Paris v. Brown

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ARNAUD PARIS, No. 24-4950

D.C. No.

Petitioner-Appellant,

1:24-cv-00648-

AA

v.

HEIDI MARIE BROWN,

OPINION

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Ann Aiken, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 22, 2025

Portland, Oregon

Filed October 3, 2025

Before: CONSUELO M. CALLAHAN, MILAN D.

SMITH, JR., and SALVADOR MENDOZA, JR., Circuit

Judges.

Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

2 PARIS V. BROWN

SUMMARY *

Hague Convention / Fugitive-Disentitlement Doctrine

The panel (1) reversed the district court’s dismissal,

pursuant to the fugitive-disentitlement doctrine, of Arnaud

Paris’s petition under the Hague Convention on the Civil

Aspects of International Child Abduction for the return of

his children to France; and (2) remanded for adjudication of

the petition on the merits.

Paris and Heidi Brown, the children’s other parent, lived

with the children in France. Brown brought them to Oregon,

but Paris asserted that he had obtained a French court

judgment, and he brought the children back to France. An

Oregon state court granted Brown sole custody, and she

brought the children back to Oregon. The Oregon court held

Paris in contempt of a restraining order forbidding him from

taking the children out of Oregon and issued a warrant for

his arrest. He remained in France and filed the Hague

Convention petition in the district court.

In determining whether to apply the fugitive-

disentitlement doctrine, a district court in this circuit must

first consider whether the doctrine should be narrowly

applied because the case is not a direct criminal

appeal. Second, the court must consider whether the alleged

fugitive was in fact a fugitive during the pendency of the

action at issue. Third, the court must consider whether

dismissal of the action is supported by the traditional

*

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

PARIS V. BROWN 3

justifications of abandonment, deterrence, dignity of the

courts, efficiency, and enforceability.

Applying this test, the panel first concluded that the

doctrine must be narrowly applied in this civil case. Second,

the panel assumed without deciding that Paris qualified as a

fugitive. Third, the panel concluded that the fugitive-

disentitlement doctrine’s five traditional justifications did

not necessitate dismissal. As to enforceability, Paris’s

absence from Oregon was no impediment to carrying out an

adverse judgment on his petition. The efficiency factor did

not support dismissal because Paris’s absence did not delay

or frustrate district court proceedings. The dignity factor did

not support dismissal because Paris did not flout the judicial

authority of the court in which he filed his Hague

Convention petition. The district court’s interest in

deterrence was weak to nonexistent, and the abandonment

factor was of little importance in this case. The panel also

agreed with other circuits that the parental rights at stake in

cases brought under the Hague Convention, as well as the

treaty’s unique and important goals and purposes, counsel

caution before a court extinguishes a fugitive’s right to seek

the return of his or her children. Accordingly, the panel held

that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing

Paris’s petition based on the fugitive-disentitlement

doctrine.

4 PARIS V. BROWN

COUNSEL

Arnaud Paris (argued), Pro Se, Paris, France, for Petitioner-

Appellant.

Katrina A. Seipel (argued) and Katelyn Skinner, Buckley

Law PC, Lake Oswego, Oregon, for Respondent-Appellee.

Anna M. Stapleton (argued) and Kelsey Peden, Paul Weiss

Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP, San Francisco,

California; Kannon K. Shanmugam, Damonta D. Morgan,

and Regina C. Fairfax, Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton &

Garrison LLP, Washington, D.C.; for Court Appointed

Amicus Curiae.

OPINION

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

This appeal arises from a bitter child custody dispute

between two parents living on different continents.

Petitioner-Appellant Arnaud Paris and Respondent-

Appellee Heidi Marie Brown are the parents of two minor

twins, E.P. and J.P., who possess dual French-U.S.

citizenship. The parties lived together with their children at

various times in Oregon and France. However, after their

relationship broke down, the parties filed near-simultaneous

petitions for custody in their respective homelands: Mr. Paris

in France and Ms. Brown in Oregon, where she resided with

the children at the time. The Oregon state court issued a

restraining order forbidding Mr. Paris from taking the twins

out of Oregon. But after a French court purportedly granted

PARIS V. BROWN 5

him permission to do just that, Mr. Paris returned to France

with both children.

In Mr. Paris’s absence, the Oregon court granted Ms.

Brown sole custody, held Mr. Paris in contempt, and issued

a warrant for his arrest. He refused to appear and clear the

warrant. Shortly afterward, Ms. Brown traveled to France to

see her children and returned to Oregon with the twins.

Mr. Paris contends that Ms. Brown violated a French

court order by doing so. He therefore petitioned the U.S.

District Court under the Hague Convention on the Civil

Aspects of International Child Abduction, a multinational

treaty requiring signatories like the United States to order the

return of children wrongfully removed from their country of

“habitual residence.” But the district court dismissed Mr.

Paris’s petition without reaching the merits pursuant to the

“fugitive-disentitlement doctrine.” Though “exceptionally

harsh” and disfavored in civil cases, federal courts can

invoke this doctrine to dismiss actions brought by fugitives

from justice so long as dismissal is “necessary” to promote

the doctrine’s policy rationales.

The facts of this case reflect no such necessity. In

concluding otherwise, the district court overlooked

controlling precedents, causing the court to misapply the

fugitive-disentitlement doctrine. Accordingly, we reverse.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

A. The Parties’ Competing Custody Petitions

Arnaud Paris and Heidi Brown are the parents of two

minor twins, E.P. and J.P. Mr. Paris is a dual citizen of

France and the United States, and Ms. Brown is a citizen of

6 PARIS V. BROWN

the United States. The twins are dual citizens of the U.S. and

France. Mr. Paris, Ms. Brown, and the twins lived together

at various points in Oregon, California, and France.

Over time, Mr. Paris and Ms. Brown’s relationship broke

down. As of mid-2022, the four family members were all

living together in France. But in July 2022, Ms. Brown

relocated from France to Oregon and took the twins with her.

The parties dispute whether Mr. Paris continued to live in

France or instead traveled to Oregon with the intent of living

with Ms. Brown and the twins.

A few months later, the parents filed near-simultaneous

petitions for custody in their respective home nations. Mr.

Paris filed his petition in a French court on October 6, 2022,

although it may not have been received until October 7,

2022. Also on October 7, 2022, Ms. Brown petitioned the

Circuit Court for the State of Oregon for custody, child

support, and a dissolution of domestic partnership.

Shortly after receiving Ms. Brown’s petition, the Oregon

state court issued a temporary protective order of restraint

fixing the twins’ usual place of residence as Ashland,

Oregon. The order restrained both parents from changing

the twins’ usual place of residence, interfering with their

daily routine, interfering with the other’s parenting time, and

removing the twins from Oregon without the other’s or the

court’s permission. 1

1

While the Oregon custody litigation continued, Mr. Paris filed his first

petition under the Hague Convention for the children’s return to France.

The U.S. District Court denied the petition and ordered that the children

would remain in Oregon for the 2022-2023 school year. See Paris v.

Brown, Case No. 1:22-cv-01593-MC (D. Or. Dec. 7, 2022). Mr. Paris’s

ensuing appeal was dismissed. Ms. Brown does not argue in this Court

PARIS V. BROWN 7

In March 2023, a French court held a hearing on Mr.

Paris’s custody petition, at which he testified. Ms. Brown

did not appear and could not appear remotely, though,

counsel appeared on her behalf. Ms. Brown has indicated

that she did not attend because she believed the hearing

would only address the French court’s jurisdiction. Three

weeks later, based largely on that hearing, the French court

awarded the parents joint custody. The French court

concluded that the family lived in France and that the twins

were domiciled there, so they were subject to the jurisdiction

of the French courts. The court also granted Mr. Paris’s

“request for a ban on the departure of the children from

French soil without the authorization of both parents.”

Based on this ruling, Mr. Paris sought to register the

French judgment in Oregon. He also requested that the

Oregon state court proceedings be dismissed for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction. 2 Ms. Brown opposed

registration and urged the Oregon court to exercise

jurisdiction. The court held an evidentiary hearing on these

matters for multiple days in July 2023 and recessed toward

the beginning of Ms. Brown’s cross-examination of Mr.

Paris. Testimony was set to resume the next month.

B. Mr. Paris’s Alleged Abduction & Subsequent

Proceedings

A few days after the hearing recessed, however, Mr.

Paris abruptly took the twins from Oregon to France, despite

the Oregon state court’s temporary restraining order. Ms.

that Mr. Paris’s prior petition precludes the current one, and amicus

curiae contends that his current petition is based on different conduct.

2

Mr. Paris asked the Oregon Supreme Court to vacate the temporary

restraining order, but his request was denied.

8 PARIS V. BROWN

Brown characterizes this as an unlawful abduction, while

Mr. Paris contends he was acting in accordance with a

French court order and with the assistance of a French

consulate. He also insists he did not violate the restraining

order because a French court had nullified it. In the course

of bringing the twins out of the country, Mr. Paris had to

explain the legality of his departure to agents from the U.S.

Customs and Border Protection, who permitted him to depart

with the twins.

Upon returning to France, Mr. Paris requested to appear

remotely when the Oregon evidentiary hearing resumed in

August 2023. The Oregon state court denied his request, and

Mr. Paris did not appear for the remainder of the hearing.

The twins remained in France while the proceedings

continued. Contemporaneously, a French court ruled that

neither parent could remove the twins from French territory

without the other’s consent.

In August 2023, the Oregon state court concluded that

only it had jurisdiction over the parents’ custody dispute and

thus denied Mr. Paris’s request to register the French

judgment. The court further concluded that the French

proceedings did not substantially conform with the Uniform

Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (ORS

109.701) and that Ms. Brown received inadequate notice of

the hearing in France. The Oregon court determined that Mr.

Paris failed to appear at the continued evidentiary hearing,

that he “was in willful violation of the court’s orders not to

leave the state with the minor children,” and that he “acted

in bad faith.” The court also denied Mr. Paris’s motion to

dismiss Ms. Brown’s custody petition for lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction.

PARIS V. BROWN 9

In November 2023, Ms. Brown filed a motion in the

Oregon state court to hold Mr. Paris in contempt for

violating the restraining order by removing the children from

Oregon. The court held a preliminary hearing on Ms.

Brown’s motion the same day, with Ms. Brown appearing in

person and Mr. Paris appearing remotely. During the

hearing, the court stated it would not permit Mr. Paris to

proceed remotely while holding the twins abroad in violation

of the restraining order. It also stated it would not consider

Mr. Paris’s many requests for relief given his defiance of the

court’s orders. In the court’s view, Mr. Paris had committed

“a felony” and was “holding the[] children criminally.”

The following month, the Oregon state court ordered Mr.

Paris to return the children to Oregon, reiterated that his

attempt to register the French judgment in Oregon had been

denied, and again ruled that “[n]o other state has

jurisdiction.” The court concluded that Mr. Paris “remains

in France with the minor children in flagrant, willful,

contemptuous violation of the Court’s orders.” Mr. Paris did

not comply with the court’s order to return the children.

In December 2023, the Oregon state court entered a

limited decision in Ms. Brown’s custody case, after another

hearing at which Mr. Paris did not physically appear and in

which he was apparently not permitted to participate

remotely. The court found, in relevant part, that Mr. Paris

violated the restraining order by taking the children to

France and that, since doing so, he had denied Ms. Brown

“virtually all parenting time.” Among other things, the court

awarded Ms. Brown sole custody of the twins and largely

stripped Mr. Paris of his noncustodial parental rights

pursuant to O.R.S. 107.154. The court again referred to Mr.

Paris’s conduct as “criminal[].”

10 PARIS V. BROWN

Following the custody ruling, in March 2024, the Oregon

state court ordered Mr. Paris to appear at two hearings to

show cause why he should not be held in contempt. The

court denied Mr. Paris’s requests to appear remotely. After

Mr. Paris failed to appear at either hearing, the Oregon court

issued a bench warrant for his arrest. As far as we can tell,

the warrant remains outstanding.

C. Ms. Brown’s Alleged Abduction & Subsequent

Proceedings

A month after the warrant issued, Ms. Brown removed

the children from France without Mr. Paris’s permission and

returned them to Oregon. French authorities launched an

investigation into Ms. Brown’s actions.

Shortly thereafter, the Oregon state court entered a

default judgment against Mr. Paris, adopting its previous

limited judgment granting Ms. Brown sole custody. The

default judgment also granted Ms. Brown a dissolution of

her and Mr. Paris’s domestic partnership, while sanctioning

Mr. Paris and striking his pleadings. Mr. Paris appealed the

judgment, prompting Ms. Brown to move to dismiss the

appeal under the “fugitive disentitlement doctrine,” an

equitable doctrine that permits courts to refuse to resolve

cases or appeals initiated by fugitives from justice.

However, the Oregon Court of Appeals denied her motion.

II. Procedural & Statutory Background

In April 2024, Mr. Paris petitioned the U.S. District

Court for the twins’ return under the Hague Convention, “a

multilateral international treaty on parental kidnapping.”

Colchester v. Lazaro, 16 F.4th 712, 717 (9th Cir. 2021).

More than 100 nations, including the United States, adopted

the treaty “[t]o address the problem of international child

PARIS V. BROWN 11

abductions during domestic disputes.” Monasky v. Taglieri,

589 U.S. 68, 71 (2020). To implement the United States’

obligations under the Hague Convention, Congress enacted

the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, codified at

22 U.S.C. § 9001 et seq., which grants state and federal

courts “concurrent jurisdiction . . . over petitions arising

under the Convention.” Colchester, 16 F.4th at 717.

“Under the Hague Convention, ‘a child wrongfully

removed from her country of “habitual residence” ordinarily

must be returned to that country.’” Nisbet v. Bridger, 124

F.4th 577, 583 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Monasky, 589 U.S.

at 70–71). Such removals are “wrongful if done in violation

of the custody laws of the child’s habitual residence.”

Monasky, 589 U.S. at 72. The “return remedy” is the Hague

Convention’s “central operating feature.” Abbott v. Abbott,

560 U.S. 1, 9 (2010). The remedy is “provisional,” as “it

merely ‘fixes the forum for custody proceedings’ and leaves

the merits to the country of habitual residence.” Radu v.

Shon, 62 F.4th 1165, 1169 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Monasky,

589 U.S. at 72). “Upon the child’s return, the custody

adjudication will proceed in that forum.” Monasky, 589 U.S.

at 72. Thus, “[a] court that receives a petition under the

Hague Convention may not resolve the question of who, as

between the parents, is best suited to have custody of the

child.” Cuellar v. Joyce, 596 F.3d 505, 508 (9th Cir. 2010).

This scheme is designed “to eliminate ‘any tactical

advantages gained by absconding with a child.’” Id. at 510

(quoting Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir.

2004)).

Mr. Paris’s petition pursuant to the Hague Convention

alleged that Ms. Brown “kidnapped” the twins, removed

them from France in violation of French court orders, and

smuggled them back into the United States. Mr. Paris asked

12 PARIS V. BROWN

the district court to issue an order “directing” the twins’

“prompt return” to France, which he maintains is their

“habitual residence.”

As she did with Mr. Paris’s appeal in state court, Ms.

Brown moved the district court to dismiss Mr. Paris’s Hague

Convention petition pursuant to the fugitive-disentitlement

doctrine. Mr. Paris countered that the doctrine should not

apply here, given that Ms. Brown herself abducted the

children and evaded French authorities. The district court

granted Ms. Brown’s motion and dismissed Mr. Paris’s

petition. While the court acknowledged that disentitlement

was “exceptionally harsh,” it nevertheless deemed the

sanction appropriate. Applying the test set out in Walsh v.

Walsh, 221 F.3d 204 (1st Cir. 2000), the district court

determined that Mr. Paris was a fugitive and that dismissal

was necessary to “effectuate the concerns” underlying the

doctrine. On the latter point, the district court relied on Mr.

Paris’s “history of contempt for and non-compliance with”

the Oregon state-court’s orders, leaving the federal district

court with a “firm conviction” that he “would not abide by

any adverse rulings” that the district court issued.

Appearing pro se, Mr. Paris timely appealed the district

court’s dismissal order in this Court. Ms. Brown then moved

to dismiss this appeal, too, based on the fugitive-

disentitlement doctrine. A panel of our Court denied her

motion but permitted Ms. Brown to renew the argument at

the merits stage. The panel also noted that the appointment

of pro bono counsel would be helpful in resolving the issues

presented, so the Court appointed as amicus curiae attorneys

from Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP. The

matter was heard on August 21, 2025, and was submitted the

same day.

PARIS V. BROWN 13

JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review a district court’s application of the fugitive-

disentitlement doctrine for abuse of discretion. Mastro v.

Rigby, 764 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2014). A district court

abuses its discretion “when it makes an error of law” in

applying the doctrine. Id. at 1097.

ANALYSIS

As a sanction for Mr. Paris’s contempt for Oregon state

court orders, the federal district court dismissed Mr. Paris’s

petition for the return of his children. In so doing, the district

court applied a test articulated by the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the First Circuit. But our Circuit has a test of its own,

and it required the district court to “narrowly” apply the

fugitive-disentitlement doctrine in civil cases like this one.

The court did not do so. The chief flaw in the district court’s

analysis, however, lies in its conclusion that dismissal was

“necessary” to promote the policy rationales underlying

fugitive disentitlement. We disagree. Applying the

precedents that control this dispute to the unique facts

presented, the severe sanction of disentitlement cannot be

justified. Reversal is warranted.

I. The Fugitive-Disentitlement Doctrine

A. Legal Principles

The district court dismissed Mr. Paris’s petition pursuant

to the Hague Convention on the pleadings based on the

fugitive-disentitlement doctrine. This doctrine is a

manifestation of federal courts’ “inherent power” to “protect

their proceedings and judgments in the course of discharging

their traditional responsibilities.” United States v.

Terabelian, 105 F.4th 1207, 1214 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting

14 PARIS V. BROWN

Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996)). When

the conditions justifying the doctrine exist, a court can

dismiss an action or appeal initiated by a “fugitive from

justice.” Id. (quoting Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States,

507 U.S. 234, 239 (1993)).

Over the last century, courts have articulated several

rationales supporting the doctrine. “First, the doctrine exists

to ‘prevent the entry of unenforceable judgments against

absent criminal defendants.’” Terabelian, 105 F.4th at 1214

(quoting Mastro, 764 F.3d at 1090). “Second, an appellant’s

escape ‘disentitles’ her ‘to call upon the resources of the

Court for determination of her claims’”—akin to a theory of

“abandonment or waiver.” Id. (first quoting Degen, 517 U.S.

at 824; then quoting Mastro, 764 F.3d at 1095 (cleaned up)).

“Finally, the doctrine ‘serves an important deterrent function

and advances an interest in efficient, dignified’” judicial

proceedings. Id. (quoting Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at

242).

Courts fashioned this principle to preclude criminal

defendants from appealing their sentences while

simultaneously evading capture and confinement. See, e.g.,

Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97, 97 (1876); see also

Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 239–42 (discussing the

doctrine’s history). In civil proceedings, however, the

doctrine’s policy rationales tend to have less sway, so it

“should be narrowly applied and subject to significant

scrutiny.” Mastro, 764 F.3d at 1096.

As the district court recognized, fugitive disentitlement

is “an exceptionally ‘harsh sanction,’” “disfavored” unless

the facts necessitate its application. Id. at 1096. Courts “do

not lightly impose” the doctrine, Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423

F.3d 977, 987–88 (9th Cir. 2005), and it “should be applied

PARIS V. BROWN 15

only in exceptional circumstances” warranting dismissal.

Terabelian, 105 F.4th at 1217.

These are key instructions from the Supreme Court’s

unanimous decision in Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820

(1996), reversing summary judgment for the government in

a civil-forfeiture action. Id. at 821–22. There, the defendant

sought to oppose the action while concurrently refusing to

return to the United States and face charges for drug crimes

and money laundering. Id. Despite the Court’s “disquiet at

the . . . defendant reposing in Switzerland, beyond the reach

of our criminal courts, while at the same time mailing papers

to the court in a related civil action and expecting them to be

honored,” the Court held the district court’s power to

extinguish the defendant’s right to challenge his property’s

forfeiture “limited by the necessity giving rise to its

exercise.” Id. at 828–29. While the government had an

interest in preventing the defendant from exploiting the

broad scope of civil discovery to gain an “improper

advantage in the criminal matter,” this concern presented no

“necessity” justifying “the harsh sanction” of disentitlement.

Id. at 826–27. Rather, the district court had “alternative

means” of protecting the government’s interests, such as

discovery sanctions. Id.

On our most recent occasion to consider the doctrine, we

set out “three critical questions” that courts in this Circuit

must answer “in determining whether to apply the doctrine.”

Terabelian, 105 F.4th at 1217. “First, is the appeal a direct

criminal appeal?” Id. If not, the doctrine “should be

narrowly applied.” Id. (citing Mastro, 764 F.3d at 1096).

Second, was the alleged fugitive in fact “a fugitive during

the pendency” of the action at issue? Id. (quotations and

alterations omitted). “And third, do the traditional

justifications of abandonment, deterrence, dignity of the

16 PARIS V. BROWN

courts, efficiency, and enforceability support dismissal?” Id.

(citing Degen, 517 U.S. at 824; Mastro, 764 F.3d at 1095).

Courts must address these questions in view of “the totality

of the circumstances.” United States v. Van Cauwenberghe,

934 F.2d 1048, 1055 (9th Cir. 1991).

B. Application

Rather than applying Terabelian’s three-part test, the

district court applied the First Circuit’s similar but not

identical test from Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204 (1st Cir.

2000). One key difference is that Terabelian first queries

whether the proceeding is a “direct criminal appeal,” as that

context is the fugitive-disentitlement doctrine’s heartland.

105 F.4th at 1217. Where—as here—the matter is not a

criminal appeal, the doctrine “should be narrowly applied

and subject to significant scrutiny.” Id.; Mastro, 764 F.3d at

1096. There is no dispute that Mr. Paris’s petition under the

Hague Convention is civil in nature. Although the district

court recognized the doctrine’s limited application in civil

matters, the court does not appear to have accorded this

factor much, if any, weight. Our precedents require more.

See Mastro, 764 F.3d at 1096; Terabelian, 105 F.4th at 1217.

Terabelian’s second prong asks whether the party

against whom disentitlement is sought “was a fugitive”

during the relevant action’s pendency. 105 F.4th at 1217.

This inquiry aligns with the first Walsh factor, which the

district held to support dismissal. 3 We take no position on

3

In making this determination, the district court relied on Mr. Paris’s

failure to return to Oregon and resolve the outstanding arrest warrant.

Mr. Paris contends that conclusion was erroneous, and amicus curiae

likewise argues that Mr. Paris was not a “fugitive” because he left the

country before the warrant issued, has not been charged with a crime,

and his whereabouts are well-known. For her part, Ms. Brown maintains

PARIS V. BROWN 17

the matter, as we can resolve this appeal without determining

whether Mr. Paris qualified as a “fugitive” for purposes of

fugitive disentitlement. Assuming without deciding that he

qualified, Mr. Paris is still entitled to reversal because of the

district court’s answer to the third “critical question.”

That question, Terabelian directs, is whether the

fugitive-disentitlement doctrine’s traditional justifications of

enforceability, efficiency, dignity of the courts, deterrence,

and abandonment necessitate dismissal. 105 F.4th at 1217.

This prong approximates the third Walsh factor that the

district court analyzed and again held to support

disentitlement. But rather than considering how caselaw has

elucidated and applied these factors, the district court relied

heavily on two out-of-circuit cases that it regarded as

factually analogous: the Virginia Supreme Court’s opinion

in Sasson v. Shenhar, 667 S.E.2d 555 (Va. 2008) and the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in

Pesin v. Rodriguez, 244 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2001). For

reasons we explain below, both cases are distinguishable on

the facts. And, contrary to the district court’s conclusion,

disentitlement was not necessary to vindicate any of these

five interests.

1. Enforceability

The first traditional justification courts have offered for

disentitling fugitives is that courts should generally seek to

“avoid making decisions that could not be enforced.”

Antonio-Martinez v. INS, 317 F.3d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir.

2003) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 300 F.3d 1048,

that Mr. Paris is a fugitive because he fled Oregon in violation of the

restraining order and remains there despite the outstanding warrant. The

panel has no occasion to resolve this dispute because, for the reasons

below, it will not change the outcome.

18 PARIS V. BROWN

1051 (9th Cir. 2002)). These concerns are at their pinnacle

when a fugitive’s whereabouts are unknown. “[S]o long as

the party cannot be found, the judgment on review may be

impossible to enforce.” Degen, 517 U.S. at 824; see also

Antonio-Martinez, 317 F.3d at 1093 (“Because no one has

any clue where Antonio-Martinez is, his petition has the

same ‘heads I win, tails you’ll never find me’ quality that

justifies disentitlement in other contexts.”).

This case poses no risk of thrusting Ms. Brown into the

sort of lose-lose scenario that the “enforceability” factor

aims to prevent. Both she and the district court know exactly

where Mr. Paris is located: he remains in Paris, France,

where he regularly communicates with both the state and

federal courts presiding over his matters. To our knowledge,

he has taken no measures to conceal his whereabouts. More

fundamentally, Mr. Paris’s absence from Oregon is no

impediment to carrying out an adverse judgment on his

petition. The twins are currently in Oregon with their

mother. As a result, an order denying Mr. Paris’s petition on

the merits, thus rejecting his request to order the twins’

return to France, would simply retain the status quo. The

“enforceability” prong thus lends Ms. Brown no assistance.

See Mastro, 764 F.3d at 1096 n.5 (“[T]he record does not

suggest that Linda’s absence impedes the enforcement of a

judgment against her.”); cf. Degen, 517 U.S. at 825 (no

“enforceability” concern in civil-forfeiture matter “[s]ince

the court’s jurisdiction over the property [was] secure

despite Degen’s absence”). 4

4

While Mr. Paris’s foreign residence might at first glance seem to raise

enforceability concerns, that is the norm in Hague Convention cases. To

some extent, “all cases under the Convention raise [enforceability]

problems since, by definition, one of the parties lives in a foreign

PARIS V. BROWN 19

The district court identified “the unenforceability of

judgment” as one of the disentitlement doctrine’s policy

rationales but did not proceed to analyze the issue or

consider the lack of enforceability problem here. Ms.

Brown, however, contends that Mr. Paris’s absence from

Oregon might jeopardize the district court’s enforcement of

“other potential case rulings,” such as an order “to appear in

person at trial” or an “order requiring Mr. Paris to produce

discovery.” Perhaps, but such hypothetical, downstream

concerns do not require dismissal. Just as the district court

in Degen had “alternative means” of preventing the alleged

fugitive from abusing civil discovery, 517 U.S. at 827, the

district court here would also have alternate means of

enforcing such orders. At the current posture, however,

disentitlement is not required to further any legitimate

interest Ms. Brown has in preventing enforceability

problems.

2. Efficiency

The “efficiency” factor does not support dismissal either.

This factor considers mostly whether the alleged fugitive’s

flight or absence has stymied or delayed the operation of the

courts. See, e.g., Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 245;

Terabelian, 105 F.4th at 1217. It generally supports

dismissal where the fugitive’s absence gives rise to a “flurry

of extraneous matters,” such as extensive efforts to recapture

the fugitive, and thereby requires the court to “divert its

attention from the merits of the case before it.” Ortega-

Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 245 (quotations omitted); see

Terabelian, 105 F.4th at 1217 (“efficiency” prong favored

jurisdiction.” See Walsh, 221 F.3d at 216. What matters here is that, on

the record presented, dismissal is not necessary to address any concerns

about enforcing an adverse judgment against Mr. Paris.

20 PARIS V. BROWN

dismissal where the government went great lengths and

expended substantial resources to locate and extradite

defendant while her appeal sat pending).

In assessing this factor, courts tend to consider the

prejudice to the party seeking disentitlement, if any. See

Degen, 517 U.S. at 825 (holding there was “no risk” of

“delay or frustration in determining the merits of the

government’s forfeiture claims” because the court possessed

the subject property); United States v. Sudthisa-Ard, 17 F.3d

1205, 1207 (9th Cir. 1994) (dismissing appeal where

defendant’s “thirteen years as a fugitive” between conviction

and appeal caused loss and destruction of evidence,

precluding the government from retrying case in the event of

reversal).

This case raises none of those concerns. Mr. Paris’s

absence has not delayed or frustrated the district court

proceedings. Nor has it prompted Ms. Brown or the court to

expend resources tracking him down. Again, his location is

known to all stakeholders. Nor is this a case where the

alleged fugitive’s physical absence will thwart the

proceedings—as mentioned, a Hague Convention

petitioner’s absence from the venue state is common to such

proceedings. See Walsh, 221 F.3d at 216.

The district court reasoned that Mr. Paris’s “past conduct

shows a willingness to frustrate the resolution of the merits

of claims by flight if he senses that the rulings will not go his

way.” Yet Mr. Paris is already in France—he is not capable

of “frustrat[ing]” the proceedings “by flight.” In the event

he disregards future orders by the district court, the court will

have a variety of less severe measures at its disposal to

manage its proceedings and sanction Mr. Paris, if necessary.

PARIS V. BROWN 21

But on the current record, concerns over the court’s efficient

operation do not merit disentitlement.

Ms. Brown asserts that Mr. Paris’s “fugitive status”

places him “entirely beyond judicial control, thus creating a

situation severely prejudicial” to her. Yet beyond predicting

that Mr. Paris will ignore adverse decisions by the district

court, she fails to substantiate this point. Nor can we foresee

much, if any, prejudice to Ms. Brown should her prediction

prove true because, again, she currently has custody of both

children. Cf. Degen, 517 U.S. at 825. Next, Ms. Brown

contends this case is an “extraneous” matter, diverting

courts’ “attention from the merits of the parties’ custody

battle in Oregon state courts.” She is mistaken. This is not

the sort of “extraneous” matter that courts hold to support

dismissal. Far from an extradition proceeding undertaken by

government officials for the purpose of recapturing the

fugitive, Terabelian, 105 F.4th at 1217, Mr. Paris initiated

this case himself under a treaty that seeks to facilitate the

return of children wrongfully removed from their home

country. Nisbet, 124 F.4th at 583. His petition has little, if

anything, to do with his alleged fugitive status. That the

petition and the parties’ custody dispute in Oregon involve

an overlapping corpus of facts does not render the former

“extraneous” for fugitive-disentitlement purposes.

3. Dignity

The indignity visited upon the judicial system by Mr.

Paris cannot support disentitlement either. This factor,

together with deterrence (discussed below), are undoubtedly

“substantial” interests. Degen, 517 U.S. at 828. But as the

district court recognized, the U.S. Supreme Court has made

clear that “disentitlement is too blunt an instrument for

advancing them” on their own. Id. The court thus did “not

22 PARIS V. BROWN

rely upon” the interest in judicial dignity “in reaching its

determination,” though, it nonetheless deemed the factor

“implicated in the present case.” Under the circumstances

presented, we conclude that it does not support

disentitlement either.

An affront to the court’s dignity supports disentitlement

where the fugitive flouts the judicial authority of the court

contemplating disentitlement. See Ortega-Rodriguez, 507

U.S. at 245–46; Mastro, 764 F.3d at 1096. At first blush it

might seem odd that a fugitive’s contempt for one court is

insufficient for another to apply the doctrine, but the

Supreme Court has made this point crystal clear and

explained its thinking. In Ortega-Rodriguez, the Court

concluded that an appellate court could not disentitle a

defendant based on his “contemptuous disrespect” directed

at a trial court before initiating appeal. 507 U.S. at 245–46.

The Court reasoned that only the court whose authority the

fugitive disrespected has the power “to defend its own

dignity, by sanctioning an act of defiance that occurred

solely within its domain.” Id. at 246.

We similarly affirmed in Mastro that, under the facts

presented, “disregard for the authority of a different court

[did] not constitute a ‘necessity’ capable of ‘justifying the

rule of disentitlement’” 764 F.3d at 1096–97 (district court

erred in holding that dignity interests supported dismissal

where defendant flouted authority of criminal court but not

the bankruptcy court whose order was on appeal (alterations

omitted)). Our sister circuits likewise hold that if the court

applying the disentitlement remedy is not the one whose

authority the fugitive flouted, the court’s interest in judicial

dignity is usually insufficient to justify such a severe

sanction. See United States v. Anagnos, 853 F.2d 1, 2 (1st

Cir. 1988); Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 288 F. App’x 800, 803 (3d

PARIS V. BROWN 23

Cir. 2008); March v. Levine, 249 F.3d 462, 470 (6th Cir.

2001).

This limitation applies here. Mr. Paris never defied the

district court, which is the court that ultimately disentitled

him of his right to petition under the Hague Convention.

Instead, he disrespected and disregarded the Oregon state

court by violating its restraining order and refusing to

address the bench warrant it issued. While we in no way

condone Mr. Paris’s behavior, precedent compels the

conclusion that disentitlement cannot rest on a general

interest in respect for judicial dignity. Ortega-Rodriguez,

507 U.S. at 246; Mastro, 764 F.3d at 1096. That rings

especially true here, since the Oregon Court of Appeals,

which heard Mr. Paris’s appeal of the Oregon state court’s

orders, declined to apply disentitlement.

4. Deterrence

As just explained, the court’s interest in deterring escape

is inadequate by itself to justify disentitlement. Degen, 517

U.S. at 828. And as with the “dignity” factor, the district

court regarded the “deterrence” factor “implicated” in this

case but did not predicate its dismissal order on it.

In any event, the court’s interest in deterrence here is

weak to nonexistent. This factor aims to discourage

fugitives from evading the “reach of the law,” as the

“prospect of disentitlement provides a strong incentive to

maintain contact” with the relevant authorities. Antonio-

Martinez, 317 F.3d at 1092–93. Like the “dignity” factor, a

court’s interest in deterring flight is at its peak where the

fugitive has evaded the authority of the court considering

disentitlement. See Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 247

(“Once jurisdiction has vested in the appellate court, . . . then

any deterrent to escape must flow from appellate

24 PARIS V. BROWN

consequences, and dismissal may be an appropriate sanction

by which to deter. Until that time, however, the district court

is quite capable of defending its own jurisdiction.”). Here,

Mr. Paris is “maintain[ing] contact” with the relevant

authorities, and, again, there is no evidence that he has

offended the district court’s authority. Rather, Ms. Brown

argues only that he violated and ignored orders by the

Oregon state court.

Other courts suggest the deterrence factor seeks to

discourage “flight from criminal prosecution” by not only

the defendant, but “others,” too. Degen, 517 U.S. at 828; see

also Terabelian, 105 F.4th at 1217 (holding that deterrence

favored dismissal of direct criminal appeal by fugitive who

evaded the government for six months while her appeal sat

pending because, among other things, disentitlement would

“deter similar behavior by future defendants”).

But this consideration does not help Ms. Brown. While

we acknowledge that affirming dismissal here might have

some slight value in discouraging would-be transgressors

from violating restraining orders or ignoring bench warrants

in the future, this factor alone is insufficient to support

dismissal. Degen, 517 U.S. at 828. Moreover, the only

binding case we identified relying on a broad interest in

general deterrence, rather than an interest in deterring the

specific litigant at bar, arose from a direct criminal appeal.

Terabelian, 105 F.4th at 1217; see also United States v.

Awadalla, 357 F.3d 243, 246–47 (2d Cir. 2004) (dismissing

criminal appeal in part to “deter similarly situated parties

from absconding”). This case, by contrast, is a civil matter,

where fugitive-disentitlement doctrine “should be narrowly

applied.” Terabelian, 105 F.4th at 1217 (quoting Mastro,

764 F.3d at 1096).

PARIS V. BROWN 25

5. Abandonment

Next is the issue of abandonment. This prong is based

on the view that a fugitive should not be permitted to “‘call

upon the resources of the [c]ourt’ whose very authority he is

flouting.” Mastro, 764 F.3d at 1095 (quoting Molinaro v.

New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970) (per curiam)). The

principle approximates a theory of “abandonment or

waiver.” Id.; see Parretti v. United States, 143 F.3d 508, 511

(9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (“By fleeing the jurisdiction of the

United States” while his appeal was pending, “Parretti

forfeited his right to appellate review under the fugitive

disentitlement doctrine.”).

This factor is of little importance here. Again, Mr. Paris

seeks to invoke the power of the federal courts, not the

Oregon state courts whose authority he flouted. Nor did he

initiate this action until after he returned to France. Unlike

a criminal defendant who flees the country during the

pendency of his appeal, see, e.g., Parretti, 143 F.3d at 511,

Mr. Paris cannot be said to have abandoned or waived his

right to seek relief under the Hague Convention—relief he

did not seek until after departing from Oregon.

6. Other Considerations

In evaluating whether the traditional justifications

necessitate disentitlement, the Supreme Court has also

considered the rights that the defendant seeks to vindicate.

Noting the doctrine’s severity, the Degen Court observed

that the defendant there had a “right” to “defend his

property” against forfeiture—a “corollary to the plaintiff’s

right to sue.” 517 U.S. at 828 (citing McVeigh v. United

States, 78 U.S. 259, 267 (1870)).

26 PARIS V. BROWN

Our sister circuits have likewise considered, in this very

context, the rights at stake when assessing the propriety of

disentitlement. The First Circuit’s decision in Walsh v.

Walsh involved an Irish petitioner who sought his children’s

return from Massachusetts under the Hague Convention,

despite an outstanding arrest warrant there. 221 F.3d at 208–

09. Affirming the district court’s order rejecting

disentitlement, the court stated that “applying the fugitive

disentitlement doctrine would impose too severe a sanction

in a case involving parental rights.” Id. at 216. The court

continued: “Parenthood is one of the greatest joys and

privileges of life, and, under the Constitution, parents have a

fundamental interest in their relationships with their

children.” Id. (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)

(plurality)). Barring “a parent who has lost a child from even

arguing that the child was wrongfully removed to another

country,” the court observed, was simply “too harsh” on the

facts presented. Id. The Sixth Circuit reached the same

conclusion when it held that, considering the “fundamental

rights at issue” in a matter arising under the Hague

Convention, “disentitlement will generally be too harsh a

sanction.” March, 249 F.3d at 470.

We agree that the parental rights at stake in cases brought

under the Hague Convention, as well as the treaty’s unique

and important goals and purposes, counsel caution before a

court extinguishes a fugitive’s right to seek the return of his

or her children. 5 This factor, too, undermines the district

court’s decision.

5

We decline to address Mr. Paris’s contention that fugitive

disentitlement is wholesale “inapplicable” to the Hague Convention. As

amicus curiae aptly explained at oral argument, this case can be decided

on narrower grounds.

PARIS V. BROWN 27

* * *

All told, the district court abused its discretion by

dismissing Mr. Paris’s petition based on the fugitive-

disentitlement doctrine. See Mastro, 764 F.3d at 1096–97

(district court abused discretion by committing an “error of

law” when it applied the fugitive-disentitlement doctrine

contrary to Degen). Perhaps “[t]here would be a measure of

rough justice” in requiring Mr. Paris to “take the bitter with

the sweet,” such that he must “participate” in judicial

proceedings “for all purposes or none.” Degen, 517 U.S. at

829. But like in Degen, “the justice would be too rough,” as

“[t]here was no necessity to justify the rule of

disentitlement.” 6 Id. Such justice would be “particularly

rough” in this case, given that “parental rights are at stake.”

Walsh, 221 F.3d at 216.

The district court’s reliance on out-of-circuit authorities

does not merit a different outcome. Neither the Virginia

Supreme Court’s decision in Sasson nor the Eleventh

Circuit’s decision in Pesin can countermand binding

precedents like Degen, Ortega-Rodriguez, Mastro, and

Terabelian, which establish the framework governing

assertions of fugitive disentitlement. The facts in Sasson,

moreover, presented a much stronger case for applying the

doctrine than the facts here. Most importantly, the parent

barred from appealing the denial of his Hague Petition

remained abroad with his child, thus “clearly interfer[ing]

with [the other parent’s] parental rights.” 667 S.E.2d at 564.

The disentitled parent had also repeatedly defied “the same

judicial system” that ordered disentitlement—namely, the

6

For the same reason, Ms. Brown’s renewed motion to dismiss Mr.

Paris’s appeal in this Court under the fugitive-disentitlement doctrine is

denied.

28 PARIS V. BROWN

Virginia state courts. See id. at 560. Both facts were

likewise present in Pesin. See 244 F.3d at 1253. Precedent

renders both facts significant, see Degen, 517 U.S. at 825;

Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 245–46; Mastro, 764 F.3d at

1096 & n.5, and yet neither exist in this case.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we reverse the district court’s

order dismissing Mr. Paris’s petition under the Hague

Convention. We remand this matter to the district court to

adjudicate Mr. Paris’s petition on the merits. 7

REVERSED and REMANDED. 8

7

Mr. Paris’s request that we “[d]irectly resolve” his Hague Convention

petition is denied. So too are his similar requests that we “make findings

of fact” or “order relief without remand.” We appreciate that Mr. Paris

wishes to expedite the process given his separation from his children; but

we know of no authority granting this Court jurisdiction to resolve his

petition in the first instance, and Mr. Paris has provided us none. We

express no opinion on the merits of Mr. Paris’s petition.

8

Each side shall bear its own costs on appeal.