Thompson v. Wilshire

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

CHARLESTON DIVISION

MAURICE-EDWARD THOMPSON,

Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:24-cv-00268

S. WILSHIRE, et al.,

Defendants.

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is assigned to the Honorable Joseph R. Goodwin, United States

District Judge, and by standing order entered January 4, 2016, and filed in this case May

31, 2024, is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for submission of

proposed findings and recommendations for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(B). (ECF No. 3). Pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 24),

filed March 10, 2025, by Defendant S. Wilshire. Plaintiff Maurice-Edward Thompson,

who is proceeding pro se, responded in opposition on March 21, 2025, (ECF No. 27), and

Defendant timely replied (ECF No. 28). The matter is ready for adjudication.

For the reasons explained more fully herein, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED

that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 24) be DENIED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE and Plaintiff be granted leave to amend his Amended Complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint in this matter on May 30, 2024. (ECF No. 2).

After Defendant moved to dismiss on August 16, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff leave

to amend his Complaint. See (ECF Nos. 12, 22). On February 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed the

operative Amended Complaint against Defendant.1 (ECF No. 18).

According to Plaintiff, on April 28, 2024, he was pulled over by Defendant, an

officer with the Oak Hill Police Department, for a traffic stop due to an alleged

malfunction of his registration plate light. (Id. at 2). Plaintiff was then directed by

Defendant to exit his vehicle, and Plaintiff complied. (Id.). Defendant then placed Plaintiff

in handcuffs and, together with other officers, began forcing Plaintiff into Defendant’s

police cruiser above Plaintiff’s requests to speak to a supervising officer. (Id.). Plaintiff

contends that he asked the officers to be patient because herniated discs in his back and

arthritis in his left knee made it difficult to get into the vehicle comfortably. (Id.). Despite

Plaintiff’s requests, Defendant and the other officers continued to force him into the

police cruiser. (Id.).

Plaintiff contends that the broken light cited by Defendant in the traffic stop was

mere pretext for the traffic stop and that Defendant “[took] it upon himself to arrest

[Plaintiff] without probable cause.” (Id. at 3). Accordingly, Plaintiff asserts three causes

of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourth Amendment in his Amended

Complaint: (1) a violation of his due process rights; (2) unlawful arrest; and (3) use of

excessive force. (ECF No. 18).

On March 10, 2025, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, arguing that

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted and that Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from suit. (ECF

No. 24). In response, Plaintiff contends that Defendant and another unnamed officer

1 Plaintiff clarifies in his Response that, despite referencing the Oak Hill Police Department in his

Complaint, his claims are against S. Wilshire only. (ECF No. 27 at 7).

violated their duties and oath of office by turning on the emergency lights in their police

cruiser when they pulled him over and that the stop was “all because of a previous

encounter” he had with Defendant, not based on reasonable suspicion. (ECF No. 27 at 2,

6). He further contends that traffic infractions are not crimes justifying a warrantless

arrest or detention, and thus, his arrest was unlawful. (Id. at 3). Finally, he asks this Court

to “reject the doctrines of absolute and qualified immunity completely” and find

Defendant liable for Plaintiff’s alleged injuries. (Id. at 4-5).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Federal Rules”) require a plaintiff’s

complaint, which is a type of “pleading,” to set forth a “short and plain statement of the

claim showing that [he or she] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of

this procedural rule is to ensure that a plaintiff’s complaint provides the defendant with

“fair notice” of the plaintiff’s legal claims, and the alleged factual “grounds” for plaintiff’s

entitlement to relief pursuant to those claims. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555–56 (2007). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (“Our decision in

Twombly expounded the pleading standard for all civil actions[.]”) (quotation

omitted); accord Willner v. Dimon, 849 F.3d 93, 112 (4th Cir. 2017). Pursuant to

Federal Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant may challenge

the legal sufficiency of a complaint by filing a motion to dismiss, which posits that, even

if the facts alleged by the plaintiff are true, the complaint fails to state “a claim upon

which relief can be granted” under the applicable law. Glessner v. Chardan, LLC, 22-cv-

3333, 2023 WL 4351331, at *2 (D. Md. July 5, 2023) (citing In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d

88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)).

