McElroy v. Stamps

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

JEREL R. McELROY PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 5:24-CV-05022-TLB-CDC

JOHN OR JANE DOE DETENTION OFFICERS, BCDC;

DETENTION OFFICER D. STAMPS, Benton County Detention Center; and

LEVI FRANKS, BCDC DEFENDANTS

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Jerel R. McElroy has filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging

that Benton County Detention Center (“BCDC”) officials placed him in lockdown and subjected

him to punitive conditions of confinement without constitutional due process. (ECF No. 31).

Plaintiff proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF No. 6).

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1) and (3), U.S. District Judge Timothy

L. Brooks referred this case to the undersigned for the purposes of making a report and

recommendation on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 77). For the

reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment, (ECF No. 77), be GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND1

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Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the BCDC at the time he initiated this action. See (ECF

No. 1). Accordingly, this Court first reviewed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)

prior to service being issued. Upon that review, this Court noted potential legal and factual

1 This Court does not endeavor to describe every docket entry, only those relevant to the Court’s

consideration of the Motion for Summary Judgment presently before it.

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deficiencies with his claims and ordered him to submit an amended complaint. (ECF No. 3).

Upon preservice review of Plaintiff’s amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), it was

recommended that the following two claims proceed: (1) claims against Deputy David Polack and

John and Jane Doe detention officers in their individual capacities for placing him in “lockdown”

from November 8, 2021, to December 10, 2021, without due process of law; and (2) the claims

against Deputy David Polack and John and Jane Doe detention officers for the allegedly

unconstitutional conditions of his confinement in lockdown from November 8, 2021, to December

10, 2021. (ECF No. 11). This Court then ordered service of the amended complaint on Deputy

David Polack, the only named defendant at the time. (ECF No. 12). That order also directed

Deputy Polack to identify the names of the John and Jane Doe detention officers who “signed the

paperwork” authorizing Plaintiff to be placed on lockdown from November 8, 2021, to December

10, 2021. Id.

After initiating service efforts, Plaintiff filed a motion to further amend the amended

complaint. (ECF No. 25). Upon review, this Court granted that motion, allowing Plaintiff to

amend his amended complaint with further factual detail concerning his claim that Deputy Polack

and John and Jane Doe detention officers (in their individual capacities) placed him in lockdown

without due process of law and that he was “physically and emotionally abused” during that time.

(ECF No. 29). Plaintiff was directed to submit a Second Amended Complaint asserting those

claims, and only those claims. Id. Plaintiff’s motion to amend was denied as futile in all other

respects. Id. The Second Amended Complaint identified Defendant Stamps as the official who

signed the paperwork placing him on lockdown from November 8, 2021, to December 10, 2021.

(ECF No. 31). Upon review, the Court ordered that the claims asserted in the Second Amended

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Complaint that were previously dismissed be stricken and that the Second Amended Complaint be

served on Defendant Stamps. Id.; see also (ECF Nos. 32-33).

When efforts to serve Deputy Polack were unsuccessful, this Court ordered Plaintiff to

provide an address for service for Deputy Polack, failing which the claims against him would be

subject to dismissal for lack of service pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). (ECF No. 35). Service

of the Second Amended Complaint on Deputy Polack was ordered at the address Plaintiff

provided. (ECF No. 39). Defendant Stamps’s Answer indicated that Defendant Levi Franks

decided Plaintiff’s disciplinary action on November 15, 2021. (ECF No. 43). Considering this

information, the Court also ordered service of the Second Amended Complaint on Defendant

Franks and directed that he be added as a defendant. (ECF No. 44). Service on Deputy Polack

was returned unexecuted, and service was subsequently ordered on Deputy Polack at a newly

identified potential service address. (ECF Nos. 46-47). When the summons was returned

unexecuted at this address, this Court entered a report and recommendation for dismissal of Deputy

Polack from this action without prejudice for lack of service pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).

(ECF No. 53). Judge Brooks adopted this recommendation over Plaintiff’s objection. (ECF No.

60). David Polack was thus terminated as a defendant to this action.

