Morgan v. Nurse

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

HERSHEL MORGAN, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:25-cv-1219-SEM-DJQ

)

LATOYA HUGHES, et al.,)

Defendants. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff pro se Hershel Morgan has filed a Complaint

(Doc. 1) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is now before the

Court for screening. For the following reasons, the Court finds

that Plaintiff may proceed on an Eighth Amendment failure to

protect claim against Defendants Nurse, Wurster, Doolin, and

Boguszewski. Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant

Hughes.

I. Screening Standard

The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint and

dismiss any legally insufficient claim or the entire action if

warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if

it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from

a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing

the complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations as

accurate, liberally construing them in the plaintiff’s favor.

Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However,

conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough

facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is

plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d

418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

II. Facts Alleged

At all times relevant to his Complaint, Plaintiff was an

inmate at Pontiac Correctional Center (“Pontiac”).

Plaintiff’s suit names as Defendants Illinois Department

of Corrections (“IDOC”) Director Latoya Hughes, Warden Mindi

Nurse, Dr. Samantha Wurster, Lieutenant Doolin, and

Correctional Officer Boguszewski.

Plaintiff alleges he was housed in the East Cell House

and assigned “single cell only” status based on his mental

health issues. In May 2023, Plaintiff learned he would be

placed with a cellmate because the IDOC and Defendant

Director Hughes planned to close the East Cell House.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Warden Nurse was aware of

his mental health issues, past altercations with cellmates, and

“single cell only” status due to face-to-face discussions with

Defendant Nurse at his cell front.

Plaintiff alleges Defendants Nurse and Dr. Wurster

altered his mental healthcare treatment, paperwork, and

assignment status to have Plaintiff double celled, despite

knowing Plaintiff’s safety was at risk.

On June 1, 2023, Plaintiff submitted an emergency

grievance notifying Defendants Hughes and Nurse he had

“single cell only” status, feared for his safety, and would

immediately “fight for his life” if he was placed with a cellmate.

(Doc. 1 at 7). Plaintiff alleges Defendants Hughes and Nurse

ignored the risk to his safety.

On June 3, 2023, Plaintiff was moved to the South Cell

House. Plaintiff alleges prison staff from the East Cell House

notified Defendant Lieutenant Doolin that Plaintiff feared for

his safety and should not be double celled in the South Cell

House. Defendant Doolin attempted to assign Plaintiff to a

single cell, but when Plaintiff notified Defendant Doolin he had

a low gallery permit for medical issues, Defendant Doolin

allegedly became angry and assigned Plaintiff to a double cell.

Plaintiff alleges he told Defendant Correctional Officer

Boguszewski he feared for his safety and intended to fight his

new cellmate. Nevertheless, Defendant Boguszewski allegedly

locked Plaintiff in a cell with his new cellmate and instigated a

fight on June 3, 2023. Defendant Boguszewski allegedly

brought the cellmate to the cell and warned the cellmate

Plaintiff was going to swing at him. The cellmate crouched in a

fighting stance, confirmed he was ready to fight, and motioned

for Defendant Boguszewski to open the cell door. When

Defendant opened the cell door, Plaintiff and his cellmate

“immediately collided in physical combat.” Id. at 13. Plaintiff

alleges he suffered serious physical and psychological injuries.

III. Analysis

Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they

act with deliberate indifference to “an excessive risk to inmate

health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S 825, 837 (1994).

The risk of harm to which the prisoner was subjected must be

objectively serious. Sinn v. Lemmon, 911 F.3d 412, 419 (7th

Cir. 2018). “[I]t does not matter whether the risk comes from a

single source or multiple sources, any more than it matters

whether a prisoner faces an excessive risk of attack for

reasons personal to him or because all prisoners in his

situation face such a risk.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843.

A prison official acts with deliberate indifference if he “knows

of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety;

the official must both be aware of the facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious

harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. A

plaintiff “normally proves actual knowledge of impending harm

by showing that he complained to prison officials about a

specific threat to his safety.” Gevas v. McLaughlin, 798 F.3d

475, 480 (7th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). Generalized,

vague, or stale concerns about one’s safety typically will not

suffice. Id. at 480-81.

Based on the Court’s review, the facts alleged in the

Complaint are sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment failure

to protect claim against Defendants Warden Nurse, Dr.

Wurster, Lieutenant Doolin, and Correctional Officer

Boguszewski. Plaintiff asserts Defendant Nurse was aware of

the threat to Plaintiff’s safety through face-to-face discussions

at his cell front. Plaintiff also alleges he filed an emergency

grievance to notify Defendant Nurse of the threat he faced.

Plaintiff alleges Defendants Nurse and Dr. Wurster altered his

mental healthcare records and assignment status to have

Plaintiff double celled, despite knowing Plaintiff’s safety was at

risk. Plaintiff alleges Defendants Boguszewski and Doolin

assigned him to a double cell in the South Cell House, despite

knowing the risk Plaintiff faced. Defendant Boguszewski was

present when Plaintiff and his cellmate fought on June 3,

2023.

Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim

against Defendant Director Hughes. Plaintiff alleges Defendant

Hughes closed the East Cell House at Pontiac, causing him to

be double celled in the South Cell House. Plaintiff alleges he

submitted an emergency grievance notifying Defendant

Hughes he had “single cell only” status and feared for his

safety if he was double celled. Section 1983 does not allow

actions against individuals based on their supervisory role of

others. Individual liability under § 1983 can only be based

upon a finding that the defendant caused the deprivation

alleged. Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996)

(“Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal

liability and predicated upon fault; thus, liability does not

attach unless the individual defendant caused or participated

in a constitutional deprivation.”). Simply receiving

correspondence from a prisoner does not make a prison official

liable for the alleged constitutional violation. Norington v.

Daniels, No. 11- 282, 2011 WL 5101943, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Oct.

25, 2011); see also Diaz v. McBride, No. 93-176, 1994 WL

750707, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 30, 1994) (plaintiff cannot

establish personal involvement and subject a prison official to

liability under § 1983, merely by sending the official various

letters or grievances). Defendant Hughes is dismissed without

prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) According to the Court's Merit Review of Plaintiff's

Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff has

alleged enough facts to proceed with an Eighth

Amendment failure to protect claim against

Defendants Mindi Nurse, Samantha Wurster, Doolin,

and Boguszewski. Additional claims shall not be

included in the case, except at the Court's discretion

on motion by a party for good cause shown or under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

2) The Clerk is directed to dismiss Defendant Latoya

Hughes as a Defendant in this matter.

3) This case is now in the process of service. The Court

advises Plaintiff to wait until counsel has appeared

for Defendants before filing any motions, to give

Defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to

those motions. Motions filed before Defendants’

counsel has filed an appearance will generally be

denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit

evidence to the Court unless otherwise directed by

the Court.

4) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by

mailing a waiver of service. Defendants have sixty

days from service to file an Answer. If Defendants

have not filed an Answer or appeared through counsel

within ninety days of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff

may file a motion requesting the status of service.

After Defendants have been served, the Court will

enter an order setting discovery and dispositive

motion deadlines.

5) Defendants shall file an Answer within sixty days of

the date the Clerk sends the waiver. A motion to

dismiss is not an Answer. The Answer should include

all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The

Answer and subsequent pleadings shall be to the

issues and claims stated in this Order. In general, an

answer sets forth Defendants’ positions. The Court

does not rule on the merits of those positions unless

and until Defendants file a motion. Therefore, no

response to an Answer is necessary or will be

considered.

6) This District uses electronic filing, which means that,

after Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance,

counsel will automatically receive electronic notice

of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with

the Clerk. Therefore, Plaintiff does not need to mail

copies of motions and other documents that Plaintiff

has filed with the Clerk to Defendants’ counsel.

However, this does not apply to discovery requests

and responses. Discovery requests and responses are

not filed with the Clerk. Instead, Plaintiff must mail

his discovery requests and responses directly to

Defendants’ counsel. Discovery requests or responses

sent to the Clerk will be returned unfiled unless they

are attached to and the subject of a motion to

compel. Discovery does not begin until Defendants’

counsel has filed an appearance, and the Court has

entered a scheduling order, which will explain the

discovery process in more detail.

7) If a Defendant no longer works at the address

provided by Plaintiff, the entity for whom Defendant

worked while at that address shall submit to the

Clerk Defendant’s current work address or, if not

known, Defendant’s forwarding address. This

information shall be used only for effectuating

service. Documentation of forwarding addresses shall

be retained only by the Clerk and shall not be

maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the

Clerk.

8) Defendants’ counsel is granted leave to depose

Plaintiff. Defendants’ counsel shall arrange the time

for the deposition.

9) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in

writing, of any change in his mailing address and

telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to inform the

Court of a change in mailing address or phone

number will result in the dismissal of this case with

prejudice.

10) If a Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of

service to the Clerk within thirty days after the

waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps

to effect formal service through the U.S. Marshals

Service on Defendant and will require Defendant to

pay the total costs of formal service under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

11) The Court directs the Clerk to enter the standard

qualified protective order under the Health Insurance

Portability and Accountability Act.

12) The Court directs the Clerk to attempt service on

Defendants under the standard procedures.

ENTERED October 7, 2025.

s/ Sue E. Myerscough

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE