The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
CENTRAL DIVISION
JIMMY DEWAYNE STANLEY JR., PLAINTIFF
v. 4:25CV00902-JM-JTK
DREW COUNTY DETENTION DEFENDANTS
FACILITY CENTER, et al.
PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
INSTRUCTIONS
The following recommended disposition (“Recommendation”) has been sent to United
States District Judge James M. Moody, Jr. Any party may file written objections to all or part of
this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain the factual
and/or legal basis for your objections; and (2) be received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen
(14) days of this Recommendation. By not objecting, you may waive the right to appeal
questions of fact.
DISPOSITION
I. INTRODUCTION
Jimmy Dewayne Stanley, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) is in custody at the Drew County, Arkansas,
Detention Center (the “Detention Center”). He filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. ' 1983. (Doc. No. 2).
Although Plaintiff submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C.
' 1915(a), Plaintiff’s IFP Motion (Doc. No. 1) should be denied because Plaintiff is a “three
striker” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) and, as set out below, has not
established imminent danger.
II. SCREENING
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints seeking relief against a governmental
entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. '1915A(a).1 Additionally, the
PLRA, 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(g), provides that:
[i]n no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil
action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on three (3) or more prior
occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal
in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the
prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
1 The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims
that: (a) are legally frivolous or malicious; (b) fail to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or (c) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b). An action is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke
v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Whether a plaintiff is represented by counsel or is
appearing pro se, his complaint must allege specific facts sufficient to state a claim. See Martin v.
Sargent, 780 F .2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir.1985). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In reviewing a pro se
complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must give the complaint the benefit of a liberal
construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The Court must also weigh all
factual allegations in favor of the plaintiff, unless the facts alleged are clearly baseless. Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992).
Additionally, to survive a court’s screening, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-7. The plausibility
standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that
a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with”
a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement
to relief.” Id.
Plaintiff has had at least three complaints dismissed for failure to state a claim.2 The Court
finds that Plaintiff is a “three-striker” within the meaning of the PLRA. Gonzalez v. United
States, 23 F. 4th 788, 789-91 (8th Cir. 2022).
Plaintiff may, however, be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis if he falls under the
“imminent danger” exception to the three strikes rule set forth above. 28 U.S.C. '1915(g). This
exception does not apply to allegations of past danger, and the alleged harm must be “real and
proximate” and occurring at the time the complaint is filed. Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 531
(7th Cir. 2002). In the Eighth Circuit, the exception does not apply unless the plaintiff alleges
“specific fact allegations of ongoing serious physical injury, or of a pattern of misconduct
evidencing the likelihood of imminent serious physical injury.” Martin v. Shelton, 319 F.3d 1048,
1050 (8th Cir. 2003).
Plaintiff sued the Drew County Detention Center, Detention Center Worker Jackson, and
unidentified Doe Defendants, including the Detention Center Doctor. (Doc. No. 2). Plaintiff
complains that the Doctor, who comes to the Detention Center once a week on Tuesdays, ordered
antibiotics for Plaintiff. (Id. at 4). The following Tuesday Plaintiff still did not have his
medication. (Id.). And the next Tuesday Plaintiff still did not have medication. (Id.). On
Wednesday, August 20, 2025, Plaintiff received medication after he had a fever, vomited, suffered
from diarrhea and could barely eat for several days. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges he was denied the
right to medical assistance. (Id.). He also says this is not the first time the Doctor neglected him
2 Stanley v. Jefferson Comprehensive Care Clinic, et al, 4:25cv00674-JM (E.D. Ark.)
(dismissed July 11, 2025, for failure to state a claim); Stanley v. Drew Memorial Hospital, et al.,
4:25cv00679-BSM (E.D. Ark.) (dismissed Aug. 1, 2025, for failure to state a claim); and Stanley
v. Health-Care Pharmacy, 4:25cv00714-JM (E.D. Ark.) (dismissed Aug. 4, 2025, for failure to
state a claim).
and complains that a guard had to hand out medication. (Doc. No. 2 at 5). Plaintiff asserts that
the neglect “look[s] like racism.” (Id.).
Plaintiff signed his Complaint on August 22, 2025, two days after Plaintiff received
medication. (Id.). Plaintiff does not allege that his need for medical attention continued after he
received his medication. Plaintiff also does not describe any related ongoing medical problems
from which he suffers. Even liberally construing Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court finds Plaintiff’s
allegations do not support a finding of “ongoing serious physical injury, or of a pattern of
misconduct evidencing the likelihood of imminent serious physical injury.” Martin, 319 F.3d at
1050. As such, Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed without prejudice pending payment of
the $405.00 filing and administrative fee.
The Court reminds Plaintiff that he may submit objections to this Recommendation. As
part of his objections Plaintiff may add factual allegations that explain why he believes the
imminent danger exception is applicable in this case.
III. CONCLUSION
IT IS, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDED that:
1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 1) be
DENIED.
2. Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED without prejudice.
3. If Plaintiff wishes to continue this case, he be required to submit the statutory filing
and administrative fee of $405.00 to the Clerk, noting the above case style and number, within
fifteen (15) days of the date of this Order, together with a motion to reopen the case. Upon receipt
of the motion and full payment, the case will be reopened.
4. The Court certify, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an in forma pauperis
appeal from any Order adopting these recommendations and the accompanying Judgment would
not be taken in good faith.
Dated this 4" day of September, 2025.
JEROME T. KEARNEY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE