Dollar v. Adams

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

CENTRAL DIVISION

RONNIE DOLLAR PLAINTIFF

v. NO. 4:24-cv-333 JM

DEREK ADAMS, individually and in

his official capacity as Chief Deputy Sheriff

of Van Buren County; CHASTA HARRISON,

Sheriff’s Investigator for Van Buren County

Sheriff’s Office; ERIC KOONCE, individually and

in his official capacity as Sheriff of Van Buren

County; VAN BUREN COUNTY, Arkansas DEFENDANT

ORDER

This case arises out of the arrest of Ronnie Dollar when he argued with then Chief

Deputy Sheriff Derek Adams about whether Dollar had to pay a towing charge to pick up his

truck. Pending is a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants. (Doc. No. 29). The

motion has been fully brief and is ripe for determination.

I. Factual Background

In January of 2024, Ronnie Dollar’s brother was inside a gas station in Clinton, Arkansas

paying for gas when his pickup truck was stolen. After taking the truck for a joy ride, the thief

abandoned the truck at Flash Market. The county had it towed. A day or two later, on Friday,

January 19, 2024, Dollar got a call from his brother asking him to pick up the truck for him.

Believing he had a warrant out for his arrest for failure to pay fines, his brother gave Dollar a bill

of sale for the truck and asked him to go retrieve it. Ronnie went to the Clinton Police

Department and spoke with Officer Jay Murdock about the truck. After some checking, Murdock

told Dollar that the truck had been impounded by the county. He also told Dollar that Dollar

should not have to pay the towing fee since the truck had been stolen.

Dollar, driven by his cousin, then went to the sheriff’s office. He was directed to a service

window where he told the employee that he was there to retrieve his truck, he had a bill of sale,

and he wanted to talk to Sheriff Eric Koonce about getting it. Instead of the sheriff, Investigator

Chasta Harrison and Chief Deputy Derek Adams came through the door into the lobby where

Dollar was waiting. Dollar testified that he said “I asked for the sheriff” to which Adams

responded that he was the chief deputy. Dollar was told that he was going to have to pay $218

for the towing fee. He argued that he should not have to pay the fee, that the truck had been

stolen, and it was the county who had towed it “for no good reason.” Dollar and Adams argued,

and again Dollar said he wanted to talk to the sheriff. There is a factual dispute about what

happened next.

Dollar testified:

We argued about whether I was going to pay the tow bill. Then, Derek Adams

started getting mad and told me to leave. I told him I didn't have to. It was a public

office. I was there on official business. And I had done asked to talk to the sheriff a

few times. And at which, Derek came out grabbed me by my arm, and I jerked my

arm away and turned around and looked at him like, what are you doing? And then

he grabbed me by my arm again and shoved me out the door, and at that point I done

decided I was going to get in the car, and I started to walk away, and he said

something, and I turned around, and he got up in my face and started yelling. I do

not remember what all he said. And I turned around again, and he grabbed me and

tackled me to the ground, choking me.

(Doc. No. 31-4, p. 41, ln 12-24). Dollar testified that when Adams pulled him down, he fell on

top of Adams, who then pushed Dollar over on to his stomach with the assistance of Harrison

and another sheriff’s office employee. Adams sat or pressed his knee on Dollar’s back and

shoved his face into the concrete and pulled his hair. He was handcuffed, brought to his feet, and

taken back inside.

Casey Cresswell, a detention officer with Van Buren County, was present the day Ronnie

came into the office about the truck. She testified that she witnessed the events inside the office

from behind the glass window. She said she looked up when she heard Adams yelling and “the

next thing you know, they’re pushing Ronnie outside” while Ronnie had his “hands up” and was

“stepping backwards” while Adams had “his finger in Ronnie’s face.” (Doc. No. 29-4, p. 11).

She further testified that she never heard Dollar’s voice. Id. Cresswell did not see what happened

outside at the time it occurred, but she was able to watch the video of the events outside later that

day. She testified that she was “totally appalled” at what she saw to the point where she filed a

complaint with the Department of Justice and the Arkansas State Police.

Adams’s account of the events is very different. He reported that Dollar got aggressive

inside the office, repeatedly refused to leave, and was screaming in Adams’s face. He stated that

he only took Dollar to the ground after Dollar took an aggressive posture and balled his right fist

at his side (which Dollar, who is left handed, disputes in his deposition). Harrison executed an

affidavit stating that Dollar got loud inside the building while demanding to see the sheriff and

refused to leave. (Doc. No. 31-2). She also stated that once Adams and Dollar were outside,

Adams repeatedly asked Dollar to leave and that Dollar was yelling. While she saw Adams wrap

his right arm around Adam’s neck and witnessed the takedown, she did not have a view of the

right side of Dollar’s body because it was blocked by Adams..

