KELLEY v. REYES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ERIC KELLEY,

Plaintiff, No. 2:19-cv-17911 (WJM)

v.

RICHARD REYES, LORI HILLAS AS

EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF LOUIS

STELL, ROBERT SMITH, ESTATE OF

MICHAEL FINER, ALEX NIEVES, PETER □

IURATO, TIMOTHY JORDAN, RAYMOND

REID, ALBERT CLARK, in their individual

capacities, RICHARD MUNSEY and

VINCENT AMORESANO, in their official

capacities, and THE CITY OF PATERSON,

Defendants,

RALPH LEE,

Plaintiff, No. 2:19-cv-17936 (WIM)

v.

ALBERT CLARK, ESTATE OF MICHAEL OPINION

FINER, PETER IURATO, TIMOTHY

JORDAN, ALEX NIEVES, RAYMOND

REID, RICHARD REYES, ROBERT

SMITH, LORI HILLAS AS EXECUTOR

OF THE ESTATE OF LOUIS STELL, and

JOHN DOES #1-10, in their individual

capacities, RICHARD MUNSEY and

VINCENT AMORESANO, in their official

capacities, and THE CITY OF PATERSON,

Defendants.

WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.:

In this civil rights action, Plaintiffs Eric Kelley and Ralph Lee, Jr. (“Plaintiffs”),

Defendant Raymond Reid, and Defendant City of Paterson (“Paterson”) each seek limited

reconsideration of rulings issued in the Court’s February 26, 2025 summary judgment

Opinion and Order (“SJ Opinion”). Kelley ECF No, 292, Lee ECF No, 262 (Plaintiffs’

Motions); Kelley No. 296, Lee ECF No. 266 (Reid Motion); Kelley ECF No. 298, Lee ECF

No. 268 (Paterson Motion). The Court decides the motion on the papers without oral

argument. Fed. R. Civ. P, 78(b). After careful consideration of the parties’ submissions,

and for the reasons stated below, the motions for reconsideration are GRANTED IN

PART AND DENIED IN PART.

1. BACKGROUND

The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts of this case and

the prior decisions of the Court, and unless otherwise indicated, all facts originate from the

SJ Opinion, Briefly, the Court summarizes the key facts relevant to the instant motions for

reconsideration.

Plaintiffs were incarcerated for 24 years for the July 28, 1993 robbery of Victoria’s

Video in Paterson, New Jersey and murder of the store clerk, Tito Dante Merino—crimes

that they contend they did not commit, After DNA testing in 2014 proved that the

distinctive green plaid baseball hat left at the crime scene was owned by Eric Dixon,

Plaintiffs moved for a new trial. The state court granted that application but specifically

noted that its decision was “in no way, shape, or form” a finding as to Plaintiffs’ innocence,

which would still need to be determined by a jury. Thereafter, the State dismissed the

indictments and did not retry Plaintiffs. In September 2019, Plaintiffs each filed separate

lawsuits against Paterson and members of the Paterson Police Department in their

individual capacities, raising various civil rights and related claims.

On February 26, 2025, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’

motions for summary judgment. Before the Court are four separate motions for

reconsideration of claims against Detectives Alex Nieves, Richard Reyes, Peter Iurato, and

Sergeants Raymond Reid, Louis Stell:!

1, Mr. Kelley’s motion to reconsider and reinstate the fabricated confession claims

against Reyes and Stell (Count I); the deliberate deception claims against Reyes and

Reid (Count D; and malicious prosecution and state law claims against Reid (Counts

I, VHI, EX, X, and XII);

2. Mr. Lee’s motion to reconsider and reinstate the malicious prosecution claim (Count

I) and other state law claims against Iurato (Counts III, IV, VIL, [X, X, XID); the

fabricated confession claim against Reyes, Stell, Nieves, and Iurato (Count ID; and

the deliberate deception claims against Reyes and Reid (Count I}; and malicious

Stell passed away on March 20, 2024. His estate was substituted as a party on August 26, 2025. Kelley ECF No.

307; Lee ECF No. 277.

prosecution and state claims against Reid (Counts I, VIII, IX, X, and XII);

3, Reid’s motion to reconsider and grant dismissal of the remaining claims against him

(Counts IV, VI, and X1);

4, Paterson’s motion to reconsider and grant dismissal of all claims (Counts VI, X, XI,

and XII).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Local Civil Rule 7.1) governs motions for reconsideration and requires a movant

to set forth “the matter or controlling decisions which the party believes the Judge has

overlooked.” L. Civ. R. 7.1@). “[A] judgment may be altered or amended if the party

seeking reconsideration shows at least one of the following grounds: (1) an intervening

change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available

when the court [made its decision]; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or

to prevent manifest injustice.” Max ’s Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176

F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). Manifest injustice can occur when a matter is “overlooked,”

meaning that the Court did not consider “some dispositive factual or legal matter that was

presented to it.” Rich v. State, 294 F, Supp. 3d 266, 272-73 (D.N.J. 2018). Manifest

injustice can also occur if the Court made a “direct, obvious, and observable” error, Haines

v. United States, No, 22-cv-07461, 2023 WL 2540426, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 15, 2023).

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTIONS

In their motions, Plaintiffs raise three bases for reconsideration. First, Plaintiffs

argue that the Court overlooked dispositive facts and Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273 (3d

Cir. 2014). Plaintiffs also argue that qualified immunity cannot be granted to defendants in

fabricated-confession cases. Second, Plaintiffs argue that the Court misconstrued their

deliberate deception claim as a failure-to-disclose claim under Brady v. Maryland, 373 US.

83 (1963), rather than a deliberate-deception claim under Dennis v. City of Philadelphia,

19 4th 279 (3d Cir, 2021), Third, Mr. Lee argues that the Court improperly granted Iurato

summary judgment by overlooking facts pointing to his involvement in Mr. Lee’s

prosecution.

A. Fabrication Claims

Mr. Kelley seeks to reinstate his fabrication claim (Count I) against Reyes and Stell.

Mt. Lee seeks to reinstate his fabrication claim (Count II) against Reyes, Stell, Nieves, and

Iurato. At issue is whether Plaintiffs met their burden at summary judgment to show

genuine issues of material fact as to whether “the defendant offered false evidence

knowingly, willfully, or with reckless disregard for the truth.” Hicks v. City of Phila., No.

22-cv-00977, 2025 WL 1448205, at *10 (E.D, Pa. May 20, 2025) (citing Halsey v. Pfeiffer,

750 F.3d 273, 294-95 (3d Cir. 2014) (emphasis added); Mervilus v. Union Cnty., 73 F Ath

185, 194-95 (3d Cir. 2023)). Given that Reyes, Stell, Nieves, and Iurato participated in

creating the confessions that contained nonpublic and inaccurate information and viewing

that and other evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court assumed on

summary judgment that the confessions were false. See SJ Op. 15. Nevertheless, the Court

granted summary judgment finding that Plaintiffs did not offer “persuasive evidence” of

“bad faith.” Mervilus, 73 F.4th at 194-95; Halsey, 750 F.3d at 295 (highlighting that

fabricated evidence must have been offered in bad faith and warning that “it will be an

unusual case in which a police officer cannot obtain a summary judgment in a civil action

charging him with having fabricated evidence used in an earlier criminal case.””). Although

the confession in Halsey also contained inaccurate and nonpublic information, Halsey did

not dictate a different result because the question of whether the confession was knowingly

fabricated was not at issue in that case.

However, the Third Circuit’s recent decision in Evans v. Newark City, — F.4th □□

No. 23-1723, 2025 WL 2628093 (3d Cir. Sept. 12, 2025) is instructive as to what factual

allegations and inferences support a finding of intent. In Evans, the court affirmed the

denial of summary judgment on a malicious prosecution claim, reasoning that if a jury

credits testimony that the coerced confession was false, the repeated denials of knowledge

or involvement in the murders and insistence that the fabricated story was a lie was

exculpatory evidence. Evans, 2025 WL 2628093, at *5. The omission of such evidence

from the affidavit of probable cause by officers who were present during the alleged

confession and repeated denials of knowledge was enough for the court to find that a

reasonable jury could conclude that the officers acted with reckless disregard for the truth

or even with malice. Id.

Guided by Evans’ inference of intent based on such facts, the Court concludes that

reconsideration is warranted here. Assuming that Plaintiffs’ confessions were fabricated, a

reasonable jury could believe that Reyes, Stell, Nieves, and Iurato, who were present during

the alleged fabrications, typed up the confessions, signed as witnesses, or ensured that Mr.

Kelley and Mr. Lee’s confessions essentially matched each other, acted knowingly and

deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth. See id. Accordingly, given the genuine

issues of material fact as to whether Reyes, Steil, Nieves, and Iurato violated Plaintiffs’

constitutional right to due process, those defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity

on the fabrication claims. Mr. Kelley’s motion to reinstate Count I against Reyes and Stell

and Mr, Lee’s motion to reinstate Count IT against Reyes, Stell, Nieves, and Iurato are

GRANTED.

B. Deliberate Deception Claims

Next, Plaintiffs move for reconsideration to reinstate their deliberate deception

claims (Kelley Count Lee Count ID) against Reyes and Reid on the grounds that the Court

previously misconstrued their deliberate deception claim as a claim under Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). A Brady claim is the contention that a defendant’s “due

process rights were violated by the failure to disclose exculpatory or impeachment

evidence to the defense.” Dennis, 19 F.4th at 291. Instead, a deliberate deception claim

“must go beyond the failure to disclose evidence and arises when imprisonment results

from the knowing use of false testimony or other fabricated evidence or from concealing

evidence to create false testimony to secure a conviction.” /d. (emphasis in original).

Because the fabrication claim is reinstated against Reyes, the jury could find that

imprisonment resulted from Reyes’ knowing use of false testimony, Reconsideration and

reinstatement of the deliberate deception claim against Reyes in Count I of Mr. Kelley’s

Complaint and Count Il of Mr. Lee’s Complaint is GRANTED.

In contrast, Plaintiffs present no facts upon which a jury could conclude that Reid,

as Reyes’ supervisor, knowingly used false testimony to secure a conviction. Reinstatement

of the deliberate deception claim against Reid in Count I of Mr. Kelley’s Complaint and

Count II of Mr. Lee’s Compiaint is DENIED. Hence Plaintiffs’ request that upon

reinstatement of the deliberate deception claims against Reid, Counts U1, VUI (malicious

prosecution), [X, X, and XII (state law claims) in Mr. Kelley’s Complaint and Counts I and

(malicious prosecution claims), TX, X, and XJI (state law claims) in Mr. Lee’s

Complaint be reinstated against Reid is also DENIED.

C. Malicious Prosecution Claim

Lastly, Mr. Lee argues that the Court improperly granted summary judgment to

Iurato on his malicious proseculion claim (Count I). A Fourth Amendment malicious

prosecution contains five elements: (1) a defendant initiated a criminal proceeding against

the plaintiff; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in the plaintiff's favor; (3) the defendant

initiated the proceeding without probable cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for

a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered

deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal

proceeding. Johnson vy. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 82 3d Cir. 2007). The Court granted summary

judgment to Turato on Mr. Lee’s malicious prosecution claim due to insufficient evidence

to support a finding that Iurato influenced or participated in the decision to institute

criminal proceedings without probable cause. SJ Op. 17-18.

In light of the Court’s decision to reinstate the fabrication claim against Turato,

genuine issues of material fact necessarily exist as to whether Jurato’s participation in the

initiation of Mr. Lee’s criminal proceedings was without probable cause. See Evans, 2025

WL 2628093 at *5. Thus, Mr. Lee’s motion for reconsideration to reinstate the malicious

prosecution claim against Iurato is GRANTED. Counts I and VIII? of Mr. Lee’s Complaint

against Iurato are reinstated. Accordingly, Mr. Lee’s request to reinstate Counts IV (civil

conspiracy) and Counts TX, X, and XII (state law claims) against Turato, which were

initially dismissed because no claims against him remained, is also GRANTED. Mr. Lee’s

unexplained contention that reinstatement of the malicious prosecution claim against Iurato

also requires reinstatement of Count IIE (coercion) is DENTED.

? Mr. Lee asks that upon reinstatement of Count I (malicious prosecution) against Jurato, Count VI (municipal liability

against Paterson) be reinstated, Lee Br, 15, Since Count VII was never dismissed, the Court assumes that this is a

typographical error and that Mr, Lee means to ask for reinstatement of Count VIII (state law malicious prosecution).

IV. RETD’S MOTION

Defendant Raymond Reid moves for reconsideration on three grounds. First, Reid

argues that the record is “devoid of any material facts which could lead a jury to believe

either that Defendant Reid acted recklessly and with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs’

constitutional rights, or that Defendant Reid was acting in a supervisory fashion in the

investigation at hand.” Reid Mot. 10. Second, Reid argues that because the Court granted

qualified immunity as to some of the claims against him, qualified immunity further

protects his actions as to the remaining claims. Reid Mot. 10-11. Third, Reid suggests that

Defendant Stell’s untimely passing is a material change in the factual landscape, such that

a verdict against Reid “would effectively impose liability on him for actions he neither

directed nor controlled.” Mot. 13.

A. — Reid’s Supervisory and Civil Rights Conspiracy Liability

At the onset, Reid’s entire argument is an impermissible attempt to take another bite

at the apple. In essence, Reid quibbles with the proposition that a jury could reasonably

determine that his role as a “step on co-defendant Reyes’ administrative ladder to

submitting a report” would support supervisory or civil conspiracy liability. Reid Mot. 8.

Reid also complains that “the Court has failed to establish that Defendant Reid was a

supervisor.” fd. 7, But that is not the Court’s role at summary judgment. See Anderson vy.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S, 242, 256 (1986) (establishing that “[t]he movant has the

burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of fact” (emphasis added)). Instead, the

Court evaluates whether there exists record evidence from which a juror could conclude

that Reid acted recklessly or with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

SJ Op, 21; see, e.g., A.M ex rel. JMLK. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juv. Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586

(3d Cir, 2004) (reversing grant of summary judgment on a supervisory liability claim where

the plaintiff presented sufficient record evidence in the form of notice to the supervisor and

the supervisor’s failure to act); Nudleman v. Borough of Dickson City Police Dep’t, No.

3:05-cv-01362, 2007 WL 3275259, at *14 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2007) (denying summary

judgment due to record evidence pointing to both the supervisor’s personal involvement as

well as his awareness of disputes about improper procedures).

As the Court noted in the SJ Opinion, Plaintiffs identify several facts, which Reid

conveniently omitted in his brief, that further undergird the basis for supervisory liability:

Reid’s awareness and dismissal of James Thompson’s eyewitness report as it relates to

negligent supervision; Reid’s role in reviewing investigative reports; and Reid’s

handwritten notes identifying concerns about the evidence. SJ Op. 21-22; Reid Opp. 5-10,

Kelly ECF No. 301, Lee ECF No. 270. Since these issues would be sufficient to allow a

“rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,” the Court properly denied summary

judgment. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587

(1986).

B. Qualified Lmmunity

Next, Reid argues that because the Court granted summary judgment on some

counts against him, all of Reid’s acts were protected by qualified immunity, Reid Mot, 10-

12. That is not how qualified immunity works. Qualified immunity is determined on a

claim-by-claim basis, See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 312 (1999) (explaining that

qualified immunity “is a right to immunity from certain claims, not from litigation in

general” (emphasis in original)). A defendant who has qualified immunity for one claim

does not necessarily have qualified immunity for other claims, even when those claims

involve overlapping facts, because the legal standards applicable to each substantive

violation may differ. See, e.g., Hicks v. City of Phila., 2025 WL 1448205, at *8-9, 14 (E.D.

Pa, May 20, 2025) (granting qualified immunity as to a Brady claim but denying qualified

immunity as to a Dennis claim predicated on the same conduct and declining to adopt a

“conduct-centric” theory of qualified immunity). For example, not every right is clearly

established at the same time, even when both rights protect against the same conduct by

the officer. See Thomas vy, City of Phila., 290 F. Supp. 3d 371, 382-83 (E.D. Pa, 2018) (“It

would be strange to say that right X is clearly established just because right Y is clearly

established and happens to prohibitthe same conduct.”), On this basis alone,

reconsideration is improper because Reid’s legal rationale is defective. Furthermore,

summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is improper because there are genuine

issues of material fact as to whether Reid was deliberately indifferent to the “red flags”

identified by his subordinate officers. SJ Op. 21-22; see Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d

120, 142 n.15 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Because there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether [the

supervisor] was deliberately indifferent, she has not carried her burden to establish that she

is entitled to such immunity.”).

Cc, Defendant Stell’s Death

Finally, Reid argues that Stell’s death is a factual development requiring

reconsideration. Reid claims that the “death of the actual investigative supervisor

materially alters the factual context” and “would effectively impose liability on him for

actions he neither directed nor controlled.” Reid Mot. 13. Where a motion to reconsider is

based on new evidence, (1) the evidence must be material, (2) the exercise of reasonable

diligence must not have discovered the evidence, and (3) the evidence must be outcome-

determinative. Brown vy. Mace-Liebson, 779 F. App’x 136, 142 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing

Coregis Ins. Co. v. Baratta & Fenerty, Ltd., 264 F.3d 302, 309-10 (3d Cir. 2001)). Reid

failed to show that Stell’s death is material or outcome determinative, especially since

Stell’s death does not impact any of the evidence of Reid’s own misconduct. SJ Op. 7, 21-

22; see Phoenix Canada Oil Co. v, Texaco, inc., 842 F.2d 1466, 1475 (3d Cir, 1988)

(affirming denial of motion to reconsider where the new evidence was immaterial).

Similarly, Reid fails to identify any reason why a limiting instruction to the jury would not

resolve any confusion, See Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779, 818 (2024) (Alito, J.,

concurring) (noting “only one situation in which a limiting instruction is insufficient,”

which involves extrajudicial, incriminating statements of a non-testifying criminal

codefendant). Accordingly, Steli’s passing does not require reconsideration.

After evaluating all of Defendant Reid’s arguments, the Court DENIES Reid’s

motion for reconsideration.

PATERSON’S MOTION

Paterson brings two bases for reconsideration. First, Paterson argues that the Court

improperly considered newspaper articles discussing the Paterson Police Department’s

culture of impunity, without which there would be no genuine dispute of material fact as

to the Monell, New Jersey Civil Rights Act, and negligent supervision claims. Paterson

Mot. 5. Second, Paterson argues that the Court improperly imputed liability for state-law

negligence or gross negligence claims to it under a respondeat superior theory, Id. 6-7.

A. The Court’s Consideration of Newspaper Articles

Paterson argues that manifest injustice will result from the Court’s consideration of

newspaper articles under the residual hearsay exception, Fed. R. Evid. 807. Jd. 5. Paterson

disagrees with the Court’s invocation of Thomas v. City of Phila., No. 17-cv-04196, 2019

WL 4039575 (ELD, Pa, Aug. 27, 2019). fd. 3-4. In Thomas, the court referenced newspaper

articles in light of other evidence, including an expert opinion. Thomas, 2019 WL 4039575,

at *19. According to Paterson, absent the Court’s consideration of newspaper articles,

“there are no other links to make a chain referenced by the Thomas Court” supporting a

culture of impunity at the Paterson Police Department. Paterson Mot. 5. As the Court

explains below, this argument does not meet the high bar for reconsideration.

At the onset, the SJ Opinion fully discusses arguments for and against considering

the newspaper articles, so the issue was not overlooked. See SJ Op, 27-28. By requesting

“the Court revisit the doctrines’ application to the facts here,” Paterson Mot. 3, Paterson is

merely “advancfing] the same arguments” it raised—and the Court considered—in the SJ

Opinion, Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010). Paterson. effectively

concedes that it wants another bite at the apple, stating that “the City does not dispute the

findings or reasoning of the Thomas Court, or the existence of F.R.C.P. [sic] 807,” as well

as the “precedent in this Circuit” for considering newspaper articles at summary judgment.

Paterson Mot. 1, 3. Apart from disagreeing with the Court’s invocation of Thomas,

Paterson fails to identify any “indisputable” error barring the Court’s invocation of the

residual exception, See, e.g., Teri Woods Pub., L.L.C. v. Williams, No. 12-cv-04854, 2013

WL 6388560, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2013) (holding that reconsideration was unwarranted

when the party that originally prevailed “raise[d] colorable arguments”).

Moreover, the Court’s reliance on Thomas v. City of Philadelphia is not a clear error

of law. Paterson claims that because Plaintiffs did not rely on an expert supporting the

existence ofa culture of impunity, unlike in Thomas, there was an insufficient basis for the

Court to consider the newspaper articles. Paterson Mot. 3-5. However, Thomas did not hold

that expert testimony was necessary—only that the court could consider newspaper articles

in light of “other evidence presented,” which can (but does not have to) include expert

opinions, Thomas, 2019 WL 4039575, at *19. The “general rule” remains that “expert

testimony not only is unnecessary but indeed may properly be excluded in the discretion

of the trial judge,” particularly where the jury is “as capable of comprehending the primary

facts and of drawing correct conclusions from them as are witnesses possessed of special

or peculiar training, experience, or observation in respect of the subject under

investigation.” Salem v. U.S. Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35 (1962); see also Padillas v. Stork-

Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412, 445-16 3d Cir. 1999) (affirming a denial of summary judgment

on this basis), Additionally, the existence of other sufficient record evidence is an

independent basis for denying summary judgment to Paterson, particularly when viewed

in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs as non-movants. SJ Op. 24-26 (identifying only

“[rlepresentative examples” of deposition testimony, including of defendants in this case,

alongside declarations); see Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc)

(stating that the Third Circuit “may affirm the District Court on any grounds supported by

the record”)?

Since there is legal support for the Court’s decision, Paterson’s motion for

reconsideration is DENIED as to all claims resting on the consideration of newspaper

articles.*

B. Respondeat Superior Liability for State-Law Negligence Claims

Paterson failed to meet its burden to show manifest injustice resulted from the

Court’s denial of summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ negligence-based state law claims. As

its only basis for reconsideration of this holding, Paterson asserts that “no matter what

version of facts are at issue in the record . . . the issues are not material.” Paterson Mot. 6,

But the Court previously considered arguments and record evidence as to Plaintiffs’

negligence claims and concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact precluding

summary judgment. SJ Op. 23-27 (discussing a litany of facts supporting Plaintiffs’ claims

that Paterson acted negligently, or grossly so, in failing to address the Paterson Police

Department’s culture of impunity); id. 31-32 (rejecting Defendants’ arguments). There is

ample legal support for declining summary judgment in negligence cases based on issues

of material fact, and Paterson failed to meet its burden to identify any binding case law to

the contrary, See, e¢.g., Ward y. Barnes, 545 F. Supp. 2d 400, 420-21 (D.N.J. 2008) (denying

summary judgment to state entities based on respondeat superior liability for a negligence

claim); Hayward y. Salem City Bd. of Educ., No. 14~cv-05200, 2016 WL 4744132, at *13

(D.NJ. Sept. 12, 2016) (denying summary judgment to the city based on respondeat

superior where claims against the individual defendant survived), Because Paterson is

impermissibly attempting “a second bite at the apple.” Gundell v. Sleepy’s, LLC, No. 15-

ev-07365, 2023 WL 3983872, at *2 (D.N.J. June 13, 2023), its motion for reconsideration

is DENIED as to the state-law negligence claims,

3 ‘The Court properly exercised its discretion in considering Plaintiffs’ affidavits, notwithstanding that the identity of

the affiants was previously unknown to Defendants, See, e.g., Newman v, GHS Osteopathic, Inc., 60 F.3d 153, 156

(3d Cir. 1995) (finding no abuse of discretion where the district court considered testimony notwithstanding the party’s

failure to disclose the witnesses’ identities because such failure was harmless and not in bad faith).

* The Court did not admit the newspaper articles in the SJ Opinion, and it reserves decision on the admission of all

evidence until the appropriate moment.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs’ motions for reconsideration ate

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Reconsideration and reinstatement is

GRANTED as to: 1) Plaintiffs’ fabricated confession claims against Reyes, Stell, Nieves,

and Turato; 2) Plaintiffs’ deliberate deception claims against Reyes; 3) Mr. Lee’s malicious

prosecution, civil conspiracy, and state law claims against [urato. Reconsideration is

DENIED as to: 1) Plaintiffs’ motions to reinstate the deliberate deception, malicious

prosecution, and state law claims against Reid; 2) Mr. Lee’s motion to reinstate the

coercion claim against Iurato; 2) Reid’s motion for reconsideration; 3) Paterson’s motion

for reconsideration. An appropriate order follows.

ILLIAM J. WARTINE, U.S.D.J.

DATE: October 4. 2025