Allen v. Forren

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS

JOHN DALE ALLEN, : Case No. 2:25-cv-1012

:

Plaintiff, : District Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.

: Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson

vs. :

:

B. FORREN, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, a resident of Westerville, Ohio, and a former prisoner in the Ohio Department of

Rehabilitation and Correction, brings this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the

Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), and Ohio state law. See Jordan v. Moore, No. 99-3489, 2000

WL 145368, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 2000) (“the district court properly construed the complaint as

filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as this circuit does not recognize direct constitutional claims against

local officials and municipalities”). Having initially filed a substantially identical case in this

Court in 2024, under Case 2:24-cv-3782, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed that action upon his

incarceration. Now, having been released from prison, Plaintiff has refiled the case, albeit with

some changes to the named Defendants. Plaintiff seeks to challenge his arrest, subsequent

Muskingum County, Ohio, convictions by no-contest plea, and sentence for theft,

telecommunications fraud, and the unauthorized practice of law.1 He has been granted leave to

1The docket in Plaintiff’s Muskingum County Court Case, No. CR2024-163 (see Case No. 2:24-cv-3782 (Doc. 1-1 at

4)), may be viewed at: https://clerkofcourts.muskingumcounty.org/eservices/searchresults.page?x=fvrNcA-

cLV9CpxBwyYmkiSYtMmPyBtj6W307RLMkC1pQhs0GmlQWiHMIY7zWglGqPpxujTvFUV1iDlw*iiEjeg. The

Court may take judicial notice of proceedings in its own and other courts of record. See Rodic v. Thistledown Racing

proceed in forma pauperis by separate order.

This matter is before the Court for a sua sponte review of the newly filed Complaint (Case

No 2:25-cv-1012 (Doc. 1-1)) to determine whether the Complaint or any portion of it should be

dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted

or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B).

I. STANDARD

In enacting the original in forma pauperis statute, Congress recognized that a “litigant

whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an

economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Denton v.

Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To

prevent such abusive litigation, Congress has authorized federal courts to dismiss an in forma

pauperis complaint if they are satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. Id.; see also 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot

make any claim with a rational or arguable basis in fact or law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.

319, 328-29 (1989); see also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action

has no arguable legal basis when the defendant is immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a

violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action

has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the

irrational or “wholly incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32; Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The Court

need not accept as true factual allegations that are “fantastic or delusional” in reviewing a

Club, Inc., 615 F.2d 736, 738 (6th Cir. 1980) (quoting Granader v. Public Bank, 417 F.2d 75, 82 83 (6th Cir. 1969)).

See also National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. VP Bldgs., Inc., 606 F.3d 835, 839 n.2 (6th Cir. 2010); Lyons v. Stovall, 188

F.3d 327, 333 n.3 (6th Cir. 1999).

complaint for frivolousness. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 328).

Congress also has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii). A complaint filed by

a pro se plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By the same token, however, the complaint “must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Hill, 630 F.3d at 470-71 (“dismissal standard articulated in

Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim” under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept all well-pleaded

factual allegations as true, but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).

Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than

an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does

a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.”

Id. at 557. The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted).

II. ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff brings his Complaint against Defendants Blendon Township Officer “B. Forren,”

Muskingum County Sheriff Matt Lutz, Muskingum County Prosecutors Ron Welch and Gerald V.

Anderson, II, defense counsel Keith Edwards, Muskingum County Detective Brad Shawger,

Jessica Marshall, Brandon Morgan, and Muskingum County Common Pleas Judge Kelly J. Cottrill

(misspelled “Cottrell” by Plaintiff) in their individual and official capacities. He also names

various, unidentified Blendon Township Officers as “J. Doe” Defendants. (Doc. 1-1 at 1–2).

Plaintiff, who describes himself “as an elderly man of 73 years in very poor health,” alleges

that, on April 16, 2024, Defendant Officer Forren and unidentified “J. Does” banged on his door.