After Defendant Franks filed an Answer to this lawsuit, this Court ordered the identified

defendants – Defendants Stamps and Franks – to file a motion for summary judgment on the issue

of whether Plaintiff properly exhausted his administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a) before initiating this lawsuit by October 21, 2024, or promptly file a notice saying that

the Defendants do not intend to pursue an exhaustion defense at trial. (ECF No. 51). On October

8, 2024, Defendants Stamps and Franks filed a notice informing the Court and Plaintiff that they

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did not intend to pursue exhaustion as a defense at trial. (ECF No. 54). That same day, Plaintiff

filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel, (ECF No. 54), and Motion for Leave to Amend. (ECF No. 56).

On October 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed another Motion to Amend Complaint. (ECF No. 57). This

Court later denied all three motions. (ECF No. 61).

On October 15, 2024, the Court entered an initial scheduling order governing discovery

and requiring a motion for summary judgment on the merits to be filed by March 14, 2025. (ECF

No. 58). On March 14, 2025, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss and to Stay the Scheduling

Order Deadlines on the grounds that their mail to Plaintiff had been returned as undeliverable and

Plaintiff had not provided any updated contact information. (ECF No. 63). That same day, this

Court granted the stay and deferred ruling on the Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 66). This Court

also directed Plaintiff to respond to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, failing which this matter

would be subject to dismissal for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with court orders.

(ECF No. 67). When Plaintiff submitted a notice of change of address but did not respond to

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as ordered, this Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why this

matter should not be dismissed for failure to comply with court orders. (ECF No. 69). The show

cause response was due by April 22, 2025. Id. On April 8, 2025, Plaintiff responded to

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 71). That same day, this Court denied Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss as moot because Plaintiff had provided his updated contact information and

had evinced his intent to continue to prosecute this case. (ECF No. 72). The Court also ordered

that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment be filed by May 16, 2025. (ECF No. 72). On

May 15, 2025, Defendants requested and received an extension of time to submit their motion for

summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 73 & 74). On May 16, 2025, Plaintiff submitted a change of

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address indicating that he was no longer incarcerated. (ECF No. 75). In response, this Court

ordered Plaintiff to submit an updated in forma pauperis (“IFP”) application reflecting his “free

world” financial status by June 6, 2025, failing which this matter would be subject to dismissal for

failure to comply with court orders. (ECF No. 76).

On May 23, 2025, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that the

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because there is no evidence that Plaintiff suffered

a constitutional violation, and no evidence Defendants violated Plaintiff’s clearly established

constitutional rights. (ECF Nos. 77-79). Plaintiff was ordered to respond to Defendants’ Motion

for Summary Judgment by June 17, 2025, and was provided directions on how to respond. (ECF

No. 80). Defendants later submitted a supplement to their statement of facts, including video of

the incident that purportedly gave rise to the disciplinary action at issue here. (ECF Nos. 89 &

90). After receiving an extension of time, (ECF Nos. 87-88), Plaintiff filed his response to

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, contending that he was placed on “lock down” in

violation of his rights. (ECF No. 91). The Motion is ripe for decision.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury

to return a verdict for either party.” Ward v. Olson, 939 F. Supp. 2d 956, 961 (D. Minn. 2013)

(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). A fact is material only when

its resolution would affect the outcome of a case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

Further, the moving party bears the initial burden of identifying “those portions of the

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record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Jackson v.

United Parcel Serv., Inc., 643 F.3d 1081, 1085 (8th Cir. 2001). In response, the nonmoving party

“may not rest upon mere denials or allegations but must instead set forth specific facts sufficient

to raise a genuine issue for trial.” Forrest v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 285 F.3d 688, 691 (8th Cir. 2002).

In considering a summary judgment motion, the court views all the evidence and inferences in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

III. FACTS

Plaintiff alleges that while in custody at the BCDC in 2019, Deputy Polack used excessive

force against him. (ECF No. 31). Approximately three years later, Plaintiff returned to the

BCDC following his arrest on a failure to appear warrant. Id. While in custody at the BCDC for

the second time, Deputy Polack and John and Jane Doe detention officers allegedly placed him in

lockdown “without cause or proper reason.” Second Amended Complaint at 4. When on

lockdown, everything was taken from Plaintiff, including his mat and socks, and he was subjected

to “freezing” conditions, and he was “emotionally and physically abused,” Id. at 6-7. The

following claims remain and are now subject to summary judgment: (1) That Defendants Stamps,

Franks, and John and Jane Doe detention officers placed Plaintiff on lockdown from November 8,

2021, to December 10, 2021, without due process of law; and (2) the conditions of Plaintiff’s

confinement while on “lockdown” violated his constitutional rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment. See (ECF No. 31, 32, 53).