There is a video of the events that happened outside the sheriff’s office. There is also

about a minute of video from inside the office when Dollar first walked in, but about ten minutes

of the inside video—though it had been viewed by several county employees immediately after

the incident—was not able to be produced in discovery. Plaintiff alleges deliberate destruction.

While there is no sound, the evidence viewed most favorably to Dollar supports his account of

the events.

Because he was dizzy and had a blood-clotting disorder, Dollar requested that he be taken

to the hospital out of concern that he might have an internal bleed from hitting his head on the

concrete. After sitting handcuffed for a couple of hours, Dollar was taken to the hospital where

an MRI confirmed that he was not suffering a bleed.1 Once he got back to the sheriff’s office, he

was booked for aggravated assault on Adams2 (a felony) and disorderly conduct (a

misdemeanor). Rather than being released on his own recognizance with a court date, Dollar

spent the weekend in jail because of the pending felony charge. He was released without bond on

Monday, January 22, 2024. After reviewing the video and the statements from the sheriff’s

office, the prosecutor did not charge Dollar with a felony. The disorderly conduct charge was

tried in November of 2024, and the court granted Dollar’s motion for directed verdict.

Dollar filed a 42 U.S.C. §1983 action alleging that defendants violated his constitutional

rights and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA) through the use of excessive force, false

imprisonment, civil conspiracy, and negligent hiring, supervision, and retention. He claims

physical injuries as well as emotional distress. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all

claims and asserted claims of qualified immunity.

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only when the evidence, when viewed in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and

that the defendant is entitled to entry of judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The initial burden is on the moving party to

1 Dollar testified that Sheriff Koonce came to see him while he was at the hospital and “chewed

him out” and told him that Adams had every right to do what he had done. (Doc. No. 21-4, p. 81,

ln 16-20).

2 The affidavit for the arrest of Dollar states that as Dollar was screaming back at Adams, “his

saliva transferred from his mouth to Chief Adams’ forehead and bottom lip.” (Doc. 39-9, p. 2). At

his deposition, Adams testified that he realized later that he was “in the wrong” and that Dollar

did not spit in his face on purpose. (Doc. 31-3, pp. 41-42).

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, at 323. The burden then

shifts to the nonmoving party to establish that there is a genuine issue to be determined at trial.

Prudential Ins. Co. v. Hinkel, 121 F.3d 364, 366 (8th Cir. 1997).

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity in a § 1983 case “unless the

official's conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 495 (8th

Cir. 2009). Courts undertake a two-step inquiry to make this determination: “(1) whether the

facts shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, and (2)

whether that right was clearly established at the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct.” Id.

at 496.

III. Analysis

The Court will address the claims as presented in Defendants’ brief in support of their

motion for summary judgment. At the outset, the Court notes that in the style of the case only

Sheriff Eric Koonce and Chief Deputy Derek Adam are explicitly named in their individual

capacity as well as their official capacity. The style does not reflect in which capacity

Investigator Chasta Harrison was sued. Defendants argue that Dollar has not made an individual

capacity claim against Harrison. In response Dollar argues that under the “course of

proceedings” test announced S.A.A. v. Geisler, 127 F.4th 1133 (8th Cir. 2025), he also is suing

Harrison individually. The Court finds that, as Geisler is to be applied retroactively, the

allegations in the complaint state individual claims against Harrison. Geisler at 1139. The

allegations in the complaint and the amended complaint were sufficient for Harrison to fairly

ascertain “that she was being sued in her individual capacity” and that “her personal liability was

at stake.” Id. (quoting Daskalea v. D.C., 227 F.3d 433, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).

As the “ACRA is generally treated as coextensive with § 1983 and analyzed under

federal standards,” the Court will not separately address the ACRA claims. McDaniel v. Neal, 44

F.4th 1085, 1093 (8th Cir. 2022); Arl. Code Ann. § 16-123-105(c). Plaintiff relies on the same

arguments for both.

A. False Arrest. “It is well established that a warrantless arrest without probable

cause violates an individual's constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments.” Marksmeier v. Davie, 622 F.3d 896, 900 (8th Cir.2010) (citation omitted).

Probable cause exists “when the totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest are

sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe that the defendant has committed or is

committing an offense.” Ryno v. City of Waynesville, 58 F.4th 995, 1005 (8th Cir. 2023) (cleaned

up).

