S.M. Donahue v. PA DHS & PA Governor's OA

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Sean M. Donahue, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 540 M.D. 2024

:

PA Department of Human : Submitted: September 9, 2025

Services and PA Governor’s Office :

of Administration, :

Respondents :

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION

BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: October 7, 2025

Before this Court are the Preliminary Objections (POs) filed by the

Pennsylvania Department of Human Services (Department) and the Pennsylvania

Governor’s Office of Administration (OA) (collectively, Respondents), to a Petition

for Review (PFR) in the nature of a complaint titled Petition for a Writ of Prohibition1

1

“A writ of prohibition, the purpose of which is to protect a party from enduring a hearing

or trial before a tribunal that has absolutely no power to deal with the subject matter before it, is

an extraordinary remedy that lies within the court’s discretion and will be issued only with extreme

caution.” Independence Blue Cross v. Pennsylvania Insurance Department, 670 A.2d 221, 223

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). A writ of prohibition “is available only if the petitioning party has established

that it has an extreme necessity for such a remedy and that there exists no other adequate remedy

at law.” Id. “The writ is not appropriate where relief may be sought through ordinary avenues of

judicial review.” Chester Community Charter School v. Department of Education, 996 A.2d 68,

79 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). We agree with OA Respondents that it is clear that while Petitioner has

(Footnote continued on next page…)

filed pro se by Sean M. Donahue (Petitioner) in this Court’s original jurisdiction.

Upon review, we sustain Respondents’ POs and dismiss the Petition.

I. Factual and Procedural History

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.

On November 5, 2024, and November 10, 2024, Petitioner applied for advertised

positions for an income maintenance (IM) caseworker at the Hazleton County

Assistance Office (CAO).2 (PFR attachment B.1, C.1) On November 12, 2024,

Petitioner applied for a similar position at the CAO which required applicants to be

bilingual in English and Spanish (bilingual). (PFR at Attachment A.1.) On the same

day, he was informed that he had been found ineligible for the bilingual position

because he declined to participate in the required Spanish proficiency evaluation.

(PFR at Attachment A.2.)

On November 23, 2024, Petitioner filed a PFR with this Court seeking

to enjoin the Department and OA from filling any of its currently open positions for

IM caseworkers in the CAO through their job announcement “JOB NUMBER

CSSC-2024-11621-44720” which seeks bilingual candidates for the positions. The

PFR also seeks to enjoin the Department and OA from issuing future job

announcements for such positions within the CAO requiring applicants to be

bilingual. (PFR, ¶¶ 1, 2.)

In his PFR, Petitioner alleges that:

As soon as [the Department] and OA saw that the

Petitioner applied for the [IM] Caseworker positions at Job

Announcement CS-2024-11423-44720 on November 5,

2024 . . . and at Job Announcement CS-2024-11606-44720

styled his pleading as a Petition for a Writ of Prohibition, Petitioner actually seeks the issuance of

injunctions against the Commonwealth parties. (OA Respondent’s Br. at 2 n.1.)

2

Petitioner’s PFR indicates that when he refers to the Hazleton CAO, he means the Luzerne

County Assistance Office in Hazleton.

2

on November 10, 2024 . . . they immediately announced

the position again on November 12, 2024, at Job

Announcement CSSC-2024-11621-44720 . . . but this time

as a Spanish language[-]speaking job only.

(PFR, ¶ 4.) Petitioner asserts that the Department and OA are illegally manipulating

the Department’s hiring process by requiring applicants to speak Spanish in order to

qualify to work as caseworkers on English language IM cases and that Respondents

have used this illegal non-merit based hiring practice for many years. Id., ¶¶ 5, 6,

23. He contends that the purpose for requiring IM caseworkers to be bilingual has

been to illegally exclude white people from being hired at the CAO and that the

practice has been used to deny veterans, such as Petitioner, their statutory veterans

preference when they apply for state civil service jobs.3 Id., ¶¶ 8, 9.

On December 19, 2024, and December 24, 2024, the Department and

OA, respectively, filed POs to the PFR.4 Respondents assert in their POs that (1) the

PFR fails to satisfy any of the prerequisites for injunctive relief, (2) Petitioner has

failed to exhaust his statutorily prescribed administrative remedies, (3) the doctrine

of sovereign immunity bars Petitioner’s suit, and (4) Petitioner has failed to plead a

cognizable claim.5 (Department’s POs, ¶¶ 3-14; ¶¶ 15-20; OA’s POs, ¶¶ 9-16; ¶¶ 17-

46.)

II. Discussion

In ruling on POs, this Court must “accept as true all well-pleaded

material allegations in the petition for review and any reasonable inferences that [it]

3

Veterans’ preference refers to legal preferences granted to veterans with respect to hiring

for state civil service jobs by the Veterans’ Preference Act, 51 Pa.C.S. §§ 7101.1-7111.

4

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1516(b) authorizes the filing of preliminary

objections to an original jurisdiction petition for review. See Pa.R.A.P. 1516(b).

5

On April 2, 2025, both the Department and OA filed briefs in support of their POs. On

May 12, 2025, Petitioner filed a brief in opposition to Respondents’ POs.

3

may draw from the averments.” Highley v. Department of Transportation, 195 A.3d

1078, 1082 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). However, we are “not bound by legal conclusions,

unwarranted inferences from facts, argumentative allegations, or expressions of

opinion encompassed in the Petition for review.” Id. This Court should sustain POs

only where “the law makes clear that the Petitioner cannot succeed on his claim.”

Id. at 1083. “[W]here any doubt exists as to whether the [POs] should be sustained,

the doubt must be resolved in favor of overruling the [POs].” Pennsylvania State

Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police v. Department of Conservation & Natural

Resources, 909 A.2d 413, 416 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019).

With respect to the requirements for the content of a PFR,

“Pennsylvania is a fact-pleading state.” Brimmeier v. Pennsylvania Turnpike

Commission, 147 A.3d 954, 967 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). The Pennsylvania Supreme

Court has explained that although the Rules of Civil Procedure are to be liberally

construed, a petition for review “must nonetheless apprise the [Respondent] of the

claim being asserted and summarize the essential supporting facts.” Bricklayers of

Western Pennsylvania Combined Funds, Inc. v. Scott’s Development Company, 90

A.3d 682, 694 (Pa. 2014). A party’s use of boilerplate allegations defeats the

primary purpose of pleading under our rules of procedure, and “a failure to

adequately plead a claim ‘can and typically does result in the dismissal of the claim

and/or cause of action.’” Brimmeier, 147 A.3d at 967 (quoting Allen v. State Civil

Service Commission, 992 A.2d 924, 927 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010)).

Finally, we note that “the allegations of a pro se complainant are held

to a less stringent standard than that applied to pleadings filed by attorneys.”

Stodghill v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 150 A.3d 547, 551 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2016) (quoting Danysh v. Department of Corrections, 845 A.2d 260, 262-

63 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004)). “If a fair reading of the [PFR] shows that the complainant

4

has pleaded facts that may entitle him to relief, the preliminary objections will be

overruled.” Id. (emphasis removed.)

Department’s PO #2 - Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

We first address the Department’s second PO because it is dispositive.

Respondents assert in their POs that Petitioner is not entitled to seek judicial relief

because he has failed to exhaust his available statutory remedies. (Department’s

POs, ¶¶ 15-20).

“It is well settled that when an adequate administrative remedy exists,

the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a suit in either law or equity.” McNew v.

East Marlborough Township, 295 A.3d 1, 10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023) (quoting

Pennsylvania Independent Oil & Gas Association v. Department of Environmental

Protection, 135 A.3d 1118, 1129 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015)). See also Lashe v. Northern

York County School District, 417 A.2d 260 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980) (holding that equity

has no basis to intervene where there is an available and adequate statutory remedy).

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

requires that a person challenging an administrative

decision must first exhaust all adequate and available

administrative remedies before seeking relief from the

courts. The purposes of this exhaustion requirement are to

prevent premature judicial intervention in the

administrative process and ensure that claims will be

addressed by the body with expertise in the area. Thus,

where the legislature has provided an administrative

procedure to challenge and obtain relief from an agency’s

action, failure to exhaust that remedy bars this Court from

hearing claims for declaratory or injunctive relief with

respect to that agency action.

McNew, 295 A.3d at 10 (quoting Propel Charter Schools v. Department of

Education, 243 A.3d 322, 327 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020)). Thus, where a petitioner in this

Court has failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, the exhaustion rule

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will bar actions for injunctive relief with respect to agency action. Keystone ReLeaf

LLC v. Department of Health, 186 A.3d 505, 513-14 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (en banc).

Our Supreme Court has stated that where the General

Assembly has seen fit to enact a pervasive regulatory

scheme and to establish a governmental agency possessing

expertise and board regulatory and remedial powers to

administer that statutory scheme, a court should be

reluctant to interfere in those matters and disputes which

were intended by the Legislature to be considered, as least

initially, by the administrative agency. Full utilization of

the expertise derived from the development of various

administrative bodies would be frustrated by

indiscriminate judicial intrusions into matters within the

various agencies’ domains.

Propel Charter Schools, 243 A.3d at 327. Thus, the doctrine “is intended to prevent

the premature interruption of the administrative process, which would restrict the

agency’s opportunity to develop an adequate factual record, limit the agency in the

exercise of its expertise, and impede the development of a cohesive body of law in

that area.” Keystone ReLeaf LLC, 186 A.3d at 513 (citing Empire Sanitary Landfill,

Inc. v. Department of Environmental Resources, 684 A.2d 1047, 1054 (Pa. 1996)).

The rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, however, is

not absolute. The Supreme Court “has recognized three exceptions to the doctrine,”

including “where (i) the jurisdiction of an agency is challenged, (ii) the

constitutionality of the statute is challenged[,] or (iii) the remedy at law is

inadequate.” Keystone ReLeaf LLC, 186 A.3d at 514. “The mere existence of a

remedy does not dispose of the question of its adequacy; the administrative remedy

must be ‘adequate and complete.’ Where a statutory procedure would be of ‘little,

if any, utility,’ it may be bypassed.” Propel Charter Schools, 243 A.3d at 327

(citations omitted).

6

“[A]n administrative remedy is inadequate if it either:

(1) does not allow for adjudication of the issues raised . . .

or (2) allows irreparable harm to occur to the [petitioners]

during the pursuit of the statutory remedy.”

[Commonwealth ex rel. Nicholas v. Pennsylvania Labor

Relations Board], 681 A.2d [157,] 161 [(Pa. 1996)]. A

party claiming this exception must make a “clear showing

that the remedy is inadequate.” Commonwealth v.

Eisenberg, 454 A.2d 513, 515 ([Pa.] 1982).

Keystone ReLeaf LLC, 186 A.3d at 517.

Respondents assert that Petitioner has an adequate statutory remedy,

arguing that the Civil Service Reform Act, 71 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-3304 (Act), was

passed by the General Assembly to create an administrative appeal process,

administered through the State Civil Service Commission, to provide a statutory

remedy for those wishing to challenge their non-selection for any position within the

Merit Service System. The Merit Service System includes IM caseworker positions

with the Department. (OA’s Br. at 21.) (Department’s Br. at 9.) Section 3003(7)(ii)

of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] person who is aggrieved by an alleged

violation of section 2704[6] (relating to the prohibition of discrimination) may appeal

in writing to the commission within 20 calendar days of the alleged violation.” 7 71

Pa.C.S. § 3003(7)(ii). (OA’s Br. at 21.)

6

Section 2704 of the Act states:

An officer or employee of the Commonwealth may not discriminate

against an individual in recruitment, examination, appointment,

training, promotion, retention or any other personnel action with

respect to the classified service because of race, gender, disability or

political, partisan or labor union affiliation or other nonmerit factors.

71 Pa.C.S. § 2704.

7

Once the Commission receives notice of an appeal, it is required to promptly schedule

and hold a public hearing. 71 Pa.C.S. § 3003(7)(ii). The Commission then has 90 days to report

its findings and conclusions to the parties. 71 Pa.C.S. § 3003(8)(i).

7

Respondents further assert that should the Commission sustain a

statutory appeal by Petitioner, the Commission has broad remedial authority,

including the ability to place Petitioner’s name on the appropriate eligible lists for

consideration by the Department.8 Id. Finally, Respondents assert that Petitioner

has made no allegation or averment that he has exhausted this administrative

remedy, but rather, Petitioner immediately sought judicial relief. Id.

In response, Petitioner asserts that he has filed complaints with the

Commission regarding the abuse of the Spanish language requirement, which is the

subject of this action, but that he has not heard the status of his complaint.

(Petitioner’s Br. at 35.) Based on this statement, it is clear that Petitioner has not

exhausted his administrative remedy before the Commission. Petitioner, however,

argues that his remedy before the Commission is inadequate because the

Commission does not have jurisdiction to grant the injunction he seeks. (Petitioner’s

Br., ¶¶ 65, 77.)

We agree that the Act allows Petitioner to file a complaint before the

Commission to challenge as discriminatory his failure to be hired by the Department.

Because Petitioner does have an available administrative remedy, we next address

whether Petitioner’s remedy is adequate. In Keystone ReLeaf, LLC, the Petitioner

similarly contended that the statutory remedy available to him was not adequate and

that therefore he was not required to exhaust it. In that case, this Court held that

“[a]bsent a facial constitutional challenge, there is no aspect of its claims that is not

suitable for disposition by the administrative tribunal.” Id. at 518. We also stated

that because the claims raised by the petitioner involved matters that were within the

8

Section 71 Pa.C.S. § 3003(8) lists the remedies that the Commission may provide to

prevailing parties.

8

administrative tribunal’s expertise, petitioner was asking this Court to prejudge

issues that were committed for initial resolution to the administrative forum.

Here, as in Keystone ReLeaf LLC, the issues raised by Petitioner

involving alleged discrimination in civil service hiring fall squarely within the

expertise of the State Civil Service Commission.9 Petitioner has not raised a facial

constitutional challenge to the Act, nor has he challenged the Commission’s

jurisdiction. Because the issues raised by Petitioner involve the Commission’s

expertise, he has failed to make a clear showing that his remedy is inadequate and

his challenge must be brought before the Commission in the first instance before he

can resort to judicial review.

Petitioner states that he has filed administrative appeals with the

Commission regarding what he views as the “abuse of the Spanish language

requirement.” (Petitioner’s Br. at 50) However, Petitioner did not allow those

appeals to conclude before filing his PFR with this Court. At this point, having failed

to complete the administrative appeals process, Petitioner’s allegations regarding the

hiring process at the Luzerne CAO remain speculative and lacking in factual detail.

The appropriate way for Petitioner to advance his arguments is to allow his

administrative appeals to reach their conclusion. Until this occurs, “there is no basis

upon which this Court can conclude that the [administrative] process is wholly

inadequate.” Keystone ReLeaf LLC, 186 A.3d at 519. See also Canonsburg General

Hospital v. Department of Health, 422 A.2d 141, 145 (Pa. 1980) (“courts should not

presume futility in the administrative appeal”).

9

We note that the Civil Service Reform Act states that its purpose is “to create and sustain

a modern merit system of employment within the Commonwealth workforce that promotes the

hiring, retention and promotion of highly qualified individuals, ensuring that government services

are efficiently and effectively delivered to the public.” 71 Pa.C.S. § 2102.

9

Since Petitioner has not exhausted his available administrative remedy,

there is no reason not to require that Petitioner’s previously filed complaint before

the Commission proceed to its conclusion.10 However, if the administrative review

process ultimately fails to provide meaningful administrative review, Petitioner is

free to appeal the Commission’s decision. We therefore sustain Respondents’ PO

relative to Petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies.11

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we sustain Respondents’ PO relating to

Petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies and dismiss Petitioner’s

petition for review.

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

10

We note that Petitioner has not argued in his PFR that the administrative appeal process

“allows irreparable harm to occur during the administrative process.” Nicholas, 681 A.2d at 161.

11

In light of this determination, we need not address the remaining POs.

10

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Sean M. Donahue, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 540 M.D. 2024

:

PA Department of Human :

Services and PA Governor’s Office :

of Administration, :

Respondents :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 7th day of October, 2025, upon consideration of the

Pennsylvania Department of Human Services and the Pennsylvania Governor’s

Office of Administration’s preliminary objections asserting a failure to exhaust

available administrative remedies, it is hereby ordered that such preliminary

objections are SUSTAINED, and the petition for review filed by Petitioner is hereby

DISMISSED.

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge