Stancu v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

JOHN STANCU, §

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § No. 3:24-CV-2127-X-BW

§

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT §

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, §

Defendant. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

On March 4, 2025, Defendant Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(“EEOC”) filed a motion to dismiss claims brought by Plaintiff John Stancu, who is

appearing pro se in this case. (See Dkt. No. 16 (“Mot.”).) The EEOC filed an

appendix in support. (Dkt. No. 17 (“D. App.”).) Stancu filed a response in

opposition to the motion on May 5, 2025 (Dkt. No. 26 (“Resp.”)), and the EEOC

filed a reply on May 19, 2025 (Dkt. No. 28). This case has been automatically

referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for case management pursuant to

Special Orders 3-251 and 3-354. (See Dkt. Nos. 1, 7.)

For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends that the District

Judge grant the EEOC’s motion and dismiss this case.

I. BACKGROUND

Stancu alleges that, on August 7, 2023, he filed a workplace discrimination

“complaint” with the EEOC against his employer, Highland Hilton Hotel. (Dkt.

No. 3 at 1 (“Compl.”).) He attached a copy of what he characterizes as the EEOC

complaint, which he acknowledges was actually titled as a “Pre-Charge Inquiry.”

(See id. at 1, 2, 7.1) He avers that his complaint against his employer concerned

allegations of unlawful discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities

Act (“ADA”) by his former employer. (Id. at 2.) Stancu asserts that the EEOC

delayed “the proceedings of said complaint under bogus pretenses and obstructed”

his constitutional and civil rights and, on August 19, 2024, notified him that his pre-

charge inquiry was closed. (Id. at 1, 2.) Stancu alleges that the EEOC closed the

matter under false pretenses and that it “covered up” his former employer’s

retaliation against him. (Id. at 3.) By closing the matter and “refusing” to give him a

right-to-sue letter, Stancu alleges, the EEOC “block[ed]” him from taking legal

action against his employer for workplace discrimination. (Id.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

The EEOC moves for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and,

alternatively, Rule 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges a

federal court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim before it. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(1). Being courts of limited jurisdiction, a federal court must have jurisdiction

conferred by statute vesting the power to adjudicate claims before it. See Texas v.

Travis Cnty., Texas, 910 F.3d 809, 811 (5th Cir. 2018). When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion

1 The undersigned cites the pages of the Complaint by the page number assigned by

the ECF system displayed at the top of each page.

is made in conjunction with other motions to dismiss, the court should in most

instances first address the jurisdictional attack. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d

158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). The burden of establishing that federal jurisdiction exists

“rests on the party seeking the federal forum.” Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d

912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001).

The EEOC alternatively seeks dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted. In deciding a motion to dismiss under

Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191,

205–06 (5th Cir. 2007). Such a motion therefore is “not meant to resolve disputed

facts or test the merits of a lawsuit” and “instead must show that, even in the

plaintiff’s best-case scenario, the complaint does not state a plausible case for relief.”

Sewell v. Monroe City Sch. Bd., 974 F.3d 577, 581 (5th Cir. 2020). A plaintiff must

plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and must plead those facts with enough

specificity “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” id. at 555.

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility

standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. So, “[w]here a complaint

pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the

line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (cleaned up); see also Bryant v. Ditech Fin., L.L.C., No. 23-

10416, 2024 WL 890122, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2024) (unpublished) (“[J]ust as

plaintiffs cannot state a claim using speculation, defendants cannot defeat plausible

inferences using speculation.”).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) does not mandate detailed factual

allegations, but it does require that a plaintiff allege more than labels and

conclusions. And, while a court must accept a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, it

is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Consequently, a

threadbare or formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, will not suffice. See id. And so, “to survive a motion to

dismiss” under Twombly and Iqbal, plaintiffs must “plead facts sufficient to show”

that the claims asserted have “substantive plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely,

and directly events” that they contend entitle them to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby,

Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e)).

“Pro se complaints receive a ‘liberal construction.’ Even so, ‘mere conclusory

allegations on a critical issue are insufficient.’” Brown v. Tarrant Cnty., Texas, 985

F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Carlucci v. Chapa, 884 F.3d 534, 538 (5th Cir.