To survive a motion to dismiss under this minimal standard, the complaint only

needs to set forth enough allegations of fact which, if true, suggest a clearly identifiable

legal claim for relief that “is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 570. For a

claim to be “plausible,” the complaint does not need to include “detailed factual

allegations.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Further, a complaint should not be dismissed

simply because the actual proof of those facts is improbable, because recovery is unlikely,

or because the legal theory supporting the claim is not stated perfectly. Id.; accord

Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014) (per curiam). On the other hand, a

complaint may not simply rely on bald accusations, conclusory statements, or mere

speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Painter’s Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d

342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013). The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that if the complaint

provides no more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action,” dismissal is proper. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In other

words, it is fundamentally insufficient for a complaint to be made up of nothing

more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Instead, the complaint must

plead facts which move the claim beyond the realm of mere possibility and allow the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

When reviewing a defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Court decides whether the

complaint met this standard by separating the legal conclusions from the factual

allegations, assuming the truth of only the factual allegations, and then determining

whether those allegations allow the court to “reasonably infer” that the plaintiff is entitled

to the legal remedy he or she seeks. A Soc’y Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342,

346 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 937 (2012).

Additionally, when a plaintiff is proceeding “pro se”—or in other words, without

legal counsel—the Court must “liberally construe” the complaint, meaning that it is held

to a less stringent standards than if it had been drafted by an attorney. Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Therefore, when a potentially viable complaint is deficient but its

shortcomings can be remedied by amendment, the pro-se plaintiff should be given an

opportunity to amend the complaint and “particularize” his or her allegations. See

Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); accord Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151-53

(4th Cir. 1978) (“What might be a meritorious claim on the part of a pro se litigant

unversed in the law should not be defeated without affording the pleader a reasonable

opportunity to articulate his cause of action.”); Coleman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 603, 604

(4th Cir. 1965) (reversing dismissal and explaining that “claims of legal substance should

not be forfeited because of a failure to state them with technical precision”). Nevertheless,

the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court may ignore a clear

failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a cognizable claim. See Weller v.

Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685 (2009).

Likewise, “a district court is not required to recognize obscure or extravagant claims

defying the most concerted efforts to unravel them.” Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901

F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (“[E]ven a solicitous examination of the allegations reveals

little on which federal subject matter jurisdiction may be based.”) (internal markings

omitted). In other words, the mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings

means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which

the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so; however, a district court may not rewrite a

complaint to include claims that were never presented, construct the plaintiff's legal

arguments for him or her, or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the

Court. Randolph v. Baltimore City, 14-3176, 2014 WL 5293708, at *1 (D. Md. Oct. 14,

2014), aff’d sub nom. Randolph v. New Tech, 588 Fed. App’x 219 (4th Cir. 2014) (citations

omitted) (quoting Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985)). See

also Weller, 901 F.2d at 391 (affirming dismissal where the “complaint fail[ed] to allege

anything that even remotely suggests a factual basis for the claim,” and explaining that

“[t]he ‘special judicial solicitude’ with which a district court should view such pro se

complaints does not transform the court into an advocate”). Consequently, the Court may

deny leave to amend when “the amendment would be futile,” such that “it is clearly

insufficient or frivolous on its face” or “if the claim it presents would not survive a motion

to dismiss.” Equal Rights Ctr. v. Niles Bolton Assocs., 602 F.3d 597, 603 (4th Cir. 2010);

Save Our Sound OBX, Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 914 F.3d 213, 228 (4th Cir. 2019).

III. ANALYSIS

Construing Plaintiff’s Complaint liberally, in light of his status as both a pro-se

party and the non-moving party, the Court surmises that Plaintiff seeks to assert three

constitutional claims against Defendant, Officer S. Wilshire, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

based upon three alleged Fourth Amendment violations.

First, Plaintiff appears to assert that Defendant conducted an unlawful Terry stop

of Plaintiff’s vehicle due to an alleged “malfunction of a registration plate light,” which

violated Plaintiff’s due process rights. (ECF No. 18 at 2). It is well-settled that “a traffic

stop based on a reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation comports with the Fourth

Amendment.” Hawthorne v. Cty. of Putnam, 492 F. Supp. 3d 281, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

Cf. United States v. DeSantis, 23-4421, 2024 WL 3439423, at *1 (4th Cir. July 16, 2024)

(finding that “upon observing DeSantis following too closely to another vehicle, Ohio

State Trooper Seth Jones had probable cause to believe a traffic violation had been

committed and therefore lawfully stopped the vehicle”). “[I]n determining whether a

traffic stop is reasonable, [courts] apply the standard articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1 (1968), wherein the court asks,” inter alia, “if the stop was legitimate at its

inception[.]” United States v. Smith, 2:18-cr-173, 2019 WL 4691469, at *2 (S.D. W. Va.

