State of Tennessee v. Marcus Anthony Pearson

10/07/2025

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs September 16, 2025

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. MARCUS ANTHONY PEARSON

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 2007-C-1912 Khadija L. Babb, Judge

No. M2025-00031-CCA-R3-CD

The Defendant, Marcus Anthony Pearson, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to

correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On

appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court did not sufficiently set forth findings of

fact and conclusions of law with regard to each argument raised in his Rule 36.1 motion.

Additionally, the Defendant contends that his consecutive sentences are illegal because he

was not resentenced in accordance with this court’s prior order, and as such, adequate

Wilkerson findings were never made to support the imposition of consecutive sentences.

Lastly, he claims the amended judgment forms were not entered in a timely fashion. After

review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

KYLE A. HIXSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER,

P.J., and ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., J., joined.

Marcus Anthony Peason, Wartburg, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Lacy E. Wilber, Senior Assistant

Attorney General; Glenn R. Funk, District Attorney General; and Christopher Buford,

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Based upon events that took place on April 15, 2006, a Davidson County jury

convicted the Defendant of one count of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of

first degree felony murder, and two counts of attempted first degree murder. State v.

Pearson, No. M2007-02826-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 1616678, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App.

June 10, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 19, 2009). Thereafter, the Defendant was

sentenced to life imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction, a conviction into

which both of the felony murder convictions were merged. Id. He received twenty years

for each of the attempted first degree murder convictions, which were to be served

concurrently with each other but consecutively to the life sentence for a total effective

sentence of life plus twenty years. Id.

On direct appeal, this court affirmed the Defendant’s convictions but concluded that

the trial court committed plain error1 when it ordered consecutive sentences based upon the

Defendant’s being a dangerous offender without making the required findings pursuant to

State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 993, 939 (Tenn. 1995) (“[T]he imposition of consecutive

sentences on an offender found to be a dangerous offender requires, in addition to the

application of general principles of sentencing, the finding that an extended sentence is

necessary to protect the public against further criminal conduct by the defendant and that

the consecutive sentences must reasonably relate to the severity of the offenses

committed.”). Pearson, 2009 WL 1616678, at *13. This court remanded the case for

“resentencing solely on the issue of consecutive sentences[.]” Id.

The trial court held a resentencing hearing on December 3, 2009, during which it

stated “[t]hat an extended sentence [was] necessary to protect the public against further

criminal conduct by the [D]efendant” and that “the offenses were very serious and very

severe, so the [consecutive] sentence [did] reasonably relate to the severity of the offenses.”

The Defendant was present and represented by counsel at this hearing.

On June 30, 2011, the Defendant filed his first petition for post-conviction relief.

Pearson v. State, No. M2012-01529-CCA-R3-PC, 2013 WL 1912586, at *1 (Tenn. Crim.

App. May 8, 2013), no perm. app. filed. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition

as time-barred, calculating the statute of limitations from June 10, 2009, the date this

court’s direct appeal opinion was filed. Id. at *2. The Defendant appealed the timeliness

determination. Id. On appeal, this court observed that the Defendant’s case was remanded

for resentencing by this court’s June 10, 2009 opinion and that the supreme court denied

permission to appeal that decision on October 19, 2009. Id. This court explained that while

the October 2009 denial “would have [normally] been [the] date of the final action of the

highest court[,]” the date from which to calculate the post-conviction statute of limitations

in this case was from the date the resentencing occurred and the new sentence was imposed.

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The Defendant and his brother, Elvin Pearson, were convicted in a joint trial. Although it was

Elvin Pearson, not the Defendant, who raised the Wilkerson issue on appeal, this court nonetheless

conducted a plain error review regarding the Defendant’s consecutive sentences.

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Id. Finding no judgment forms or any other information in the record to reflect the date of

resentencing, this court remanded the case to the post-conviction court for “an evidentiary

hearing to determine the timeliness of the petition for post-conviction relief.” Id. This

court further noted that it could not determine from the record whether “a resentencing

hearing was ever conducted in this matter in accordance with [this court’s prior] order in

the [Defendant’s] direct appeal.” Id. at *2 n.3. We instructed the post-conviction court to

“make such an inquiry and request a copy of such judgments, if they exist[ed]” because

such judgment forms were required to determine the timeliness of the Defendant’s

post-conviction petition. Id.