A. Incident Giving Rise to Disciplinary Proceedings

The following facts are undisputed:2 Plaintiff was booked into the BCDC on November

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2 Plaintiff’s handwritten response in opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is

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10, 2021, on a failure to appear warrant. (ECF No. 79-2 at 1). He bonded out on December 3,

2021. Id. at 2. On November 14, 2021, Deputy Polack submitted an incident report saying that

on November 13, 2021, Polack observed Plaintiff through the “E101 housing unit window working

out on the top tier doing dips from the top rail.” (ECF No. 79-5 at 1). According to the incident

report,3 Deputy Polack directed Deputy Williams to order Plaintiff to stop working out and to

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return to the day room. Id. In response, Plaintiff questioned the order, at which time Deputy

Polack directed Deputy Williams to order Plaintiff to step out of the housing unit so that he could

discuss the matter with Plaintiff directly. When Plaintiff stepped out, he started yelling at Deputy

Polack. After Plaintiff acknowledged that he understood Deputy Polack’s explanation of the

facility rules, Deputy Polack directed Deputy Williams to escort Plaintiff back to his housing unit,

but when Plaintiff returned to his housing, Deputy Polack saw “[Plaintiff] make stabbing gestures

with an inmate showing frustration.” Id. At this point, Sergeant Keil entered the housing unit

and spoke to the inmates about respect and the rules, Defendant Stamps was informed of the

situation, and Defendant Stamps spoke to Plaintiff individually about his actions. Id. After this

neither notarized nor sworn under penalty of perjury. See (ECF No. 91). This Court, therefore,

considers Plaintiff’s handwritten response as argument, not evidence, and looks to his verified

Second Amended Complaint to determine whether any material fact disputes preclude summary

judgment. See Roberson v. Hayti Police Dept., 241 F.3d 992, 994-95 (8th Cir. 2001) (explaining

that a plaintiff’s verified complaint is the equivalent of an affidavit for the purposes of summary

judgment and a complaint signed and dated under penalty of perjury constitutes a verified

complaint).

3 Considering the affidavit of BCDC Lieutenant Brittany Wright, the incident report is admissible

as a record of a regularly conducted activity. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). Within that report,

Plaintiff’s statements are non-hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). To the extent the

incident report contains statements made by Deputy Polack or some third party, the Defendants do

not claim that these statements fall under some recognized exception to the rule against hearsay.

See (ECF No. 78). This Court, therefore, does not consider these statements for the fact of the

matter asserted, but rather for some other purpose, specifically, the effect on the listener.

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discussion, Deputy Polack placed Plaintiff on lock down for the following rule violations: A-18

threatening or intimidating any other person.4 Id.

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BCDC surveillance video of the events giving rise to the rule violation shows the

following:

At approximately 7:51 pm on November 13, 2021, Plaintiff is on the top of the stairs of

housing unit E101, pushing himself up several times with his body weight. (ECF No. 89-2 at 7:52

pm). After about a minute, he walks into the control room, at which time a corrections officer,

identified by the Defendants as Deputy Polack, speaks to him from the control desk. Id. The

control desk is in the shape of a large hexagon and contains several chairs and monitors. This

area is elevated off the floor, surrounded by walls reaching to the top of the monitors. Deputy

Polack is pointing and gesturing at Plaintiff from behind the control desk, he moves closer to where

Plaintiff is standing but does not exit the control desk area. Id. At approximately 7:53 pm,

additional officers run into the control room and circle Plaintiff, who remains standing next to the

control desk. Id. at 7:53 pm. After about one minute, Deputy Polack exits the control desk,

stepping down to talk to Plaintiff directly. Id. at 7:54. After about two minutes, Deputy Polack

and Plaintiff move towards the door to the housing unit. Id. At 7:58 pm, Plaintiff re-enters the

housing unit. Deputy Polack, along with an unidentified deputy, continues to stand next to this

door, looking into the housing unit where the video shows Plaintiff walking back and forth,

gesturing, and hitting one of the tables in the common area. Id. At approximately 7:59 pm,

4 As Plaintiff points out, Defendants did not include a copy of the BCDC policy describing rule

“A-18” in its documents in support of their summary judgment motion. See generally (ECF No.

79-6). For the reasons described below, however, this omission is not material to the Court’s

analysis.

