McGill v. Ballard

Anited States District Court

for the s2orthern District of Oklahoma

Case No. 23-cv-365-JDR-MTS

SAMUEL CurRTIS MCGILL, JR.,

Plaintiff,

versus

MatTT BALLARD; GEORGE GIBBS, JR.; MARY LEAVELL; ROGERS

County DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, through Matt Ballard in

his official capacity as District Attorney; ROGERS COUNTY SHERIFF’S

DEPARTMENT, through Scott Walton in his official capacity as Sheriff, Jo-

SEPH CLINTON; CANDY CLINTON; JOHN AND JANE DOEs,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Good fences may make good neighbors, but the same cannot be said

of lawsuits. The neighbors in this case, Plaintiff Samuel Curtis McGill, Jr. and

Defendants Joseph and Candy Clinton, are proof of that. The Clintons own

land that is burdened by a 30-foot easement. Mr. McGill has the right to use

that easement to access his property, and in May 2021, he removed part of a

gate and a fence belonging to the Clintons in order to do so. In response, the

Clintons called the sheriff. Mr. McGill was arrested and charged with mali-

cious injury to property. The charge was ultimately dismissed, but that did

not end the matter: Mr. McGill sued the Clintons, the Rogers County Sher-

iff’s Department, the Rogers County District Attorney’s Office, a former dis-

trict attorney, and two assistant district attorneys for their role in his arrest

and prosecution. The District Attorney’s Office and its employees have

moved to dismiss the claims against them on immunity grounds [Dkt. 20],

No. 23-cv-365

and the Sheriff’s Department has filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state

a viable claim against it under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 [Dkt. 21]. For the

reasons set forth below, the District Attorneys’ motion [Dkt. 20] is granted

in part and denied in part. The Sheriff’s motion [Dkt. 20] is granted.

J}

Mr. McGill’s father, Samuel McGill, Sr., owned real property in Rog-

ers County that could not be accessed by public roads. He was awarded a 30-

foot-wide easement in March 2017 that burdened property owned by Defend-

ants Joseph and Candy Clinton. The easement afforded Sam McGill, Sr. the

right to access his property via a new road and, when necessary, the right to

temporarily remove cross-members from the entry gate providing access to

the easement and road.

The property and the easement were transferred to Plaintiff Samuel

McGill, Jr., who decided to move a manufactured home and other vehicles

onto the property. The manufactured home was too large to pass through the

gate at the easement’s entrance, so Mr. McGill (or, more precisely, his attor-

ney) contacted the Clintons (through their attorney) to coordinate the re-

moval of the gate’s cross member and a portion of a fence that allegedly im-

peded the easement. The Clintons refused his request to remove the imped-

iments. Mr. McGill called the Rogers County Sheriff’s Department and

asked for assistance in enforcing the easement. This request was also refused.

Mr. McGill sought relief in state court, but neither he nor his attorney held

out any hope for a swift resolution.

Mr. McGill, finding himself at both a legal and physical impasse, took

matters into his own hands. On the advice of his attorney, he removed the

cross-member and a portion of the Clintons’ fence and began moving his

The following facts are drawn from Mr. McGill’s complaint and are accepted as

008), purposes of this opinion. See Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir.

No. 23-cv-365

manufactured home onto his property. When the Clintons discovered

McGill’s self-remedy, they called the Sheriff’s Department. The Depart-

ment sent a deputy to the property. Mr. McGill told the deputy that, as the

successor to the easement, he had the right to remove the obstructions to his

property and had done so on the advice of his attorney. Mr. McGill provided

the deputy with a copy of the easement order, and the deputy left. Mr. McGill

moved the manufactured home onto his property, but he did not replace the

cross-member because the Clintons told him “not to touch ‘their’ property.”

Dkt. 2 at J 43.

About two months later, Mr. McGill was charged with malicious injury

to property and arrested. He was subjected to a search incident to the arrest

and a second search at the Rogers County jail. Mr. McGill retained counsel

and fought the charge, arguing that the easement order authorized him to re-

move the gate’s cross-member and the fencing impeding the easement. The

District Attorney’s Office refused to withdraw the charge. Over a year later,

Mr. McGill filed a motion to dismiss the criminal charge for want of probable

cause, which the District Attorney’s Office contested. The Rogers County

District Court granted Mr. McGill’s motion, and the charge was later ex-

punged from his record.

