Brooks v. Smith

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT CHATTANOOGA

NATHAN E. BROOKS, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:24-cv-00378-CEA-CHS

)

JOE SMITH, et. al., )

Defendants. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. Introduction

Nathan Brooks, pro se, is proceeding in forma pauperis [Doc. 1]. This Court is responsible

for screening all actions filed by plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis and for dismissing any

action or portion thereof which is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In addition, "federal courts have a continuing obligation to inquire into the

basis of subject-matter jurisdiction to satisfy themselves that jurisdiction to entertain an action

exists." Campanella v. Commerce Exch. Bank, 137 F.3d 885, 890 (6th Cir. 1998).

II. Standard of Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must screen all actions filed by plaintiffs

proceeding in forma pauperis and dismiss any action or portion thereof which is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a

defendant who is immune from such relief. McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir.

1997), overruled on other grounds, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). This obligation remains

even where some or all of the filing fee has been paid by or assessed against the plaintiff. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2); see also In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131 (6th Cir. 1997) ("All

prisoners while incarcerated must now pay the required filing fees and costs. When an inmate

seeks pauper status, the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the

proceeding or over a period of time under an installment plan. Prisoners are no longer entitled to

a waiver of fees and costs.").

Generally, the standard to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) is the same as that

required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Brand v. Motley, 526 F.3d 921, 924 (6th Cir.

2008); accord Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2007). In determining whether the

plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court accepts all well-pleaded

factual allegations in the complaint as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S 544, 555 (2007). "Specific facts are not necessary; the

statement need only 'give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which

it rests.'" Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569–70). Additionally, pro se

pleadings must be liberally construed and "held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers." Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).

III. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff filed the present action on December 3, 2024 [Doc. 2]. Plaintiff's claims arise from

an incident at the Hamilton County Jail wherein he alleges he was denied the ability to celebrate

Holy Communion with the prisoners [Id. at 4]. Plaintiff asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

denial of his free exercise of religion under the First Amendment, and names as defendants: (1)

Joe Smith in his individual capacity; (2) Joe Smith as an agent of Hamilton County; (3) Chaplain

Jones in his individual capacity; (4) Chaplain Jones as an agent of Hamilton County; (5) Hamilton

County; (6) Hamilton County Sheriff's Department; and (7) Sheriff Austin Garrett [Id. at 15].

According to Plaintiff, Joe Smith performs workhouse prison ministry; Sheriff Garrett is the Head

Sheriff in Hamilton County; and Chaplain Jones is a chaplain at the Hamilton County Jail [Id. at

10–11, 13]. Plaintiff also asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc for violations under the

Religious Land Use Act, and 18 U.S.C. § 242 for deprivation of rights under color of law [Id.].

Plaintiff brings these claims on behalf of the prisoners1 in the Hamilton County Jail [Id.].

Plaintiff states that Defendants denied the prisoners and himself the sacrament of Holy

Communion and Anointment for Healing and Deliverance [Id. at 3–4]. By way of background,

Plaintiff states that from 2009 until 2020, he visited the Hamilton County Jail to celebrate Holy

Communion and Anointing for Healing [Id. at 4]. However, in 2020, jail operations were moved

to Silverdale2 [Id.]. When Plaintiff called then-current Chaplain Waters to ask for instructions on

how to proceed with administering Communion at the new location, Waters advised him that he

could not because the jail did not have a chapel [Id.]. Plaintiff lists a number of prisoners who were

denied access to Holy Communion and Anointment including Jessie Matthews, Richard Manning,

and Jaime Zarate [Id. at 5]. He also claims that he could not "administer the bread of Holy

Communion to prisoners through their cell bars when they were unable to attend the service with

a group of prisoners." [Id.].

Plaintiff claims he was prevented from engaging in ministry during the Covid-19 pandemic

[Id. at 10]. In April 2024, Plaintiff wrote to Sheriff Garrett, inquiring about whether he could return

to the jail to engage in ministry, and Garrett did not respond [Id. at 10–11]. Plaintiff then spoke to

Joe Smith (who performed prison ministry at Silverdale), who told Plaintiff that he could not

1 For clarity, the Court will refer to Nathan Brooks as "Plaintiff." When the Court refers to claims on behalf of the

prisoners, the Court will refer to them as "the prisoners."

2 During the referenced time period from 2009 to 2020, the Hamilton County Jail was located in downtown

Chattanooga, while Corrections Corporation of America (later "CoreCivic") operated the Silverdale Detention Center

located at 7609 Standifer Gap Road in Chattanooga. In or around 2020, Hamilton County took over operations at the

Silverdale Detention Center and ceased operations at the downtown jail. To distinguish between the two jails in this

report and recommendation, the Court will refer to the Standifer Gap location as "Silverdale" or ("Silverdale

Workhouse") even though the County now refers to it as the Hamilton County Jail.

administer Communion or participate in Anointing for Healing, but that Plaintiff could minister to

the prisoners [Id. at 11–12]. Plaintiff next called Chaplain Jones, who told Plaintiff there was no

place for Plaintiff to administer Communion [Id. at 13]. Plaintiff stated that he explained to

Chaplain Jones over the phone that the prison website lists Holy Communion as a service for the

prisoners, and Chaplain Jones hung up on him [Id.]. Plaintiff claims that Defendants were

conspiring together to violate Plaintiff's and the prisoners' First Amendment rights. [Id. at 4–5].

Plaintiff requests this Court to certify a class action for all prisoners who have been denied

the sacrament of Holy Communion, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 [Id. at 14]. He states that, while

he cannot represent the class, he would like this Court to appoint a representative [Id.].

Finally, Plaintiff requests a preliminary injunction, a permanent injunction, class

certification, $75,000 in compensatory damages, $900,000 in punitive damages, and a jury trial

[Id. at 17].

IV. Analysis

Construed in his favor, Plaintiff's allegations do not state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. The claims on behalf of the prisoners fail because Plaintiff lacks standing to bring a claim

on their behalf. The claims also cannot be brought as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 because

Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action on behalf of the prisoners. Plaintiff's claims on his own

behalf fail because he does not state a claim under the Free Exercise Clause. Plaintiff also fails to

state a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act. Finally, Plaintiff

cannot bring a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 242 because it is a criminal statute.

A. The Prisoners' Claims

Plaintiff attempts to sue Defendants on behalf of the prisoners, alleging that their First

Amendment rights were violated when they were denied Communion. However, Plaintiff lacks

standing to sue on the prisoners' behalf. Here, Plaintiff attempts to sue as a putative next friend.

However, to sue on a prisoner's behalf and establish standing, "a putative next friend must

demonstrate that the prisoner is unable to prosecute the case on his own behalf due to

inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability and that the next friend is truly dedicated

to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate." Tate v. United States, 72 F.

App'x 265, 266 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163–64 (1990))

(internal quotation marks omitted). The burden is on the next friend to clearly establish his status

and the jurisdiction of the court. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164.

The Court finds that Plaintiff does not qualify for next friend status. First, Plaintiff does

not assert, or provide any evidence, that any of the prisoners are incompetent or otherwise

incapable of pursuing this action on their own behalf. Second, Plaintiff does not demonstrate that

he is truly dedicated to the prisoners' best interests. Even assuming Plaintiff is acting in the

prisoners' best interests, the failure of Plaintiff to demonstrate that the prisoners are incompetent

or not capable of bringing this action is fatal to his claim. Thus, Plaintiff does not have standing to

bring this claim as next friend on behalf of the prisoners.

Plaintiff also cannot bring this claim as a class action for the prisoners because "[t]hreshold

individual standing is a prerequisite for all actions, including class actions." Fallick v. Nationwide

Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 410, 423 (6th Cir. 1998). Having found that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring

this claim on the prisoners' behalf, it follows that the Court cannot certify a class action initiated

by Plaintiff on the prisoners' behalf.

B. Plaintiff's Claims

1. Free Exercise Clause

Plaintiff asserts, via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that he was denied his right to freely exercise his

religion under the First Amendment. Section 1983 is a remedial statute which does not itself create

independent substantive legal rights. Rather, Section 1983 simply provides a vehicle by which a

person may recover damages for a violation of rights secured to him by federal law. Pyles v. Raisor,

60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995). To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff is required to

show that he has been deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity secured to him by the United

States Constitution or other federal law and that the defendants caused the deprivation while they

were acting under color of state law. Gregory v. Shelby County, Tenn., 220 F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir.