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Plaintiff sits down, at which point a different deputy enters the housing unit and starts talking to

the inmates. During this conversation, Plaintiff is gesturing, pointing, and standing up next to the

table. Id. at 8:05 pm. The conversation continues for another 5 minutes before the deputy exits

the housing unit and the inmates return to their activities. Id. at 8:10 pm. Approximately thirty

minutes later, Plaintiff is brought into the control room again and speaks to several deputies,

including Defendant Stamps. Id. at 8:58 pm. Following this conversation, the video shows

Plaintiff being moved into the E102 housing unit. Id. at 9:17. He is searched prior to this move

and at one point he kicks off his orange slides but then puts them back on. Id. at 9:18-9:19. He is

wearing a black and white striped jumpsuit when he is escorted to the E102 housing unit. Id. At

approximately 9:23 pm, the video shows a deputy exiting the E101 housing unit with a folded

mattress, entering the E102 housing unit with the mattress, and delivering it to Plaintiff’s cell. Id.

B. Plaintiff’s Disciplinary Proceedings

On November 14, 2021, Deputy Polack initiated disciplinary action against Plaintiff for

“threatening or intimidating any other person,” in violation of Rule “A-18.” (ECF No. 79-5 at 1).

The note “refused” appears on the “inmate signed” line. Id. at 3. A hearing was held on this

purported rule violation on November 15, 2021. Defendant Levi Franks, who was not present

during the events giving rise to the rule violation, presided over the hearing, found him guilty, and

sentenced him to 20 days lockdown, effective from November 13, 2021, to December 3, 2021.

Id. at 4. The form reflects that Plaintiff requested an appeal of these findings on the grounds that

“he never threatened anyone.” Id. An “appeal hearing” was held on November 16, 2021, and

the decision to place Plaintiff on lockdown was upheld. Id. The form was signed by a disciplinary

official but not countersigned by an “approving” official. Id. at 6. The place for the inmate’s

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signature is noted “refused.” Id.

On November 27, 2021, Officer Chance Gregory initiated disciplinary action against

Plaintiff for “assault and battery or accessory to battery or extortion” in violation of Rule “A-4”

for an incident that occurred that same day. (ECF No. 79-5 at 11). At the time, Plaintiff was still

serving time on “lockdown” for the November 13, 2021, incident. Id. The disciplinary

proceedings following the November 27, 2021, incident are not at issue here. See (ECF No. 31).

Suffice to say that following those proceedings, Plaintiff was sentenced to fifteen days lockdown,

effective November 27, 2021, to December 12, 2021. (ECF No. 79-5 at 11).

C. Benton County Detention Center Policies and Procedures

The Benton County Sheriff’s Office Detention Center Policies and Procedures (“BCDC

policies”) defines four types of segregation. (ECF No. 79-6 at 1). Disciplinary segregation is

defined as a “[s]tatus of confinement that entails separation from the general population of the

facility for the inmates found in violation of institutional rules, criminal laws or codes, policies, or

the reasonable orders of officers and staff.” Id. Prior to placement in disciplinary detention, “[a]

due process hearing is conducted, in accordance with facility policy.” Id. If an inmate is found

to have violated a jail rule, following a disciplinary due process hearing, [he may] be placed in

disciplinary segregation for up to ten [10] days for a minor rules violation or up to thirty [30] days

for a major rules violation . . . .” Id. at 4. An inmate’s conditions of confinement in disciplinary

segregation “are consistent with those described in the policy discussing locked unit operations.”

Id. at 5. The Defendants did not include “the policy discussing locked unit operations” as an

exhibit in support of their summary judgment motion. See generally (ECF No. 79-6).

BCDC policy provides that:

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[a]ll key aspects regarding placement of inmates in disciplinary

segregation are documented and include the following:

1. Completed Internal Incident Report providing an accurate

account of the details of the violation resulting in

disciplinary segregation;

o Incident report will be completed before the end of

shift it occurred on or was found on;

o Incidents involving Use of Force will be completed

before the end of shift it occurred on;

o Incident reports must be approved

2. Signed disciplinary form;

o If the inmate refuses to sign the form, notate on the

form;

3. Commissary Inventory Form;

o If the inmate does not have commissary items, notate on the form

and attach to the disciplinary paperwork

(ECF No. 79-6 at 5).

The BCDC policy on disciplinary hearings provides:

Disciplinary Hearings:

The reporting of rule and regulation violations is the responsibility of every

employee, regardless of work assignment. Any violation of the rules and

regulations that the deputy deems warrants more than a verbal reprimand

will be documented and the disciplinary process begins:

1. The deputy notifies the inmate(s) they are being placed on

administrative segregation, pending a disciplinary hearing,

and notifies the inmate(s) of the misconduct and disciplinary

infractions.

2. The deputy will prepare a disciplinary form and serve this to

the inmate. The deputy will sign and date the form and retain

a signature from the inmate, informing the inmate by signing

the form they are not admitting guilt, but acknowledging

they have been served. In the event the inmate refuses to sign

the form, the deputy will notate this on the form.

3. No sooner than twenty-four (24) business hours of the

incident and no later than seventy-two [72] hours of the

incident (excluding weekends and holidays), the

Disciplinary Sergeant, or designee, will review the

documentation and relevant evidence related to the alleged

misconduct. The Disciplinary Sergeant will speak with the

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inmate and make a determination of guilty/not guilty.

4. In the event the Disciplinary Sergeant finds the inmate not

guilty, the inmate will be allowed to return to their prior

housing unit, if possible. The Disciplinary Sergeant will

notify the charging deputy, or their shift supervisor, if the

disciplinary is overturned for any reason.

5. In the event the Disciplinary Sergeant finds the inmate

guilty, they will notify the inmate of the punishment

imposed. At this time, the inmate will be subject to losing

privileges they would have been afforded if not on

disciplinary segregation. The Disciplinary Sergeant will

advise the inmate they have the right to appeal their decision

to a higher authority.

6. In the event the inmate chooses to appeal the Disciplinary

Sergeant’s decision, the Jail Lieutenant, or designee, will

review the finding and administer an appeal hearing no

sooner than twenty-four (24) business hours of the initial

disciplinary hearing and no later than seventy-two [72]

business hours of the incident.

7. The Jail Captain or designee will review all disciplinary

action taken. Copies of all reports will be placed in the

inmate's OCA file.

Id. at 6.

Finally, according to BCDC policy, “[i]ncidents of misconduct while in disciplinary

segregation may result in additional disciplinary segregation time being imposed.” Id.

Notably, Plaintiff’s response in opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

includes BCDC Policy Number 6.01 on “inmate discipline.” (ECF No. 91 at 18-21). That policy

further outlines the “formal hearing process.” Namely, according to Policy 6.01, “[i]f a

CR/DEPUTY has reasonable belief that an infraction has occurred, and that formal disciplinary

action is warranted, a hearing or disciplinary action is scheduled within seventy-two [72] hours.”

Id. at 20. “During the hearing the C/R DEPUTY hears the facts of the alleged violation, weighs

the evidence, and makes a ruling as to the disposition of the case. An inmate charged with a rule

violation may have the opportunity [but is not required] to be present, make a statement, and

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present documentary evidence. The C/R DEPUTY has the discretion not to allow inmates to

attend or participate in a hearing if disruptive, violent prone, or otherwise uncooperative or lacking

respect for the process.” Id. at 20. Additionally, pursuant to policy, “[t]he inmate may request

witnesses when such witnesses are reasonably available . . . .”5 Id. It is unclear from the record

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whether Plaintiff was present at his disciplinary hearing or if he requested witnesses.

IV. ANALYSIS

The undersigned turns to the two claims on summary judgment: (1) That Defendants

Stamps, Franks, and John and Jane Doe detention officers placed Plaintiff on lockdown from

November 8, 2021, to December 10, 2021, without due process of law; and (2) That the conditions

of Plaintiff’s confinement while on “lockdown” violated his constitutional rights under the

Fourteenth Amendment.

Defendants contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Officials are entitled to

qualified immunity in § 1983 actions unless “they violated a federal ‘statutory or constitutional

right that was clearly established at the time.’” Webster v. Westlake, 41 F.4th 1004, 1009 (8th

Cir. 2022) (quoting City & Cty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 611 (2015)). “To decide

whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, [courts] conduct a two-step inquiry: (1)

whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, demonstrate a constitutional or

statutory deprivation; and (2) whether the right was clearly established at the time.” Id. at 1009-

10 (citing Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 786 (8th Cir. 2015)). The court “may decide which

5 This excerpt appears to come from page 3 of 6 of BCDC Policy Number 6.01. See (ECF No.

91 at 20. Neither party provided the Court with all six pages of this policy—indeed, page 4

appears to be missing. Accordingly, there are no facts in the record establishing what (if any)

other conditions must be met for an inmate to present witnesses at his disciplinary hearing.

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step to address first.” Id. (citing Morgan v. Robinson, 920 F.3d 521, 523 (8th Cir. 2019) (en

banc)). In this case, the undisputed material facts show that Defendants Stamps and Franks

should be entitled to qualified immunity.

A. Due Process

Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, “[p]retrial detainees are

presumed innocent and may not be punished.” Martinez v. Turner, 977 F.2d 421, 423 (8th Cir.

1992) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)). There are two ways to determine

whether conditions of confinement rise to the level of punishment. Stearns v. Inmate Servs.

Corp., 957 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2020). First, “a plaintiff could show that the conditions were

intentionally punitive.” Id. “Alternatively, if there is no expressly demonstrated intent to punish,

the plaintiff could also show that the conditions were not reasonably related to a legitimate

governmental purpose or were excessive in relation to that purpose.” Id. (citing Wolfish, 441

U.S. at 538-39). “Not every disability imposed during pretrial detention amounts to punishment

in the constitutional sense.” Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1996). “[T]here is a

de minimis level of imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned.” Id. “In

considering whether the conditions of pretrial detention are unconstitutionally punitive, [courts]

review the totality of the circumstances of a pretrial detainee's confinement.” Morris v. Zefferi,

601 F.3d 805, 810 (8th Cir. 2010).

Plaintiff contends that he was placed in “lockdown” without due process of law.

Defendants respond that Plaintiff was afforded a hearing where Defendant Franks, acting as the

hearing officer, found Plaintiff guilty of the rule violation after considering the evidence. See

(ECF No. 79 at 2). After being found guilty of this violation, Plaintiff was sentenced to 20 days

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in lockdown. (ECF No. 79-5 at 4). Plaintiff says that he was under 23-hour lockdown, and

“stripped” of everything, like mats and socks, “under freezing conditions without sheets or

blankets for a period of time throughout the day.” (ECF No. 31 at 9). According to BCDC

policies, “the basic living conditions and services in the disciplinary segregation unit are consistent

with those described in the policy discussing locked unit operations.” (ECF No. 79-6 at 5).

While the Defendants did not include the BCDC policy discussing “locked unit operations,” the

policy provided states that, “inmates in disciplinary segregation are subject to more stringent

personal property, reading material limitations, communications such as visitation and telephone

privileges, programs, reading materials, and activities and commissary privileges. Showers will

be regulated, per state and federal guidelines to once every three [3] days.” Id. There are no

facts in the summary judgment record establishing to what extent (or even whether) Plaintiff was

subjected to these limitations.

1. Lockdown

The first question for the Court to decide is whether the decision to move Plaintiff from his

housing unit to “lockdown” violated Plaintiff’s due process rights. The Court concludes that it

did not.

“If a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal – if it is arbitrary

or purposeless – a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is

punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees.” Dale v.

Brott, Case No. 12-CV-383 (PJS/JSM), 2013 WL 12074952, at *12 (D. Minn. July 23, 2013)

(quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 539), R&R adopted by 2013 WL 12074953 (D. Minn. Sept. 5, 2013).

But, as noted above, “if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably

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related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to ‘punishment’.”

Id. (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 539). Further, “when courts consider whether jail conditions

amount to punishment, they must bear in mind that jail officials have ‘legitimate interests that stem

from [their] need to manage [their] facility,’ which ‘may require administrative measures that go

beyond those that are, strictly speaking, necessary to ensure that the detainee shows up at trial.’”

Id. (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 540). Accordingly, “the effective management of the detention

facility . . . is a valid objective that may justify the imposition of conditions and restrictions of

pretrial detention and dispel any inference that such restrictions are intended as punishment.” Id.

(quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 540).

In this case, the uncontroverted video evidence shows that after Deputy Polack told

Plaintiff to stop using the railing in the housing pod to work out, Plaintiff returned to his housing

pod and proceeded to pace around in the day area, pointing, and gesturing. While it is not clear

what gestures Plaintiff was making with his hands, the surveillance video shows that Plaintiff’s

conduct prompted a deputy to enter the housing pod to discuss the detention center rules. On this

record, therefore, BCDC officials’ decision to remove Plaintiff from the housing pod and house

him in a different pod was not “arbitrary and purposeless.” Rather, given the circumstances, the

decision to move Plaintiff to a different housing unit falls squarely within the wide-ranging

deference afforded to jail officials to “adopt[] and execut[e] policies and practices that in their

judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional

security.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 547. Put differently, the record shows that the decision to move

Plaintiff was not intended to punish Plaintiff but to maintain order in the facility. See Dale, 2013

WL 12074952 at *12 (pretrial detainee not entitled to a due process hearing before being assigned

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to a new unit because move was made for “administrative/security reasons”). Because Plaintiff

did not establish that the move violated his constitutional rights, Defendants should therefore be

entitled to qualified immunity with respect to this claim.

2. Conditions of Confinement

Turning to the conditions of confinement Plaintiff experienced while in “lockdown,” even

if those conditions were punitive (and the Court is unconvinced they were), it is not clearly

established that the process Plaintiff received was constitutionally deficient.

First, the Court is not convinced that the conditions Plaintiff experienced in “lockdown”

constitute the type of “punishment” that requires due process protections. Although the BCDC

policy explains that pretrial inmates in “disciplinary segregation” are subject to limitations in their

access to reading materials, programs, the telephone, visitation and commissary privileges, there

is nothing describing the extent to which an inmate’s access is so limited. Further (and more to

the point), there is nothing in the record suggesting that Plaintiff was subject to any of these

limitations. Instead, Plaintiff claims that he was subjected to “freezing conditions,” and “locked

down” for 23 hours with restricted access to his mat, sheets, blanket, and socks. See (ECF No.

31).

Under the Fourteenth Amendment, pretrial detainees “are entitled to reasonably adequate

sanitation, personal hygiene, and laundry privileges, particularly over a lengthy course of time.”

Stickley v. Byrd, 703 F.3d 421, 423 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017,

1045 (8th Cir. 2012)). But not every deprivation rises to the level of punishment under the due

process clause. See Green v. Baron, 879 F.2d 305, 310 (8th Cir. 1989). In this case, Plaintiff

asserts (and Defendants fails to assert any facts to dispute) that he was in a cold cell with restricted

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access to his mat, sheets, blanket, and socks for 20 days following the November 13, 2021, events

giving rise to his disciplinary proceedings. But there are no facts in the record suggesting that he

had no access to his mat, bedding, or socks during this timeframe, nor are there any facts suggesting

that he did not have access to any personal hygiene items or that he was exposed to unsanitary

conditions. Certainly, moreover, Plaintiff does not point to any case—controlling or otherwise—

that places Plaintiff’s right to be free from these conditions (absent Due Process protections)

beyond debate. See Thurmond v. Andrews, 972 F.3d 1007, 1012 (8th Cir. 2020) (To define a

“clearly established right . . . there need not be a case directly on point, but existing precedent must

have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”) (internal citations and

quotations omitted) (cleaned up).

Second, even if it were clearly established that these conditions qualify as “punitive,” it is

undisputed that Plaintiff was afforded a hearing. Defendants assert that this hearing, consistent

with policy, involved Defendant Franks reviewing the incident report and speaking with Plaintiff,

who purportedly said that “he never threatened anyone.” See (ECF No. 79 at 2); see also (ECF

No. 79-5, p. 4). To the extent that Plaintiff claims that this process was inconsistent with BCDC

policy, a violation of policy does not establish a constitutional violation. See Phillips v. Norris,

320 F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[T]here is no federal constitutional liberty interest in having

state officers follow state law or prison officials follow prison regulations.”). Further, to the

extent Plaintiff contends that the procedures he received were constitutionally deficient, he again

fails to point to any clearly established law that would not only support his assertion but also put

any reasonable official on notice that the constitution required his hearing to include more robust

procedures. By contrast, it is undisputed that Plaintiff received the “fundamental requisite[s]” of

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due process—notice and a right to be heard.” Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 888 (8th

Cir. 2006) (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)).

Accordingly, the Defendants should be entitled to summary judgment with respect to this claim as

well.

B. Retaliation

While not explicitly asserted as a separate claim, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint

contends that Deputy Polack placed him in lockdown due to a “personal ulterior motive” he had

against Plaintiff dating back to an excessive force incident that purportedly occurred in October

2019. (ECF No. 31 at 4). Defendants construe these allegations as a First Amendment retaliation

claim, arguing that the undisputed material facts show that they are entitled to summary judgment

on this claim, as well. This Court agrees.

“An inmate may maintain a cause of action for retaliatory discipline under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 where a prison official files disciplinary charges in retaliation for an inmate’s

exercise of constitutional rights.” Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 829 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing

Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989)). But a claim for retaliation fails if “the

alleged retaliatory conduct violations were issued for the actual violation of a prison rule.” Id.

(citing Orebaugh v. Caspari, 910 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1990)). Accordingly, “a defendant may

successfully defend a retaliatory discipline claim by showing ‘some evidence’ the inmate actually

committed a rule violation.” Id.

In this case, the Defendants have met that standard. The undisputed facts show that

Deputy Polack charged Plaintiff with a violation of jail rules, and Plaintiff was provided notice of

that violation, and an opportunity to be heard. See (ECF No. 79-5 at 2-6). Following that

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hearing, he was found guilty of the violation. Id. This finding constitutes “some evidence” that

Plaintiff violated the jail’s rules, thereby foreclosing any retaliation claim. Hartsfield, 511 F.3d

at 831. This Court therefore agrees that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, as well.

For these reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted and the

claims against them dismissed with prejudice.

C. John and Jane Doe Detention Officers

One final housekeeping matter requires some discussion: Plaintiff’s Second Amended

Complaint identifies “Jane or John Doe” defendants. (ECF No. 31). Plaintiff asserts the

following two claims against these unnamed defendants: (1) “Mr. Polack and said Jane and John

Doe officers assaulted me back in October 2019 and had a personal ulterior motive when seen

me,” (ECF No. 31 at 4 & 6, 7) and (2) “On or around Nov. 8, 2021 – December 10, 2021, I was

booked into Benton County Detention Center . . . [w]hen I arrived John or Jane Doe (Detention

Officers) along with David Polack placed me on lockdown (segregation) signing papers for

lockdown without cause or proper reason violating due process of law,” id. at 9.

As a threshold matter, following the Court’s preservice review of Plaintiff’s amended

complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), this Court recommended that Plaintiff’s claims

related to the November 2019 excessive force incident be dismissed as time barred. See (ECF

No. 11) (citing Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 767, 739 (8th Cir. 2001 (Arkansas 3-year personal injury

statute of limitations applies to § 1983 actions)). Those recommendations were adopted without

objection. (ECF No. 16). This Court subsequently denied as futile Plaintiff’s request to further

amend his complaint to add a claim against Sheriff Shawn Holloway related to this 2019 incident.

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(ECF No. 61). To the extent that Plaintiff endeavors to reassert claims against John and Jane Doe

defendants related to the 2019 excessive force incident these claims are time barred because the

statute of limitations to bring § 1983 claims in Arkansas is 3 years, and 3 years has elapsed since

the excessive force incident allegedly occurred. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

Second, to the extent that Plaintiff asserts that the John and Jane Doe defendants retaliated

against him by placing him in lockdown on or about November 13, 2021, as described above,

because there is “some evidence” in the record that Plaintiff committed a disciplinary violation,

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is without merit and therefore should be dismissed with prejudice.

Finally, with respect to any remaining claims against the John and Jane Doe defendants,

Plaintiff has not requested to amend his pleadings with the names of these defendants even though

the deadline for the parties to complete discovery was February 12, 2025, and the deadline for the

parties to request to amend their pleadings was January 13, 2025. Because these defendants

remain unidentified and no further effort has been made to identify them, any remaining claims

against them should be dismissed without prejudice.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, it is hereby RECOMMENDED THAT,

(1) The Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendants Stamps and Franks (ECF No.

77) be GRANTED and the claims against them be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

(2) The claims against the John and Jane Doe Defendants should be dismissed as

follows:

a. The claims against them for their purported involvement in the 2019 excessive

force incident should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(a).

b. The claims against the John and Jane Doe Defendants for purportedly retaliating

against Plaintiff by placing him on “lock down” on or about November 13, 2021, be DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE; and

c. Any other claims against the John and Jane Doe Defendants be DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation

in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are

reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the

district court.

STATUS OF REFERRAL: No longer referred.

RECOMMENDED this 4th day of September 2025.

/s/ Christy Comstock

CHRISTY COMSTOCK

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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