II

Mr. McGill sued the Clintons, the District Attorney’s Office, District

Attorney Matt Ballard, Assistant District Attorneys George Gibbs, Jr., and

Mary Leavell, the Rogers County Sheriff’s Department, and an unknown

number of unidentified individuals involved in his arrest and prosecution. He

alleges that the District Attorney’s Office and its agents knew that Mr. McGill

was acting lawfully but prosecuted him anyway; the Sheriff’s Department

knew it lacked probable cause to believe Mr. McGill had committed a crime

but arrested and jailed him anyway; and the Clintons orchestrated the events

that resulted in his arrest and prosecution. He argues that each of the Defend-

ants violated his federal rights and state law, and he asks for an award of

No. 23-cv-365

damages and an order enjoining the Defendants from further violating his

rights. Dkt. 2 at 73.7

The Clintons have answered Mr. McGill’s complaint, but the remain-

ing Defendants have moved to dismiss Mr. McGill’s claims. Mr. Ballard, Mr.

Gibbs, and Ms. Leavell argue that they are immune from suit with respect to

any claims brought against them in their individual capacities. Dkt. 20. The

District Attorney’s Office argues that the Eleventh Amendment bars both the

claims asserted against it and the claims asserted against Mr. Ballard, Mr.

Gibbs, and Ms. Leavell in their official capacities. /d. And the Sheriff’s De-

partment contends that Mr. McGill’s complaint fails to state a claim for relief

under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. 21.

To withstand the parties’ motions, Mr. McGill’s complaint must set

forth sufficient factual allegations “to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The

allegations, when taken as true, must demonstrate that Mr. McGill’s right to

relief is not merely speculative. /d. at 555. In other words, the Court must

determine whether the complaint provides a “reason to believe that [Mr.

McGill] has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for [his]

claims.” Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schnieder, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir.

2007).

The Court begins its assessment with Mr. McGill’s federal claims

against Mr. Ballard, Mr. Gibbs, and Ms. Leavell in their individual capacities,

all of which are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.% See Dkt. 2 at YJ 92-115. Mr.

McGill alleges that those Defendants violated his rights under the Fourth

Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause of the

? All citations utilize CM/ECF pagination.

Mr. McGill’s official-capacity claims are addressed in Section II(C), znjra.

No. 23-cv-365

Fourteenth Amendment because they charged, arrested, and prosecuted Mr.

McGill without probable cause to believe that he had committed a crime. /d.

The Defendants respond that, even if the facts alleged by Mr. McGill are true,

the doctrines of absolute and qualified immunity bar Mr. McGill’s claims.

The doctrine of prosecutorial immunity operates as a complete bar to

claims for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Chilcoat v. San Juan Cnty.,

41 F.4th 1196, 1208 (10th Cir. 2022). This common-law doctrine seeks to pro-

tect the integrity of the judicial process (not prosecutors) by permitting pros-

ecuting attorneys to perform their roles vigorously and independently, with-

out fear of retaliatory litigation. /d. Within the Tenth Circuit, courts assessing

the applicability of the doctrine adopt a “functional approach” focused on the

role performed by the prosecutor at the time of the challenged conduct. Jd. at

1208-1209 (quoting Bledsoe v. Vanderbilt, 934 F.3d 1112, 1117 (10th Cir. 2019)).

Of course, prosecutors engage in a range of activities, some of which are more

intimately associated with the judicial process than others. /d. Thus, courts

must consider prosecutorial conduct on a continuum; the closer an action is

to the “judicial phase of the criminal process,” the more likely it is that the

prosecutor will be immune from suit. /d. at 1209 (quoting Jmbler ». Pachtman,

424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)).

Conduct that is intimately associated with initiating and pursuing a

criminal case—such as gathering and evaluating evidence, determining

whether probable cause exists, and deciding to prosecute a case—falls on the

near side of that continuum and is shielded by absolute immunity. /d. (“We

begin with an obvious benchmark: a prosecutor is absolutely immune when

functioning ‘within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a crimi-

nal prosecution.’” (quoting /mbler, 424 U.S. at 410)). This is true even if the

prosecutor makes false statements when engaging in that conduct or files

charges without a legal basis for doing so. F.g., id. at 1210-11 (recognizing that

the plaintiff could not defeat absolute immunity by showing that the state-

ments made to support a probable cause finding were false or that the

No. 23-cv-365

prosecutor lacked sufficient evidence to establish probable cause). The focus

is on the action taken, “not on the harm that the conduct may have caused or

... whether it was lawful.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 271 (1993).

