granted leave to

amend a pro se plaintiff’s complaint whe[n] the plaintiff has

introduced new facts in his opposition papers” that might be

helpful for stating a claim). And that proffer makes clear that

amendment would not be futile. Weaver v. Wilcox, 650 F.2d

22, 27 (3d Cir. 1981) (“Pro se plaintiffs should be given an

opportunity to amend their complaints unless it clearly appears

that the deficiency cannot be overcome by amendment.”).

Accordingly, denying Montanez leave to amend was an

abuse of discretion and should be corrected on remand.

IV. Conclusion

Pro se complaints—however inartfully pleaded—must

be carefully considered, for while prisoners surrender many

36

liberties upon conviction, the right to access the courts and seek

redress for constitutional and statutory violations is not one of

them. We will therefore (1) reverse the District Court’s

dismissal of Montanez’s Eighth Amendment claims against

Dr. Mahli, Nurse Wagman, and Administrator Ellers, the Title

II and Section 504 claims against the Commonwealth, and the

Section 504 claim against Wellpath; (2) affirm the District

Court’s dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claims against the

Commonwealth and Individual Commonwealth Defendants in

their official capacities, the disability law claims against the

Individual Commonwealth and Medical Defendants, and the

ADA claim against Wellpath; and (3) remand with instructions

to permit Montanez to amend his Complaint.

37