Patricia Bullock-Pierce v. Cabria Davis

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1774-24

PATRICIA BULLOCK-PIERCE

and CARL PIERCE, SR.,

Administrators Ad Prosequendum

and General Administrators of the

ESTATE OF CHRISTINE PIERCE,

Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v.

CABRIA DAVIS,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

CAMDEN COUNTY,

CAMDEN COUNTY POLICE

DEPARTMENT, and KACHEIM

DAVIS,

Defendants.

______________________________

Argued September 25, 2025 – Decided October 2, 2025

Before Judges Mawla and Puglisi.

On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior

Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County,

Docket No. L-0238-23.

William F. Cook argued the cause for appellant (Brown

& Connery, LLP, attorneys; William F. Cook, on the

briefs).

Anthony Granato argued the cause for respondents

(Jarve Granato Starr, LLC, attorneys; Anthony

Granato, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Sergeant1 Cabria Davis, appeals from a January 17, 2025 Law

Division order denying her motion for summary judgment on claims brought by

plaintiffs Patricia Bullock-Pierce and Carl Pierce, Sr., Administrators Ad

Prosequendum and General Administrators of the Estate of Christine Pierce. We

reverse for the reasons expressed in this opinion.

On January 30, 2021, in the mid-afternoon, Sergeant Davis was on patrol

when she observed Christine Pierce standing outside of a home on Haddon

Avenue in Camden. The sergeant stopped her vehicle and approached Pierce.

Two more officers arrived at the scene about three minutes later.

1

Since the incident, the sergeant has been promoted to lieutenant. For purposes

of this opinion, we refer to her by the rank she held at the time of the incident

to avoid confusion. We intend no disrespect.

A-1774-24

2

The sergeant's body-worn camera captured her encounter with Pierce, who

was upset, crying, and yelling, as she banged on the front door of her house.

Pierce was wearing only a bathrobe and slippers, and the weather was freezing

cold. She told Sergeant Davis that after a verbal altercation with her boyfriend,

he pushed her in her chest "out [of] the house," onto the floor of the front porch,

and locked her outside. Pierce said her father had a spare key to the home, so

Sergeant Davis called the father, but no one answered.

Sergeant Davis and Pierce knocked on the front door to the residence

several times before the boyfriend answered the door. The sergeant asked the

boyfriend to step outside to talk and provide identification, however, he

remained in the doorway.

Approximately a minute later, Pierce's father called back, so Sergeant

Davis stepped away and explained the situation to him. Pierce's father advised

the sergeant this "always happens."

The boyfriend asked if he was being arrested as he continued to stand in

the doorway. Sergeant Davis assured him that he was not being arrested. He

then said he would go to his mother's house and proceeded to retreat further into

the home. Sergeant Davis requested that he come outside, told him he would

not be arrested, and then he finally stepped out onto the front porch.

A-1774-24

3

Sergeant Davis and Pierce then entered the house to speak, while other

officers spoke with the boyfriend outside. The sergeant asked Pierce if she

wanted to file any charges. Pierce declined. She then asked if Pierce was injured

or had any pain, and Pierce said no.

Sergeant Davis advised Pierce of her rights under the Prevention of

Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. She also advised

her the incident would be documented. Pierce then said Sergeant Davis could

"just leave." Sergeant Davis asked Pierce again if she would like to seek a

restraining order or press criminal charges, but Pierce declined. The sergeant

requested Pierce's personal information and told her she would provide her with

a case number.

After speaking with Pierce, Sergeant Davis joined the other two officers

and the boyfriend outside the residence. The sergeant and the other officers

repeatedly requested the boyfriend's name. Pierce eventually provided it after

the boyfriend refused to cooperate.

The boyfriend and Pierce re-entered the alcove of the home. The sergeant

told the other officers that she would wait in her patrol car for a few minutes to

see that the boyfriend did not "push her out the door again." While in her patrol

car, Sergeant Davis conducted a computer search. She then drove down the

A-1774-24

4

road, pulled over, and continued her search. According to her body-worn

camera, the entire interaction lasted approximately thirty-three minutes.