Sept. 25, 2019) (citing United States v. Bowman, 884 F.3d 200, 209 (4th Cir. 2018)).

Even if the officer is ultimately incorrect about whether the traffic infraction occurred, a

mistaken but reasonable belief does not violate the Fourth Amendment, which simply

“requires that an officer making a traffic stop have probable cause or reasonable suspicion

that the person stopped has committed a traffic violation[.]” United States v. Stewart, 551

F.3d 187, 191 (2d Cir. 2009). See also United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th

Cir. 2005) (“The determinative question is not whether [defendant] actually violated the

Motor Vehicle Code by operating a vehicle with one defective brake light, but whether an

objectively reasonable police officer could have formed a reasonable suspicion that

[defendant] was committing a code violation.”); United States v. Lopez–Soto, 205 F.3d

1101, 1105 (9th Cir.2000) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment requires only reasonable suspicion

in the context of investigative traffic stops.”).

In Hawthorne, the plaintiff argued that the officer in that case, Deputy Kennedy,

violated the Fourth Amendment by initiating a traffic stop in light of the ultimate

dismissal of the traffic citations. Hawthorne, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 295-96. The U.S. District

Court for the Southern District of New York found that the officer’s traffic stop “does not

automatically give rise to a Fourth Amendment claim . . . [n]or does it equate in itself to

a plausible allegation that Deputy Kennedy lacked reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry

stop.” Id. at 296. The court in Hawthorne found it significant that the plaintiff “does not

go so far as to accuse Deputy Kennedy of falsifying the allegation in order to create pretext

for a traffic stop.” Id. at 295. Because the plaintiff stopped short of “assert[ing] facts

expressly challenging [Officer Kennedy’s] version of events,” the court dismissed his

claim.

Here, like in Hawthorne, Plaintiff falls short of explicitly alleging that Defendant

falsified the allegation in order to create pretext for a traffic stop, instead implying that

the traffic stop must have been pretextual because Defendant “did not bring [the broken

light] forward in his charges.” (ECF No. 18 at 3). Plaintiff alleges that Officer Wilshire has

had prior dealings with him and that “he was asserting his ‘authority’” by arresting him

without probable cause. (Id.). However, the Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis “does

not depend on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.” Whren v. United

States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). See also United States v. Lucas, 19-cr-3937, 2021 WL

3700944, at *1 n.1 (2d Cir. Aug. 20, 2021) (finding the argument that tinted windows were

not the actual reason that the police stopped a defendant was “irrelevant” to whether there

was probable cause under Whren). Without more factual allegations, it is not clear from

the face of the Complaint whether Defendant’s alleged actions violated the Fourth

Amendment. Despite giving Plaintiff leave to amend his original Complaint, the factual

deficiencies that plagued that Complaint remain.

The second of Plaintiff’s three apparent Fourth Amendment claims under § 1983

appears to be a claim for “unlawful arrest.” (ECF No. 18 at 1). However, the U.S. Supreme

Court has held that an officer has probable cause to arrest an individual for even a minor

traffic violation that is committed in the officer's presence. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,

532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (upholding warrantless arrest based upon driver’s failure to wear

seatbelt). See also United States v. Fayton, 694 F. Supp. 3d 179, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2023)

(“While it may not be the NYPD's general approach to arrest a driver and take him back

to the precinct for minor traffic violations committed in the officers’ presence, rather than

issue a ticket or summons on site, such an arrest is reasonable under the Fourth

Amendment.”). Thus, just as with the prior claim, without more, it is not clear from the

face of the Amended Complaint whether Officer Wilshire’s alleged actions violated the

Fourth Amendment.

Third and finally, Plaintiff asserts a claim for excessive force. However, this claim,

too, suffers from fatally scant factual detail. A “claim that law enforcement officials used

excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of

[a] person” is “properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's ‘objective

reasonableness’ standard.” Estate of Armstrong ex rel. Amrstrong v.Vill. of Pinehurst,

810 F.3d 892, 899 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 388). “An officer may

employ force, when such force is reasonable under the circumstances, in the course of his

or her duty.” Moody v. City of Newport News, Virginia, 193 F. Supp. 3d 530, 543 (E.D.