On August 22, 2013, the trial court entered amended judgment forms, reflecting the

same partial consecutive sentences and total effective sentence of life plus twenty years.

On the judgment form for the first degree murder conviction, the trial court noted that the

judgment form was amended to comply with the opinion of this court and that a

resentencing hearing occurred on December 3, 2009.

The Defendant’s post-conviction claims, which included several allegations of

ineffective assistance of counsel, were then heard on the merits. Pearson v. State, No.

M2015-01159-CCA-R3-PC, 2016 WL 2779229, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 13, 2016),

perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 19, 2016). Ultimately, the post-conviction court denied

relief, and this court affirmed the post-conviction court’s judgment. Id.

On October 3, 2023, the Defendant filed the instant pro se motion to correct an

illegal sentence, alleging therein that his effective sentence of life plus twenty years was

illegal because a resentencing hearing was never held, and as such, the trial court never

made the requisite Wilkerson findings to impose consecutive sentences. Counsel was

appointed for the Defendant, and the trial court orally ruled on the motion on December 3,

2024. At the beginning of the hearing, the trial court explained that it had reviewed the

trial, original sentencing hearing, and resentencing hearing transcripts, and this court’s

opinions regarding the Defendant’s various appeals. The trial court found that resentencing

had taken place at a hearing on December 3, 2009. It repeated the findings made by the

trial court at the resentencing hearing regarding the Defendant’s being a dangerous

offender and found that, although it characterized these findings as “bare-bones,” the

Wilkerson requirements were met. As such, the trial court ruled that the Defendant’s

sentence was not illegal and denied his motion. On January 7, 2025, the trial court filed a

written order memorializing its ruling. This timely appeal followed.

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II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Defendant, pro se, argues that the trial court’s order denying his Rule

36.1 motion was insufficient for failing to set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law

with regard to each argument raised in his Rule 36.1 motion. Substantively regarding his

claim of an illegal sentence, he avers that his consecutive sentences are illegal because he

was not resentenced in accordance with this court’s prior order, and as such, adequate

Wilkerson findings were never made to support the imposition of consecutive sentences.

He also submits that the amended judgment forms do not comply with the timing

requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-209(e)(1) (“After the defendant

is sentenced, the district attorney general shall complete and file within thirty (30) days the

uniform judgment document for the conviction.”). The State contends the trial court

properly denied the Defendant’s Rule 36.1 motion and the Defendant is not entitled to

relief.

Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 provides a mechanism for a defendant

or the State to seek correction of an illegal sentence. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(a); State v.

Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 208-09 (Tenn. 2015). An illegal sentence under this rule is “one

that is not authorized by the applicable statutes or that directly contravenes an applicable

statute.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(a)(2). The term “illegal sentence” “is synonymous with

the habeas corpus concept of a ‘void’ sentence.” Cox v. State, 53 S.W.3d 287, 292 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Moody v. State, 160 S.W.3d 512 (Tenn.

2005). “[I]f the [trial] court determines that the sentence is not an illegal sentence, the

[trial] court shall file an order denying the motion.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(c)(1). We

review the lower courts’ constructions of Rule 36.1 de novo with no presumption of

correctness. Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 205.

Sentencing errors are divided “into three categories—clerical errors, appealable

errors, and fatal errors.” State v. Wooden, 478 S.W.3d 585, 595 (Tenn. 2015). Clerical

errors “arise simply from a clerical mistake in filling out the uniform judgment

document[.]” Id. Appealable errors are those “for which the Sentencing Act specifically

provides a right of direct appeal[,]” and generally involve challenges to “sufficiency of the

evidence supporting a conviction” or “attacks on the correctness of the methodology by

which a trial court imposes a sentence.” Id. Fatal errors are “so profound as to render the

sentence illegal and void.” Id. Only fatal errors render a sentence illegal and entitle a

defendant to relief under Rule 36.1. Id.