Thus, charges that are “inherently related to a prosecutor’s role as an advo-

cate,” such as filing charges against a defendant, will be “protected by abso-

lute immunity whether or not probable cause exists.” Chilcoat, 41 F.4th at

1211,

Mr. McGill challenges conduct that falls at or near the “obvious

benchmark” where absolute prosecutorial immunity applies. /d. at 1209. He

alleges that Mr. Ballard, Mr. Gibbs, and Ms. Leavell obtained a warrant to

arrest Mr. McGill without disclosing that Mr. McGill had an easement and a

right to remove property impinging on that easement, charged Mr. McGill

with malicious injury to property, prosecuted him for that charge, refused to

withdraw the charge despite knowing they lacked probable cause to pursue it,

and contested Mr. McGill’s motion to dismiss. See Dkt. 2 at 944, 47, 55, 70,

95. These are core prosecutorial duties inherently tied to the Defendants’

roles as advocates for the state, and they are shielded by the doctrine of abso-

lute prosecutorial immunity.’

Mr. McGill argues the question of whether the Defendants are entitled

to immunity is a fact-based inquiry that cannot be resolved at this stage of the

pleadings. See Dkt. 27 at 15, 15 n.2 (arguing that Defendants “cannot prove”

absolute immunity and that Mr. McGill “will argue” that “Defendants com-

mitted acts outside of their prosecutorial functions”). This contention is

without merit. Courts routinely consider the availability of prosecutorial

* See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 126-29 (1997) (holding that activities pertain-

ing to the preparation and filing of charging documents are protected by absolute immun-

ity); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 491 (1991) (recognizing that the prosecutor’s presentation

of evidence to support a motion for a search warrant “clearly involve[d]” his role as state’s

advocate); Chilcoat, 41 F.4th at 1210-11 (granting immunity to claims based on allegedly

false statements made to support probable cause finding).

No. 23-cv-365

immunity at the pleading stage. F.g., Van Cleave v. City of Marysville, Kansas,

185 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1213-15 (D. Kan. 2002) (dismissing claim based on pros-

ecutor’s alleged failure to conduct an adequate investigation). The question

presented by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not whether Mr. McGill could allege

that a prosecutor engaged in conduct that falls on the far side of the contin-

uum and, consequently, is not shielded by prosecutorial immunity; the ques-

tion is whether he Aas alleged that conduct in his complaint. Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 556. Mr. McGill has not pointed to any allegations of conduct that falls

outside the scope of the Defendants’ prosecutorial functions.’ As a result, he

has not given this Court any “reason to believe that [he] has a reasonable like-

lihood of mustering factual support for [his] claims.” Ridge at Red Hawk, 493

F.3d at 1177.

In an attempt to salvage his claims, Mr. McGill argues that, even if his

claims for damages are barred, he should nevertheless be permitted to pursue

his claims for injunctive relief against Mr. Ballard, Mr. Gibbs, and Ms.

Leavell. Dkt. 27 at 13-16. This argument also lacks merit, at least insofar as it

applies the claims asserted against those Defendants in their individual ca-

pacities. “Section 1983 plaintiffs may sue individual-capacity defendants only

for money damages and official-capacity defendants only for injunctive re-

lief.” Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1161 n.5 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing Hafer

yp. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30 (1991)). There is no legal basis to support Mr.

McGill’s claims for injunctive relief against the individual prosecutors. Be-

cause Mr. McGill cannot seek injunctive relief against Mr. Ballard, Mr. Gibbs,

or Ms. Leavell in their individual capacities, and because his claims for

> Mr. McGill argues in a footnote [Dkt. 27 at 15, n.2] that he has alleged that Mr.

Ballard, Mr. Gibbs, and Ms. Leavell made “defamatory statements” about him. But the only

statements he refers to are those made in the context of the prosecution of the criminal case.

See Dkt. 2 at 193. The complaint does not identify any allegedly defamatory statements

that were unrelated to the prosecution of criminal charges. Cf Buckley, 509 U.S. at 277-78

(finding that comments a press conference were not connected to the prosecutor’s role as

an advocate).

No. 23-cv-365

damages under against those Defendants are barred by the doctrine of abso-

lute prosecutorial immunity, Mr. McGill’s federal claims against the prose-

cutors must be dismissed.

The Court next turns to Mr. McGill’s state-law claims against Mr. Bal-

lard, Mr. Gibbs, and Ms. Leavell in their individual capacities, all of which

arise out of the same conduct as the § 1983 claims. See Dkt. 2 at {J 166, 177,

188, 193, 199, 210, 216 (alleging the Defendants charged Mr. McGill with a

crime and falsely stated that he committed a crime). Defendants argue that

they are entitled to common-law absolute immunity on these claims as well.

Dkt. 20 at 21-24 (arguing that prosecutors are absolutely immune from liabil-

ity arising out of activities performed within the scope of their judicial duties).

Mr. McGill responds that the common-law doctrine of prosecutorial immun-

ity was abrogated by the Oklahoma Government Tort Claims Act, Okla. Stat.

tit. 51 §§ 151 et seq., and that, even if it was not, his claims for injunctive relief

should be permitted to proceed. Dkt. 27 at 24-27.

The Court disagrees with Mr. McGill’s claim that common-law pros-

ecutorial immunity was abrogated by the GTCA. The GTCA was enacted in

1985 in response to a judicial opinion abrogating the doctrine of common-law

sovereign immunity. See Nguyen v. State, 1990 OK 21, 7 3, 788 P.2d 962, 964.

The Oklahoma Supreme Court has since recognized that, while the Act op-

erates as “both an adoption and conditional waiver of the sovereign immunity

doctrine,” it does not impair other distinct grounds for immunity. Su/lins ».

Am. Med. Response of Oklahoma, Inc., 2001 OK 20, 23 P.3d 259, 266 n.6, 267

n.11 (emphasis added) (recognizing that the “[c]ommon-law protection of

judges from tort liability is a rubric entirely distinct from ‘governmental tort

immunity’” (citing Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984))). In fact, the Okla-

homa Supreme Court has recognized that the protections of the GTCA are

supplemental to traditional immunity doctrines available at common law. Mo-

rales v. City of Oklahoma City ex rel. Oklahoma City Police Dep’t, 2010 OK 9,

No. 23-cv-365

18, 230 P.3d 869, 877 (stating that the GTCA provides government employers

with “the same defenses to and limitations on liability” as private employers

under similar circumstances and that, “if the employee has immunity from

suit under a statute other than the GTCA or under the common lam, . . . the

terms of § 155(16) should ordinarily extend those . . . benefits to the govern-

mental employer” (emphasis added)).

Although there are some opinions that appear to conflate the immun-

ity offered under the GTCA with the immunity available at common law,

those cases do not hold that the GTCA abrogates the doctrine of prosecuto-

rial immunity.® Mr. McGill has not pointed to any case law holding that the

GTCA abrogates prosecutorial immunity, and this Court’s research suggests

that traditional common-law immunities can coexist with the GTCA, occa-

sionally overlap with the GT'CA, and have been applied since the GT'CA was

enacted forty years ago. See Morales, 2010 OK 9, 718, 230 P.3d at 877; Sullins,

2001 OK 20, 23 P.3d 259, 266 n.6, 267 n.11; Allen v. Zigler, 2002 OK CIV

APP 30, 9] 4, 41 P.3d 1060, 1061 (recognizing that “[it] has long been the law

that judges enjoy absolute immunity from damages for acts performed in their

judicial capacities”). And if there were any doubt as to whether common-law

immunities survived the enactment of the GT'CA at the time this action was

filed, the Tenth Circuit has recently put the question to rest. See Modoc Nation

». Follis, No. 24-5135, slip op. at 9-10 (10th Cir. Oct. 3, 2025) (recognizing that

personal immunity defenses such as prosecutorial immunity are distinct from

sovereign immunity and stating that, “[i]n Oklahoma, a judicial officer is not

liable in civil action for judicial acts” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).

® See N. Side State Bank v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Tulsa Cnty., 1994 OK 34, J 12,

894 P.2d 1046, 1050 (evaluating whether judicial immunity attached to a court clerk under

the GTCA); White v. State ex rel. Harris, 2005 OK CIV APP 79, ¥ 11, 122 P.3d 484, 488

(concluding that the district attorney was “immune from liability pursuant to the GTCA”

which provides that the State ‘shall not be liable for losses resulting from judicial, quasi-

judicial, or prosecutorial functions”).

No. 23-cv-365

Mr. McGill argues that he may nevertheless pursue his state-law

claims for injunctive relief against Mr. Ballard, Mr. Gibbs, and Ms. Leavell

even if the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity applies. Mr. McGill provides

no case law to support his contention that he may seek and obtain a personal

injunction against a state prosecutor under Oklahoma law. See Dkt. 27 at 25-

26. Furthermore, the allegations of the complaint do not state a claim for in-

junctive relief against Mr. Ballard, Mr. Gibbs, or Ms. Leavell in their individ-

ual capacities because the complaint does not allege that any of those Defend-

ants engaged in any wrongful conduct outside of their official duties as pros-

ecutors. See Dkt. 2 at J] 44, 47, 55, 70, 95. An order enjoining the prosecutors

from individually violating Mr. McGill’s rights would be purely speculative

and inappropriate given the absence of any allegation that they previously en-

gaged or threatened to engage in any individual wrongdoing. See Oklahoma

Pub. Employees Ass’n v. Oklahoma Dep’t of Cent. Servs., 2002 OK 71, J 20, 55

P.3d 1072, 1081 (Okla. 2002) (recognizing that “an injunction should be de-

nied when the expectation of future wrongdoing is too speculative to form the

basis for issuing an injunction”’).’

The common-law doctrine of prosecutorial immunity applies here,

and it bars any claim for damages arising out of intrinsically prosecutorial con-

duct. See Powell v. Seay, 1976 OK 22, J 21, 553 P.2d 161, 164. And as discussed

in Section II(A), supra, all of Mr. McGill’s allegations regarding Mr. Ballard,

Mr. Gibbs, and Ms. Leavell concern conduct intrinsic to the prosecution of

Mr. McGill. To the extent Mr. McGill has a legal basis for asserting state-law

claims for injunctive relief against those Defendants in their individual capac-

ities, his complaint fails to set forth facts establishing a right to that relief.

” See also J. Corman Fam. Ltd. P’ship #4 v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., L.P., No. CIV-

16-1213-R, 2017 WL 4053858, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 13, 2017) (dismissing claim for in-

junctive relief where the allegation that a defendant would continue in breach of its obliga-

tions was “purely speculative”).

No, 23-cv-365

Accordingly, Mr. McGill’s state-law claims against the prosecutors in their

individual capacities are dismissed.

Mr. McGill’s claims against the District Attorney’s Office and his of-

ficial-capacity claims against the prosecutors are next. These Defendants ar-

gue that, as an agency and employees of the state, they are immune from suit.

See Dkt. 20 at 18-21. Mr. McGill agrees that the Eleventh Amendment bars

his claims for damages against those Defendants. Dkt. 27 at 22-24. See Butler

vy. Rainbolt, No. 23-7091, 2024 WL 3548936, at *2 (10th Cir. July 26, 2024).

Based on the parties’ agreement, the Court dismisses Mr. McGill’s damages

claims against the District Attorney’s Office and his official-capacity claims

against its agents.

Mr. McGill argues that, although he cannot maintain a claim for dam-

ages, he may obtain injunctive relief against both the District Attorney’s Of-

fice and its agents in their official capacities. Dkt. 27 at 22-24. The Defendants

did not address this issue in their opening brief, which is directed primarily at

Mr. McGill’s damages claims. See Dkt. 20 at 19 (stating that the “Eleventh

amendment bars suits for damages against a state in federal court”’); zd. at 20

(same). The Court cannot find a request to dismiss Mr. McGill’s claims for

injunctive relief anywhere in Defendants’ motion. Although Defendants ar-

gue in their reply that Mr. McGill lacks standing to seek injunctive relief un-

der Ex Parte Young, that argument was not raised in their original motion, and

Mr. McGill has not had an opportunity to respond to it.

The Court is mindful of its independent obligation to determine a

party’s standing to seek relief, regardless of when and how that issue is raised.

Nevertheless, the Court is reticent to address that issue when only one party

has briefed it. The Court denies Defendant’s motion to dismiss Mr. McGill’s

claims for injunctive relief against the District Attorney’s Office and its

No. 23-cv-365

agents in their official capacities and will direct the parties to submit supple-

mental briefing on this issue as noted in part III, znfra.

