Bryceland v. The City of New York

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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MARTA BRYCELAND,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

24-CV-6203 (EK)(SDE)

-against-

THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COUNTY OF

RICHMOND, OFFICER MICHAEL MASULLO,

OFFICER JAMES BURNS, JOHN DOE NOS.

1-3, and THOMAS GUT,

Defendants.

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ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:

Marta Bryceland brings this action against the City of

New York, the County of Richmond, several officers of the City

and the New York Police Department, and her former romantic

partner. She alleges that, while attempting to visit her

daughter in Staten Island, officers unlawfully arrested her and

used excessive force against her. She brings federal claims

under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Racketeering Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), and Title 18 of the United

States Code. She also brings a state-law negligence claim.

Bryceland has moved to proceed in forma pauperis.

That motion is granted. Bryceland’s Section 1983 claims for

excessive force and false imprisonment against Officers Masullo

and Burns, as well as her state-law negligence claim against the

City and a Jane Doe 911 operator, may proceed. All other claims

are dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Background

The following factual allegations are drawn from the

complaint, and are presumed true for purposes of this order.

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

This case arises from a custodial dispute between

Bryceland and her former partner (Thomas Gut), with whom she

shares a daughter. On August 24, 2021, Bryceland contacted

Gut’s partner and asked to visit her daughter in Staten Island.

Compl. ¶ 32, ECF No. 1. The partner refused permission. Id.

Bryceland believed that this refusal violated her custodial

rights. Id. ¶ 33. After failing to reach her daughter by

phone, Bryceland called 911 and requested that police officers

perform a “wellness check.” Id. ¶ 34. The 911 operator told

Bryceland that when the police car arrived, she should follow it

to a street corner near Gut’s house. Id. ¶¶ 37-38. Once there,

she could file an “incident report” with the officers for

“custodial interference and child abuse.” Id. ¶ 38.

Bryceland obeyed these instructions. Id. ¶ 39. When

she reached the designated street corner, Officers Burns and

Massulo approached her car and asked for her keys. Id. ¶¶ 39-

40. They did not say that she had committed a crime, or that

they were arresting her. Id. ¶ 41. They did, however, insist

that Bryceland hand over her keys. Id. ¶¶ 40-42. When

Bryceland asked why, Officer Burns answered: “Because I said

so.” Id. ¶ 42.

Bryceland tried to drive away. Id. ¶ 44. Burns then

drew his weapon, jumped in front of the car, and pointed it at

her head. Id. Meanwhile, Massulo “attempt[ed] to pull [her] by

her left arm” from the vehicle. Id. Bryceland suffered

“significant injuries” during this encounter. Id. The officers

took her to a hospital, where they “shackled [her] to a hospital

bed” and denied her access to the restroom. Id. ¶ 47. While at

the hospital, Massulo allegedly stole medical records in which

an unnamed police captain had provided Bryceland the ”complaint

number for [a] substantiated complaint for abuse of force.” Id.

Bryceland filed this lawsuit on August 23, 2024.

Legal Standard

A complaint must plead facts sufficient to “state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550

U.S. at 570.1 The Court must accept the truth of “well-pleaded,

nonconclusory factual allegations,” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch

Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir. 2010), but it need not

1 Unless otherwise noted, when quoting judicial decisions this order

accepts all alterations and omits all citations, footnotes, and internal

quotation marks.

accept “legal conclusions” as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009).

A pro se complaint should be liberally construed.

Ceara v. Deacon, 916 F.3d 208, 213 (2d Cir. 2019). But an

unrepresented plaintiff is not exempt from “compliance with

relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Traguth v.

Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983).

A district court will dismiss an in forma pauperis

action when the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii)

fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii)

seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The court may also

permit some claims to go forward. Importantly, however, an

“initial [Section 1915] screening decision permitting some

claims to proceed does not amount to a judicial imprimatur

endorsing the validity of those claims.” Hendrix v. Pactiv LLC,

488 F. Supp. 3d 43, 51 (W.D.N.Y. 2020) (collecting similar

cases). Those claims are still subject to a later motion to

dismiss or for summary judgment. Id.

Discussion

Invoking the court’s federal-question and diversity

jurisdiction, Bryceland brings eighteen claims for relief. All

but two of them must be dismissed.

A. The Title 18 Claims

Bryceland brings six claims (Claims 3, 7, 13, and 15-

17) under provisions of Title 18 — the federal criminal code.2

But it is “a truism . . . that in our federal system crimes are

always prosecuted by the Federal Government, not . . . by

private complaints.” Conn. Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating

Co., 457 F.2d 81, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1972). “Title 18 . . . does

not provide a private cause of action unless the specific

statute includes an express or implied private right of action.”

Aaron v. United States, No. 24-CV-387, 2025 WL 1029263, at *1

(D. Conn. Mar. 21, 2025). None of the statutes invoked by

Bryceland provides such a right. So, the six Title 18 claims

must be dismissed.

B. The RICO Claim

Bryceland also alleges that the defendants violated

RICO (Claim 2). Compl. 23-26. She does not specify a

particular RICO provision, but in any event, she ultimately

lacks “RICO standing” to bring a claim under that statute.

Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 266 (2d Cir. 2006).3

2 Specifically, Bryceland invokes 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 (conspiracy against

rights), 242 (deprivation of rights under color of law), 351(e) (assault on

federal officials), 1018 (false statement in an official certificate or

writing), 1509 (obstruction of justice), and 1512 (witness tampering). See

Compl. 26-28, 32, 40-41, 46-53.

3 The Court follows the lead of the Second Circuit in referring to this

doctrine as “RICO standing.” Denney, 443 F.3d at 266. We note, however,

that “RICO standing” governs whether a plaintiff has a valid RICO claim, not

whether the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear that claim. Id.

RICO creates a cause of action for any person “injured

in his [or her] business or property by reason of a violation of

[S]ection 1962” of that statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). For its

part, Section 1962 prohibits (1) investing income derived from a

“pattern of racketeering activity” into an enterprise that

affects interstate or foreign commerce; (2) using a “pattern of

racketeering activity” to acquire interest in or control of an

enterprise that affects interstate or foreign commerce; (3)

using a “pattern of racketeering activity” to conduct or

participate in the activities of an enterprise that affects

interstate or foreign or commerce; and (4) conspiring to perform

any of the aforementioned activities. 18 U.S.C. § 1962. A

“pattern of racketeering activity” requires “at least two acts

of racketeering activity within ten years after the commission

of a prior act of racketeering activity.” City of New York v.

LaserShip, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d 303, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).

To state a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must plead

(1) a violation of Section 1962, (2) an “injury to the

plaintiff’s business or property,” and (3) “causation of the

injury by the defendant’s violation.” Lerner v. Fleet Bank,

N.A., 318 F.3d 113, 120 (2d Cir. 2003). Bryceland has not

And the Supreme Court has counseled that it is “misleading” to use the word

“standing” to refer to doctrines that “d[o] not implicate subject-matter

jurisdiction, i.e., the court’s statutory or constitutional power to

adjudicate the case.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components,

Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128 n.4 (2014).

pleaded a violation of Section 1962. She adduces no facts

suggesting that any defendant was involved in any racketeering

activity, let alone a pattern of such activity. Accordingly,

she lacks “RICO standing” and her claim must be dismissed. Id.

C. The ADA Title II Claim

Bryceland brings a claim under Title II of the ADA

(Claim 18). To state a viable Title II claim, a plaintiff must

allege that (1) she has a disability, (2) “she was excluded from

participation in a public entity’s services, programs or

activities or was otherwise discriminated against by a public

entity,” and (3) “such exclusion or discrimination was due to

her disability.” Fulton v. Goord, 591 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir.

2009)

Bryceland fails to satisfy this standard. She alleges

only that the officers’ conduct “triggered her Post Traumatic

Stress Disorder.” Compl. ¶ 180. At the outset, this allegation

does not state a cognizable disability. Bryceland offers no

details about the nature or duration of her PTSD, and courts

“regularly dismiss [ADA claims] that do not specify the nature,

duration, or frequency of a disabling condition.” Papaliberios

v. Mt. Sinai Health Sys., Inc., No. 23-CV-8661, 2025 WL 964114,

at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025) (collecting cases). But even if

we assume, arguendo, that Bryceland has pleaded a cognizable

disability, the claim still fails. Bryceland never alleges that

the City discriminated against her because of her PTSD — only

that the officers’ conduct aggravated that condition. She

therefore does not satisfy the third pleading requirement

either. The ADA claim is dismissed.

D. The Section 1985 Claim

Bryceland also brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985

(Claim 1), which broadly prohibits conspiracies to violate civil

rights. To plead a Section 1985 claim, a plaintiff must allege

“(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either

directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the

equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and

immunities under the laws; [and] (3) an act in furtherance of

the conspiracy[,] (4) whereby a person is either injured in his

person or property or deprived of any right of privilege of a

citizen of the United States.” Julian v. N.Y. City Transit

Auth., 857 F. Supp. 242, 252 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). A complaint that

contains only “conclusory, vague, or general allegations of

conspiracy to deprive a person of constitutional rights” will

not avoid dismissal. Leon v. Murphy, 988 F.2d 303, 311 (2d Cir.

1993).

Bryceland pleads no facts supporting the existence of

a conspiracy. She relies entirely on conclusory assertions that

certain defendants conspired with each other. See, e.g., Compl.

¶¶ 45-46, 64. And conspiracy allegations are “baseless” when a

plaintiff does not offer “a single fact to corroborate her

allegation of a meeting of the minds among the conspirators.”

Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364, 369 (2d Cir. 2011). So, the

Section 1985 claim must be dismissed.

D. The Section 1983 Claims

Bryceland’s remaining federal claims fall under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 (Claims 4-6, 8-11, and 14). While most of these

claims must be dismissed, two may proceed as against Officers

Burns and Masullo.

Three clarifying points are necessary at the outset.

First, no Section 1983 claim may proceed against Gut.

An alleged Section 1983 violation must be “fairly attributable

to the state.” Cranley v. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. of Vermont, 318

F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 2003). But Bryceland has not alleged

that Gut acted under color of state law. Nor has she alleged

that Gut was a “private entity” whose conduct shared a “close

nexus . . . [with] that of the State itself.” Id. So, Gut is

not liable under Section 1983.

Second, no Section 1983 claim may proceed against the

City or the County. “A municipality may not be held liable

under [Section] 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor.”

Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403

(1997). Instead, a plaintiff must “identify a municipal policy

or custom that caused [her] injury.” Id. Bryceland has not

plausibly alleged the existence of any such policy or custom.

And her August 24 arrest is not enough on its own. “[I]solated

acts of excessive force by non-policymaking municipal employees

are generally not sufficient to demonstrate a municipal custom,

policy, or usage that would justify municipal liability.” Jones

v. Town of E. Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 2012).

Third, Bryceland is effectively advancing five Section

1983 claims, not eight. Bryceland twice pleads a constitutional

claim for false arrest / false imprisonment under Section 1983.

Compare Compl. 31 (Claim 6), with Compl. 35-36 (Claim 9). She

also twice pleads a constitutional claim for excessive force.

Compare Compl. 29 (Claim 5), with Compl. 33 (Claim 8).4 And she

pleads a generic claim for violation of her “civil rights,”

without specifying which rights were violated. Compl. 28-29.

After consolidating the duplicative claims, the Court construes

the complaint as alleging claims for excessive force, false

arrest and / or wrongful imprisonment, deprivation of the right

to associate with an intimate familiar, intentional infliction

of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional

distress.

4 Bryceland labels Claims 5 and 8 as “battery” claims. But the

complaint frames both claims as arising under the Constitution. See Compl.

29, 33 (describing the claims as arising under Section 1983 and the

Fourteenth Amendment). And a constitutional claim alleging battery by a

police officer is “properly formulated as [an] excessive force claim[].”

Boyler v. City of Lackawanna, 287 F. Supp. 3d 308, 323 (W.D.N.Y. 2018).

1. Excessive Force

Bryceland’s excessive force claim may proceed as

against Officers Masullo and Burns at this stage. The claim is

dismissed as against the John / Jane Doe defendants, because

Bryceland never alleges — by name or otherwise — that anyone

other than Masullo and Burns used physical force against her.

2. False Arrest / Wrongful Imprisonment

Bryceland’s false arrest and wrongful imprisonment

claim may proceed as against Officers Masullo and Burns. The

claim is dismissed as against the John / Jane Doe defendants,

because Bryceland never alleges that anyone other than Masullo

and Burns arrested her or later confined her.

3. Deprivation of Right to Intimate Association

“The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a substantive

right under the Due Process Clause to intimate familial

association . . . .” Gorman v. Rensselaer Cnty., 910 F.3d 40,

47 (2d Cir. 2018). This right extends to the relationship

between a parent and her child. Patel v. Searles, 305 F.3d 130,

136 (2d Cir. 2002).

Bryceland has not stated a claim for deprivation of

her right to familial association. To state such a claim,

Bryceland must (among other things) plausibly allege that a

state actor “specifically intended to interfere with [her]

family relationship.” Gorman, 910 F.3d at 48. She has not done

so. To be sure, she offers the conclusory assertion that the

defendants conspired “with a clear goal to deprive [her] of the

relationship with her only child.” Compl. ¶ 146. But she

alleges no facts suggesting that any defendant specifically

intended to end her relationship with her daughter by arresting

and hospitalizing her.

4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

“There is no recognized claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress under [S]ection 1983.” Blanco

v. Success Acad. Charter Sch., Inc., 722 F. Supp. 3d 187, 216

n.19 (S.D.N.Y. 2024); accord Love v. Riverhead Cent. Sch. Dist.,

823 F. Supp. 2d 193, 199 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (describing it as

“well-settled” that “a cause of action may not be asserted

pursuant to Section 1983 for emotional distress”). This claim

therefore fails.

5. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

“Mere negligence is insufficient as a matter of law to

state a claim under Section 1983.” Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d

123, 145 (2d Cir. 2002). So, Bryceland’s Section 1983 claim for

negligent infliction of emotional distress also fails. See,

e.g., Anderson v. City of New York, No. 13-CV-1745, 2013 WL

6182675, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2013).

D. The State-Law Negligence Claim

Finally, Bryceland brings a state-law negligence claim

(Claim 12) against the City, the officers, and the Jane Doe 911

operator. That claim may not proceed either.

“When a negligence claim is asserted against a

municipality or its employees, the threshold inquiry is whether

the municipal entity . . . acted in a governmental capacity at

the time the claim arose.” Velez v. City of New York, 730 F.3d

128, 134 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Applewhite v. Accuhealth, Inc.,

995 N.E.2d 131, 134 (N.Y. 2013)). This threshold is easily

surmounted: police officers and emergency responders fulfill

“quintessential” government functions. Id.; see also Maldonado

v. Town of Greenburgh, 460 F. Supp. 3d 382, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

So, the “next inquiry focuses on the extent to which

the municipality owed a special duty to the injured party.”

Applewhite, 995 N.E.2d at 135. Such a duty arises:

(1) when the municipality violates a statutory duty

enacted for the benefit of a particular class of persons;

(2) when it voluntarily assumes a duty that generates

justifiable reliance by the person who benefits from the

duty; or (3) when the municipality assumes positive

direction and control in the face of a known, blatant[,]

and dangerous safety violation.

Metz v. State of New York, 982 N.E.2d 76, 79 (N.Y. 2012).5

While the existence of a special duty is ordinarily a jury

5 A special duty can alternatively arise via a “special relationship,”

which requires “(1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or

question, a court may dismiss a complaint where a plaintiff

“fails to allege or provide the factual predicate for a

special relationship in the complaint.” Maldonado, 460 F.

Supp. 3d at 400.

That is the case here. Bryceland has not alleged

that the City or its employees owed her a special duty.

Nor has she alleged any facts that might support the

existence of one. Nothing in the complaint suggests that

the City violated a statutory duty enacted for the benefit

of persons like Bryceland; that it voluntarily assumed a

duty toward her that engendered justifiable reliance on her

part; that it assumed positive control in the face of known

safety violation; or that it assumed any affirmative duty

to act on Bryceland’s behalf. Accordingly, the negligence

claim must be dismissed.

Furthermore, Bryceland may not bring a negligence

claim against Officers Masullo and Burns, because it cannot

coexist with her allegations of excessive force and false

arrest. Courts in this circuit have held that “when a

plaintiff’s factual allegations are only consistent with a

actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was

injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality's agents that inaction

could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the

municipality's agents and the injured party; and (4) that party's justifiable

reliance on the municipality's affirmative undertaking.” Applewhite, 995

N.E.2d at 138.

theory of intentional, or perhaps reckless, conduct, negligence

claims must be dismissed.” Lozada v. Weilminster, 92 F. Supp.

3d 76, 107 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). That rule applies here. “If the

officer [d]efendants were not acting as reasonable officers

should — i.e., using excessive force or seizing [Bryceland]

without probable cause — they will be liable for intentional

torts, not negligence.” Benbow v. City of New York, No. 17-CV-

6457, 2024 WL 5165073, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2024) (quoting

Rizk v. City of New York, 462 F. Supp. 3d 203, 229 (E.D.N.Y.

2020)); accord Antonious v. Muhammad, 250 A.D.2d 559, 559-60 (2d

Dep’t 1998).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Bryceland’s Section 1983

claims for excessive force and false arrest may proceed against

Officers Burns and Masullo. All other claims are dismissed.

No summons shall issue as to the County, the City, the

Jane / John Doe defendants, or Thomas Gut. The Clerk of Court

is respectfully directed to (1) correct the caption to reflect

those defendants’ dismissal; (2) issue a summons against

Officers Burns and Masullo; and (3) mail a copy of this order to

the plaintiff and note the mailing on the docket. The United

States Marshals Service is respectfully directed to serve the

complaint and this order on Officers Burns and Masullo without

prepayment of fees. A copy of this order shall also be served

on the Special Federal Litigation Division of the Office of the

Corporation Counsel.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)

that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good

faith, and accordingly denies in forma pauperis status for

purposes of an appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438,

444-45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Eric Komitee

ERIC KOMITEE

United State

s District Judge

D ated: September 29, 2025

Brooklyn, New York