Garcia v. Broward County Public Schools

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 24-61343-CIV-DAMIAN

JAVIER E. GARCIA,

Plaintiff,

v.

BROWARD COUNTY PUBLIC

SCHOOLS (BCPS),

Defendants.

________________________________/

ORDER ON PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT [ECF NO. 33]

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant, School Board of Broward

County’s (the “School Board” or “Defendant”), Partial Motion to Dismiss Complaint [ECF

No. 33] (the “Motion”), filed June 16, 2025.

THE COURT has considered the Motion, the parties’ briefing, the record, and the

relevant authorities and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons that follow, this Court

finds that the Motion is due to be denied.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

This Court summarized the procedural and factual background in the May 22, 2025

Order on the School Board’s Motion to Dismiss. See ECF No. 30. Therefore, the following

background includes only that information relevant to the issues raised in the Motion now

before the Court.

Plaintiff, Javier E. Garcia (“Garcia” or “Plaintiff”), filed the original Complaint

against the School Board on July 26, 2024. [ECF No. 1]. In the Complaint, Garcia asserted

claims for retaliation, discrimination, and harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”), and a claim for defamation. Id.

On July 29, 2024, this Court sua sponte dismissed the Complaint as an impermissible shotgun

pleading. See ECF No. 5. After Garcia filed an Amended Complaint [ECF No. 6], the School

Board filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint in its entirety. [ECF No. 21].

On May 22, 2025, this Court granted in part the motion, dismissed the defamation

claim with prejudice as time barred, and dismissed the remaining claims without prejudice

and with leave to amend. [ECF No. 30]. On June 5, 2025, Garcia filed a Second Amended

Complaint, the operative pleading. [ECF No. 32 (“SAC”)]. In the Second Amended

Complaint, Garcia asserts three claims: Retaliation Under Title VII (Count I), Gender

Discrimination Under Title VII (Count II), and National Origin Discrimination Under Title

VII (Count III).

On June 16, 2025, the School Board filed the Motion now before the Court seeking

dismissal of Counts II and III of the Second Amended Complaint. In the Motion, the School

Board argues that while Garcia identifies a comparator, the allegations in the Second

Amended Complaint fail to establish that Garcia and his comparator are “similarly situated

in all material respects.” Garcia filed a Response to the Motion on July 1, 2025 [ECF No. 35

(“Response”)], and the School Board filed a Reply on July 11, 2025. [ECF No. 38 (“Reply”)].

The Motion is fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.

II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. “To survive a motion to dismiss

[under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A pleading withstands a motion

to dismiss if it alleges “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

This pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more

than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must

construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and take the factual

allegations as true. See Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th

Cir. 1997) (citing SEC v. ESM Grp., Inc., 835 F.2d 270, 272 (11th Cir. 1988)). Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) also requires that a pleading contain a “short and plain statement of

the claim” showing the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint

must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it

rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

In addressing the merits of the Motion, Plaintiff’s pro se Response, and the Second

Amended Complaint, this Court is mindful that courts afford a liberal construction to the

allegations of pro se litigants, holding them to more lenient standards than formal pleadings

drafted by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). “Yet even in the case of pro

se litigants this leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or

to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” GJR Invs. v. Cnty. of

Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted), overruled on other

grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709 (11th Cir. 2010). In addition, a pro se litigant is

still “subject to the relevant law and rules of court, including the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.” Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 863

(1989).

III. DISCUSSION

This Court has carefully reviewed the allegations in Garcia’s Second Amended

Complaint and the parties’ arguments regarding the School Board’s challenges. As noted

above, the School Board seeks dismissal of Counts II and III. See generally Mot. The

undersigned first addresses Garcia’s discrimination claims and then the parties’ arguments

regarding the issues raised in the Motion.

A. Garcia’s Allegations.

In the Second Amended Complaint, Garcia alleges that he was employed by the

School Board as a “Systems Analyst III with Before and After School Child Care (BASCC)

and held a secondary position at Tropical Elementary supporting students and staff with

technology, as well as supporting and maintaining a Student Data Management System.”

SAC ¶ 8. Garcia further alleges that, on September 16, 2022, he was reassigned from the

BASCC department to the “Technology and Support Services Center (TSSC) after the

Professional Standards Committee determined there was insufficient factual or legal basis to

establish just cause.” Id. ¶ 9. According to Garcia, during the reassignment, he was “denied

the ability to work his secondary position, resulting in a loss of income totaling $125,077.50.”

Id. ¶ 10. Garcia alleges that the School Board took adverse employment actions against him

after he engaged in protected activities under Title VII, including denying him the ability to

work his secondary position and denying his grievance for back pay. Id. ¶¶ 11–12. Garcia

claims that Michele Parsons, a white female employee, who worked as a teacher (her primary

position) and Afterschool Supervisor (her secondary position), was reassigned pending an

investigation and initially lost her aftercare supplemental pay. Id. ¶ 13. Garcia alleges that the

School Board “granted Parsons’ grievance and paid her for all aftercare monies lost during

her reassignment,” (id. ¶ 14) but that the School Board denied him back pay for his secondary

position despite his having filed a grievance. Id. ¶ 15.

B. Title VII Discrimination Claims.

Title VII prohibits employers from intentionally discriminating against their

employees based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Lewis v. City of Union City,

918 F.3d 1213, 1220 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). A complaint in an

employment discrimination case need not contain specific facts establishing a prima facie case

under the evidentiary framework for such cases to survive a motion to dismiss. Swierkiewicz v.

Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511-12 (2002); see also McCone v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 582 F. App’x

798, 801, n.4 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting that Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), “had

no impact on Swierkiewicz’s statement that a plaintiff is not required to plead a prima facie case

of discrimination in order to survive dismissal”); Steinberg v. Donahoe, No. 13-61617-CIV,

2014 WL 1356711, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2014) (Rosenbaum, J.) (“The Court recognizes

that a Title VII claimant’s prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas is an evidentiary standard,

not a pleading requirement; thus, the complaint need not establish every element of a prima

facie case.”). Nevertheless, complaints alleging discrimination still must provide enough

factual matter (taken as true) to suggest a plausible claim of discrimination under the

standards set by Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). See Henderson v. JP Morgan

Chase Bank, N.A., 436 F. App’x 935, 937 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[C]omplaints alleging

discrimination still must meet the ‘plausibility standard’ of Twombly and Iqbal.”).

C. Whether Garcia Pled Sufficient Facts To State A Claim For Disparate Treatment

Under Title VII.

In the Motion, the School Board argues that Counts II and III should be dismissed

because the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint fail to adequately plead that

Garcia and his alleged comparator, Parsons, were similarly situated in all material respects,

and therefore, the Complaint fails to plead any facts to support a discriminatory intent on the

part of the School Board. Specifically, the School Board argues that the Complaint pleads no

facts to establish that Garcia and Parsons engaged in the same conduct or that they were both

subject to the same employment policy, guideline, or rule. Mot. at 3–4. The School Board

further argues that the Complaint pleads no facts to establish that Garcia and Parsons reported

to the same supervisor or that they both shared the same employment history. Id.

In Response, Garcia argues that he, a Cuban male, was treated less favorably than

Parsons, a non-Cuban female, in their supplemental roles, thereby satisfying Title VII’s

pleading standard. Resp. at 2. More specifically, Garcia argues that proof of discriminatory

intent for his gender and national origin discrimination claims lies in the fact that, whereas

he, a Cuban male, was denied back pay for his secondary position after his grievance , Parsons

− a white, non-Cuban, woman – received back pay for her secondary position after filing a

grievance. Id. Garcia asserts that Parsons is an adequate comparator because they both (1)

held secondary positions providing additional income, (2) were reassigned pending

investigations, (3) lost supplemental pay, and (4) filed grievances seeking back pay. Id. Garcia

also points out that the grievance process, “a key point of comparison, was the same for both.”

Id.

In the Reply, the School Board maintains that the Complaint fails to allege sufficient

factual allegations to show that Garcia and Parsons were “similarly situated” and, without an

adequate comparator, it will be impossible for Garcia to establish the fourth element of his

prima facie case.

