Taylor Gammons v. Cody

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SHAWN TAYLOR GAMMONS,

Plaintiff,

1:25-CV-941

V. (AJB/DJS)

SAMANTHA ANNA-KAY CODY, et al.,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:

SHAWN TAYLOR GAMMONS

Plaintiff, Pro Se

Albany, New York 12206

DANIEL J. STEWART

United States Magistrate Judge

REPORT-RECOMMENDATION and ORDER

The Clerk has forwarded for review a civil Complaint filed by Plaintiff. The

Complaint was filed July 17, 2025. Dkt. No. 1, Compl. The filing fee in this action has

not been paid, but Plaintiff has filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Dkt. No. 2.

That Motion has been granted. The matter has been referred to the undersigned for an

initial review pursuant to L.R. 72.3.

_l-

I, FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Shawn Taylor Gammons and Defendant Samantha Anna-Kay Cody were

married and have two children together, S.N. and S.M. See generally, Compl. Plaintiff

and Defendant are now separated, and Samantha Cody now resides with Defendant Derek

Cody, in Freehold, New York. Compl. at J] 7 & 8. The children live with their mother in

Freehold, while Plaintiff lives in Albany, New York. Compl. at {5 & 6. In March 2025,

domestic strife between Samantha Cody and Derek Cody precipitated a custody

proceeding in Greene County Family Court. Compl. at 9 18 & 19. This matter was

assigned to Defendant Family Court Judge Charles Tailleur and, it appears, is still

ongoing. Judge Tailleur appointed Defendant Andrea Gamalski to represent Plaintiff,

Defendant Sondra Smith to represent Defendant Samantha Cody, and Defendants Max

Zacker and James Gross to represent S.N. and S.M. Gammons respectively. Compl. at □□

12-15. Plaintiff alleges these court appointed attorneys capitalized on a bias against him,

failed to make proper motions, provided ineffective counsel for his children, and refused

to submit favorable evidence. Compl. at 9 22 & 31.

Judge Tailleur issued, and at times extended, a temporary order of protection

against Plaintiff, ordered him to pay child support, and ordered to Plaintiff to serve 30

days in Greene County Jail on account of his failure to do so. Plaintiff alleges that he was

not given sufficient notice of the hearing for a temporary order of protection. He further

alleges that the child support determinations of both Judge Tailleur and Defendant Sarah

_2-

Richards, a child support magistrate, are without legal justification or jurisdiction, and

that conclusions of his violation and the subsequent jail time are based on erroneous

information provided to Greene County Family Court by Samantha and Derek Cody.

Specifically, Plaintiff contests the sum of $27,000 owed in child support as discharged by

Judge Tailleur in an earlier proceeding. Plaintiff alleges, as part of a broader conspiracy,

that his testimony was systematically excluded, while representations by Defendants,

including court appointed attorneys, were admitted despite what he contends are either

biases or outright lies. Plaintiff also takes issue with the denial of certain proposed

conditions of custody issued by Judge Tailleur. See generally Compl.

Plaintiff also lists his children as plaintiffs in this action. He claims his children

were prevented from participating in the Family Court proceedings, exposed to domestic

violence by Samantha and Derek Cody, and that S.N.G. was body-slammed by a New

York State Trooper and ordered to enroll in a Pre-Person’s In Need of Supervision

program without due process. /d.

Plaintiff also claims he has been denied custodial, visitation, and parental rights

«| with respect to S.N. and S.M. He further claims that Samantha Cody attempted to prevent

court-appointed attorneys from interviewing the children in relation to the custody

proceeding. Jd.

Plaintiff alleges violations of his Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Thirteenth, and

Fourteenth Amendment rights by the Defendants. Plaintiff also claims common law

-3-

conversion as against Defendants Samantha and Derek Cody. Finally, he appears to allege

a separate due process violation against Columbia and Greene Counties. In his prayer for

relief, Plaintiff demands a jury trial and requests the arrest and deportation of Samantha

Cody, sole legal and residential custody of S.N. and S.M., discharge of his child support

obligations, impeachment of all public officers named as Defendants in the case, a public

apology, and derivative use immunity. Compl. at pp. 15-16

II. GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) directs that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma

pauperis, “(2) ... the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that

—...(B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (11) fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted; or (ili) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune

from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).!

In reviewing a pro se complaint, the court has a duty to show liberality toward pro

se litigants, see Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam), and should

exercise “extreme caution . . . in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint

«| before the adverse party has been served and both parties (but particularly the plaintiff)

have had an opportunity to respond.” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir.

1983). Therefore, a court should not dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff has stated

' To determine whether an action is frivolous, a court must look to see whether the complaint “lacks an arguable

basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 319, 325 (1989).

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

Although a court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained

in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Jd. “Threadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”

Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts

do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the

complaint has alleged - but it has not show[n] - that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Jd.

at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

«#|Thus, a pleading that only “tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual

enhancement” will not suffice. /d. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

_5-

I. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff?s Claims on Behalf of his Children

It appears that Plaintiff may intend to assert claims on behalf of his children. The

Complaint identifies Plaintiff's children as Plaintiffs. Compl. at p. 2. The children have

not signed the Complaint. While a litigant in federal court has the right to act as her own

counsel, “[a] person who has not been admitted to the practice of law may not represent

anybody other than [her]self.” Guest v. Hansen, 603 F.3d 15, 20 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation

omitted). This rule extends to parents: “a parent not admitted to the bar cannot bring an

action pro se in federal court on behalf of his or her child.” Tindall v. Pultney High School

Dist., 414 F.3d 281, 284-85 (2d Cir. 2005). As a result, any claim brought on behalf of

the children should be dismissed. H.B. v. Brookdale Hosp., 2022 WL 17539117, at *2

(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2022).?

B. Judicial Immunity

Judge Charles Tailleur continues to preside over Family Court proceedings

involving Plaintiff and Defendants Samantha Anna-Kay Cody and Derek Cody. All

| claims against Judge Tailleur arise out of actions taken in his judicial capacity. Ata March

2 This is particularly true where as here “one parent is attempting to bring suit on behalf of a child against the other

parent.” Mulready v. Mulready, 2007 WL 1791120, at *1 (D. Conn. June 16, 2007).

3 The sole factual allegation in the Complaint against a State Trooper identified only as John Doe relates to

allegations of alleged assault against one of Plaintiff's children. Compl. at { 17. Since there is no allegation that

Doe violated Plaintiff’s rights, it is recommended that that claim be dismissed.

-6-

24, 2025 appearance, Judge Tailleur took testimony from the parties and issued a

temporary order of protection against Plaintiff. Compl. at 9] 22 & 29. At an April 7, 2025

appearance, Judge Tailleur extended the temporary order of protection and elicited more

testimony from the parties. Compl. at § 29. Finally, at a May 5, 2025 appearance, Judge

Tailleur made several determinations on the issue of custody, including with respect to a

pick-up/drop-off location and visitation, and further extended the temporary order of

protection. Compl. at § 31. Plaintiff contends that Judge Tailleur gave no legal

justification for his rulings on custody or visitation, or his extensions to the temporary

order of protection.

Judicial immunity is applicable to conduct taken by the court as part of its judicial

power and authority, and its absolute protection extends to all judicial acts except those

performed in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554

(1967). The Supreme Court has emphasized that the scope of a judge’s jurisdiction must

be construed broadly. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (citing Bradley

v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 336 (1871)). Generally, “acts arising out of, or related to,

«| individual cases before [a] judge are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579

F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). “[E]ven allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome

judicial immunity.” /d. at 209. This is because “[w]ithout insulation from liability, judges

would be subject to harassment and intimidation.” Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d

Cir. 1994).