Sergeant Davis continued her research and directed the other two officers

to contact Camden County Police Department's (CCPD) Realtime Tactical

Operation Intelligence Center to determine whether there were any prior calls

or other information involving Pierce and her boyfriend. She also reviewed

CCPD's domestic violence policies on her computer.

Sergeant Davis learned there were approximately four prior calls for

service to the residence. However, there were no charges, active warrants for

the boyfriend, or restraining orders in place between him and Pierce.

Sergeant Davis returned to speak with Pierce. This encounter was

captured on a second body-worn camera video. Before exiting the vehicle, the

sergeant reviewed CCPD's domestic violence training module on her computer.

The sergeant then exited the vehicle and asked Pierce whether the

boyfriend left. Pierce confirmed he was gone. She asked how many times the

police had been involved with the couple, and Pierce replied, "two or three."

Sergeant Davis then stated that because of the number of times the police were

called, the officers must do their "due diligence" to protect Pierce and explained

CCPD policy and procedure may require the police to act. The sergeant said she

A-1774-24

5

wanted to ensure Pierce was given every possible option to seek help, which

Pierce responded she had.

Sergeant Davis asked Pierce whether: the boyfriend had ever threatened

her; they had children in common; or he abused alcohol or drugs. Pierce replied

"no" to each question. The sergeant then asked, "You're just choosing not to

cooperate any further?" Pierce replied "nope."

Sergeant Davis reminded Pierce that she had been given a case number

and advised her of her right to file criminal charges and seek a restraining order

under the PDVA. The sergeant again confirmed Pierce did not wish to proceed

in either regard. Pierce again confirmed she was not injured, had no complaints

of pain, and did not wish to speak with a detective.

Nonetheless, after Pierce shut the front door, Sergeant Davis told another

officer to contact a detective due to the number of times CCPD had previously

been called to the residence. A detective would need to determine whether

further follow-up was required.

Despite what Pierce said, the officers suspected the boyfriend had not left

the residence. However, Sergeant Davis advised they could not enter the

residence to search for him because Pierce said she was no longer in danger.

A-1774-24

6

That evening, CCPD returned to the residence in response to a call about

a fire alarm. Camden City Fire Department also responded and tragically found

Pierce inside the home, face down on the floor, with a stab wound on her back.

Pierce was transported to the hospital and later pronounced dead. The boyfriend

was subsequently prosecuted and pled guilty to manslaughter.

The Camden County Prosecutor's Office and the CCPD's Professional

Standards Bureau reviewed the police response. The prosecutor's office

concluded the CCPD officers' actions were appropriate because Pierce was

advised of her rights, she declined to pursue a restraining order or criminal

charges, and she did not have any visible signs or complaints of injury. The

Professional Standards Bureau concluded there was not "sufficient evidence to

prove any allegation of criminal conduct against these officers beyond a

reasonable doubt."

Plaintiffs filed a seven-count complaint in the Law Division. Relevant to

this appeal, the complaint asserted counts against Sergeant Davis for negligence

and violation of Pierce's right to due process under the New Jersey Civil Rights

Act (NJCRA), N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2.

Sergeant Davis moved for summary judgment, arguing she had immunity

under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 14-4. She

A-1774-24

7

pointed out Pierce "was adamant that she did not wish to pursue anything."

Although Sergeant Davis made multiple inquiries, Pierce "wanted nothing

further to do with" the police. The sergeant saw no signs of injury, and because

there was no probable cause to arrest, the sergeant had absolute immunity.

Further, there was no civil rights violation because no one was taken into

custody and "there were no affirmative acts of law enforcement that put [Pierce]

in a position that . . . she would not have otherwise been."

Plaintiffs argued there was liability because the facts showed Pierce and

the boyfriend had a history of violent interactions, which Pierce's father

corroborated. Sergeant Davis did not separate the couple, even though there was

evidence the boyfriend had committed simple assault because Pierce was crying,

said she had been pushed, and was standing in the cold in her sleepwear.

Plaintiffs alleged the PDVA mandated the boyfriend's arrest and the filing of a

criminal complaint. Yet when the sergeant returned to her car, she failed to

search the parties' history or administer an assault assessment form on either

Pierce or the boyfriend. Plaintiffs claimed the Legislature could not have

mandated arrest under the PDVA and, at the same time, granted police immunity

for not upholding the PDVA.

A-1774-24

8

Plaintiffs asserted the civil rights violations were apparent because police

established a special relationship through their interactions with Pierce, but did

not protect her, thereby creating a danger. Given the disputes in fact on these

issues, the judge could not grant summary judgment.

Relying on Campbell v. Campbell, 294 N.J. Super. 18 (Law Div. 1996),

the motion judge concluded there was a conflict between the TCA's immunity

provisions and the PDVA's requirement that police "shall arrest" a perpetrator

of domestic violence. Whether there was negligence was a material issue of fact

that only a jury could decide. The judge denied summary judgment on the

negligence and civil rights claims for failure to protect for the same reasons. We

subsequently granted Sergeant Davis leave to appeal.

I.

A summary judgment ruling is reviewed de novo, applying the same legal

standard as the trial court. Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 59 (2015). We

"review the competent evidential materials submitted by the parties to identify

whether there are genuine issues of material fact and, if not, whether the moving

party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law." Bhagat v. Bhagat,

217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014) (citing Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J.

520, 540 (1995)); R. 4:46-2(c). If "only a legal issue is involved in the absence

A-1774-24

9

of a genuine factual dispute, that standard is de novo, and the trial court rulings

'are not entitled to any special deference.'" Henry v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs.,

204 N.J. 320, 330 (2010) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of

Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).

II.

A.

Sergeant Davis contends the TCA provides absolute immunity for an

officer who fails to arrest notwithstanding the PDVA. She points to S.P. v.

Newark Police Department, 428 N.J. Super. 210, 233 (App. Div. 2012), a case

she cited to the motion judge, in support of the proposition that an officer who

fails to arrest a domestic violence perpetrator who later harms their victim is

entitled to immunity pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:5-5. This statutory provision

clearly states: "Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for injury

caused by the failure to make an arrest or by the failure to retain an arrested

person in custody." N.J.S.A. 59:5-5.

The sergeant argues S.P. also held domestic violence cases do not create

a special relationship exception under the TCA and no such exception exists.

428 N.J. Super. at 233-34. The special relationship exception was created by

Campbell, a non-binding Law Division case that has been rejected by us in

A-1774-24

10

several instances. See S.P., 428 N.J. Super. at 233; Macaluso ex rel. Macaluso

v. Knowles, 341 N.J. Super. 112, 116 (App. Div. 2001); see generally Blunt v.

Klapproth, 309 N.J. Super. 493, 507 (App. Div. 1998) (questioning the

"applicability of the special relationship doctrine to case law" in New Jersey ).

The sergeant asserts the motion judge also did not consider the other TCA

immunities. He did not address N.J.S.A. 59:5-4, which states: "Neither a public

entity nor a public employee is liable for failure to provide police protection

service or, if police protection service is provided, for failure to provide

sufficient police protection service." The judge did not consider N.J.S.A. 59:2-

4, which provides that "[a] public entity is not liable for any injury caused by

adopting or failing to adopt a law or by failing to enforce any law," and N.J.S.A.

59:3-5, which states "[a] public employee is not liable for an injury caused by

his adoption of or failure to adopt any law or by his failure to enforce any law."

Further, N.J.S.A. 59:3-3, which grants a public employee immunity "if [they]

act[] in good faith in the execution or enforcement of any law" applies here as

well because there are no facts indicating the sergeant failed to act in good faith.

B.

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-21 states:

a. When a person claims to be a victim of domestic

violence, and where a law enforcement officer

A-1774-24

11

responding to the incident finds probable cause to

believe that domestic violence has occurred, the law

enforcement officer shall arrest the person who is

alleged to be the person who subjected the victim to

domestic violence and shall sign a criminal complaint

if:

(1) The victim exhibits signs of injury caused by

an act of domestic violence;

(2) A warrant is in effect;

(3) There is probable cause to believe that the

person has violated N.J.S.[A.] 2C:29-9, and there

is probable cause to believe that the person has

been served with the order alleged to have been

violated. If the victim does not have a copy of a

purported order, the officer may verify the

existence of an order with the appropriate law

enforcement agency; or

(4) There is probable cause to believe that a

weapon as defined in N.J.S.[A.] 2C:39-1 has

been involved in the commission of an act of

domestic violence.

Notwithstanding this provision, we have stated the N.J.S.A. 2C:25-21's

mandatory arrest provision does not trump the governmental immunity provided

by N.J.S.A. 59:5-5 under the TCA. Turner v. Twp. of Irvington, 430 N.J. Super.

274, 286 (App. Div. 2013) (citing S.P., 428 N.J. Super. at 230, 232-33). Indeed,

we have unequivocally found "[t]he legislative policies of the TCA and [P]DVA

are compatible." S.P., 428 N.J. Super. at 230.

A-1774-24

12

In S.P., we held

"[w]hen a person claims to be a victim of domestic

violence," and the responding law enforcement officer

"finds probable cause to believe that domestic violence

has occurred," the officer is required to arrest the

alleged perpetrator and sign a criminal complaint if the

victim "exhibits signs of injury caused by an act of

domestic violence[.]"

[428 N.J. Super. at 223 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:25–21(a))

(alterations in original).]

However, "the TCA immunizes public employees for injury that results from

'the exercise of judgment or discretion vested in [them.]'" Id. at 230 (citing

N.J.S.A. 59:3-2(a), N.J.S.A. 59:2-3(a)).

The process of deciding whether a "person is a 'victim of domestic

violence' [or whether] there is probable cause to believe that 'domestic violence,'

has occurred," is discretionary because it requires responding officers to conduct

"significant thoughtful analysis" and deliberate on "a variety of factors." Id. at

231. Where a discretionary decision is required, a public employee is liable

"only for 'palpably unreasonable conduct.'" Gonzalez by Gonzalez v. City of

Jersey City, 247 N.J. 551, 571 (2021) (quoting Henebema v. S. Jersey Transp.

Auth., 219 N.J. 481, 495 (2014)). In S.P., we were unconvinced "the Legislature

intended to make officers [who respond to domestic violence calls] civilly liable

for the victim's subsequent injury if, within their judgment, she was not entitled

A-1774-24

13

to the protections of the PDVA." 428 N.J. Super. at 233. Thus, we concluded

the officers in S.P. were entitled to absolute immunity. Ibid.

The facts here demonstrate Sergeant Davis's determination that the PDVA

did not mandate the arrest of the boyfriend was a proper exercise of discretion

that is entitled to absolute immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:3-2(a), N.J.S.A. 59:2-

3(a), and N.J.S.A. 59:5-5. The sergeant did not just base her decision on what

Pierce told her, but on an objective assessment of whether Pierce had been

injured and, independent of injury, whether there was some other basis to arrest

under every subsection of N.J.S.A. 2C:25-21(a). There simply was none.

In addition, as Sergeant Davis correctly points out, the law is well-

established that there is no "special relationship" exception to the TCA created

under the PDVA. See Macaluso, 341 N.J. Super. at 116; Blunt, 309 N.J. Super.

at 507-08; S.P., 428 N.J. Super. at 233-34. Campbell does not control, nor is it

good law. Macaluso, 341 N.J. Super. at 116. For these reasons, based on our

de novo review, we hold the sergeant had absolute immunity.

III.

A.