2018); United States v. Woods, 870 F.2d 285, 288 n.3 (5th Cir. 1989)). And “liberal

construction does not require that the Court . . . create causes of action where there

are none.” Smith v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. 3:12-CV-2465-B, 2013 WL 2291886, at

*8 (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2013).

III. ANALYSIS

Stancu sues the EEOC for allegedly failing to adequately investigate and for

undermining his claims of discrimination and retaliation against his former

employer. The EEOC argues that authority compels a conclusion that the Court

lacks jurisdiction to consider Stancu’s claims.2 After considering applicable

authority, the undersigned agrees. In Gibson v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 579 F.2d

890 (5th Cir. 1978), the Fifth Circuit first recognized that a person may not sue the

agency for its handling of discrimination claims, as “Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964 . . . confers no right of action against the [EEOC].” Id. at 891.

The Fifth Circuit reinforced that conclusion in Newsome v. E.E.O.C., 301 F.3d

227 (5th Cir. 2002), a case that bears considerable similarity to this one. There, a

woman filed a charge of discrimination against her former employer for

discrimination. Id. at 229. After the EEOC determined that the former employer

was not subject to Title VII and dismissed her charge of discrimination, the woman

filed a complaint in federal court against the agency and three of its employees. Id. at

2 Stancu does not address the EEOC’s cited authority in response, nor does he

address dismissal standards or authority. Rather, Stancu’s response largely contains

additional conclusory allegations against the EEOC for mismanaging or suppressing his

claims. Stancu also relies on summary judgment standards that do not apply at the

dismissal stage of the proceedings. (See Resp. at 6.)

229–30. She sought to compel the defendants to investigate her claims and to enjoin

them from interfering with her rights under Title VII and the 14th Amendment. Id.

at 230. The EEOC sought dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, and the district court

dismissed the suit based on frivolity and failure to state a claim. Id. On appeal, the

Fifth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s assertion that Title VII conferred jurisdiction for

the plaintiff’s suit. Id. at 232. Following Gibson, the court noted its recognition that

Title VII “does not confer on a charging party a right of action against the EEOC”

and concluded that the plaintiff’s claims against the EEOC were properly dismissed.

Id. The court further observed that “the United States and its officials are entitled to

sovereign immunity for the civil rights claims brought by [the plaintiff], ‘because the

United States has not consented to suit under the civil rights statutes.’” Id. at 233

(quoting Unimex, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 594 F.2d 1060, 1061 (5th Cir.

1979)).

And in Jones v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, No. 21-10914, 2021

WL 5444736 (5th Cir. Nov. 19, 2021) (unpublished), the Fifth Circuit again affirmed

the dismissal of claims similar to the one Stancu brings here. After an employee

unsuccessfully sued his employer for discrimination and retaliation, he asserts claims

against the EEOC alleging that it failed to timely investigate his prior claims. Id. at

*1. The employee appealed after this Court dismissed the action for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. Id. Applying de novo review on appeal, the Fifth Circuit

observed that “[f]ederal courts have jurisdiction over suits against the United States

and its agencies only to the extent that sovereign immunity has been waived.” Id.

(quoting Charles v. McHugh, 613 F. App’x 330, 332 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing F.D.I.C. v.

Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994))). Relying on Gibson, Newsome, and other caselaw,

the Fifth Circuit explained that only present or former EEOC employees (or

applicants) may sue the EEOC for violations of Title VII. Id. at *2. Because the

employee was instead suing the EEOC for failing to properly investigate his claim of

workplace discrimination against his employer—as Stancu does here—the court

concluded that “it was proper for the district court to dismiss [the plaintiff’s] Title VII

claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id.

These authorities make clear that the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain

Stancu’s claim that the EEOC mishandled his charge of discrimination against his

former employer. The District Judge, therefore, should grant the EEOC’s motion

and dismiss this action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

Alternatively, the District Judge may dismiss Stancu’s claim against the

EEOC for failure to state a claim. In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court

limits its review to the face of the pleadings. See Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772,

774 (5th Cir. 1999). The pleadings include the complaint and any documents

attached to it. Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir.

