The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
WILLIAM COVERT,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 6:25-cv-1071-CEM-NWH
ARIELLE C. HACKING, DEREK
BROWN, THOMAS HIGBEE,
MATTHEW BELL, and
GREGORY ORME,
Defendants.
/
ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed in Forma
Pauperis (Doc. 2). The United States Magistrate Judge issued a Report and
Recommendation (“R&R,” Doc. 18), recommending that the Motion be denied and
this case be dismissed. Plaintiff filed an Objection (Doc. 23) to the R&R and a Notice
of Clarification (Doc. 27).
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises from an underlying defamation case filed by Plaintiff against
Defendant Arielle C. Hacking in Utah. (Am. Compl., Doc. 8, at 2). Defendants
Thomas Higbee, Matthew Bell, and Gregory Orme are Utah state court judges, and
Defendant Derek Brown is the Attorney General of Utah (collectively “State
Defendants”). (Id. at 4–5). Plaintiff lost the underlying lawsuit, resulting in an
attorney’s fees award against Plaintiff. (Id. at 3, 5–6). Plaintiff exhausted his appeals
within the Utah state courts. (Id. at 3).
Upon review of the original Complaint, the Court concluded that it failed to
meet basic pleading standards, giving Plaintiff a detailed explanation of why and
what he needed to do to correct the deficiencies. (See generally July 3, 2025 Order,
Doc. 7). Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint (Doc. 8), which
is the operative pleading.1 At its core, the Amended Complaint challenges the
underlying case as violative of Plaintiff’s rights. (See generally id.). As such, the
R&R concluded that this Court lacks jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.2 (Doc. 18 at 3–4). Plaintiff objects to this determination. (Doc. 23 at 5–6,
9–10).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), when a party makes a timely objection, the
Court shall review de novo any portions of a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation concerning specific proposed findings or recommendations to
which an objection is made. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). De novo review
1 Plaintiff has also improperly filed a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 20) without leave
of Court, which will be stricken. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
2 The R&R also noted that Plaintiff’s claims against the judicial Defendants would be
barred by judicial immunity. The Court agrees, but it is unnecessary to address because the entire
action is due to be dismissed pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
“require[s] independent consideration of factual issues based on the record.” Jeffrey
S. v. State Bd. of Educ. of Ga., 896 F.2d 507, 513 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam). The
district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
III. ANALYSIS
In his First Claim, Plaintiff asserts that the application of the attorney’s fee
statute in his underlying case—i.e., the award of fees against Plaintiff in that case—
violated his rights. (Doc. 8 at 5–6). Plaintiff’s Second Claim alleges that his rights
were violated by the exclusion of evidence in the underlying case. (Id. at 6–8). For
both the First and Second Claims, Plaintiff seeks “injunctive relief against [the State
Defendants] for each contested decision, and injuncti[ve] relief preventing the
enforcement of” the attorney’s fee statute in the underlying defamation suit. (Id. at
6, 8). The Third Claim alleges the defamation claims against Hacking that were
asserted, and rejected, in the underlying defamation case and complains that the State
Defendants failed to remedy such defamation. (Id. at 8–9).
“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine ‘is a jurisdictional rule that precludes the
lower federal courts from reviewing state court judgments.’ The rule is not
prudential but rather ‘follows naturally from the jurisdictional boundaries that
Congress has set for the federal courts. First, federal district courts are courts of
original jurisdiction’ which ‘generally cannot hear appeals [a]nd second, only the
Supreme Court can reverse or modify state court judgments.’” Efron v. Candelario,
110 F.4th 1229, 1235 (11th Cir. 2024) (quotations omitted).
Despite Plaintiff’s protestations that he “does not seek reversal or nullification
of” the underlying judgment, the Amended Complaint clearly seeks just that.
Regardless of how they are framed, the First Claim is an appeal of the Utah state
court’s award of attorney’s fees against Plaintiff, the Second Claim is an appeal of
evidentiary rulings made by the Utah state court, and the Third Claim is an appeal
of the underlying determination on the merits of the defamation claim. “Rooker-
Feldman ‘bars all appeals of state court judgments—whether the plaintiff admits to
filing a direct appeal of the judgment or tries to call the appeal something else.’” Id.
at 1236 (quotation omitted). Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies
here, and this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
In accordance with the foregoing, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED as
follows:
1. The Report and Recommendation (Doc. 18) is ADOPTED and made a
part of this Order.
2. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) is DENIED.
3. The Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 20) is STRICKEN.
4. This Case is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
5. All other pending motions are DENIED as moot.
6. The Clerk is directed to close this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on September 29, 2025.
CARLOS E. MENDOZA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUD@E
Copies furnished to:
Unrepresented Party