Finally, the Court turns to the Sheriff’s motion to dismiss. The Sher-

iff, who is sued in his official capacity only,® argues that (1) Mr. McGill’s

claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be dismissed because the com-

plaint fails to set forth an underlying constitutional violation that was caused

by a municipal policy or custom, and (2) Mr. McGill’s complaint is too vague

and conclusory to state a claim for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. The

Court agrees on both points.

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. McGill must

allege facts sufficient to establish (a) an underlying constitutional violation,

(b) a municipal policy or custom, and (c) a link between the policy or custom

and the constitutional injury he allegedly suffered. Graves ». Thomas, 450 F.3d

1215, 1218 (10th Cir. 2006). Mr. McGill’s complaint does not establish the

first essential element.

Mr. McGill’s chief constitutional complaint is that the Sheriff’s De-

partment and its agents arrested him without probable cause. Dkt. 2 at {{ 93,

94, 100, 101, 214. But Mr. McGill acknowledges that he was arrested pursuant

to a warrant, and he has not alleged or even suggested that the warrant was

facially invalid or otherwise legally insufficient to permit the Department to

arrest him. Without such an allegation, Mr. McGill cannot state a claim for a

constitutional violation; the complaint itself establishes that a facially valid

arrest warrant provided the Sheriff’s Department and its agents with a con-

stitutional basis for the arrest. See, e.g., Jones v. Hacker, No. 13-cv-00444-JHP,

Mr. McGill’s claim against Sheriff Walton is, in substance, a claim against Rogers

County. See Myers v. Okla. County Bd. of County Com’rs, 151 F.3d 1313, 1316 n.2 (10th Cir.

1998).

No. 23-cv-365

2015 WL 1279363, at *4 (E.D. Okla. Mar. 20, 2015) (recognizing that officers

may “rely on a judicially secured warrant for immunity from a § 1983 action

for illegal search and seizure unless the warrant is so lacking in indicia of prob-

able cause that official belief in the existence of probable cause is unreasona-

ble” (quoting Yancey v. Carroll County, 876 F.2d 1238, 1243 (6th Cir. 1989)));

Chavez v. Cnty. of Bernalillo, 3 F. Supp. 3d 936, 994 (D.N.M. 2014) (holding

that the county employees did not violate the Fourth Amendment by detain-

ing the plaintiff pursuant to a cancelled, facially valid warrant).

Mr. McGill argues that the Sheriff’s Department had “actual

knowledge” that the warrant was invalid because it had access to the ease-

ment through public records and because an officer had been given a copy of

the easement prior to Mr. McGill’s arrest. Dkt. 3 at 94. But even if this

information would have put the Department on notice of potential problems

with the warrant, that does not mean the Department violated Mr. McGill’s

rights by executing the warrant. An “officer is not required by the Fourth

Amendment to obtain a copy of [a] warrant, research supporting documenta-

tion, or go behind the facial validity of a warrant before making [an] arrest.”

Smyth v. City of Lakewood, No. 95-1481, 1996 WL 194715, at *4 (10th Cir. Apr.

19, 1996).° To the extent the Department was in possession of information

allegedly at odds with the arrest warrant,"° it had no constitutional obligation

to challenge or refuse to execute the warrant based on that knowledge.

* See also Scull v. New Mexico, 236 F.3d 588, 598 (10th Cir. 2000) (concluding that

the appellees “were not required by . .. the Constitution .. . to investigate independently

Mr. Reed’s claim that he should be released”); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 393 (10th Cir.

1984) (holding that, “[uJ]nless a warrant is facially invalid an officer has no constitutional

duty to independently determine its validity”).

© The Court does not agree with Mr. McGill’s suggestion that the information he

provided was sufficient to call the legality of the warrant into question. The easement is not

in Sam McGill, Jr.’s name. Furthermore, Mr. McGill was charged with malicious injury to

property, a charge that encompasses acts including injury to and destruction of property. It

is not clear that a person who has the legal right to move property cannot be charged with

maliciously znjuring that property during the moving process.

No. 23-cv-365

Mr. McGill contends the Department should be judicially estopped

from arguing that it had probable cause to arrest him because the charges

against him were ultimately dismissed. See Dkt. 26 at 11-12. This argument

lacks merit. The question of whether probable cause exists at the time of an

arrest is distinct from the question of whether probable cause continues to exist

at the outset of a criminal trial. F.g., Pena Lee v. City of Las Cruces, _ FF.