2000).

Plaintiff states that he was deprived of his right to freely exercise his religion when he was

not allowed to administer Communion to the prisoners. The First Amendment of the United States

Constitution states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or

prohibiting the free exercise thereof." (U.S. Const. amend. I). The right to free exercise of religion

"includes the right to engage in conduct that is motivated by the religious beliefs held by the

individual asserting the claim." Bible Believers v. Wayne Cnty., Mich., 805 F.3d 228, 255–56 (6th

Cir. 2015) (citing Prater v. City of Burnside, 289 F.3d 417, 427 (6th Cir. 2002)). The government

cannot prohibit an individual from participating in religious conduct or acts that are protected by

the First Amendment. Id. Additionally, it is well-settled that this First Amendment right extends to

prisoners, and that prisoners must be given reasonable opportunities to practice their religion.

Howes v. Bragg, No. 1:23-CV-00023, 2023 WL 3204014, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. May 2, 2023) (citing

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984)). However, while prisoners have certain First

Amendment rights, it does not mean that these rights are without limitations and restrictions. Bell

v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979).

"A prisoner alleging that the actions of prison officials violate his religious beliefs must

show that the belief or practice asserted is religious in the person's own scheme of things and is

sincerely held." Flagner v. Wilkinson, 241 F.3d 475, 481 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Barhite v. Caruso,

377 F. App'x 508, 510 (6th Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). After a prisoner

establishes a sincerely held religious belief, "the court move[s] on to determining whether the

prison's actions restricting the practice are valid." Id. (citing Boles v. Neet, 486 F.3d 1177, 1182

(10th Cir. 2007)).

However, Plaintiff does not point to, and the Court is not aware of, any case law or statutory

authority to support the claim that volunteer chaplains have a constitutional right to administer

religious services in prisons. Instead, in a Section 1983 case, the Sixth Circuit held that a volunteer

chaplain's "right to conduct services in the prison chapel was a privilege created by the state."

Phelps v. Dunn, 965 F.2d 93, 102 (6th Cir. 1992).3 By implication then, the right to conduct

services in the prison is not a constitutional right. Therefore, Plaintiff does not allege a viable

infringement of his constitutional rights.

A second issue with Plaintiff's complaint is that his free exercise claim rests on the

prisoners' inability to access Holy Communion due to the alleged actions of the Hamilton County

Jail staff, not his own inability to access Holy Communion or otherwise practice his faith. The Free

3 In Phelps, an inmate sued the volunteer chaplain for a § 1983 violation. 965 F.2d at 96-97. The parties claimed

that the district court "granted summary judgment . . . on the ground that Phelps could not bring a § 1983 action

against [the volunteer chaplain] because he was not a state actor." Id. at 101. The Sixth Circuit found that the

district court had not granted summary judgment on that ground, but that if it had, it would have been incorrect to

do so. Id. at 101-02. As part of the analysis on potential state actor issue, the Sixth Circuit specifically noted that

the privilege of conducting services at the prison was created by the state. Id.

Exercise Clause protects one's ability to practice their religion, not one's ability to administer

Communion in a jail (with all of its attendant security concerns) or engage in ministry for others.

Even if the Free Exercise Clause did protect one's ability to engage in ministry in a jail,

Plaintiff's claim would still fail. Courts have found causes of action in cases where a prisoner was

denied access to their religious advisor, Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); where a prisoner was

not allowed to purchase certain religious publications due to his religion, which was a privilege

afforded to prisoners of a different religion, Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964); where a prison

did not allow prisoners to celebrate Passover, Whitney v. Brown, 882 F.2d 1068, 1073 (6th Cir.

1989); and where a prison did not allow prisoners to participate in Eid,4 Maye v. Klee, 915 F.3d

1076, 1083 (6th Cir. 2019). However, in the instant case, Plaintiff does not argue that the prisoners

have been denied access to practice their religion, or that the jail allowed volunteer chaplains of

other religions to freely minister and administer Communion, while denying Plaintiff access. See

Thompson v. Com. of Ky., 712 F.2d 1078, 1080 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding that the prisoners' claim

failed because they did not "claim that they have been denied the opportunity to practice their

religion or that they have incurred punishment for doing so"). Plaintiff only states that he was not

allowed to engage in ministry at the Hamilton County Jail. It is plausible that other chaplains of

the same religion are allowed to engage in ministry, administer Holy Communion, and provide the

prisoners access to that religion. Plaintiff, of course, is free to engage in ministry and administer

Holy Communion in other places that are not the Hamilton County Jail. Plaintiff, however, does

not have a right to engage in ministry and administer Holy Communion specifically in the

Hamilton County Jail.

4 A Muslim religious observance marking the end of Ramadan ("Eid al-Fitr") or the Hajj pilgrimage ("Eid al-

Adha").

Even accepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and construing the complaint

with the required liberality for pro se pleadings, Plaintiff does not show that he was deprived of

his right to freely exercise his religion. Consequently, his complaint does not survive screening for

a Section 1983 claim.

2. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated RLUIPA because there is no place for him in the

Hamilton County Jail to administer Communion. In relevant part, RLUIPA provides that:

[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that

imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a

religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that

imposition of the burden on that person, assembly, or institution—

A. is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and

B. is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental

interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). Stated differently, RLUIPA protects land use as religious exercise by

limiting government's ability to impose a land use regulation that imposes a substantial burden on

religious exercise. Id. RLUIPA defines land use regulation as a zoning or landmarking law that

"limits or restricts a claimant's use or development of land (including a structure affixed to land),

if the claimant has an ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or other property interest in the

regulated land or a contract or option to acquire such an interest." Id. at § 2000cc–5(5). The Sixth

Circuit has found that "not just any imposition on religious exercise will constitute a violation of

RLUIPA[,]" but rather, it must have "some degree of severity to be considered substantial."

Livingston Christian Sch. v. Genoa Charter Twp., 858 F.3d 996, 1003 (6th Cir. 2017) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff appears to be alleging that Defendants violated RLUIPA because there was no

physical space for Plaintiff to administer Communion, and he and the prisoners were entitled to a

space. However, Plaintiff does not point to any land use regulation that is burdening religious

exercise—his only allegation is that Defendants stated there was no place for him to minister and

administer Communion to the prisoners. Further, Plaintiff does not have a property interest (i.e.,

an "ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or other property interest" [Id.] in Hamilton County

Jail. Consequently, Plaintiff could not have been limited by a land use regulation as required by §

2000cc. See Prater v. City of Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 434 (6th Cir. 2002) ("[A] government

agency implements a land use regulation only when it acts pursuant to a zoning or landmarking

law that limits the manner in which a claimant may develop or use property in which the claimant

has an interest") (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, RLUIPA is inapplicable to the

factual circumstances in the present case.

3. Deprivation of Rights under Color of Law

Plaintiff also claims that Defendants deprived him of his rights under color of law, pursuant

to 18 U.S.C. § 242. However, 18 U.S.C. § 242 is a federal criminal statute, and "criminal statutes

generally do not create private causes of action." Young v. Overly, No. 17-6242, 2018 WL 5311408,

at *2 (6th Cir. July 2, 2018). Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 242 does not create a private cause of action

for Plaintiff. See id. Thus, Plaintiff's complaint does not survive screening under 18 U.S.C. § 242.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff does not state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. It is, therefore, RECOMMENDED5 that this action be DISMISSED without prejudice.

ENTER.

/s/ Christopher H. Steger

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

5 Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after

service of a copy of this recommended disposition on the objecting party. Such objections must conform to the

requirements of Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Failure to file objections within the time

specified constitutes a forfeiture of the right to appeal the District Court's order. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 88

L.Ed.2d 435, 106 S. Ct. 466 (1985). The district court need not provide de novo review where objections to this

report and recommendation are frivolous, conclusive or general. Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636 (6th Cir. 1986).

Only specific objections are reserved for appellate review. Smith v. Detroit Federation of Teachers, 829 F.2d 1370

(6th Cir. 1987).