-7J-

“Judicial immunity is overcome in only two circumstances: (1) a judge is not

immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial

capacity; and (2) a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the

complete absence of all jurisdiction.” McCluskey v. Roberts, 2022 WL 2046079, at *5

(2d Cir. June 7, 2022) (internal quotation omitted). Acts related to a specific case, such

as the orders of protection and support determinations at issue here, are clearly judicial in

nature. Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d at 210. And “[j]Judicial immunity applies to these judicial

acts even if they were allegedly done maliciously or corruptly.” McCluskey v. Roberts,

2022 WL 2046079, at *5. For these reasons, no exception to the immunity doctrine

applies and claims against Judge Tailleur should be dismissed.

Defendant Richards is identified as a New York Support Magistrate. Compl. at J

10. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Richards concern her role in child support

determinations made on June 4, 2025. Plaintiff contests Richards’s assessment that

Plaintiff owes $27,000 in child support to Samantha Cody and claims the sum was

discharged as a result the divorce agreement he entered with his ex-wife in 2010. He

«| further takes issue with Richards’s demands to appear at a July 18, 2025 hearing with

copies of certain court records so that Judge Tailleur can properly adjudicate his case.

These actions are also within the scope of judicial immunity as they are an extension of

the Court’s custodial proceedings. See Gerken v. Gordon, 2024 WL 4608307, at *8

(N.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2024) (child support magistrate found immune from suit under

-8-

doctrine of judicial immunity); Clay v. Bishop, 2023 WL 3352903, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Feb.

7, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 2910545 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 12,

2023). Thus, claims against Defendant Richards must also be dismissed.

The vast breadth of judicial immunity also protects judicial staff. See Rodriguez

v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1997) (“A court’s inherent power to control its

docket is part of its function of resolving disputes between parties. This is a function for

which judges and their supporting staff are afforded absolute immunity.”). “Judicial

immunity has been extended to court clerks and others who perform functions closely

associated with the judicial process when they are performing discretionary acts of a

judicial nature which are essential to the judicial process, especially the filing of court

documents and managing a court’s calendar.” Kellier v. Ross, 2022 WL 1292290, at *4

(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2022) (internal quotation omitted) (citing Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474

U.S. 193, 200 (1985) and Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d at 66). “Court clerks have

absolute immunity from civil liability based on actions they take in helping process cases,

even if such actions are ‘ministerial’ or ‘administrative.’” Foy v. New York State Unified

wl Ct. Sys., 740 F. Supp. 3d 136, 150 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (quoting Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116

F.3d at 66-67). As to Defendant Paula Wright, Plaintiff complains of a hearing for a

temporary order of protection of which he was not informed. Compl. at 28-1. This is the

only allegation against Wright and, because of it is in relation to docketing, scheduling,

and court proceedings, it clearly falls within that immunity. Foy v. New York State

-9-

Unified Ct. Sys., 740 F. Supp. 3d at 150; Goldberg v. Roth, 2001 WL 1622201, at *4

(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2001).4

Accordingly, claims against Defendants Wright and Berg must also be dismissed.

C. State Action

. . .

“Because the United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not

private parties, a litigant claiming that his constitutional rights have been violated must

first establish that the challenged conduct constitutes state action.” Flagg v. Yonkers Sav.

& Loan Ass’n, 396 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A

plaintiff pressing a claim of violation of his constitutional rights under § 1983 is thus

required to show state action.” Tancredi v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 316 F.3d 308, 312 (2d

Cir. 2003). “State action requires both the exercise of some right or privilege created by

the State and the involvement of a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.”

Meadows vy. United Servs., Inc., 963 F.3d 240, 243 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Flagg v.

Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass’n, FA, 396 F.3d at 186) (internal quotations and alterations

omitted).

The role of counsel appointed to represent Plaintiff and Defendant Anna-Kay Cody

in state court litigation does not render them state actors. See, e.g., Alexander v. Murphy,

+ The Complaint also names Shara Berg as a Defendant. It appears that Berg is the Chief Clerk of Columbia County

Family Court. https://ww2.nycourts.gov/courts/3jd/columbia/3JD-Columbia%20Multi%20Courts.shtml. The

Court takes judicial notice of that fact. Serrano v. DiPerna, 2024 WL 5247710, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2024).

Any claim made regarding Berg’s handling of proceedings in state court are likewise covered by this judicial

immunity doctrine.

-10-

2018 WL 3232349, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. July 2, 2018), report and recommendation adopted,

2018 WL 6000145 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2018) (private attorney not a state actor);

Harrison v. New York, 95 F. Supp. 3d 293, 328 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing cases). The same

is true for counsel appointed to act as law guardians for the children. Parent v. New York,

786 F. Supp. 2d 516, 538 (N.D.N.Y. 2011), aff'd, 485 F. App’x 500 (2d Cir. 2012)

(“although appointed by the state, an attorney for the children or law guardian is not a

state actor because he or she must exercise independent professional judgment on behalf

of the clients they represent.’’).

The Complaint also names Samantha Anna-Kay Cody and Derek Cody as

Defendants with respect to section 1983 claims. Compl. at pp. 2 & 15. “Private parties

are generally not amenable to suit under § 1983, because they are not state actors.” Bhatia

v. Yale Sch. of Med., 347 F. App’x 663, 664 (2d Cir. 2009). The mere fact that they

allegedly availed themselves of the judicial system, Compl. at □□ 11-12, does not make

them state actors. Sam & Mary Hous. Corp. v. New York State, 632 F. Supp. 1448, 1450

(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“one does not become a state actor merely by being a litigant in a state

| court action.”).

Accordingly, the Court recommends that the section 1983 claims against

Defendants Samantha Cody, Derek Cody, Gamalski, Smith, Zacker, and Gross be

dismissed based on a failure to allege state action.

-ll-

D. Personal Involvement

Defendant Valerie Caruso is sued in her capacity as Director of Columbia County

Support Collections Unit. Compl. at 16. Though named in the Complaint, there are

little, if any, specific factual allegations made against Defendant Caruso.

Liability under section 1983 action is appropriate only if a defendant was

personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation. See Wright v. Smith, 31 F.3d

496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994); Collins v. Saratoga Cty. Support Collection Unit, 2012 2571288,

at *3 (N.D.N.Y. July 3, 2012). “[MJere ‘bald assertions and conclusion of law’ do not

suffice.” Dorsey v. Fisher, 2010 WL 2008966, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. May 19, 2010) (quoting

Leeds v. Meltz, 85 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1996)). Here, the lack of factual allegations

against this Defendant warrant dismissal of claims against Caruso. Hendrickson v. U.S.

Atty. Gen., 1994 WL 23069, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1994), aff'd, 40 F.3d 1236 (2d Cir.

1994) (“To be sufficient before the law, a complaint must state precisely who did what

and how such behavior is actionable under law.”).

E. Conversion Claim

The second cause of action in the Complaint is identified as a conversion claim

against Samantha and Derek Cody. Compl. at p. 16. The allegations are brief and allege

only that Defendant Samantha Cody “defrauded” multiple governmental agencies

through perjury. Jd.

_12-

“According to New York law, ‘conversion is the unauthorized assumption and

exercise of the right of ownership over goods belonging to another to the exclusion of the

owner’s rights.’” Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 400, 403-04 (2d Cir.),

certified question accepted, 7 N.Y .3d 837, 857 N.E.2d 528 (2006), and certified question

answered, 8 N.Y .3d 283 (2007).

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Home Depot U. S. A., Inc. v.

Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743, 1746 (2019). Jurisdiction exists when the matter at issue arises

“under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Jurisdiction also exists when diversity of citizenship is present. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Conversion is a “pure state law claim[].” Greenidge v. Mundo Shipping Corp., 41 F.

Supp. 2d 354, 358 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). As a result, no federal “arising under’ jurisdiction

exists for such a claim.

“Diversity jurisdiction exists where the parties are citizens of different states and

the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.” Ceglia v. Zuckerberg, 772 F. Supp. 2d 453,

455 (W.D.N.Y. 2011). “A case falls within the federal district court’s original diversity

jurisdiction only if diversity of citizenship among the parties is complete, i.e., only if there

is no plaintiff and no defendant who are citizens of the same State.” Wisconsin Dep’t of

Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998) (internal quotations omitted). Complete

diversity is required — meaning if any Defendant is a resident of the same state as the

Plaintiff, diversity jurisdiction does not exist. Seemann v. Maxwell, 178 F.R.D. 23, 24

-13-

(N.D.N.Y. 1998). The Complaint specifically alleges that both Plaintiff and the Cody

Defendants are residents of New York. Compl. at p. 2. As a result, there is also no

diversity jurisdiction in this case and no independent jurisdictional basis for entertaining

these claims.

A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law

claims when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the

lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should

decline the exercise of jurisdiction.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350

(1988). Having recommended dismissal of the federal claims over which the Court has

original jurisdiction, the Court also recommends that the District Court decline to exercise

its supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims Plaintiff may be asserting.

F. Municipal Defendants

The third cause of action in the Complaint names Columbia County and Greene

County as Defendants. Compl. at p. 16. Claims against these Defendants should be

dismissed.

In Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), the

Supreme Court found that “the language of § 1983, read against the background of the . .

. legislative history, compels the conclusion that Congress did not intend municipalities

to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused

_14-

a constitutional tort.” Courts apply “rigorous standards of culpability and causation” to

ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its employees.

Jeffes v. Barnes, 208 F.3d 49, 61 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Bd. of the Cnty. Comm'rs v.

Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997)). Thus, in order for an individual whose constitutional

rights have been violated to have recourse against a municipality under § 1983, he must

show that he was harmed by a municipal “policy” or “custom.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. at 690-91. A “policy” or “custom” cannot be shown

by pointing to a single instance of unconstitutional conduct by a mere employee of the

State. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 831 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in

part and concurring in the judgment) (“To infer the existence of a city policy from the

isolated misconduct of a single, low-level officer, and then to hold the city liable on the

basis of that policy, would amount to permitting precisely the theory of strict respondeat

superior liability rejected in Monell’).

Here, however, the Complaint identifies no unconstitutional policy on the part of

either municipal Defendant. That omission is fatal, at this juncture, to Plaintiff's

«|Complaint. Arnold v. Town of Camillus, New York, 662 F. Supp. 3d 245, 259 (N.D.N.Y.

2023) (“Plaintiff has not identified any formal town policy that has deprived [him] of

equal protection.”); Beckwith v. City of Syracuse, 642 F. Supp. 3d 283, 293 (N.D.N.Y.

2022) (dismissal required when complaint “does not allege the existence of any policy,

practice, or custom from which [plaintiff's] alleged constitutional violation resulted.”).

-15-

Claims against the municipal entities, therefore, should be dismissed.

G. Leave to Amend

“Ordinarily, a court should not dismiss a complaint filed by a pro se litigant

without granting leave to amend at least once ‘when a liberal reading of the complaint

gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.’” Bruce v. Tompkins Cnty. Dep’t

of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Kephart, 2015 WL 151029, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2015) (quoting

Branum vy. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991)). “However, where the grounds

for dismissal offer no basis for curing the defects in the pleading, dismissal with prejudice

is appropriate.” Norwood v. Albany City Police Dep’t, 2019 WL 7593292, at *2

(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 5415873

(N.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2019). Here, for the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs allegations

that are barred by judicial immunity should be dismissed without leave to amend since no

additional pleading could undue that immunity. Since the law is clear that the attorneys

assigned to represent parties to state court litigation are not state actors, those claims too

should be dismissed without leave to amend. Plaintiff could, perhaps, make factual

allegations to establish a claim against the remaining Defendants and so those claims

should be dismissed with leave to amend.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, it is hereby

-16-

RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiff's Complaint be DISMISSED as set forth

above; and it is

ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Report-

Recommendation and Order upon the parties to this action.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen (14)° days within

which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed

with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN

FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v.

Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,

892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72 & 6(a).

Dated: September 2, 2025

Albany, New York

iG

US-Magistrate Judge

5 If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order by mail, three additional days will be added to the

fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the order was mailed to you to serve and

file objections. FED. R. Civ. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal

holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.

FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a)(1)(C).

-17-