Va. 2016), aff'd sub nom. Moody v. Hollandsworth, 690 F. App'x 140 (4th Cir. 2017).

In determining whether force is reasonable, courts must carefully balance “ ‘the

nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests’

against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396

(quoting Tenneessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)). To do so, courts “focus on the facts

and circumstances of each case, taking into account ‘[1] the severity of the crime at issue,

[2] whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,

and [3] whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.’ ”

Yates v. Terry, 817 F.3d 877, 885 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396);

Armstrong, 810 F.3d at 899. Courts must consider the reasonableness of the force

employed “ ‘in full context, with an eye toward the proportionality of the force in light of

all the circumstances.’ ” Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 101 (4th Cir.2015) (quoting Waterman

v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471, 481 (4th Cir.2005)). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

has recognized that “ ‘police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in

circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—[and] we take care to

consider the facts from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, and avoid

judging the officer's conduct with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.’ ” Cooper v. Sheehan, 735

F.3d 153, 158–59 (4th Cir.2013) (quoting Clem v. Corbeau, 284 F.3d 543, 550 (4th

Cir.2002)).

While the pleading standard set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “does

not require detailed factual allegations . . . it demands more than an unadorned, ‘the-

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me’ accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Yet Plaintiff’s

Complaint does just that—alleges that Defendant used excessive force in putting Plaintiff

in the patrol vehicle without telling the Court how the force used was excessive. Plaintiff’s

factual allegations related to this claim are as follows:

After defendant S. Wilshire placed me in handcuffs, he and the other officers

used excessive force to place me in the vehicle after I politely asked to speak

to the supervisor above them all. As they continued to force me in the

vehicle[,] I asked them to be patient because I couldn’t be comfortable

getting in the way they were forcing me to get in. I informed them that I had

herniated discs in my back. I also have bad arthritis in my left knee. They

continued to force me into the patrol car.

(ECF No. 18 at 2). This falls short of the requisite standard.

In short, each of Plaintiff’s claims set forth in the Amended Complaint—despite

having a prior opportunity to amend and cure factual deficiencies—still falls short of the

pleading standard and warrants dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. However, the undersigned notes that “the Fourth Circuit has stated that

a court should consider granting plaintiffs, particularly pro se plaintiffs, leave to amend

if it dismisses a complaint based on [Rule] 12(b)(6).” Smith v. Virginia, No. 3:08cv800,

2009 WL 2175759, at *9 (E.D. Va. July 16, 2009) (citing Ostrzenski v. Seigel, 177 F.3d

245, 252–53 (4th Cir.1999)). In fact, amendment should be refused only if it appears to a

certainty that plaintiff cannot state a claim. The better practice is to allow at least one

amendment regardless of how unpromising the initial pleading appears because except

in unusual circumstances it is unlikely that the court will be able to determine conclusively

on the face of a defective pleading whether plaintiff can state a proper claim. Id. at 253.

Accordingly, the undersigned FINDS that Plaintiff should be granted leave to file a

Second Amended Complaint that sets forth sufficient factual support for Plaintiff’s claims.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that

Defendant’s motion be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and Plaintiff be granted a

reasonable period of time from the presiding District Judge’s adjudication of the instant

Proposed Findings and Recommendation to file a Second Amended Complaint.

The parties are notified that this Proposed Findings and Recommendation is

hereby FILED, and a copy will be submitted to the Honorable Joseph R. Goodwin, United

States District Judge. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), the parties shall have fourteen (14) days (filing of

objections) and three (3) days (mailing) from the date of the filing of this Proposed

Findings and Recommendation to file with the Clerk of this Court specific written

objections identifying the portions of the Proposed Findings and Recommendation to

which objection is made and the basis of such objection. Extension of this time period

may be granted by the presiding District Judge for good cause shown. Copies of any

objections shall be provided to the opposing party or, if it is represented by counsel, to its

counsel, and to Judge Goodwin.

Failure to file written objections as set forth above shall constitute a waiver of de

novo review by the District Court and a waiver of appellate review by the Fourth Circuit

Court of Appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985);

Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363, 1366 (4th Cir. 1989); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841,

846 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 (4th Cir. 1984).

The Clerk is DIRECTED to file this Proposed Findings and Recommendation and

to mail a copy of the same to Plaintiff and to transmit a copy to counsel of record.

ENTERED: September 5, 2025

a + ~~

/ = \A

Dwane L. Tinsley .

_ United States Magistrate Judge ;

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