noting that screening 12 pursuant to § 1915 “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a 13 claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”
How later courts described this case
- noting that screening 12 pursuant to § 1915 “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a 13 claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
9
10
PAMELA CRAWFORD, CASE NO. 3:25-cv-05662-DGE
11
Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISING SECOND
12 v. COMPLAINT WITHOUT
PREJUDICE
13 DOUGLAS M. MILNER et al.,
14 Defendants.
15
16 This matter comes before the Court sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff,
17 who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”), has submitted an amended complaint
18 suing Defendants Douglas Milner and Michelle Milner. (Dkt. No. 10.) Plaintiff asserts causes
19 of action for: (1) violation of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), (2) violation of the Washington
20 Law Against Discrimination, (3) violation of the Washington First-in-Time Tenant Screening
21 Law, and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id. at 5–8.)
22
23
24
1 I DISCUSSION
2 Any complaint filed by a person proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is
3 subject to a mandatory and sua sponte review and dismissal by the Court to the extent it is
4 frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
5 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v.
6 Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir.2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not
7 limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
8 “The standard for determining whether [a] Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief
9 can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
10 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir.
11 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that screening
12 pursuant to § 1915 “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a
13 claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”).
14 Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Fair Housing Act. The FHA “bars discriminatory
15 housing policies and practices” based on “certain protected characteristics or traits.” SW. Fair
16 Housing Council, Inc. v. Maricopa Domestic Water Improvement Dist., 17 F.4th 950, 955 (9th
17 Cir. 2021). The Act makes it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide
18 offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a
19 dwelling to any person because of race . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
20 Here, Plaintiff appears to be asserting a claim for disparate treatment under the FHA.
21 Plaintiff’s claim fails on its face because she remains silent as to the race of the individual who
22 received the unit. (See Dkt. No. 8 at 3.) Until Plaintiff can provide any facts asserting an
23
24
1 individual of another race received the unit, Plaintiff cannot state a plausible disparate treatment
2 claim.
3 Even assuming Plaintiff can allege sufficient evidence someone of a different race
4 received the unit, the facts as stated do not currently establish a disparate treatment claim under
5 the FHA. “Disparate treatment is synonymous with intentional discrimination.” Ohio House,
6 LLC v. City of Costa Mesa, 135 F.4th 645, 661 (9th Cir. 2025). To prevail on this claim a
7 “plaintiff must establish that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive.” Id. (internal
8 citations omitted). To show discriminatory intent or motive, the plaintiff can use any of the
9 following three approaches: (1) use the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–
10 804 (1973) burden-shifting analysis, (2) show more likely than not a discriminatory purpose
11 motivated the defendant, or (3) show a facially neutral policy has a discriminatory impact. Id. at
12 661–662. None succeed.
13 McDonnell shifts the burden to the defendant to “articulate some legitimate,
14 nondiscriminatory reason” for their actions after the plaintiff shows “(i) that he belongs to a
15 racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a [position] for which the [defendant]
16 was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after
17 his rejection, the position remained open and the [defendant[ continued to seek applicants from
18 persons of complainant’s qualifications.” 411 U.S. at 802. Plaintiff shows she belongs to a
19 racial minority. (Dkt. No. 5 at 2.) However, Plaintiff fails to show she meets the other
20 requirements. First, Plaintiff fails to show she was qualified for the unit. Plaintiff herself
21 concedes “Income Verification past and current” was required. (Dkt. No. 3.) Plaintiff provided
22 only her current boss’s phone number. (Id. at 4, fn. 1.) She provides no facts indicating she
23 provided any other form of proof of income past or present. Moreover, implicit in an income
24
1 verification requirement is the requirement the income is sufficient to pay rent for the unit.
2 Plaintiff provides no facts asserting what the required income was or whether she was able to pay
3 for the unit. Second, Plaintiff also fails to show the defendants continued to seek applicants from
4 persons of her qualification. Plaintiff provides no facts alleging the requirements for renting the
5 home remained the same.
6 Plaintiff also fails under the other two approaches. Plaintiff states there is only a
7 “plausible inference that Defendants acted with discriminatory intent.” (Dkt. No. 10 at 6.) She
8 does not allege it is more likely than not Defendants acted with discriminatory intent. Plaintiff
9 also does not allege any specific policy that led to her dismissal much less how a facially neutral
10 policy is discriminatory in effect. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action under the
11 Fair Housing Act.
12 Plaintiff’s remaining claims for violations of the Washington Law Against
13 Discrimination and Washington First-in-Time Tenant Screening Law as well as intentional
14 infliction of emotional distress are all state law claims. Because the Court can decline to
15 exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original
16 jurisdiction” and the Court has dismissed Plaintiff’s claim under the FHA, these three claims are
17 also dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
18 II ORDER
19 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint under 28 U.S.C.
20 § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) but provides Plaintiff with an opportunity to file an amended complaint to
21 address the deficiencies noted in this opinion. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint no later
22 than October 20, 2025. Failure to file an amended complaint by this date will lead to the case
23
24
1 being dismissed without prejudice. Failure to address the deficiencies noted in this order or the
2 Court’s previous order may also lead to dismissal without prejudice.
3 1. Plaintiff’s second motion for service of process by the United States Marshall (Dkt.
4 No. 11) is DENIED as moot. Plaintiff may refile a motion for service only if she files an
5 amended complaint and that amended complaint survives § 1915(a) review.
6 Dated this 29th day of September, 2025.
7
a
8
David G. Estudillo
9 United States District Judge
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24