Sergeant Davis contends the failure to arrest a domestic violence abuser

is not a due process violation. Citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County

A-1774-24

14

Department of Social Services, she asserts due process does not impose an

affirmative duty on the government to protect its citizens. She reiterates the

special relationship and state-created danger exceptions to DeShaney are not

present because here, no one was taken into custody and the failure to arrest

does not constitute affirmative action. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). Pursuant to Town

of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, she argues there are neither substantive nor

procedural due process protections for "the benefit that a third party may receive

from having someone else arrested for a crime." 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005).

Notwithstanding DeShaney and its exceptions, the sergeant asserts she is

entitled to qualified immunity on the due process claims because the record does

not clearly establish her failure to arrest the boyfriend would be unconstitutional

if this action were taken by a similarly situated officer.

B.

The NJCRA was enacted as a state analog to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Perez v.

Zagami, LLC, 218 N.J. 202, 212 (2014), and as such, "the interpretation given

to parallel provisions of [§] 1983 may provide guidance in construing our Civil

Rights Act." Tumpson v. Farina, 218 N.J. 450, 474 (2014). "Given their

similarity, our courts apply § 1983 immunity doctrines to claims arising under

the [NJCRA]." Brown v. State, 442 N.J. Super. 406, 425 (App. Div. 2015), rev'd

A-1774-24

15

on other grounds, 230 N.J. 84 (2017); see also Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J.

72, 113-16 (2014) (discussing the qualified immunity doctrine).

DeShaney held "the Due Process Clause does not 'requir[e] the State to

protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private

actors.'" Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 755 (alteration in original) (quoting

DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195). Therefore, for Pierce's claim to be actionable, an

exception must apply.

The special relationship exception exists when "the State takes a person

into its custody and holds [them] there against [their] will." DeShaney, 489 U.S.

at 199-200. The facts readily establish that did not happen here.

The state-created danger exception to DeShaney requires plaintiffs to

show "the state's own actions create[d] the very danger that causes the plaintiff's

injury." Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 167 (3d Cir. 2013). "Affirmative

conduct on the part of the [d]efendant[ is required] to support the . . .

exception . . . ." Ibid. Our de novo review of the record does not convince us

Sergeant Davis either failed to meet the proper policing standards under the

PDVA or that her conduct created the very danger that caused Pierce's death.

In Castle Rock, the Court held "the benefit that a third party may receive

from having someone else arrested for a crime generally does not trigger

A-1774-24

16

protections under the Due Process Clause, neither in its procedural nor in its

'substantive' manifestations." 545 U.S. at 768 ("[R]espondent did not, for

purposes of the Due Process Clause, have a property interest in police

enforcement of the restraining order against her husband."). For these reasons,

the failure to arrest the boyfriend here did not trigger due process protections.

Finally, qualified immunity is a doctrine which shields government

officials from civil liability when "their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Immunity from

suit is the right to avoid the rigors and costs of trial. Gormley, 218 N.J. at 113.

Procedurally, "[w]hether an official is covered by qualified immunity is a

matter of law to be decided by a court, 'preferably on a properly supported

motion for summary judgment or dismissal.'" Ibid. (quoting Wildoner v.

Borough of Ramsey, 162 N.J. 375, 387 (2000)). Substantively, "[q]ualified

immunity balances two important interests – the need to hold public officials

accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield

officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their

duties reasonably." Ibid. (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231

(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

A-1774-24

17

The doctrine of qualified immunity "shield[s] 'government officials

performing discretionary functions generally . . . from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Morillo

v. Torres, 222 N.J. 104, 116 (2015) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818). Gormley

observed that "[f]or a right to be clearly established, '[t]he contours of the right

must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what

[they are] doing violates that right.'" 218 N.J. at 113 (quoting Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)) (second alteration in original).

The motion judge did not address the qualified immunity issue.

Regardless, as we have recounted, our de novo review of the record reveals no

evidence that Sergeant Davis irresponsibly exercised her authority or violated

any clearly established right. As a result, she was entitled to qualified immunity,

and summary judgment should have been granted in her favor on the due process

claim.

Reversed. We do not retain jurisdiction.

A-1774-24

18