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First, regarding the adequacy of the trial court’s order denying the Defendant’s Rule

36.1 motion, we observe that subsection (e) of Rule 36.1 states, “An order granting or

denying a motion filed under this rule shall set forth the court’s findings of fact and

conclusions of law as to the matters alleged in the motion.” The purpose of this

requirement is to “facilitate appellate review.” State v. Jones, No. W2017-00145-CCA-

R3-CD, 2017 WL 3841371, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2017) (quoting Tenn. R.

Crim. P. 36.1, Advisory Comm’n Cmts.). Here, the trial court made an oral ruling denying

the Defendant’s motion at the December 3, 2024 proceeding. Thereafter, the trial court’s

January 7, 2025 written order outlined the factual background of the Defendant’s case,

restated the Defendant’s argument as presented in the motion, and noted the materials it

reviewed in reaching its decision before the trial court concluded that a resentencing

hearing took place and that the Defendant’s sentences were not illegal. This order

sufficiently meets the requirements of Rule 36.1(e) for findings of fact and conclusions of

law and is adequate to facilitate our review.

Second, the trial court determined that this court’s previous order for resentencing

had been complied with when the Defendant was resentenced on December 3, 2009, and

that the trial court, albeit it in short order, assessed the requisite Wilkerson factors at that

time. Rule 36.1 is not an alternative mechanism to challenge the findings of the trial court.

See Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445, 451 (Tenn. 2011) (holding in the context of a

habeas corpus proceeding that errors in the trial court’s factual findings are appealable

errors rather than fatal errors), superseded by rule on other grounds, Tenn. R. Crim. P.

36.1; Wooden, 478 S.W.3d at 594-95 (“[T]he definition of ‘illegal sentence’ in Rule 36.1

is coextensive with, and not broader than, the definition of the term in the habeas corpus

context.”). Importantly, whether the trial court complied with Wilkerson is merely an

appealable error and does not render the Defendant’s sentences illegal. See State v. Moses,

No. W2019-01219-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 4187317, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 20,

2020) (“A failure to make required findings in support of consecutive sentencing is not a

fatal error that would render the sentences illegal and entitle the [defendant] to . . . Rule

36.1 relief.”) (first citing Cantrell, 346 S.W.3d at 454-55; and then citing Williams v. State,

No. 01C01-9506-Cr-00190, 1996 WL 233982, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 9, 1996)).

Furthermore, regarding the Defendant’s issue that the trial court failed to enter the

amended judgment forms in a timely fashion, we note that the Defendant did not argue this

issue in his motion to correct an illegal sentence but that it was later raised by the Defendant

in a pro se brief filed with the trial court. However, this brief was filed at a time when the

Defendant was represented by counsel. And, counsel stated at the conclusion of the

December 3, 2024 proceeding that he had nothing further to present on behalf of the

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Defendant, despite the timing requirements for filing amended judgment forms not being

raised or discussed. It has long been the rule that a criminal defendant has the right to

representation by counsel or to proceed pro se, but not both simultaneously. State v. Hester,

324 S.W.3d 1, 31 (Tenn. 2010); State v. Burkhart, 541 S.W.2d 365, 371 (Tenn. 1976). We

will not address issues raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Alvarado, 961 S.W.2d

136, 153 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996); State v. Turner, 919 S.W.2d 346, 356-57 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 1995). Because the issue was not properly raised in the trial court, it is, therefore,

waived. Nonetheless, we briefly observe that, although the amended judgment forms were

not entered until 2013 despite resentencing occurring in 2009, the State is correct that this

does not rise to the level of a fatal error, as it did not alter the Defendant’s sentence in any

way. See Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 212 (holding that a trial court’s erroneous failure to comply

with a statute did not render the defendant’s sentence illegal when it did not alter the

sentence in any way).

Following our de novo review, we agree with the trial court that nothing in the

record indicates the Defendant is serving an illegal sentence. The Defendant has failed to

show that his sentences were “not authorized by the applicable statutes” or that they

“directly contravene[] an applicable statute.” See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(a)(2). As the

record is devoid of any fatal errors, the Defendant’s sentence is not illegal, and denial of

his motion was required. See Wooden, 478 S.W.3d at 595; Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(c)(1).

III. CONCLUSION

In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, we affirm the judgment

of the trial court.

s/ Kyle A. Hixson .

KYLE A. HIXSON, JUDGE

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