Hudson v. City of Cleveland Ohio

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

DARRYL HUDSON, CASE NO. 1:25 CV 1569

Plaintiff,

v. JUDGE CHARLES E. FLEMING

CITY OF CLEVELAND, et al.,

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendants. AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Pro se plaintiff Darryl Hudson filed this action against Cuyahoga County Court of Common

Pleas Judge John P. O’Donnell; Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals Judges Mary Eileen Kilbane,

Sean C. Gallagher, and Anita Laster Mays; the City of Cleveland; and Mayor Justin Bibb. (ECF No.

1). Plaintiff claims that the judges violated his rights by rendering decisions against him in the

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas and the Ohio Eight District Court of Appeals. He seeks

dismissal of the orders issued against him and monetary relief.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s complaint contains very few facts, instead consisting of mostly legal arguments.

According to the complaint, Plaintiff filed an employment discrimination case in the Cuyahoga

County Court of Common Pleas in 2022, in which Judge O’Donnell granted summary judgment

against him. Hudson v. FPT Cleveland LLC, No. CV-22-966432 (Cuyahoga C.P. Jul. 26, 2023). The

Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed the state trial court’s judgment. (ECF No. 1 at PageID #4).

Plaintiff objects to these state-court decisions and describes how the state courts purportedly erred.

(Id. at PageID #7–11). For example, he claims that the trial and appellate courts did not draw

inferences in his favor or follow Rule 56 of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. (Id. at PageID #7).

He claims that the judges “refused to follow jurisdictional mandatory case law on a continuous basis.”

(Id.). He also complains that the appellate court did not consider certain evidence Plaintiff presented,

such as the lack of disciplinary action taken against a “nonprotected employee” who was sleeping on

the job; that other employees engaged in the same conduct as Plaintiff were not fired; and his doctor’s

statement that Plaintiff had scar tissue in his eyes that could cause eye fatigue. (Id. at PageID #8–9).

Plaintiff alleges the judges “had the mindset of deliberate indifference” and they conspired to create

a “custom of deliberate indifference and a conscious disregard for the violations of the plaintiff’s civil

rights.” (Id. at 7). Although Plaintiff lists the City of Cleveland and Mayor Bibb as defendants, the

complaint does not include any allegations against them.

In his request for relief, Plaintiff asks this Court to “dismiss” the summary judgment order

granted against him and to “dismiss” the order by the appellate court affirming same. Plaintiff also

seeks unspecified monetary damages. (Id. at 5).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court construes Pro se pleadings liberally. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365,

(1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The Court is required to hold

Plaintiff’s complaint to a less stringent standard than one drafted by an attorney. Spotts v. United

States, 429 F.3d 248, 250 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Haines, 404 U.S. at 520).

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and, “[i]f the court determines at any time that

it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

“[D]efects in subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties and may be addressed by a

2

court on its own motion at any stage of the proceedings.” Owens v. Brock, 860 F.2d 1363, 1367 (6th

Cir. 1988) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)); Curry v. US. Bulk Transp., Inc., 462 F.3d 536, 539 (6th

Cir. 2006) (same) (citing Owens, 860 F.2d at 1367). District courts are permitted to conduct a limited

screening procedure and to dismiss, sua sponte, a fee-paid complaint filed by a non-prisoner if it

appears that the allegations are “totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of

merit, or no longer open to discussion.” Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir.1999) (citing

Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536–37 (1974)). Sua sponte dismissal is also authorized where the

asserted claims lack an arguable basis in law. Apple, 183 F.3d at 480.

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s claims for relief are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Even if the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine did not apply, Plaintiff’s claims are res judicata due to their resolution in state

Court, and the judge-defendants are immune from suit.

A. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s request that this Court vacate state-court decisions is barred by

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits federal court review of a of a

state-court judgment, which a party claims violated his or her federal rights. Berry v. Schmitt, 688

F.3d 290, 298–99 (6th Cir. 2012). Federal appellate review of state court judgments can only occur

in the United States Supreme Court. See D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 (1983);

Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923).

To determine whether Rooker-Feldman bars a claim, the Court must look to the “source of

the injury the plaintiff alleges in the federal complaint.” McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382,

393 (6th Cir.2006); see Berry, 688 F.3d at 299. If the source of the plaintiff’s injury is the state court

3

judgment itself, then the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars the federal claim. McCormick, 451 F.3d at

393. “If there is some other source of injury, such as a third party’s actions, then the plaintiff asserts

an independent claim.” Id.; see Lawrence v. Welch, 531 F.3d 364, 368–69 (6th Cir. 2008). In

conducting this inquiry, the Court also considers the plaintiff’s requested relief. Evans v. Cordray,

424 F. App’x 537, 539–40 (6th Cir. 2011).

Here, the source of Plaintiff’s alleged injury is the state trial court order granting summary

judgment against him and the appellate court’s order affirming same. Plaintiff is asking this Court to

“dismiss the trial judge order granting the motion for summary judgment . . . [and to] dismiss the 8th

District Court of Appeal[s] order affirming [it].” Pursuant to Rooker-Feldman, this Court lacks

jurisdiction to vacate the orders/judgments of the mentioned state courts.

B. Res Judicata

Even if the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply, Plaintiff cannot relitigate the issues

already decided in the prior state employment discrimination trial and appellate proceedings; those

issues are barred by res judicata. The term “res judicata,” also known as claim preclusion, literally

means “a matter [already] judged.” Res Judicata, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). The

doctrine of res judicata bars duplicative litigation based on the same event or events. Montana v.

United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326

(1979). When one court has already resolved the merits of a case, another court will not revisit them.

Id. The doctrine of res judicata therefore precludes a party from bringing a subsequent lawsuit on

the same claim or from raising a new defense to defeat the prior judgment. Gargallo v. Merrill Lynch,

Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 918 F.2d 658, 660 (6th Cir. 1990).

4

Here, res judicata bars Plaintiff from relitigating his employment discrimination action.

Bragg v. Flint Bd. of Educ., 570 F.3d 775, 776 (6th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff raised, or could have raised,

federal claims in the state court proceedings. Plaintiff cannot relitigate those issues here in the hope

of obtaining a different result.

C. Judicial Immunity

Lastly, the state court judges are immune from civil suits for money damages. Mireles v.

Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991); Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997). They are accorded

broad protection to ensure that the independent and impartial exercise of their judgment in a case is

not impaired by the exposure to damages by dissatisfied litigants. Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1115. For this

reason, absolute immunity is overcome only when (1) the conduct alleged is performed at a time

when the defendant is not acting as a judge; or (2) the conduct alleged, although judicial in nature, is

taken in complete absence of all subject matter jurisdiction of the court over which he or she presides.

Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12; Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1116. A judge will not be deprived of immunity

even if the action at issue was performed in error, done maliciously, or was in excess of his or her

authority. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978); Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 271 (6th

Cir. 1984) (acting in excess of authority does not preclude immunity).

Here, neither exception to absolute immunity applies. Judges O’Donnell, Kilbane, Gallagher,

and Mays were acting as judges when they issued their judgments against Plaintiff. Plaintiff has not

established that they acted clearly outside of the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts over which

they preside. Judges John P. O’Donnell, Mary Eileen Kilbane, Sean C. Gallagher, and Anita Laster

Mays are therefore immune from suit.

5

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES this action pursuant to the Court’s authority established

in Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999). Further, the Court CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: October 6, 2025

s/Charles E. Fleming_______________

CHARLES E. FLEMING

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

6