When Plaintiff answered the door, Forren allegedly told him that he was under arrest. Plaintiff

asserts that he demanded to see the warrant but Forren told him that he did not have one. According

to Plaintiff, Forren then “manhandled [him], handcuffed [him], and kidnapped [him] placing him

in the backseat of a police car.” (Id. at 2).

Plaintiff alleges that he was taken to the Franklin County Jail, where he was given a copy

of the arrest warrant. Plaintiff asserts that the warrant was a “sham,” however, because it was

signed by a deputy clerk and not a judge. (Id.).

Plaintiff alleges that on April 19, 2024, a “J. Doe” Defendant employee of the Muskingum

County Sheriff’s Department transferred him to the Muskingum County Jail, where bail was set at

$75,000. Plaintiff remained at the Jail until April 22, 2024, when he paid the allegedly excessive

bail. (Id. at 3).

Plaintiff states that, after paying bail, he was forced to report to the Muskingum County

Probation Department on a weekly basis and was restricted in his ability to travel. Plaintiff was

also “forced” to take a drug test on May 20, 2024, which came back negative. (Id.).

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Muskingum County Prosecutor Welch, Judge Cottrill, and

unidentified “J. Does” continued to prosecute the case, which Plaintiff asserts was instigated by

Defendants Marhsall, Morgan, and Detective Shawger. On June 10, 2024, Plaintiff pleaded no

contest to the charges, on the advice of Defendant Edwards, his attorney, who Plaintiff asserts had

numerous meetings with Defendants Prosecutor Anderson and Judge Cottrill. Plaintiff alleges that

he feared he would be incarcerated following his no-contest plea in retaliation for filing this lawsuit

and that he was in fact sentenced to a term of 12 months imprisonment. (Id.).

Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of the Defendants’ actions, he has suffered deprivations of

his rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, as well as extreme embarrassment, shame,

anxiety, and mental distress. He also alleges that he has been “abused as an elderly man,” and has

incurred expenses for alternate transportation. (Id. at 3).

For relief, Plaintiff seeks damages totaling over $32,000,000. (Id. at 4–5).

III. ANALYSIS

Based on the above allegations, Plaintiff brings three groups of claims, each alleged against

all the Defendants. In his “First Claim,” Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the United States

and Ohio Constitutions by “unlawfully assault[ing] and abus[ing]” him and depriving him of “his

rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,” that Defendant Forren violated the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution by making an “unreasonable and warrantless seizure

of Plaintiff,” that Defendants acted “pursuant to policies or customs of assisting one another” and

without “a court order signed by a judge,” and that Defendants failed to adopt clear policies and

train their employees, causing the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (Doc. 1-

1 at 3–4). In his “Second Claim,” Plaintiff alleges that the alleged deprivation of his rights “to life,

liberty and the pursuit of happiness” constituted a conversion. (Id. at 4). In his “Third Claim,”

Plaintiff alleges that his arrest violated the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and that he fears

unspecified retaliations from Defendants. (Id.). For the reasons set forth below, the Complaint

should be DISMISSED. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

A. Plaintiff’s First Claim

What Plaintiff’s labels his first claim is better construed as several separate allegations of

civil rights violations. The Undersigned considers each.

1. Fourth Amendment Challenges to Plaintiff’s Arrest

The Fourth Amendment challenges to Plaintiff’s arrest contained in the First Claim are

subject to dismissal. In this regard, Plaintiff alleges that all the Defendants “unlawfully assaulted

and abused” him and deprived him of “his rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”

(Doc. 1-1 at 3–4). He also alleges that Defendant Forren made an “unreasonable and warrantless

seizure” of him.

As an initial matter, “[s]ummary reference to a single, five-headed ‘Defendants’ does not

support a reasonable inference that each Defendant is liable for [the alleged constitutional

violation].” Boxill v. O’Grady, 935 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Heyne v. Metro. Nashville

Pub. Sch., 655 F.3d 556, 564 (6th Cir. 2011)) (“This Court has consistently held that damage

claims against government officials arising from alleged violations of constitutional rights must

allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the asserted

constitutional right.”) (in turn quoting Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008)).

Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts supporting a plausible excessive-force claim

against any of the Defendants. When examining a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim, the

Court considers “whether the officers’ actions [were] ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts

and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.”

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). Plaintiff’s excessive-force claim is entirely

conclusory. He merely alleges that Defendant Forren “manhandled” him. (Doc. 1-1 at 2). Without

specific factual allegations demonstrating that Plaintiff was subjected to excessive force during his

arrest, this Court cannot infer a plausible Fourth Amendment violation. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements” are insufficient to state a claim); see also Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400,

403 (7th Cir. 2010) (“It is by now well established that a plaintiff must do better than putting a few

words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has

happened to [him] that might be redressed by the law.”).

Further, Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible warrantless arrest claim against Defendant

Forren. The Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless entry into a suspect’s home absent valid

consent or exigent circumstances. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980). Here, however,

Plaintiff was not arrested without a warrant. The docket in Plaintiff’s underlying criminal case

(see Footnote 1, above) shows that an arrest warrant was issued for Plaintiff on March 6, 2024.

And Plaintiff concedes that he was given a copy of the arrest warrant upon his arrival at the

Franklin County Jail. (Doc. 1-1 at 2). While it appears from Plaintiff’s allegations that Forren did

not have a copy of the warrant when he arrested Plaintiff, “[i]t has long been held that ‘[t]he fact

that the officers did not have physical possession of the warrant at the time of the arrest is of no

consequence to the validity of the arrest.’” Hazelwood v. Keene, No. CV 5:22-174, 2023 WL

6050573, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 15, 2023) (quoting United States v. Holland, 438 F.2d 887, 888

(6th Cir. 1971)).

Additionally, while Plaintiff challenges the validity of the warrant, his no-contest plea

waived any alleged defects to the arrest warrant. See, e.g., Alfiero v. Warren, No. 2:07 CV 14653,

2009 WL 3388607, at **1, 6 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 16, 2009) (finding that no-contest plea waived

challenges to warrant) (citing cases).

Plaintiff has likewise waived any false arrest claim he seeks to assert. To state a false arrest

claim under § 1983, “a plaintiff [must] prove that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to

arrest the plaintiff.” Osborn v. City of Columbus, No. 2:20-CV-1229, 2022 WL 2159899, at *8

(S.D. Ohio June 15, 2022), aff’d sub nom. Osborn v. City of Columbus, Ohio, No. 22-3570, 2023

WL 2523307 (6th Cir. Mar. 15, 2023). Here, Plaintiff cannot challenge “the officer’s probable

cause that [he] committed a crime because [he] conceded that fact when [he] pleaded no contest.”

Jackim v. Sam’s E., Inc., 378 F. App’x 556, 561 (6th Cir. 2010).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment challenges to his arrest should be dismissed.

2. Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Challenges to Plaintiff’s Prosecution

The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to Plaintiff’s prosecution in the First

Claim are also subject to dismissal. As set forth above, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants deprived

him of his rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. (See Doc. 1-1 at 3). To the extent

that Plaintiff seeks to rely on a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution theory or the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause to challenge the validity of his convictions or sentence,2 his

claims are barred unless and until the convictions or sentence are reversed or otherwise invalidated.

2To the extent that Plaintiff suggest that his sentence to incarceration in this matter was retaliatory for filing this lawsuit

(see Doc. 1-1 at 3), the Court also notes that the docket in Plaintiff’s underlying criminal case (see Footnote 1, above)

reveals that Plaintiff was sentenced on July 29, 2024, a day before this case was received in this Court. Plaintiff has

not pled facts showing that Judge Cottrill was even aware of this lawsuit prior to sentencing Plaintiff.

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (holding that a § 1983 civil rights action seeking

monetary relief on the basis of an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or sentence will not lie

unless the plaintiff has already succeeded in having the conviction or sentence invalidated). See

also Maxwell v. Fields, No. 1:23-CV-319, 2023 WL 8284236, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 3, 2023),

report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:23-CV-319, 2023 WL 8280289 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 30,

2023) (citing Ramirez v. Dennis, No. 1:01-CV-160, 2002 WL 34213427, at *4–5 (W.D. Mich.