To state a claim for disparate treatment under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that: (1)

he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position, (3) he suffered an

adverse employment action, and (4) he was treated less favorably than a similarly-situated

individual outside his protected class. Maynard v. Bd. of Regents, 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th

Cir. 2003). The School Board challenges Garcia’s disparate treatment claims with respect to

the fourth element.

As to the fourth element of the prima facia case, to show that he was treated less

favorably than other similarly situated individuals, a plaintiff must identify a comparator and

show that he and his comparator are “similarly situated in all material respects.” Lewis v. City

of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1226 (11th Cir. 2019). The Eleventh Circuit has held that

“similarly situated” means “similarly situated in all material respects.” Id. at 1224.

“[P]recisely what sort of similarity the in ‘all material respects’ standard entails will have to

be worked out on a case-by-case basis, in the context of individual circumstances.” Id. at 1227.

Although formal labels regarding job title are unnecessary, a similarly situated comparator

will have ordinarily engaged in the same basic conduct (or misconduct) as the plaintiff; been

subject to the same employment policy, guideline, or rule as the plaintiff; shared the same

supervisor as the plaintiff; and shared the plaintiff's employment or disciplinary history. Id. at

1227–28.

Contrary to the School Board’s argument, this standard does not require that Garcia

and his proffered comparator have the same employment history, work responsibilities, and

superiors. Mot. at 3 (citing Eliassaint v. RTG Furniture Corp., 551 F. Supp. 3d 1293, 1303 (M.D.

Fla. 2021)). Rather, such considerations are simply “guideposts” for the Court’s analysis,

which is “worked out on a case-by-case basis, in the context of the individual circumstances.”

Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1227. As the Eleventh Circuit explained in Lewis, a plaintiff does not need

“to prove purely formal similarities—e.g., that she and her comparators had precisely the same

title.” Id. “Nor will minor differences in job function disqualify a would-be comparator.” Id.

In the Second Amended Complaint, Garcia identifies Michele Parsons as a

comparator for purposes of his Title VII gender and national origin discrimination claims.

SAC ¶¶ 25–40. Specifically, Garcia alleges the School Board discriminated against him based

on his gender (male) and national origin (Cuban) by denying him back pay for his secondary

position while granting back pay to a non-Cuban female employee, Michele Parsons. Id. ¶¶

27, 35. Garcia claims that he and Parsons are similarly situated because they were both (1)

employees of the School Board, (2) reassigned pending investigations into their conduct, and

(3) holders of secondary positions providing additional income. Id. ¶¶ 28, 36. Garcia further

alleges that his comparator “received back pay for her secondary position . . . through a

successful grievance,” while Garcia “was denied back pay despite filing a grievance.” Id. ¶¶

29, 37. Garcia alleges there is no legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for this differential

treatment. Id. ¶¶ 30, 38.

This Court finds that these allegations, which are taken as true at this stage, are

sufficient to identify a similarly situated individual outside Garcia’s protected class who was

treated more favorably in order to withstand the School Board’s Partial Motion to Dismiss.

See Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1218 (noting for comparators to be similarly situated, they do not have

to be “nearly identical,” but rather, “similarly situated in all material respects”); see also

Borgella v. Robins & Morton Corp., No. 1:21-CV-22789-JLK, 2022 WL 2104215, at *3 (S.D. Fla.

June 10, 2022) (King, J.) (“Arguments regarding whether coworkers were actually similarly

situated is [sic] again, best left until after discovery.”); Santiago v. University of Miami, No. 22-

CV-23384, 2023 WL 3045417, at *9-10 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2023) (Damian, J.), report and

recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 3043414 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 21, 2023) (Bloom, J.) (finding

plaintiff's allegations sufficient at the motion to dismiss stage where plaintiff identified a

comparator who was not disciplined for taking time off from work while plaintiff was).

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss [ECF

No. 33] is DENIED. Defendant shall file an Answer to Counts II and II of the Second

Amended Complaint no later than fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in the Southern District of Florida this 6th

day of October, 2025.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

cc: Javier E. Garcia, Pro se

Counsel of Record