Ogden v. Rivian Automotive, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

DAVID OGDEN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:23-cv-01415-JEH-RLH

)

RIVIAN AUTOMOTIVE, LLC, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER & OPINION

Now before the Court are Plaintiff David Ogden’s (“Ogden”) Motions for

Joinder of Parties (Doc. 80) and for Judicial Recusal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 (Doc.

82). Also before the Court is Defendant Rivian Automotive, LLC’s (“Rivian”) Motion

to Enforce the Court’s August 28, 2025 Order and for Sanctions. (Doc. 79.) For the

reasons set forth below, Ogden’s Motions for Joinder and Recusal are DENIED.

Rivian’s Motion to Enforce the Court’s August 28, 2025 Order and for Sanctions is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

Ogden, proceeding pro se, filed this action in November 2023 under the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634, alleging that Rivian

terminated him on account of his age. The case is currently in discovery, and the

parties have filed more than sixteen motions concerning their discovery disputes. The

Court briefly summarizes those disputes.

• November 12, 2024: Rivian filed its first motion to compel discovery, seeking

to compel Ogden to provide substantive responses to several written

interrogatories. In particular, Rivian sought information about Ogden’s

attempts to secure employment after he was fired from Rivian. (Doc. 36 at 1,

12.)

• December 11, 2024: The Court granted in part and denied in part Rivian’s

November 12 motion. The Court ordered Ogden to answer three interrogatories

and provide responsive documents to three requests for production. (See

Minute Entry dated December 11, 2024.)

• January 24, 2025: Rivian filed a motion to enforce the Court’s December 11

Order, explaining that Ogden did not respond to three requests to produce and

asked the Court to again order Ogden to produce responsive documents. (Doc.

42 at 1.)

• February 9, 2025: Ogden filed his first motion to compel, asking the Court to

order Rivian to respond to several requests for production, including those that

relate to possible comparators. (Doc. 44 at 1, 2.)

• May 28, 2025: The Court held a status conference and granted Rivian’s

January 24 motion to enforce the Court’s previous order.

• June 6, 2025: Rivian renewed its January 24 motion, asking the Court for a

second time to enforce its Order and compel Ogden to produce documents to

three of Rivian’s requests for production. (Doc. 57.)

• June 26, 2025: The Court granted Rivian’s motion to enforce the Court’s

December 11 Order, directing Ogden to provide responses to requests for

production 8, 10, and 17. (See Doc. 61 (“From November 2024 to date, the

parties have filed approximately ten motions concerning discovery disputes.”).)

• July 8, 2025: Rivian filed a third motion to compel Ogden to respond to its

requests for production, explaining that this Court had, to that point, ordered

Ogden to respond to requests number 81 and 102 three times. (Doc. 64 at 5.)

1 This request seeks the following: “All documents concerning your efforts to locate additional or

alternative employment since July 12, 2022, including but not limited to all documents related to job

searches, applications, cover letters, resumes, and responses to your efforts from potential employers.”

(Doc. 36-1 at 5.)

2 This request seeks the following:

All documents that relate to, refer to, or describe in any way the amount of wages, or benefits,

or other income you earned from any source since July 12, 2022, including but not limited to pay

stubs, leave statements, earnings statements, W-2 forms, 1099 forms, federal and state tax

returns, unemployment compensation, retirement benefits, pension benefits, Social Security

benefits, workers’ compensation, veterans’ benefits, settlement checks and any other

compensation or benefit.

(Doc. 36-1 at 5.)

• July 10, 2025: The Court held a status conference and told Ogden (for the

fourth time) that he was to produce the requested documents. The Court also

ordered the parties to meet and confer regarding Ogden’s second motion to

compel. (See Minute Entry dated July 10, 2024.)

• July 14, 2025: Rivian filed a motion explaining that Ogden insisted on

recording the parties’ discussion concerning Ogden’s second motion to compel.

(Doc. 68 at 1.) Rivian asked for sanctions and to order Ogden to meet and

confer. (Doc. 68 at 5–6.)

• August 14, 2025: The Court held a status conference and granted in part

Rivian’s Motion to Enforce the Court’s July 10 Order and deferred the

remainder of the parties outstanding motions. (See Minute Entry dated August

14, 2024.)

• August 28, 2025: The Court held another status conference and granted in

part Ogden’s motion to compel and ordered Ogden to supplement his responses

to Rivian’s requests to produce numbers 8 and 10.

• September 12, 2025: Rivian filed a motion asking the Court to enforce its

August 28 Order and to issue sanctions against Ogden, explaining that Ogden

has failed to produce eight categories of documents in violation of the Court’s

order. (Doc. 79 at 6–7.)

DISCUSSION

The Court first discusses Rivian’s Motion to Compel. The Court concludes that

Ogden did not fully comply with its August 28 Order, but that his noncompliance does

not yet warrant dismissal. The Court next discusses Ogden’s Motion to Join

Necessary Parties Under Rule 19. Because Ogden’s arguments for joining additional

parties are without merit, the Court denies the motion. Finally, the Court turns to

Ogden’s Motion for Judicial Recusal, which misreads 28 U.S.C. § 455 and therefore

the Court denies the motion.

I. Rivian’s Motion to Compel

Rivian moves to compel Ogden’s compliance with this Court’s August 28 Order,

asserting that Ogden has failed to produce documents the Court directed him to

provide. Rivian argues that Ogden’s repeated discovery violations warrant dismissal.

The Court begins with its August 28 Order. In relevant part, the Order directed

Ogden “to produce the requests within docket entry [78-1] Defendant’s Status Report

on or by September 11, 2025.” (Minute Entry dated August 28, 2025.) Rivian’s status

report, in turn, sought documents (1) “regarding [Ogden’s] efforts to locate additional

or alternative employment since July 12, 2022,” and (2) “that relate to the amount of

wages, or benefits, or other income [that Ogden] earned from any source since July

12, 2022,” including “federal and state tax returns for 2022, 2023, and 2024.” (Doc.

78-1 at 1.) Rivian contends that Ogden failed to provide those documents by this

Court’s September 11, 2025 deadline. (Doc. 79 at 6–7.) In response, Ogden asserts

that he has “provided over (125) paystubs, emails, and tax documents in addition to

his earlier production” and that he has “taken extraordinary measure[s] to obtain and

recover documents” responsive to Rivian’s request. (Doc. 83 at 2 (emphasis omitted).)

What is more revealing about Ogden’s response, however, is what it does not

say. Ogden does not claim to have produced his tax returns for 2022, 2023, and 2024;

he does not claim to have produced communications with prospective employers; he

does not claim to have clarified his employment status since August 2024; he does not

claim to have supplemented his answer to Rivian’s sixth interrogatory; and he does

not claim to have turned over the relevant attachments to his emails purporting to

show that he sought employment following his tenure with Rivian. Each of those

categories of documents was identified in Rivian’s most recent status report and

incorporated into this Court’s August 28 Order. Ogden was thus required to produce

them but has apparently failed to do so. To be sure, Ogden indicates that he has

attempted to “take[] additional measures” to correct his disclosures and “take[]

extraordinary measure to obtain and recover documents.” (Doc. 83 at 2.) Yet those

attempts do not excuse Ogden’s failure to either produce the relevant documents or

provide legitimate reasons why he cannot comply with the Court’s Order.

All of this leaves the Court at an impasse. Three times Rivian has sought an

order compelling Ogden to respond to its discovery requests, (see Docs. 42, 57, 64),

and three times the Court has ordered Ogden to do so, (see Doc. 61 at 4 (“[Ogden] was

given numerous opportunities to comply with the Court’s discovery orders, but he

repeatedly failed to produce the required documents.”).) In light of these violations,

Rivian now seeks both monetary sanctions and dismissal of this case under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 37.

Rule 37 empowers courts to issue a variety of sanctions—up to and including

dismissal—to command allegiance to their discovery orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

37(b)(2)(A)(i)–(vii). And it “gives the court a broad discretion to make whatever

disposition is just in the light of the facts of the particular case.” 8B Wright & Miller’s

Federal Practice & Procedure § 2289 (3d ed. 2025); see also Matei v. Cessna Aircraft

Co., 35 F.3d 1142, 1147 (7th Cir. 1994) (“A district court has broad discretion in

deciding whether a violation of the rules of discovery warrants the imposition of

sanctions.”). Although the Seventh Circuit has “encourage[d] district courts to

provide an explicit warning before a Rule 37 or Rule 41 dismissal is ordered,” it has

also made clear that “an explicit warning is not absolutely necessary.” Brown v.

Columbia Sussex Corp., 664 F.3d 182, 192 (7th Cir. 2011). If a warning is necessary,

let this Order be that warning. The Court issues the following caution in the clearest

possible terms: “Discovery is not supposed to be a shell game, where the hidden ball

is moved round and round and only revealed after so many false guesses are made

and so much money is squandered.” Lee v. Max Int’l, LLC, 638 F.3d 1318, 1322 (10th

Cir. 2011). If Ogden persists in disregarding the Court’s orders, the Court will not

hesitate to impose the ultimate sanction of dismissal with prejudice.

In addition to dismissal, Rivian argues that monetary sanctions against Ogden

are appropriate. The Court agrees. Because Ogden failed to produce documents that

were outlined in Rivian’s most recent status report and incorporated into the Court’s

August 28 Order, (see Doc. 78-1,), the Court finds that monetary sanctions under Rule

37(b)(2)(C) are appropriate, largely for the reasons stated in its June 26, 2025 Order,

(see Doc. 61 at 3–5). Ogden will thus be required to pay the reasonable and necessary

attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by Rivian in filing its most recent motion to compel.

In turn, Rivian will be required to file with this Court, within fourteen days of this

Order, an itemized statement of actual, reasonable, and necessary attorneys’ fees and

costs associated with filing its motion.

II. Ogden’s Motion to Join Under Rule 19

Ogden first asks this Court to order several entities affiliated with Rivian—

including Rivian Automotive, Inc.; Volkswagen Group LLC; and Rivian and

Volkswagen Group Technologies LLC—to join this case under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 19. This request is both procedurally improper and substantively without

merit.

Ogden’s Rule 19 motion presents a fundamental procedural flaw. Typically,

Rule 19 is invoked by defendants who argue that a case cannot proceed because a

person who is necessary to resolve it has not been joined. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7)

(allowing defendants to respond to a complaint by asserting that a plaintiff has

“fail[ed] to join a party under Rule 19”). Rule 19(c) reinforces this framework by

requiring plaintiffs to state, at the outset of a case, “(1) the name, if known, of any

person who is required to be joined if feasible but is not joined; and (2) the reasons for

not joining that person.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(c). Some courts have held that a failure to

do so can warrant dismissal. See, e.g., Process Control Corp. v. Tullahoma Hot Mix

Paving Co., 79 F.R.D. 223, 225 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (explaining that plaintiff’s failure

to comply with Rule 19(c) warranted dismissal but declining to dismiss the case

because absent party was unnecessary). Rule 19(c) therefore required Ogden, when

he filed this lawsuit, to identify any parties he believed were necessary to adjudicate

the case and to explain why he did not name them in his complaint.

Nor does Ogden’s motion fare any better on the merits. Rule 19 sets forth two

categories of parties who must be joined in a lawsuit: (1) those whose participation is

necessary to accord complete relief, and (2) those who “claim[] an interest relating to

the subject of the action and [are] so situated that disposing of the action in the

[party’s] absence may” either impair its ability to protect its interest or leave an

existing party subject to a risk of inconsistent obligations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1).

Ogden argues that the first category applies because the Court cannot accord

complete relief among the existing parties. In his view, Rivian’s “current rate of

financial meltdown” makes it “plausible that [Rivian] will be bankrupt before a

decision, settlement, or jury verdict can be reached” in the case. (Doc. 80 at 5.)

From a factual standpoint, Ogden’s prediction is highly speculative; from a

legal standpoint, it is untenable. A court can award “complete relief” among existing

parties if its judgment will conclusively resolve the parties’ dispute. See Perrian v.

O’Grady, 958 F.2d 192, 196 (7th Cir. 1992) Two examples illustrate this rather

abstract concept. First, in Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. Towers Fin. Corp., 920 F.2d

1211, 1124 (2d Cir. 1990), a tenant asked the court to order its landlord to increase

the electricity in the building. The court held that it could not award complete relief

among the tenant and the landlord because the energy company—the only person

who controlled the building’s electricity—was not joined as a party to the case.

Second, in Focus on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority, 344 F.3d 1263

(11th Cir. 2003), a nonprofit organization sued a local transit authority for refusing

to run the nonprofit’s advertisements at its bus stops. The court held that it could not

award complete relief among the nonprofit and the transit authority because a third-

party media company—who controlled the advertising space at the bus stops—was

not joined as a party.

Rule 19’s “complete relief” requirement thus concerns a court’s power to render

a judgment that will resolve the parties’ dispute, not a party’s practical or financial

ability to satisfy a money judgment once a court has rendered one. Ogden’s complaint

seeks back pay and lost wages for his wrongful termination. (See Doc. 1 at 10.) If he

prevails, he will obtain an enforceable money judgment against Rivian, which is

“complete relief” within the meaning of Rule 19. See Walker v. Monsanto Co. Pension

Plan, No. 04-cv-436-JPG, 2007 WL 2481179, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2007) (“[A] mere

obligation to pay money in the event of a judgment does not mandate joinder of a

party under Rule 19.”); see also Salinas v. United Auto Workers Local 551, No. 19-cv-

7313, 2020 WL 4607235, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2020) (holding that a plaintiff’s

employer was not a necessary party in a suit between the plaintiff and his union);

James v. Valvoline, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 544, 551 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (“Indisputably, in

this suit for money damages, whatever amount, if any, is awarded will be complete

as between Plaintiff and [Defendant].”). That Rivian may or may not rely on affiliates

to satisfy such a judgment is irrelevant to the Rule 19 analysis and provides no basis

for Ogden’s motion.

Ogden also argues that the absent parties—entities who are either engaged in

a joint venture with or are financially invested in Rivian—would be unable to protect

their interests. But the relevant “interest” for purposes of Rule 19 “must be a legally

protected interest, and not merely a financial interest or interest of convenience.”

Burger King Corp. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 119 F.R.D. 672, 675 (N.D. Ill. 1988)

(quoting 3A Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 19.07[2]). The entities Ogden identifies have

no legally cognizable interests at stake in this case because Rivian, a limited liability

company, is an independent legal entity distinct from its members and managers. See

Westmeyer v. Flynn, 889 N.E.2d 671 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).3 Accordingly, because those

entities have no legally protected interest in this litigation, there is no risk that they

will be unable to protect one. Rule 19 does not require their joinder.

III. Ogden’s Motion to Recuse

Next, Ogden asks the undersigned to recuse himself under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a),

which provides that “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States

shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably

be questioned.” This standard is objective: whether a reasonable person, informed of

all the facts, would harbor doubts about the judge’s impartiality. Liljeberg v. Health

Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988). In addition, § 455(b)(4) requires

recusal where the judge, spouse, or minor child has a “financial interest” in a party.

Section 455(d)(4) defines “financial interest” but explicitly excludes ownership in a

mutual fund “unless the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the

value of the interest.”

Ogden argues that recusal is required because Rivian’s investors include T.

Rowe Price, Fidelity, and BlackRock, and the undersigned’s financial disclosure form

lists diversified mutual funds managed by those same entities. Plaintiff contends that

this overlap creates either a direct financial interest under § 455(b)(4) or an

appearance of impropriety under § 455(a).

3 Ogden also claims his complaint “includes quantum meruit for breach of contract for the value of

RSU that were promised by Rivian in June 2021.” (Doc. 80 at 6.) The Court struggles to discern the

relevance of this assertion to his Rule 19 Motion. Regardless, the claim is unfounded. Ogden’s sixteen-

page complaint asserts exactly three counts: (1) age-based harassment in violation of the ADEA; (2)

age-based discrimination in violation of the ADEA; and (3) a “disparate impact” claim under the ADEA.

(See Doc. 1 at 9–12.)

But courts have consistently upheld the principle that ownership of diversified

mutual funds does not constitute a disqualifying financial interest. In New York City

Development Corp. v. Hart, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that 28 U.S.C.

§ 455(d)(4)(i) prevents disqualification based on the indirect effects of a case on

mutual fund assets. 796 F.2d 976, 979–80 (7th Cir. 1986). The court explained that

fluctuations in the value of individual stocks within a fund would have minimal

impact on the fund as a whole, and offsetting movements among securities would

further dilute any potential influence on the judge’s portfolio. Id. Only when a fund

is so narrowly tailored that litigation could substantially affect its value does

§ 455(b)(4) apply.

Ogden points to the undersigned’s investments in diversified mutual funds

managed by T. Rowe Price, Fidelity, and BlackRock, entities that also invest in

Rivian. However, these are not direct investments in Rivian stock. The mutual funds

in question are broadly diversified across numerous sectors and companies.

Importantly, § 455(d)(4) excludes such mutual fund holdings unless the

litigation could “substantially affect” the value of the fund. Ogden’s case, while

significant to him, is a single-plaintiff employment discrimination action. Practically

speaking, the amount in controversy here is far too small relative to Rivian’s overall

market capitalization and the vast assets under management by T. Rowe Price,

Fidelity, and BlackRock to affect the value of any mutual fund in which the

undersigned invests.

Ogden also invokes § 455(a)’s appearance standard. But a reasonable, well-

informed observer would understand that holdings in diversified mutual funds

managed by large investment companies do not create a direct or substantial

financial interest in Rivian. Thus, there is no reasonable basis on which to question

the Court’s impartiality.

Accordingly, recusal is not required under either § 455(b)(4) or § 455(a).

CONCLUSION

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Rivian’s [79] Motion to Compel and for

Sanctions is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Ogden is required to pay Rivian

its reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in preparing the motion, and Rivian shall

submit, within two weeks of the date of this Order, an itemized statement of the

actual, reasonable, and necessary attorney’s fees and costs associated with filing its

motion.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff David Ogden shall produce, on or

before October 17, 2025, the following documents and supplemental responses:

• (1) Any and all copies of job Ogden’s job applications, cover letters, resumes,

and communications with potential employers following his termination from

Rivian, including documents relating to Ogden’s efforts to secure employment

at Orange EV, Oxford Consulting, and Hyundai;

• (2) Any and all pay stubs, earnings statements, W-2 forms, 1099 forms, and

state and federal tax returns from 2022, 2023, and 2024;

• (3) The attachment to Ogden’s July 18, 2022, communication with David

Schneider, entitled “Ogden David References 2022july15.doc”;

• (4) The attachment to Ogden’s July 18, 2022 communication with David

Schneider, entitled “Ogden shop floor Challenge-Solution-Benefit

examples.docx”;

• (5) A supplemental response to Rivian’s Interrogatory No. 6, asking Ogden to

identify every job he has held since July 12, 2022;

• (6) A supplemental response to Rivian’s Interrogatory No. 7, asking Ogden to

identify each and every prospective employer to which Ogden has applied since

August 2024;

• (7) A supplemental response to Interrogatory No. 8, asking Ogden to identify

any income he has received since August 2024;

• (8) A supplemental response to Rivian’s Request for Production No. 8, asking

Ogden to produce documents regarding his efforts to locate additional or

alternative employment since August 2024;

• (9) A supplemental response to Rivian’s Request for Production No. 10, asking

Ogden to produce documents relating to the amount of wages, benefits, or other

income Ogden has earned from any source since August 2024.

(See Doc. 78-1 at 1–2.) Rivian shall file a status report, on or by October 24, 2025,

informing the Court whether Ogden has produced the above documents and

supplemental responses. If the Court finds that Ogden has not, it will dismiss this

case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b).

Finally, Ogden’s [80] Motion for Joinder of Parties and [82] Motion for Recusal

are DENIED.

So ordered.

Entered this 3rd day of October 2025.

s/ Ronald L. Hanna

Ronald L. Hanna

United States Magistrate Judge