June 6, 2002) (holding that the plaintiff’s no-contest plea was a conviction subject to Heck));

Osborn v. City of Columbus, No. 2:20-CV-1229, 2022 WL 2159899, at **8-9 (S.D. Ohio June 15,

2022), aff’d sub nom. Osborn v. City of Columbus, Ohio, No. 22-3570, 2023 WL 2523307 (6th

Cir. Mar. 15, 2023) (noting that “[f]or purposes of Heck, a no contest plea is a plea of guilty that

constitutes a criminal conviction” and finding the plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim to be

barred).

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has not alleged that his convictions or sentence have been

reversed or otherwise invalidated, any challenges to his prosecution under the Fourth or Fourteenth

Amendments should be dismissed.

3. Failure to Have Adequate Policies

Finally, Plaintiff alleges in his First Claim that Muskingum County had impermissible

policies of “assisting one another” and inadequate training policies. “It is only when the ‘execution

of [the] government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury’ that the municipality may be held

liable under § 1983.” City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 267 (1987) (O’Connor, J.,

dissenting) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).

Muskingum County, therefore, may be liable under § 1983 only if its policies or customs caused

the alleged constitutional injury. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.

Plaintiff fails to allege facts supporting a plausible claim that Muskingum County policies

caused his alleged harms. His conspiracy claims are merely conclusory and therefore insufficient

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Hamilton v. City of Romulus, 409 F. App’x

826, 835 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[C]onspiracy claims must be pled with some degree of specificity, and

vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts are not sufficient to state a

claim.”). Similarly, his conclusory failure-to-train assertions (see Doc. 1-1 at 3) are the types of

legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation that do not pass muster under Twombly or Iqbal.

Gibson v. City of Cincinnati, No. 1:21-cv-292, 2021 WL 2934710, at *3 (S.D. Ohio July 13, 2021),

report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 3207923 (S.D. Ohio July 29, 2021) (citing cases).

Plaintiff’s inadequate policy claims are therefore subject to dismissal.

B. Plaintiff’s Second Claim

In Plaintiff’s Second Claim, he makes a conclusory reference to conversion. (Doc. 1-1 at

4). However, he does not allege what property was converted or who converted it. (See id.). The

Court is left to speculate as to the nature of this claim, which is insufficient to state a claim for

relief. “While the Court is obligated to construe Plaintiffs’ pleading liberally, it is not required to

speculate about the claims Plaintiffs might be asserting.” Davis v. Clare Cnty. DHHS CPS, No.

1:20-CV-00496, 2020 WL 6526038, at *2 (W.D. Mich. July 15, 2020), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 1:20-CV-496, 2020 WL 6504447 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 5, 2020)

(citing Young Bey v. McGinnis, No. 98-1930, 1999 WL 776312, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 23, 1999)).

As such, this claim should be dismissed. See, e.g., Guardino v. Flagler Cty. Tax Collector

Off., No. 3:18-CV-1318, 2019 WL 1103249, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 7, 2019), report and

recommendation adopted sub nom. Guardino v. Flagler Cty. Tax Collectors Off., 2019 WL

1102177 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 8, 2019) (dismissing conversion claim where “Plaintiff provide[d] no

additional relevant information, such as what property was allegedly converted, how it was

converted, or why.”).

C. Plaintiff’s Third Claim

In Plaintiff’s Third Claim, plaintiff alleges, without elaboration, that his arrest and

prosecution violated the UCC. (Doc. 1-1 at 3–4). This argument “bears the hallmark of the

sovereign citizen movement.” Woodson v. Woodson, No. 22-MC-00003, 2022 WL 16985602, at

*1 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 18, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 22-MC-00003, 2022

WL 16963997 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 16, 2022). “[T]he UCC is not applicable to criminal proceedings;

it applies to commercial transactions.” Barcroft v. State, 881 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tex. App. 1994).

See also Bey v. Jefferson, No. 2:17-CV-1007, 2017 WL 9250348, at *5 (D.S.C. Apr. 24, 2017),

report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:17-CV-1007, 2017 WL 1956979 (D.S.C. May 11,

2017) (rejecting sovereign-citizen claims under the UCC); United States v. Mundt, 29 F.3d 233,

237 (6th Cir.1994) (rejecting similar argument as being “without merit and patently frivolous.”).

The Court is unable to infer any plausible cause of action under the UCC. Because this claim is

premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory, it is frivolous and should be dismissed. See

Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.

To the extent Plaintiff also alleges in this claim that he fears retaliation from Defendants,

the only retaliation he suggests in the Complaint is that his sentence to incarceration was in

retaliation for the filing of this lawsuit. (See Doc. 1-1 at 3). The Court has previously addressed

this allegation in considering Plaintiff’s First Claim and found it subject to dismissal for the reasons

stated above. Plaintiff’s third claim should therefore be dismissed.

D. Plaintiff’s Miscellaneous Claims

The Undersigned finally considers several other claims raised throughout Plaintiff’s

Complaint.

1. Excessive Bail

Next, although Plaintiff alleges in the Facts section of his Complaint that his bond was

excessive, he does not include an excessive-bond claim. The Court notes, however, that such a

claim would not be proper under § 1983. See Sales v. Sumner Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Off., No. 3:23-

CV-00299, 2023 WL 3871703, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. June 6, 2023) (noting that the proper procedure

for challenging bond is by habeas corpus). In any event, “a defendant’s claim to pretrial bail

becomes moot once the defendant is convicted.” Taylor v. Sheldon, No. 1:18-CV-231, 2020 WL

896511, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 25, 2020). Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to raise an

excessive bail claim, such a claim should be dismissed.

2. State Law Claims

In Plaintiff’s First Claim, he also alleges that his arrest and prosecution violated the Ohio

Constitution. (Doc. 1-1 at 3). Furthermore, in the Facts section of his Complaint, Plaintiff appears

to allege a kidnapping claim (see id. at 2), and in his Third Claim he alleges human trafficking in

violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2905.32 (id. at 4). Having found that the Court should dismiss

each of Plaintiff’s other claims in the Complaint, including all of Plaintiff’s federal claims, the

undersigned further recommends that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

the remaining state-law claims asserted in the First Claim and dismiss such claims without

prejudice. See Harper v. AutoAlliance Int’l, Inc., 392 F.3d 195, 210 (6th Cir. 2004) (although the

exercise of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 is a matter of discretion, when a

court dismisses all federal claims before trial, it generally should dismiss the state law claims as

well).

As a final note, the Undersigned observes that certain claims Plaintiff asserts against certain

Defendants are likely barred as a matter of law due to judicial immunity, prosecutorial immunity,

or the fact that some Defendants are not subject to being sued under Section 1983. In light of the

recommended dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims on the grounds discussed above, and in furtherance

of the interest in judicial economy, however, the Undersigned will not address those issues at this

time.

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), with the exception of any challenges to Plaintiff’s

underlying criminal conviction and sentence, which sound in habeas corpus and should be

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, see Sampson v. Garrett, 917 F.3d 880, 882 (6th Cir.

2019) (directing district court to dismiss claims without prejudice under Heck), and any state-law

claims, over which the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, and which

should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, see Harper, 392 F.3d at 210.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. The Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint WITH PREJUDICE, with the

exception of any challenges to Plaintiff’s conviction and sentence and any state-law claims, which

should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

2. The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that for the foregoing reasons

an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be taken in good

faith. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS:

If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that

party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and

Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in

question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Response

to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 72(b).

The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review by the District Judge and

waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat’l Latex

Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “failure to object to the magistrate

judge’s recommendations constituted a waiver of [the defendant’s] ability to appeal the district

court’s ruling”); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that

defendant waived appeal of district court’s denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely object to

the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation). Even when timely objections are filed,

appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d

981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which fails to

specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . . .”) (citation

omitted).

Date: October 3, 2025 /s/ Kimberly A. Jolson

KIMBERLY A. JOLSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE