The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION AT LAFAYETTE
JERREN JONES,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 4:24-CV-2-GSL-APR
JARED BAER and TOWN OF WOLCOTT,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 77]
filed on June 25, 2025, by Defendants Jared Baer and the Town of Wolcott. Plaintiff Jerren Jones,
pro se, filed a response on July 24, 2025, to which Defendants replied on August 25, 2025. For the
reasons below, the Court grants the motion.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 14, 2023, Plaintiff filed his complaint against the Wolcott Police
Department and a Deputy Winkler in the Southern District of Indiana. The case was then
transferred to this district. Once in this district, the case was originally assigned to Judge Jon
DeGuilio and was subsequently reassigned to the undersigned. Plaintiff filed amended
complaints on May 10, 2024, August 23, 2024, and October 22, 2024. The named defendants of
the third (and operative) amended complaint are Jared Baer and the Town of Wolcott. Plaintiff
brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for civil rights violations related to a traffic stop conducted
by Baer, the Town of Wolcott’s Marshal. The case proceeded through discovery, which closed on
May 30, 2025. The instant motion for summary judgment followed, which is now fully briefed
and ready for the Court’s adjudication.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). The movant “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for
its motion and identifying those portions of” the evidence that “demonstrate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To survive a
properly supported motion for summary judgment, “the opposing party may not simply rest upon
the pleadings but must instead submit evidentiary materials that ‘set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Harney v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 526 F.3d 1099,
1104 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court may “not weigh conflicting
evidence, resolve swearing contests, determine credibility, or ponder which party’s version of the
facts is most likely to be true.” Stewart v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 14 F.4th 757, 760 (7th
Cir. 2021). Instead, a court’s only task is “to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether
there is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial.” Id. (internal citation omitted). If there is
no genuine dispute of material fact, then summary judgment is appropriate, and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
MATERIAL FACTS1
On July 19, 2022, a 911 caller reported a tanker with a white cab being driven very
slowly and weaving on the roadway. Wolcott Town Marshal Jared Baer, on duty at the time,
received information about the call from dispatch. Baer himself observed the reported vehicle
1 These facts are drawn from Defendants’ statement of undisputed material facts, which are supported with evidence
submitted by Defendants. Plaintiff responded to this statement and asserted that facts are disputed, but he failed to
provide “citation to evidence supporting each dispute of fact” as required by Northern District of Indiana Local Rule
56-1(b)(2)(C). Merely claiming that a fact is disputed does not make it so for summary judgment analysis.
driving 27 m.p.h. in a 45-m.p.h. zone. For several miles, Baer observed the semi driver, later
identified as Jerren Jones, driving at inconsistent and low speeds as well as several instances of
where the semi was drifting in the lane and going left of center. Baer turned on his emergency
lights and siren, but Jones did not pull over and tried to wave Baer around him.
Jones acknowledges that when the uniformed police officer activated his emergency
lights he knew the officer wanted to pull him over, but Jones did not pull over and continued
driving, attempting to wave Baer around him even though Baer was using his air horn and was
motioning for the driver to pull over. White County Sheriff’s Deputy Mark Helms was
approaching the location when Jones came to an intersection and pulled off U.S. 24. Because
Jones had repeatedly ignored Baer’s attempts to stop him and had attempted to wave Baer around
him, Baer considered the stop as one presenting high risk and unholstered his weapon as he
exited his vehicle.
As shown on the body cam footage, when Jones finally came to a stop, Baer exited his
cruiser, stood behind the door, pointed with his left hand toward the cab and yelled at Jones to
turn off the semi and put his hands out the semi window where Baer could see them. Baer
brought his hands together to hold his firearm, but did not point his weapon at Jones. Baer
directed Jones into a position where Jones could be safely detained. At most, Baer’s weapon was
in a ready position for approximately 90 seconds and was holstered once Jones was in a kneeling
position. Baer never pointed his weapon directly at Jones.
Baer observed that Jones’s speech was lethargic, his eyes were glassy, eyelids were
droopy, and he appeared to have a very dry mouth. Jones consented to taking field sobriety tests,
and he did not pass a horizonal gaze nystagmus test. Baer observed signs consistent with
intoxication or other impairment. Jones agreed to take a portable breath test, which was
administered and registered a .01 breath alcohol concentration level. The other officers at the
scene agreed that Jones was impaired.
Baer told Jones he would retrieve Jones’s driver’s license from the truck cab, and Jones
did not object. Baer observed three cell phones in the cab and asked Jones if he wanted Baer to
retrieve those, to which Jones answered affirmatively. Jones consented to a chemical test, and
Baer transported Jones to the IU Health White Memorial Hospital for a blood draw. After the
blood draw, Baer told Jones that he was being charged with failing to stop for an emergency
vehicle and that the blood draw would be sent to the state lab for analysis. Baer transported Jones
to the White County Jail. The body cam footage does not reveal any threats of harm to Jones nor
any derogatory or racist remarks by Baer or any other officer.
ANALYSIS
Defendants argue that summary judgment should be granted in their favor because
Defendant Baer has qualified immunity, because Baer did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights, and because there is no basis to hold Defendant Town of Wolcott liable.
Plaintiff did not submit any evidence to support his position that Defendants violated his
civil rights. As stated above, Plaintiff cannot rest on his pleadings to withstand summary
judgment. Being a pro se litigant “doesn’t alleviate [a party’s] burden on summary judgment.”
Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 760 (7th Cir. 2011).
A. Qualified Immunity
“Qualified immunity shields a government official from suit for damages under § 1983
‘when [he] makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends
the law governing the circumstances [he] confronted.” Sabo v. Erickson, 128 F.4th 836, 843 (7th
Cir. 2025) (citations omitted); see also Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 151 (2017) (“Whether
qualified immunity can be invoked turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the official’s
acts.” (internal quotation omitted)). Qualified immunity turns on two inquiries: (1) “whether the
facts, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury[,] show that the officer’s
conduct violated a constitutional right[,]” and (2) “whether the right at issue was ‘clearly
established’ at the time of the officer’s alleged misconduct.” Tousis v. Billiot, 84 F.4th 692, 697
(7th Cir. 2023) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)).
Defendants argue that Baer is entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate
Plaintiff’s rights. They argue that Baer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity
that permitted the traffic stop, that Plaintiff consented and/or did not object to Baer entering the
cab of Plaintiff’s vehicle to retrieve Plaintiff’s wallet and cell phones, that Baer unholstered his
weapon for only a brief period and doing so was reasonable under the circumstances, that
Plaintiff consented to the blood test, and that there is no direct or indirect evidence that anyone
acted with racial animus during Plaintiff’s detention and arrest. Plaintiff has presented no
evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact about any of these matters. Because no
constitutional right has been established, Defendant Baer is entitled to qualified immunity for his
actions during the encounter with Plaintiff.
B. Conspiracy
Plaintiff contends there was a conspiracy to murder him and a conspiracy to violate his
civil rights because of his race. “When a plaintiff claims that defendants conspired to violate
[his] civil rights, [he] must proffer specific facts tending to show that a conspiracy existed to
survive a summary judgment motion; conclusory allegations will not suffice.” Cooney v. Casady,
746 F. Supp. 2d 973, 975 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (citing Stagman v. Ryan, 176 F.3d 986, 1003 (7th
Cir.1999)). Defendants maintain that Plaintiff has no evidence of conspiracy beyond conjecture
and speculation. Plaintiff has presented no evidence to support his contention that there were
conspiracies against him. On this basis, the Court grants the motion for summary judgment as to
the allegations of conspiracy.
C. Municipal Liability
Plaintiff brought suit against the Town of Wolcott in addition to Defendant Baer. “A
municipality is a ‘person’ under § 1983 and may be held liable for its own violations of the
federal Constitution and laws.” First Midwest Bank Guardian of Est. of LaPorta v. City of Chi.,
988 F.3d 978, 986 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91
(1978). However, to succeed on a § 1983 Monell claim against a municipality, “a plaintiff must
challenge conduct that is properly attributable to the municipality itself.” City of Chi., 988 F.3d at
986 (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–04 (1997). In other
words, a plaintiff must prove that a constitutional violation was caused by a
governmental “policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or
acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” City of Chi., 988 F.3d at 986 (quoting Monell,
436 U.S. at 694).
“[A] municipality cannot be liable under Monell when there is no underlying
constitutional violation by a municipal employee.” Sallenger v. City of Springfield, Ill., 630 F.3d
499, 504 (7th Cir. 2010). Because Plaintiff has not presented evidence of a constitutional
violation, there is no basis on which to hold the Town of Wolcott liable for a violation of
Plaintiff’s civil rights. The Court enters summary judgment in favor of the Town of Wolcott and
against Plaintiff on all claims brought against the town.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment [DE 77]. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter judgment against Plaintiff
Jerren Jones and in favor of Defendants Jared Baer and Town of Wolcott. Plaintiff takes nothing
by his complaint.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: October 6, 2025
/s/GRETCHEN S. LUND
Judge
United States District Court