In a qualified immunity analysis, whether probable cause exists goes to the first prong of

the qualified immunity analysis, whether a constitutional right has been violated. Id. at 1006. As

to the second prong, whether the right has been clearly established, courts are to consider

whether a defendant has established arguable probable cause, which exists “even where an

officer mistakenly arrests a suspect believing it is based in probable cause if the mistake is

‘objectively reasonable.’” Id. (citing Borgman v. Kedley, 646 F.3d 518, 523 (8th Cir. 2011)).

Arkansas law defines disorderly conduct, in relevant part, as engaging “fighting or in

violent, threatening, or tumultuous behavior” or making “unreasonable or excessive noise” with

the “purpose to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm or recklessly creating a risk of

public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-207. The Eighth Circuit,

denying a vagueness challenge to the statute, held that “the offender must intend to cause public

inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm by obstructing traffic or making unreasonable or excessive

noise, or must recklessly disregard the risk of doing so.” Duhe v. City of Little Rock, 902 F.3d

858, 864 (8th Cir. 2018). As discussed above, there are sharply conflicting versions regarding

Dollar’s behavior, demeanor, and volume that preceded the warrantless arrest. Dollar has

submitted evidence that, while he was insisting on talking to Sheriff Koonce, he was not being

unreasonably loud or threatening. Viewing the evidence, including the silent video, most

favorably to Dollar, Defendants have not established that probable cause existed for his arrest.

The same disputed material facts also preclude a finding of arguable probable cause. Adams has

not established that he is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim and disputed evidence

precludes summary judgment. As in Evans v. Cabot Sch. Dist., 114 F.4th 946, 955 (8th Cir.

2024), “a jury needs to decide ‘whether the [Dollar] was becoming disorderly.’” (quoting Tanner

v. Ziegenhorn, No. 4:17-CV-780, 2020 WL 5648642, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 22, 2020)).

Furthermore, while Dollar was ultimately not charged with the felony assault, Adams admitted

that he arrested Dollar he wanted him charged with assault at the time but admits now that “[he]

was in the wrong. [Dollar] didn’t spit on me on purpose.” (Doc. No. 31-2, pp. 41-42).

As to the claim for false arrest against Harrison, it is undisputed that while she assisted

Adams, she was not the arresting officer. The Eighth Circuit has held that while an assisting

officer cannot “blindly follow orders,” the officer “may rely on the probable cause determination

and follow the directions of an officer who is directing the arrest ‘as long as the reliance is

reasonable.’” Baude v. Leyshock, 23 F.4th 1065, 1074 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Ehlers v. City of

Rapid City, 846 F.3d 1002, 1010 (8th Cir. 2017). Harrison submitted an affidavit stating that

while she observed Adams’s take-down of Dollar through the window, she could not see

Dollar’s right side as it was blocked by Adams. Therefore, she could not see if he had in fact

clenched his right fist as Adams’ stated. Under these facts, Harrison is entitled to qualified

immunity on the claim of false arrest.

Finally, as to the claim for false arrest against Sheriff Koonce, he was not at the scene of

the arrest and did not assist in the arrest. Dollar claims that Sheriff Koonce has liability because

“he was informed of the arrest shortly after and refused to release” Dollar despite knowing that

there was no probable cause. However, Dollar has not submitted any authority that he had a

clearly established constitutional right to be released from custody by the sheriff on these facts.

Sheriff Koonce is also entitled to qualified immunity on the claim of false arrest.

B. Excessive Force and Battery. Dollar asserts claims of excessive force and battery

against Adams and Harrison individually. “The right to be free from excessive force in the

context of an arrest is clearly established under the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against

unreasonable searches and seizures.” Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 499 (8th

Cir.2009). An arresting officer the “right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat.”

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). The question is whether, “when viewed from the

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,” “the amount of force used was objectively

reasonable under the particular circumstances.” Henderson v. Munn, 439 F.3d 497, 502 (8th

Cir.2006) (cleaned up). “Some relevant considerations include: the severity of the crime; whether

the suspect poses a threat of harm to others; whether the suspect is resisting arrest; and other

factors, such as whether the situation is “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving,” which would

force an officer to make “split-second judgments” about how much force is necessary.” Coker v.

Arkansas State Police, 734 F.3d 838, 842–43 (8th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).

Viewing the evidence most favorably to Dollar, the Court cannot determine that Adams’s

use of force was reasonable as a matter of law. A reasonable jury could find that Dollar was at

the point of leaving the grounds when Adams called out to him, yelled directly in his face and

bumped his chest before throwing his arm around Dollar’s neck and taking him to the ground.

Dollar testified that while he was on the ground and not resisting, Adams pushed his face into the

concrete and pulled his hair. The jury could also conclude from the video evidence that Adams

used unreasonable force with his knee on Dollar’s back after he was on the ground and not

resisting. The crime he was alleged to have committed was not severe, and a jury could conclude

from the evidence that Dollar was not resisting arrest. Dollar testified that he still suffers from

pain in his left shoulder following the incident. Adams has not established that he is entitled to

qualified immunity or summary judgment on these claims.

As to Harrison, Dollar argues that she is liable on the claim of excessive force because

she assisted in restraining his arms and failed to intervene to stop Adams “despite having the

opportunity.” The evidence does not support a claim that Harrison herself used excessive force,

and Dollar does not argue that she committed battery. “[A] police officer may be liable if he does

not intervene to prevent the use of excessive force when (1) the officer observed or had reason to

know that excessive force would be or was being used, and (2) the officer had both the

opportunity and the means to prevent the harm from occurring.” Mitchell v. Kirchmeier, 28 F.4th

888, 901 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Robinson v. Payton, 791 F.3d 824, 829 (8th Cir. 2015)). Dollar

has not pointed to any evidence, or to any authority, to support his claim that Harrison had the

opportunity to stop Adams’s use of force against him. She was inside the building when it

happened, and the video shows that the takedown happened in the blink of an eye. In the absence

of any authority cited to the contrary, the Court finds that Harrison is entitled to qualified

immunity on the charges of excessive force and battery.

C. Civil Conspiracy. To establish a § 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must show that a

defendant conspired with others to deprive him of a constitutional right, an “overt act in

furtherance of the conspiracy, and that the act injured plaintiff. Saunders v. Thies, 38 F.4th 701,

715 (8th Cir. 2022). He must also show that he in fact suffered a deprivation of his constitutional

rights. Id. Defendants argue that Dollar has neither alleged nor proven any of the elements to

establish this claim. Defendants also raise the defense of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine,

which provides that “a local government entity cannot conspire with itself through its agents

acting within the scope of their employment.” Kelly v. City of Omaha, Neb., No. 14-3446, 2016

WL 660117 (8th Cir. Feb. 18, 2016) (quoting L.L. Nelson Enters., Inc. v. Cty. of St. Louis, Mo.,

673 F.3d 799, 812 (8th Cir.2012)).

The Court finds that the conspiracy claims against Adams, Harrison, and Koonce are

barred by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. Dollar argues against the application of the

doctrine, stating that his evidence “suggests Adams’s aggression stemmed from personal

animus” and “Harrison and Koonce’s actions may reflect similar motives.” In support of this

argument, Dollar cites to Kelly and L.L. Nelson. However, those cases do not support a personal-

animus exception, but rather the opposite: “Government agents can act within the scope of their

employment duties “even though [a] complaint alleges improprieties in the execution of these

duties.” Kelly at 1078 (quoting L.L. Nelson at 812).

Although not necessary given the application of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine,

the Court will address Dollar’s remaining conspiracy arguments. Dollar argues that he has

supplied “circumstantial evidence that Defendants acted in concert to arrest Plaintiff without

probable cause and used excessive force.” Dollar relies on “Harrison’s assistance in the arrest

and Koonce’s refusal to release Plaintiff” as evidence of “a shared intent to deprive him of his

rights.” Id. As to Harrison, the fact that she acted “in concert” with Adams to secure the

handcuffs on Dollar is not the same as participating in a conspiracy. As to Koonce, the evidence

Dollar relies on occurred after the incident of the arrest and use of force. Dollar has failed to

come forward with evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer the existence of an

agreement between the individual defendants to violate Dollar’s rights to be free from unlawful

arrest and excessive force.

Finally, Dollar makes the leap that, in furtherance of the conspiracy to arrest him without

probable cause and to use excessive force, Adams and Koonce attempted to intimidate witnesses

after the fact. (Coc. No. 39, p. 10). The Court acknowledges that Dollar has submitted evidence

to support at least an inference of witness intimidation with the testimony of Dylan Tumbleson

and the news release involving three witnesses. However, in addition to being barred by the

intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, any act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy to deprive

him of his constitutional rights would have to have occurred before the alleged constitutional

violations. This is not to say there was no evidence of possible witness intimidation, but that

evidence does not support Dollar’s claim of civil conspiracy as argued. For these reasons,

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as well as qualified immunity on the individual

claims against them for civil conspiracy.

D. Wrongful hiring, supervision, or retention. In his amended complaint, Dollar alleges

that Sheriff Koonce acted with deliberate indifference to Dollar’s safety in hiring, supervising,

and retaining “the conspicuously unqualified and ill-tempered” Adams. (Doc. No. 11, p. 12). 3

To establish personal liability against Sheriff Koonce, Dollar must show that Koonce “(1) had

3 The undisputed evidence is that the previous sheriff, Sheriff Emberton, hired Adams, not

Sheriff Koonce. (Doc. 31-2, p. 20-21), so he cannot be personally liable for that decision. Dollar

does not pursue the allegation of negligent hiring in his response.

notice of a pattern of unconstitutional acts committed by subordinates; (2) was deliberately

indifferent to or tacitly authorized those acts; and (3) failed to take sufficient remedial action; (4)

proximately causing injury to [the plaintiff].” Perkins v. Hastings, 915 F.3d 512, 524 (8th Cir.

2019) (cleaned up). Defendants argue that Dollar has not presented evidence that Koonce had

notice of a pattern of unconstitutional conduct involving Adams. Dollar argues that whether

Koonce had notice is a disputed material fact.

Dollar relies on the following evidence to support his claim against Koonce : (1) Adams

received a less than honorable discharge from the United States Air Force when he was eighteen

or nineteen yeas old; (2) he was charged with felony drug offense in 2012; (3) he was charged

with a felony domestic battery of his uncle in or around 2018 but the charges were dropped after

Adams’s settled with his uncle; and (4) he was banned from a community sports facility in

approximately 2021 for his verbal altercation with another spectator. (Doc. No. 31-3).

First, this is not a list of unconstitutional behaviors. None of the challenged behavior

occurred while he was on duty as law enforcement or otherwise qualifies as unconstitutional.

Furthermore, “[t]o impose supervisory liability, other misconduct must be very similar to the

conduct giving rise to liability.” Livers v. Schenck, 700 F.3d 340, 356 (8th Cir. 2012). The

military discharge and drug charge are remote in time and in no way related to the conduct

challenged in this action, nor is the yelling incident at the ballpark. And even assuming Koonce

had knowledge of Adams’s charge for domestic battery, that event occurred over five years prior

to the January 19, 2024 incident and does not constitute a pattern.

As to notice, Koonce testified that he was not aware of any of these incidents prior to

Dollar’s arrest on January 19, 2024, except for Adams having told him at some point about the

ballpark incident. (Doc. No. 31-1, p. 2 and Doc. 39-1, pp. 7-10). Rather than meet proof with

proof, Dollar argues in a single paragraph that “Koonce had notice of Adams’ prior aggressive

behavior, including a ballpark incident and citizen complaints.” (Doc. 39, p. 11). However, he

does not cite to the record to support his conclusion. Dollar then states that his evidence “creates

a triable issue as Koonce’s claim of limited knowledge is contradicted by documented

complaints.” Id. Again, there is no citation to any evidence of record to support his claim, nor is

the Court aware of any other than what is cited above. While he did attach five hundred pages of

exhibits, the Court is not responsible for mining for evidence to support a plaintiff’s argument.

See Rodgers v. City of Des Moines, 435 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Without some guidance,

we will not mine a summary judgment record searching for nuggets of factual disputes to gild a

party's arguments.”). Dollar has failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact that that

Koonce had notice of a pattern of unconstitutional acts committed by Adams and he is entitled to

summary judgment and qualified immunity on this claim against him in his individual capacity.

E. Claims against Van Buren County. Dollar named Adam, Harrison and Koonce as

defendants individually and in their official capacity. He also named Van Buren County as a

defendant. A suit against an individual in his official capacity is treated as a suit against the

county. Liebe v. Norton, 157 F.3d 574, 578–79 (8th Cir. 1998). And the county cannot be held

liable in §1983 action for deprivations of constitutional rights unless “the deprivation is the result

of a policy or custom” of the county. Id. Dollar has not submitted evidence of a policy or custom

that would have led to the deprivation of his rights. In his brief he argues that there is “ample

evidence” that the county’s policies were inadequate and failed to address “known risks of

misconduct,” but he does not elaborate on what the policy is or where it can be found. Instead he

refers to the list of misconduct including the 2018 felony assault charge and his ban from the

sports facility as having provided “plenty of notice” to Koonce that Adams was a “rogue

timebomb that exploded on Ronnie Dollar.” (Doc. No. 39, p. 11). Without evidentiary support,

this argument is insufficient defeat the county’s motion for summary judgment.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 29)

is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all

claims except for Plaintiffs claims against Defendant Adam for false arrest and excessive force.

The remaining defendants are dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 7" day of October, 2025.

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