Supp. 3d __, No. 2:22-cv-00960-WJ-GBW, 2025 WL 2267963, at *15

(D.N.M. Aug. 8, 2025) (recognizing whether probable cause exists to support

a criminal complaint is a question “distinct from” whether a plaintiff was

falsely arrested, which focuses “solely on whether probable cause existed at

the time of [the] initial arrest”’)." The judicial officer’s determination that the

State could not prosecute Mr. McGill for destruction of property in December

2022 does not preclude the Department from arguing (or establishing) that it

had probable cause to arrest Mr. McGill on that charge over a year earlier.

Dutton v. City of Midwest City, 630 F. App’x 742, 745 (10th Cir. 2015) (stating

that the “fact that the charges against [the plaintiff] were later dismissed

[was] not determinative” of his false-arrest claim).

The Department is not precluded from arguing that its conduct was

constitutional, and there are no allegations in Mr. McGill’s complaint that, if

true, would establish that the Department violated Mr. McGill’s constitu-

tional rights by executing a presumptively valid warrant. Absent such allega-

tions, Mr. McGill cannot satisfy the first required element of his § 1983 claims

against the Department and its agents, and those claims must be dismissed.

See Graves, 450 F.3d at 1218.

" See also Sodaro v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 753 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1237 (D. Colo.

2024) (expressing doubt as to whether “a finding of arguable probable cause . . . on [an]

unlawful seizure claim should automatically defeat [a] malicious prosecution claim” where

the two claims involve two probable-cause determinations, one at the time of the arrest and

the other at a hearing).

No. 23-cv-365

Mr. McGill’s complaint fails to state a claim that the Department and

its agents violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).” A claim for relief under § 1985(3)

cannot be premised upon “vague and conclusory allegations” but “must be

[pleaded] with some degree of specificity.” O’Connor v. St. John’s Coll., 290

F. App’x 137, 141 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omit-

ted). Mr. McGill’s complaint fails to allege specific facts showing that the De-

partment or any of its agents agreed or conspired with any other person for

the purpose of depriving Mr. McGill of his constitutional rights—allegations

that are necessary to state a claim for relief under § 1985(3). See 42 U.S.C. §

1985(3); Tilton v. Richardson, 6 F.3d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1993) (setting forth

the essential elements of a § 1985 claim). At most, the complaint alleges that

the Department and its representatives arrested Mr. McGill (pursuant to a

watrant) without probable cause and were part of a “conspiracy between all

of the Defendants to deprive McGill of the equal protection of the laws.” Dkt.

2 at YJ 150-153. These allegations are vague, conclusory, unsupported by

well-pleaded facts, and insufficient to state a claim for relief under § 1985(3).

Cf AerSale, Inc. v. City of Roswell, No. 2:22-cv-00218-MIS-DLM, 2024 WL

2939166, at *16 (D.N.M. June 11, 2024) (dismissing claim that a defendant

acted “in concert and by agreement with and at the direction of” another

defendant (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Department’s motion to

dismiss the § 1985 claim is granted.

Ill

For the reasons set forth above, the District Attorneys’ motion to dis-

miss [Dkt. 20] is granted in part and denied in part, and the Sheriff’s Depart-

ment’s motion to dismiss [Dkt. 21] is granted. Mr. McGill’s claims against

the Sheriff’s Department, his claims against Mr. Ballard, Mr. Gibbs, and Ms.

® The complaint does not indicate which subparagraph of § 1985 is at issue. The

Court assumes Mr. McGill is bringing claims under paragraph (3) of that statute.

No. 23-cv-365

Leavell in their individual capacities, and his federal claims and his state-law

damages claims against the District Attorney’s Office and its agents acting in

their official capacities are dismissed without prejudice. Mr. McGill’s state-

law claims for equitable relief against the District Attorney’s Office and Mr.

Ballard, Mr. Gibbs, and Ms. Leavell in their official capacities remain pend-

ing.

The parties are directed to appear for a case management and sched-

uling conference on October 28, 2025, at 10:00 a.m. to set a deadline to file

an amended pleading and a briefing schedule to address the viability of the

sole claim that was not resolved by this order.

DATED this 7th day of October 2025.

JOHN D. RUSSELL

United States District Judge

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