2000). Stancu attached a copy of the pre-charge inquiry he submitted to the EEOC.

(See Dkt. No. 1 at 7-10.)3 The introductory statement on the Pre-Charge Inquiry

form states that the information provided on the form “will help [the EEOC] assist

you and determine if your concerns are covered by the employment discrimination

laws we enforce.” (D. App. 13.) Additionally, it states clearly: “Please note: This

Pre-Charge Inquiry is not a Charge of Discrimination.” (Id.) It repeats this advisory

on the bottom of the first three pages of the four-page form. (D. App. 13-15.)

Courts routinely hold that a pre-charge inquiry does not constitute a charge of

discrimination because it does not invoke the EEOC’s remedial process. See, e.g.,

Pemberton v. Bell’s Brewery, Inc., ___ F.4th ___, 2025 WL 2539015, at *7-9 (6th Cir.

Sept. 4, 2025); Sambrano v. United Airlines, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 3d 652, 671–76 (N.D.

Tex. 2023); Kirkwood v. Buffalo & Erie Cnty. Naval & Mil. Park, No. 22-CV-703-LJV,

2023 WL 4959881, at *4–5 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2023); Ferdin v. Toyotetsu TTTX, No.

5:18-CV-885-DAE, 2019 WL 12598992, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2019). To the

extent Stancu alleges that he filed a charge of discrimination that was mishandled by

the EEOC, the pleadings show otherwise and that he instead filed a pre-charge

inquiry that sought to no remedial action by the EEOC. Any allegation that the

3 The EEOC also provided a more legible copy of the pre-charge inquiry form in its

appendix to the motion to dismiss. (See D. App. 13-16.) The undersigned may also

consider this copy in recommending the resolution of the motion to dismiss. See Collins, 224

F.3d at 498–99 (“Documents that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss are

considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are

central to [the plaintiff’s] claims.”). Stancu refers to this document in his complaint (and

attached it), which is central to his assertion that the EEOC mishandled his claim. (See Dkt.

No. 1 at 1.)

EEOC mishandled his charge of discrimination therefore must fail because the

document that Stancu relies on establishes that he filed no charge of discrimination

at all. Even assuming Stancu could sue the EEOC for failing to adequately

investigate or otherwise handle his charge of discrimination, the complaint still must

fail because Stancu does not plausibly allege that he filed a charge of discrimination

that would have obligated the EEOC to conduct and investigation and take any

additional action, such as issue a right-to-sue letter.

IV. LEAVE TO AMEND

“Ordinarily, a plaintiff should be afforded an opportunity to amend [his]

complaint in response to a recommended dismissal or when the action is to be

dismissed pursuant to a court order.” Beam v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc., No. 3:19-CV-

01201-M-BT, 2021 WL 4445350, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 7, 2021), adopted, 2021 WL

4439179 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2021). While a court “should freely give leave” to

amend his pleadings “when justice so requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), it has

discretion not to allow amendment when an amendment would be futile, Martin’s

Herend Imports, Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading United States of Am. Co., 195 F.3d 765,

771 (5th Cir. 1999).

The District Judge need not permit Stancu to file an amended complaint here

because doing so would be futile. As explained above, the court lacks jurisdiction

over Stancu’s claims against the EEOC relating to the agency’s handling of a charge

of discrimination against Stancu’s former employer. See Smith v. Houston Indep. Sch.

Dist., 229 F. Supp. 3d 571, 576 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (concluding it would be futile to

amend where the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over breach-of-contract claim

against an official who has immunity). Because that barrier to his lawsuit cannot be

cured through repleading, any amended complaint would be relegated to the same

fate of dismissal.

V. RECOMMENDATION

The undersigned recommends that the District Judge GRANT the EEOC’s

motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 16) and DISMISS the complaint without prejudice for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

SO RECOMMENDED on September 8, 2025.

Cw

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

-10-

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the

manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and

recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being

served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,

an objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is

made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate the place in the magistrate

judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An

objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the

magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the

aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the

magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon

grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,

1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)

(extending the time to file objections to 14 days).